United States v. Muhammad Anwar

A jury convicted Muhammad Anwar of : (1) conspiracy to distribute controlled

substances and controlled substance analogues, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(c), and 846, and (2) conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The district court1 sentenced Anwar to 240 months’

imprisonment on the first count and 60 months on the second count, to run

consecutively, followed by three years of supervised release. Anwar appeals the jury

verdict and his sentence. We affirm.

I. Background

“We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” United

States v. Payne–Owens, 845 F.3d 868, 870 n.2 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States

v. Stevens, 439 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2006)). Anwar agreed with Ahmad Saeed and

another person in 2012 to distribute synthetic cannabinoid products. Anwar and Saeed

knew these products, which contained both controlled substances and controlled

substance analogues, would be sold for human consumption. Anwar also agreed to

distribute synthetic cathinones (“bath salts”), which contained controlled substance

analogues intended for human consumption. The agreement ended about March of

2014. Anwar and Saeed’s main source for the controlled substances was Mohammed

Saleem. Saeed began dealing with Saleem as early as 2009, when Saleem supplied

Saeed with synthetic cannabinoid products. Saeed received and distributed thousands

of bags of synthetic cannabinoid products per week. Anwar became Saeed’s partner

in May 2012, although Saeed remained the sole person to deal with Saleem at the

beginning of the partnership. Anwar and Saeed also obtained synthetic cannabinoid

products from Shakeel Khan.

Beginning in late 2013, Anwar dealt directly with the wholesalers. On at least

five occasions, he purchased approximately $8,000 to $9,000 of synthetic cannabinoid

products at a time, which he received via FedEx. Anwar supplied the synthetic drug

products primarily to convenience stores in the Waterloo, Cedar Rapids, Cambridge,

and Des Moines, Iowa areas. At its peak, Saleem estimated that the Anwar–Saeed

1The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Iowa.

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enterprise sold between $600,000 to $800,000 of products to consumers per month.

Store owners paid Anwar and Saeed by cash, check, or money order. At Anwar and

Saeed’s request, persons paying via check or money order—up to $1,000

each—always left the “pay to” line blank, and they often denoted a “loan” in the

“memo” line. The checks and money orders then could be used much in the same way

as cash.

Anwar’s activities coincided with a national rise in synthetic cannabinoid abuse.

In response, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducted frequent drug

raids targeting both manufacturers and sellers. Not surprisingly, several store owners

returned products to Anwar and Saeed. Anwar addressed at least one store owner’s

concern with assurances that the products were legal; he also gave the store owner a

lab report purporting to prove that the products were legal.2 However, Anwar advised

another store owner to sell only to people he knew and to hide the products behind the

counter from the general public.

In August 2012, the Central Iowa Drug Task Force (CIDTF) began a series of

investigations into synthetic cannabinoid-containing products. CIDTF conducted

controlled buys from a Cambridge convenience store. Laboratory analyses revealed

the presence of XLR-11 and UR-144, both synthetic cannabinoids, in the incense

packages. CIDTF then received and executed a search warrant, which led to the

seizure of numerous packages of synthetic cannabinoid products from the store. Some

of the packages contained labels that read “100% cannabinoid free/DEA compliant.”

The store manager identified Anwar as the supplier of the products. The manager also

informed law enforcement officers that Anwar had also offered him a “bath salt”

product called “Pump It.” A confidential informant (CI) also purchased Pump It at a

2The laboratory reports were not comprehensive. The reports only identified

substances that were not in the products tested and did not state what substances were

actually found in the test product.

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different convenience store in October 2012; this store also received the bath salt from

Anwar or Saeed.

CIDTF conducted three controlled buys in June 2013 at a convenience store and

an adjoining mobile wireless store in Waterloo that Anwar supplied. On two

occasions, the CI purchased synthetic cannabinoid products at both stores, where the

products were stored behind the counter and out of the public view. Laboratory

analyses showed the presence of XLR-11. On the third occasion, the CI purchased

bath salts packaged as “White Angel” and “Blue.” Either Anwar or Saeed supplied

these controlled substances to the stores. Between December 2012 and June 2013,

they delivered synthetic cannabinoid products to the mobile wireless store three times,

each time supplying at least 500 packages of the products.

