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Reynaldo Gonzalez v. Google, Inc.

Date: 08-15-2018

Case Number: 16-CV-03282

Judge: Donna M. Ryu

Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco County)

Plaintiff's Attorney:















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Defendant's Attorney: Brian M. Willen, David H. Kramer

Description:
San Francisco, California personal injury lawyers represented Plaintiffs who sued Defendants based on a violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act.













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Nohemi Gonzalez was murdered during the November 2015 attacks in Paris committed by terrorists associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ("ISIS"). Plaintiffs are Gonzalez's surviving family members, including her mother, father, stepfather, and brothers. They seek to hold Defendant Google, Inc. ( "Google") liable for her death under the Anti-Terrorism Act ("ATA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2333, based on Google's ownership and operation of YouTube. In their third amended complaint, Plaintiffs contend that Google has knowingly provided material support to ISIS in the form of its YouTube platform, that ISIS has used YouTube as a tool to commit terrorism, and that Google has concealed its provision of material support to ISIS. According to Plaintiffs, Google's material support was a proximate cause of Gonzalez's death.



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Plaintiffs make the following allegations in the third amended complaint ("TAC"), all of which are taken as true for purposes of this motion.1 [Docket No. 111.] In the fall of 2015, Nohemi Gonzalez was a 26-year old California State University student studying abroad in Paris, France. [Docket No. 111 (TAC) ¶ 471.] On November 13, 2015, Gonzalez was dining with a group of friends at La Belle Équipe, a Paris bistro. A few minutes into their meal, three ISIS terrorists, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Brahim Abdeslam, and Chakib Akrouh, approached the restaurant and began spraying the patrons with bullets, killing Gonzalez and 18 others. Id. at ¶¶ 475-477. Two other groups of ISIS terrorists mounted coordinated attacks that night at other locations in Paris, including the Stade de France and the Bataclan



[335 F.Supp.3d 1161]



Theatre concert hall. They eventually killed 130 individuals and wounded nearly 400. Id. at ¶¶ 299, 305, 405-435. ISIS issued statements claiming responsibility for the attacks, including audio and video messages posted on YouTube, a free online video platform owned and operated by Google. Id. at ¶¶ 154, 179, 436-470. Plaintiffs allege that twelve individual ISIS terrorists were directly involved in the Paris attacks, including the three La Belle Équipe shooters. Id. at ¶ 306.



The TAC describes in detail the origins of ISIS, which is a designated foreign terrorist organization ("FTO") under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189. Id. at ¶¶ 82-153. It adds allegations about terrorist attacks in the 1980s, 1990s, and the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, and the evolution of anti-terrorism legislation that followed these attacks. Id. at ¶¶ 34-81. Plaintiffs allege that YouTube "has played an essential role in the rise of ISIS to become the most feared terrorist organization in the world." Id. at ¶ 185. YouTube provides ISIS with a "unique and powerful tool of communication" that enables it to achieve its program of terrorism and motivate others to carry out more terrorist attacks. Id. at ¶ 192; see also id. at ¶¶ 186-91, 193. Plaintiffs contend that ISIS uses YouTube as a means to accomplish many of its goals:



ISIS not only uses YouTube for recruiting, planning, inciting, and giving instructions for terror attacks, ISIS also uses YouTube to issue terroristic threats, attract attention to its terror attacks and atrocities, instill and intensify fear from terror attacks, intimidate and coerce civilian populations, take credit for terror attacks, communicate its desired messages about the terror attacks, reach its desired audiences, demand and attempt to obtain results from the terror attacks, and influence and affect government policies and conduct.



Id. at ¶ 194; see also id. at ¶¶ 195-96, 225. Plaintiffs identify and describe a number of videos that allegedly were posted on YouTube at the direction of individuals affiliated with ISIS, including gruesome depictions of executions of ISIS prisoners. See id. at ¶¶ 126-128, 143-45, 227, 230, 243, 245-47, 259-81. According to Plaintiffs, ISIS has recruited more than 30,000 foreign volunteers since 2014 through its use of YouTube and other social media platforms. Id. at ¶ 248.



