Thomas Edward Chapman v. Yellow Cab Cooperative and Ali Mohamed

Dennis Edwards owns a taxicab

in Milwaukee. Yellow Cab Cooperative refers business

to his cab; other arrangements between Edwards and Yellow

Cab are not in the record. Edwards leased the cab to Parashu

Giri, who subleased some of the time to Thomas Chapman.

Apparently Giri and Chapman shared the cab so that it

could be in service much of the day. Chapman received fares

2 No. 17-1758

and tips from passengers, paid rent to Giri, and kept the difference;

he did not pay anything to Yellow Cab or receive

anything from it.

Chapman contends in this suit under the Fair Labor

Standards Act that this arrangement makes him an “employee”

of Yellow Cab. He alleges that, after he complained

about not receiving the minimum wage, Ali Mohamed, the

President of Yellow Cab, told Giri that Chapman was “fired”

(in other words, would not be dispatched to passengers who

called Yellow Cab seeking a ride). Giri then terminated the

sublease. Chapman submits that Mohamed’s action violates

the Act’s antiretaliation clause, 29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3).

District Judge Randa dismissed all of Chapman’s other

theories and directed him to file a new complaint. 2016 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 23166 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016). The amended

complaint was assigned to Judge Stadtmueller, who concluded

that Chapman “must provide more detailed and

thorough allegations before the claim can be permitted to

proceed.” 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163586 at *8 (E.D. Wis. Nov.

28, 2016). The judge stated that the complaint had not discussed

all of the “factors” identified in Secretary of Labor v.

Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987), as potentially

relevant to the distinction between an employee and an independent

contractor. Because “Chapman’s allegations, even

construed liberally, do not address these factors” (2016 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 163586 at *12), the judge ordered Chapman to file

yet another complaint. The final version was filed and dismissed

with prejudice. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49309 (E.D. Wis.

Mar. 31, 2017). The judge stated that Chapman still had not

addressed all of the factors mentioned in Lauritzen and by

No. 17-1758 3

the Supreme Court in decisions such as Bartels v. Birmingham,

332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).

To the extent the district court demanded that complaints

plead facts—not only facts that bear on the statutory elements

of a claim, but also facts that bear on judicially established

standards—it was mistaken. Ever since their adoption

in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have required

plaintiffs to plead claims rather than facts corresponding to

the elements of a legal theory. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Old

code-pleading and fact-pleading systems were abandoned.

See Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zürich), 953 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.

1992). Because complaints need not identify the applicable

law, see Johnson v. Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014); Skinner v.

Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011), it is manifestly inappropriate

for a district court to demand that complaints contain all

legal elements (or factors) plus facts corresponding to each.

It is enough to plead a plausible claim, after which “a

plaintiff ‘receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the

hypotheses are consistent with the complaint’”. Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) (citation omitted).

A full description of the facts that will prove the plaintiff’s

claim comes later, at the summary-judgment stage or in the

pretrial order. So both the Supreme Court and this court

have held when rejecting contentions that Rule 8 as understood

in Twombly requires fact pleading. See Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89 (2007); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400

(7th Cir. 2010). See also, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534

U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002) (Rule 8 does not call for the pleading

of all facts required to prevail). Twombly cited Swierkiewicz

with approval, see 550 U.S. at 555–56, 563, 569–70. So did

Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 347, and Skinner, 562 U.S. at 530.

4 No. 17-1758

Perhaps the district court meant to do no more than rely

on the plausibility standard of Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009). Chapman’s claim seems implausible because

it does not allege any direct dealings between himself

and Yellow Cab. Instead it alleges that Edwards owns the

taxi, that Edwards leases the taxi to Giri, and that Giri subleased

it to Chapman. Many decisions, of which Callahan v.

Chicago, 813 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016), is an example, hold that

one does not become an “employee” of an entity several

steps removed in a chain of business relations just because

that entity’s decisions may have some effect on income.

Although Chapman’s claim as presented does not seem

plausible, the district court did not reject it on that ground—

and a desire for plausibility would not be enough to require

a complaint to contain facts matching all statutory “elements”

and judicial “factors,” for Twombly and its successors

disparage such demands. Perhaps, however, we should understand

the district court’s order as one under Rule 12(e):

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to

which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.

The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading

and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.

If the court orders a more definite statement and the order

is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within

the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue

any other appropriate order.

Rule 12(e), rather than a judicial demand for fact pleading, is

the right way to ask plaintiffs to lay out details that enable

the defendants to respond intelligently and the court to handle

the litigation effectively. See Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc.

v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2007). GivNo.

17-1758 5

ing the district court the benefit of the doubt, we treat its order

as one under Rule 12(e).

If Chapman had responded to that order with additional

details, and the district court still had dismissed the complaint

for failure to plead facts matching “elements” or “factors,”

we would be obliged to reverse. Rule 12(e) cannot be

used to turn federal civil procedure into a fact-pleading or

code-pleading system. But Chapman did not respond with a

plausible claim. He not only failed to provide additional details

but also insisted that, because Yellow Cab affected or

controlled his driving through the chain of leases starting

with Edwards, then Yellow Cab must be his employer. That

approach, equating regulatory authority with employment,

was rejected in Callahan. By disobeying the district court’s

order, while adding a legal theory, Chapman made his claim

less plausible. Rule 12(e) authorizes the district court to enter

any “appropriate order” when the plaintiff does not comply,

and after Chapman’s multiple failed efforts to frame a plausible

claim the most appropriate order was the one the district

court employed—dismissal with prejudice.

Chapman’s brief on appeal presents new allegations that

make his claim of an employment relation seem stronger.

But the place and time to make those allegations was in the

district court, in response to the judge’s order. A plaintiff

who disobeys an order from a district judge cannot hope to

have his case revived by attempting belated compliance in

the court of appeals.

AFFIRMED