Law enforcement then executed search warrants at the Waterloo mobile

wireless store, convenience store, and two residences. The search led to seizures of

nearly 2,000 grams of synthetic cannabinoid products and almost 30 grams of bath

salts from the locations. Following the raid, the two store managers temporarily

ceased drug operations but soon resumed sales. Anwar never terminated his drug

wholesale enterprise. CIDTF again conducted control buys at the stores in December

2013 and February 2014. Officers executed a search warrant in March 2014, where

they seized nearly 90 grams of bath salts. The prosecution of this drug operation

resulted in convictions and prison sentences for Earl and Mary Ramos. United States

v. Ramos, 814 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 2016). The Ramoses purchased the synthetic drugs

from Saeed and Anwar. Earl Ramos paid his suppliers with money orders, each up to

$1,000. Ramos’s internal records showed when and to whom the money orders were

paid, but the money orders themselves never identified Anwar as the payee.

In addition to supplying to the convenience stores, Anwar also opened a liquor

store in a Des Moines suburb. From there, he supplied synthetic cannabinoid products

to liquor and convenience stores in the Des Moines area. Anwar hired Erika Romar

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to work at the liquor store. He instructed Romar that each week the liquor store would

receive two large FedEx boxes. He directed her to place the shipment in the back

room, shut the door, and call him immediately. He later told Romar that the boxes

contained synthetic cannabinoid products. Eventually, Anwar assigned Romar the task

of dividing the products into smaller parcels for the customer stores. Anwar then

delivered these parcels to his customers.

After Romar had worked for several months at the liquor store, Anwar

transferred her to a Des Moines mobile wireless store, where she joined her thenboyfriend,

Randy Tyrell.3 Anwar then had the boxes of synthetic cannabinoids

shipped to the wireless store instead of the liquor store, and Romar performed the

same duty as she had previously—receiving the boxes and parsing out the products

to amounts the customers specified. Some of the customers came to the store to pick

up their synthetic cannabinoid orders and paid Romar. Anwar, accompanied by Tyrell,

also delivered to nine or ten other businesses in the surrounding area. At one point,

Anwar traveled to Pakistan; during his time out of the country, Romar called Anwar

to get instructions regarding product deliveries. Anwar also arranged for several

individuals—his wife, his daughters, Romar and Tyrell, and two others—to help

repackage old products that were not selling well into new packages under brand

names that sold well.

In March 2014, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant of the

mobile wireless store. They seized packages that later tested positive for the synthetic

cannabinoids XLR-11, UR-144, PB-22, and AB-FUBINACA. The day after the

search, Anwar told one of his customers that he had 500 “pieces” with illegal

chemicals taken from the wireless store.

3Erika Romar and Randy Tyrell married in 2014.

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In September 2015, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment, charging

Anwar and Saeed with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and controlled

substance analogues and conspiracy to launder money. Saeed pleaded guilty to both

counts. Saeed denied ever selling bath salts. Anwar did not plead guilty, and his case

proceeded to trial. Prior to the trial, Anwar gave a proffer interview with the

government. He admitted to the interviewing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent4

that he had always harbored suspicions about the legality of the products that he sold,

in part, because these products cost much more than other similarly marketed incense

products. Anwar also admitted that he knew that people purchased these products to

smoke or to ingest. Further, he agreed with the IRS agent that he remained willfully

blind to the nature of the substances that he sold. On the eve of Anwar’s trial, Saeed’s

attorney contacted the government by e-mail, informing the prosecution that Saeed

now admitted to selling bath salts, but he stopped selling the products in

approximately March 2012. The government did not inform Anwar of Saeed’s

admission.

At trial, Anwar moved for a mistrial, alleging that a government witness made

an improper comment. He also orally moved for a judgment of acquittal. The district

court denied both motions. The jury found Anwar guilty on both conspiracy counts.