The TAC details the planning and execution of the Paris attacks. Id. at ¶¶ 299-435. Plaintiffs allege that "a major component of the Paris Attack was the messaging disseminated by ISIS prior to, during, and after the events," and that the planning for the attacks "involved the use of YouTube, before and after the attack, to intensify the fear and intimidation that ISIS intended to inflict by this mass casualty attack." Id. at ¶¶ 301-303. According to Plaintiffs, ISIS used YouTube's platform and services to "facilitate and accomplish" the goals of the attacks—intimidation, coercion, and influence. Id. at ¶¶ 300-304. Of the twelve ISIS terrorists who carried out the attacks, Plaintiffs allege that two, Abaaoud and Najim Laachraoui, used online social media platforms to post alleged terrorist recruiting videos. Id. at ¶¶ 355-58, 362. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that in March 2014, Abaaoud "posted a link on his Facebook account to an ISIS recruiting video on YouTube," and that Laachraoui "actively followed ISIS social media accounts and posted links to jihadi YouTube videos on his own accounts as well." Id. at ¶¶ 356-58, 362.



The TAC also contains allegations about the operation of the YouTube platform. Registered users may establish a YouTube "channel," post videos on the platform, and post comments on the pages of YouTube



[335 F.Supp.3d 1162]



channels and videos. Id. at ¶ 163. When a YouTube user posts a video, "Google's computer servers receive the information and distribute it to the YouTube user's network of YouTube channel 'subscribers.' " Id. at ¶ 543. The TAC adds allegations that YouTube "assists ISIS in spreading its message" by recommending ISIS videos to users "based upon the content and what is known about the viewer." Id. at ¶ 535. Google employs algorithms to help users locate other videos and accounts with similarities, "introducing users to other users and videos that they will be interested in based on the video and account information and characteristics." Id. at ¶¶ 549-50. "[I]n this way, users are able to locate other videos and accounts related to ISIS even if they do not know the correct identifier or if the original YouTube account has been replaced by a new identifier." Id. at ¶ 549. Plaintiffs further allege that YouTube is "useful[ ] in facilitating social networking among jihadists," since it provides the "ability to exchange comments about videos and to send private messages to other users," enabling jihadists to rapidly identify each other. Id. at ¶ 553.



Plaintiffs further allege that Google derives revenue from ads on YouTube. According to Plaintiffs, Google targets ads to the viewer "based upon algorithms that analyze and use data about the ads, the user, and the video posted. Id. at ¶ 520. Google "agrees to share[ ] a percentage of the revenue it generates from ads placed before YouTube videos with the user who posts the video." Id. at ¶ 532. Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that "Google has reviewed and approved ISIS videos, including videos posted by ISIS-affiliated users, for 'monetization' through" its placement of ads with these videos," and that by approving such videos, "Google has agreed to share with ISIS and ISIS-affiliated users a percentage of revenues generated by these ads." Id. at ¶¶ 521-22. The TAC includes a screen shot of an example of Google-placed targeted ads alongside what Plaintiffs describe as "an ISIS video" on YouTube. Id. at ¶ 533. Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he video was created by ISIS and was posted by ISIS using a known ISIS account."Id. They further allege upon information and belief that "the poster complied with YouTube's terms and conditions, as did YouTube. Thus, YouTube shared revenue with ISIS, the creator and poster of the video[.]" Id.



Plaintiffs also allege that Google is a "content creator." While admitting that Google does not make the videos that are posted on YouTube, Plaintiffs allege that Google creates "new unique content" for viewers "by choosing which advertisement to combine with the posted video with knowledge about the viewer." Id. at ¶ 540. In that way, "Google is not simply passing along content created by third parties"; instead, "Google incorporates ISIS posted videos along with advertisements matched to the viewer to create new content for which Google earns revenue[.]" Id. at ¶ 541; see also id. at ¶ 536 ( "Google is itself creating and developing content because it exercises control over what advertisement to match with an ISIS video posting on YouTube."). Plaintiffs further allege that "Google has recommended ISIS videos to users," assisting ISIS "in spreading its message." Id. at ¶ 535.



Plaintiffs allege that Google has the ability to deny its YouTube-related services to ISIS, but refuses to do so. Although Google has suspended or blocked certain ISIS-related accounts at various times, prior to the Paris attacks, Google did not make "substantial or sustained efforts to ensure that ISIS would not re-establish the accounts using new identifiers." Id. at ¶ 493. Even though Google has tools to identify, flag, review, and remove ISIS YouTube



[335 F.Supp.3d 1163]



accounts, it allows such accounts "to be quickly regenerated." Id. at ¶¶ 554-55.