Anwar moved for a new trial, which the district court denied. At sentencing, Anwar

objected to the district court’s calculation of his base offense level and to the court

applying two sentencing enhancements. The court overruled Anwar’s objections.

Anwar’s total offense level of 43 and criminal history category of II yielded a

Guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment. However, because the statutory

maximum for each of Anwar’s convicted offenses was 20 years’ imprisonment, see

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), his Guidelines range was 480 months’

4The IRS was involved in the criminal investigation because “in many narcotic

investigations . . . those activities have a strong financial component to them.” Trial

Transcript, Vol. III, at 472, United States v. Anwar, No. 6:15-cr-02005-JAJ-1 (N.D.

Iowa Oct. 28, 2015), ECF No. 128.

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imprisonment, see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b). The district court applied a downward

variance to the Guidelines recommendation and sentenced Anwar to 300 months’

imprisonment—240 months’ imprisonment on the drug conspiracy conviction and 60

months on the conspiracy conviction, to run consecutively.

II. Discussion

Anwar raises four issues on appeal. First, he argues that his conviction is not

supported by sufficient evidence. Second, Anwar contends that the district court erred

in denying his motion for a new trial based on an improper government witness

statement. Third, he alleges that the district court procedurally erred in calculating his

total offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. Last, Anwar asserts that his

sentence was substantively unreasonable.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We first address Anwar’s argument that the government failed to prove both

charges. “We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government’s favor,

and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v.

Guenther, 470 F.3d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Washington,

318 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2003)). “[I]t is axiomatic that [we do] not pass upon the

credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony . . . .” United States

v. Spight, 817 F.3d 1099, 1102 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Goodale, 738

F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2013)). Finally, “[t]he verdict will be upheld if there is any

interpretation of the evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to convict.” United

States v. Brandon, 521 F.3d 1019, 1025 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

1. Conspiracy To Distribute a Controlled Substance or Controlled Substance

Analogue

To convict under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), “the government had to prove beyond

reasonable doubt (1) knowledge; (2) possession; and (3) intent to distribute the

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controlled substance.” United States v. Noibi, 780 F.2d 1419, 1421 (8th Cir. 1986)

(citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)). Anwar disputes only the knowledge element of the crime.

He claims that the government did not prove that he knowingly sold controlled

substances of any kind. He argues that he could not have known the products were

illegal because these chemicals were obscure and their illegality was uncertain

throughout the time he sold them.

“[A] defendant does ‘not need to know the exact nature of the substance in [his]

possession, only that it was a controlled substance of some kind.’” United States v.

Morales, 813 F.3d 1058, 1065 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Martin, 274

F.3d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 2001)). “[T]he knowledge element . . . can be proved by

demonstrating either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance.” United States v.

Honea, 660 F.3d 318, 328 (8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting United

States v. Hristov, 466 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 2006)). “Deliberate ignorance is

established if the defendant was ‘presented with facts that put him on notice that

criminal activity is probably afoot’ but ‘failed to investigate those facts, thereby

deliberately declining to verify or discover the criminal activity.’” United States v.

Sdoulam, 398 F.3d 981, 993 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Hildebrand, 152

F.3d 756, 764 (8th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Whitfield v. United

States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005)). “[A] defendant’s concealment of his activities, evasive

behavior with respect to law enforcement, knowledge that a particular substance

produces a ‘high’ similar to that produced by controlled substances, and knowledge

that a particular substance is subject to seizure” are all examples of circumstantial

evidence for the knowledge element. McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298,

2304 n.1 (2015).

Here, the government showed that Anwar chose to remain deliberately

indifferent to knowledge of the illegality of the products that he trafficked. He

admitted knowing that people ingested or smoked the products despite their being

marketed as an incense. He instructed store owners to conceal these products from the

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general public and the police. Anwar knew that the items had been seized by law

enforcement. He knew that the products were selling at prices as much as 10 to 20

times higher than traditional incense products. He also admitted to remaining ignorant

of what was in the products because they were selling. Taken together, Anwar’s

admissions show that he was on notice that criminal activity was afoot, but he

deliberately declined to verify or discover the criminal activity. See Sdoulam, 398 F.3d

at 993. Because Anwar’s deliberate ignorance satisfies the knowledge element of the

crime, the government met its burden of proof with respect to knowledge.

2. Conspiracy To Launder Money

Anwar claims that the transactions he entered with Earl Ramos were recorded

business transactions and not money laundering. He also questions Ramos’s

credibility, implying that Ramos testified on the government’s behalf in exchange for

a lesser prison sentence.

“[T]he three essential elements of conspiracy to launder money are: (1) an

agreement . . . to launder money; (2) the defendant’s voluntary joinder of the

agreement; and (3) the defendant’s knowing joinder of the agreement.” United States

v. Jarrett, 684 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2012) (ellipsis in original) (quotations omitted).

Money laundering consists of four elements:

(1) defendant conducted, or attempted to conduct a financial transaction

which in any way or degree affected interstate commerce or foreign

commerce; (2) the financial transaction involved proceeds of illegal

activity; (3) defendant knew the property represented proceeds of some

form of unlawful activity; and (4) defendant conducted or attempted to

conduct the financial transaction knowing the transaction was “designed

in whole or in part [] to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the

source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified

unlawful activity.”

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United States v. Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017, 1021–22 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in

original) (quoting United States v. Phythian, 529 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008)).

As an appellate court, we do not “judge credibility of witnesses.” United States

v. Tillman, 765 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Conway, 754

F.3d 580, 587 (8th Cir. 2014)); see also United States v. Rodriguez–Mendez, 336 F.3d

692, 694 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The jury was capable of evaluating the credibility of

testimony given in light of the agreements each witness received from the

government. The appellate court is not required to re-weigh the evidence or judge

credibility of witnesses.”). At trial, Earl Ramos testified for the government that he

would pay Anwar for the synthetic cannabinoid-laced products with money orders,

each up to $1,000. Anwar kept his name off the money orders themselves, but

Ramos’s internal records showed when and to whom the money orders were paid. The

internal records consisted only of cryptic notations on stubs in a check ledger. None

of Ramos’s records explicitly identify Anwar or any corporation with which he was

associated as being involved in the drug sale. Ramos’s testimony, however, gave a

reasonable jury the opportunity to understand the true nature of each transaction and

the identities of the participants in that transaction.

The government showed that Anwar and Ramos agreed that Ramos would pay

Anwar for the sale of the illegal synthetic cannabinoids through a mechanism where

the money was not traceable back to Anwar. On this record, the government met its

burden in proving Anwar’s conspiracy to launder money.

B. Motion for a New Trial

Anwar argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial

for two reasons: (1) the government violated Brady5 by withholding a co-conspirator’s

confession, and (2) the court erred in permitting a government witness to give

5Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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prejudicial testimony. We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Schropp, 829 F.3d 998, 1005 (8th Cir. 2016).

However, motions for a new trial “are disfavored and reviewed for a clear abuse of

discretion, a rigorous standard.” United States v. Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849, 857 (8th

Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

1. Brady Violation

Anwar’s Brady violation argument rests on Saeed’s admission to the

government, on the eve of Anwar’s trial, that he sold bath salts. He argues that

Saeed’s admission was potentially exculpatory, but the government withheld the

information. We disagree.

“The government must disclose evidence favorable to a defendant whether

requested or not.” United States v. Jones, 101 F.3d 1263, 1272 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995)). “The rule of Brady is limited to the

discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but

unknown to the defense.” United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 882 (8th Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted). A Brady violation has three components: “The evidence at issue

must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is

impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,

281–82 (1999).

To prove a Brady violation, “the defendant must show that the evidence was

favorable and material and that the government suppressed the evidence.” United

States v. Ellefsen, 655 F.3d 769, 778 (8th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (citation

omitted). “[E]vidence is ‘material’ only if there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, had

it been disclosed, ‘the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” United

States v. Robinson, 809 F.3d 991, 996 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. 263

at 280). Additionally, “[t]he government does not suppress evidence in violation of

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Brady by failing to disclose evidence to which the defendant had access through other

channels.” United States v. Zuazo, 243 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted). Likewise, “when the government does not disclose a potential source of

evidence but the evidence available from that source is cumulative of evidence already

available to the defendant, it has committed no Brady violation.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the withheld information was neither favorable nor material to Anwar’s

case. Saeed’s confession in no way exculpated Anwar because Saeed never claimed

to be the sole person distributing bath salts. Indeed, the evidence could reasonably

tend to inculpate Anwar, as it supports the existence of a conspiracy to distribute the

controlled substance. Moreover, the evidence was cumulative; Anwar acknowledged

in his opening brief that he already knew that Saeed was selling bath salts. Taken

together, the government did not withhold evidence that was favorable and material

to Anwar’s case. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anwar’s

Brady motion for a new trial.

2. Prejudicial Witness Testimony

Anwar contends that a government witness gave impermissible trial testimony

that prejudiced his case; the witness stated that Anwar previously “had legal troubles

and he was prosecuted federally.” Trial Transcript, Vol. III, at 570.

Upon the defendant’s motion, “the [district] court may vacate any judgment and

grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a).

However, “Rule 33 motions are disfavored.” Rubashkin, 655 F.3d at 857 (citation

omitted). “Rule 33 is [an] unusual remedy that is reserved for ‘exceptional cases in

which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.’” United States v.

Campos, 306 F.3d 577, 579 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 553, at 248 (2d ed. 1982)). The district court “must exercise

the Rule 33 authority ‘sparingly and with caution.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980)). While “the district court is permitted

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to ‘weigh the evidence, disbelieve witnesses, and grant a new trial even where there

is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict,’” the “court may grant a new trial . . .

only if the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice

may have occurred.” United States v. McClellon, 578 F.3d 846, 857 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting United States v. Starr, 533 F.3d 985, 999 (8th Cir. 2008)). However,

“[a]dmission of a prejudicial statement is normally cured by striking the testimony and

instructing the jury to disregard the remark.” United States v. Brandon, 521 F.3d 1019,

1026 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Here, the district court held a Rule 33 hearing and found that the government

had not acted in bad faith by eliciting improper testimony. The court further found that

the “improper testimony was brief, and while it implied prior criminal charges, it did

not imply a conviction.” United States v. Anwar, No. 6:15-cr-02005-JAJ, slip op. at

5 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 3, 2016), ECF No. 125. Moreover, the district court at the close of

the trial “reminded the jury to focus on the crimes Mr. Anwar was charged with, and

not on peripheral issues.” Id. Finally, the district court concluded that “there [was]

‘strong evidence in the record to support each of [Mr. Anwar’s] convictions.’” Id.

(second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Maples, 754 F.2d 299, 301

(8th Cir. 1985)). The court noted:

The Government called witnesses from each step of Mr. Anwar’s

wholesale process: his suppliers, employees, and customers all testified

that they saw him buying, selling, and delivering synthetic drugs. Law

enforcement officers testified that they seized and lab-tested drugs from

Mr. Anwar’s store and Mr. Anwar’s customers. The Government offered

evidence that he knew the drugs were illegal, including pictures of their

unusual labeling, evidence of their disproportionate prices, and testimony

that Mr. Anwar was told about police raids on sellers. The jury also

heard about Mr. Anwar’s proffer agreement, and that Mr. Anwar

admitted selling the drugs while willfully blind to their illegality. And

the Government provided records and testimony showing that Mr.

Anwar concealed the payments made to him.

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Id. at 5–6. Thus, the court concluded that “[a]ny prejudice that resulted from [the]

isolated testimony ‘was harmless in the context of the whole trial.’” Id. at 6 (quoting

United States v. Reed, 724 F.2d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 1984)).

In sum, the district court weighed the overwhelming evidence against Anwar

against a single instance of admission of objectionable testimony. After veering into

the weeds, the government’s questioning immediately returned to an admissible line.

The court found that no prejudice occurred during the brief detour. The court also

reminded the jury to disregard peripheral issues and to focus on Anwar’s charged

crimes. Taken together, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying

Anwar’s motion for a new trial under Rule 33.

C. Calculation of Total Offense Level Under the Sentencing Guidelines

Anwar asserts that the district court erred in: (1) calculating his base offense

level; (2) adding two levels for maintaining the premises under U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(12); and (3) adding three levels for his role as a “supervisor” or “manager”

under § 3B1.1(b). “We review the district court’s application of the sentencing

guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Miller,

511 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

1. Base Offense Level

Anwar objects to the district court’s use of the 1:167 ratio when calculating

drug amounts to determine the base offense level under the Guidelines. “In cases

involving controlled substances not specifically referenced in the guidelines,” such as

here, “the district court must use the marijuana-equivalency ratio for the most closely

related controlled substance found in the drug-equivalency tables.” Ramos, 814 F.3d

at 918 (citing U.S.S.G § 2D1.1, cmt. 6).

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In Ramos, we held that the 1:167 marijuana-equivalency ratio is the correct

ratio to apply to the synthetic cannabinoids at issue in this case because these

chemicals most closely resemble THC, which has a 1:167 marijuana-equivalency

ratio. Id. at 919. Additionally, at Anwar’s sentencing hearing, a DEA expert witness

testified that the synthetic cannabinoid products at issue most closely resembled THC,

rather than marijuana. Anwar’s counsel also conceded that the 1:167 ratio is “standing

law” in this circuit. On appeal, Anwar again acknowledges that the 1:167 ratio is the

law, but he contends nevertheless that the ratio should be 1:1.

“Our long standing rule is that one panel may not overrule an earlier decision

by another.” Jackson v. Ault, 452 F.3d 734, 736 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Only the en banc court “has [the] authority to overrule a prior panel opinion, whether

in the same case or in a different case.” Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 F.3d 553, 556

(8th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The district court therefore correctly calculated Anwar’s

base offense level using the 1:167 ratio.

2. Maintaining the Premises

Anwar next argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level

enhancement for maintaining the premises. The district court must increase the offense

by two levels “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of

manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). This

enhancement “applies when a defendant uses the premises for the purpose of

substantial drug-trafficking activities, even if the premises” also served other,

legitimate, functions. United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 707 (8th Cir. 2012). To

determine whether a defendant maintained a premises, “the court should consider

whether the defendant had a possessory interest in the premises and the extent to

which the defendant controlled access to, or activities at, the premises.” United States

v. Renteria–Saldana, 755 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(12), cmt. n.17). Holding title to the premises is not required for purposes

of this section. United States v. Garcia, 774 F.3d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 2014) (per

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curiam) (noting that the defendant maintained the premises “although the rent and

utilities for the premises were in another individual’s name, . . . this individual was

rarely at the premises and [the defendant] had free access to the premises, mowed the

lawn, and took out the garbage”).

The premises at issue is the Des Moines mobile wireless store. Anwar does not

own the building. However, the district court found that “there was no question from

the evidence in this case that Defendant Anwar used [the mobile wireless shop] to

store and distribute the controlled substances at issue.” Sentencing Transcript at 132,

United States v. Anwar, No. 6:15-cr-02005-JAJ-1 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 7, 2017), ECF No.

187. Anwar employed Romar and Tyrell to work at the store, and they testified that

Anwar “ran that shop, used it to have . . . these synthetic products dropped off,” and

that the Tyrells “would then help [Anwar] deliver.” Id. at 121. The district court

concluded:

There’s no question from even the photographs of this case that the

[mobile wireless] store, whatever legitimate reason or purpose it might

have had or if it was just a front for the drug distribution, it doesn’t

matter, it doesn’t matter that [another person] technically might have

been the owner or manager of the store, there was no question from the

evidence in this case that Defendant Anwar used it to store and distribute

the controlled substances at issue in this case.

Id. at 132. Because the evidence showed that Anwar used the wireless store for the

purpose of substantial drug-trafficking activities, the district court did not clearly err

in finding that he maintained a drug premises. See Miller, 698 F.3d at 707.

3. Aggravating Role in the Offense

Anwar contends that the district court erred in finding that he qualified for an

offense level increase due to an aggravating role in the offense. He further maintains

that the court should have instead decreased his offense level for a mitigating role.

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The Guidelines require a three-level increase “[i]f the defendant was a manager

or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five

or more participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). “[W]e define . . . ‘manager’ and

‘supervisor’ quite liberally.” United States v. Irlmeier, 750 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir.

2014) (citation omitted). The enhancement applies to defendants “even where they

manage or supervise only one other participant in the conspiracy.” Id. (citations

omitted). Indeed, “the enhancement ‘may apply even if the management activity was

limited to a single transaction.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 431 F.3d 313,

318 (8th Cir. 2005)). However, “[t]he ‘defendant[] must direct or enlist the aid of

others.’” Id. (quoting Lopez, 431 F.3d at 318).

Anwar argues that instead of the aggravating role enhancements, he should have

received a decrease for mitigating roles—he was recruited by Saeed, who according

to Anwar “called the shots throughout;” he was ignorant of the legality of the

substances he peddled because he had no training in chemistry, and law enforcement

did not tell him that the substances were illegal.

These arguments fail. The district court found that Saeed clearly recruited

Anwar to the conspiracy, but the two “quickly became partners.” Sentencing

Transcript at 133. Anwar recruited multiple store owners to sell the synthetic drugs,

and Anwar supervised the Tyrells extensively in the drug operation. The district court

found that Anwar “clearly gets an aggravating role just as it relates to [his supervision

of] Erika and Randy Tyrell alone.” Id. at 132. Anwar’s reliance on his ignorance of

the illegality of the synthetic cannabinoids is also misplaced. As discussed above,

Anwar had ample reasons to suspect that these products were illegal, but he chose to

remain deliberately ignorant. See supra Part II.A.1.

The district court committed no clear error in finding Anwar had an aggravating

role under the Guidelines.

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D. Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence

Despite the district court applying a downward variance, Anwar argues that his

sentence nevertheless is substantively unreasonable. He contends that no prison

sentence is necessary because of his medical needs, his education level, and his

cooperation with the government. Further, Anwar argues that he is not likely to

recidivate because he is subject to deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

“When we review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the

Guidelines range, we apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States

v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v.

Hayes, 518 F.3d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 2008)). “[W]e are to ‘take into account the totality

of the circumstances . . . .’” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007)). A sentence is presumptively reasonable when it falls within the advisory

guidelines. United States v. Sanchez–Garcia, 642 F.3d 658, 663 (8th Cir. 2011)

(citations omitted). “[W]here a district court has sentenced a defendant below the

advisory guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its

discretion in not varying downward still further.” United States v. Worthey, 716 F.3d

1107, 1116 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Spencer,

700 F.3d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 2012)).

Here, the district court found that Anwar’s conspiracy “was massive, one of the

largest” that the court had seen. Sentencing Transcript at 151. “In fashioning an

appropriate sentence,” id., the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors,

specifically citing consideration of the seriousness of the offense, the question of just

punishment, the need for adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, the available

sentencing options under the Sentencing Guidelines, the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparity among defendants with similar records, and the defendant’s lack

of remorse. The court found that the conspiracy “was wildly lucrative, totally greed

driven,” id., and that “[i]t was dressed up as something that was legal” so that small

town law enforcement would not “catch it,” id. at 152. Further, while other defendants

came through the court, which “serve[d] as such a wonderful wake-up call and they

. . . never . . . come back again,” Anwar “came back in with a rampage.” Id. at

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152–53. The court also “weighed heavily the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

disparity among defendants with similar records or lack thereof who have been found

guilty of similar conduct.” Id. at 153. Finally, the court found “Anwar show[ed] little

remorse.” Id.

In rendering its judgment, the court spent substantial time considering and

discussing the § 3553(a) factors. We find no abuse of discretion. Anwar’s sentence is

not substantively unreasonable.

For the reasons articulated above, we affirm the district court.