Finally, the TAC adds allegations that "Google's own terms and policies ostensibly bar ISIS and other foreign terrorist organizations ... from using Google[.]" Id. at ¶ 200. However, Plaintiffs allege, "Google has nevertheless knowingly provided its Platform and Services to ISIS, its members and affiliates[.]" Id. at ¶ 201. Thus, "by falsely representing that it does not permit ISIS" to use YouTube "when in fact it has knowingly continued to provide its Platform, Services and accounts to ISIS, Google has concealed and disguised the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing that they are used in preparation for, or in carrying out, criminal terrorist activity." Id. at ¶¶ 201-02.



Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs contend that Google violated federal prohibitions by providing material support or resources for acts of international terrorism. As in the second amended complaint ("SAC"), Plaintiffs bring four claims for relief under the ATA's civil remedy provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and (d). Section 2333(a) provides for a private right of action for damages sustained in an act of international terrorism:



Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees.



18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). Section 2333(d) provides that liability attaches to those who aid or abet an act of international terrorism by knowingly providing substantial assistance:



In an action under subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization ... liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.



18 U.S.C. § 2333(d).



Plaintiffs' first and second claims for relief assert that Google is liable for aiding and abetting acts of international terrorism under section 2333(d) because it "knowingly provided substantial assistance" to ISIS and "conspired with ISIS." TAC ¶¶ 565, 570-71. The third claim for relief asserts that Google is liable under section 2333(a) for providing ISIS with "material support and resources" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, a federal criminal statute which prohibits the provision of "material support or resources" to terrorists in the form of services, equipment, and personnel. Id. at ¶¶ 574-78. The fourth claim asserts that Google is liable under section 2333(a) based on its violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), which criminalizes the knowing provision of "material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization." Plaintiffs contend that Google violates section 2339B(a)(1) by "providing its Platform and Services, including the YouTube platform and other services ... to and for the benefit of ISIS[.]" Id. at ¶¶ 581-84.



The TAC adds a separate basis for claims three and four, based upon Plaintiffs' allegation that Google violated the ATA by knowingly sharing advertising revenue with ISIS. They allege the provision of advertising revenue to ISIS itself



[335 F.Supp.3d 1164]



constitutes material support in violation of sections 2339A and 2339B. See TAC ¶ 533.2



The TAC adds two additional claims for relief, both of which seek redress under section 2333(a). The fifth claim is for concealment of material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(c). Id. at ¶¶ 587-88. Section 2339C(c) prohibits the knowing concealment or disguise of "the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of any material support or resources, or any funds or proceeds of such funds ... knowing or intending that the support or resources are to be provided, or knowing that the support or resources were provided," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.



The sixth claim alleges that Google provides funds, goods, or services to ISIS in violation of terrorism sanctions regulations issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 - 1707, 31 C.F.R. Part 594. Id. at ¶ 592.



Google moves to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims on the ground that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), bars any claim that seeks to hold an online service provider liable for injuries allegedly resulting from its hosting of third-party material. It also argues that all of Plaintiffs' claims are insufficiently pleaded.

Outcome:


For the foregoing reasons, the TAC is dismissed. With the exception of Plaintiffs' revenue sharing claims, the claims in the TAC are all premised on the theory that Google permitted ISIS and its supporters to use the YouTube platform to disseminate a terrorist message. Claims five and six simply attempt to repackage this theory under a different name. All of these claims fall within the scope of the CDA's immunity provision and are thus barred. As Plaintiffs have already been given an opportunity to amend the complaint to avoid CDA immunity, all of their claims other than the revenue sharing claims are dismissed with prejudice. Since the court cannot conclude that further amendment of Plaintiffs' revenue sharing claims would be futile, they are granted one final opportunity to amend those claims in a manner consistent with Rule 11. Any amended complaint shall be filed within 14 days of the date of this order. The fourth amended complaint may not contain any claims for relief that the court has already dismissed.

Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
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About This Case

What was the outcome of Reynaldo Gonzalez v. Google, Inc.?

The outcome was: For the foregoing reasons, the TAC is dismissed. With the exception of Plaintiffs' revenue sharing claims, the claims in the TAC are all premised on the theory that Google permitted ISIS and its supporters to use the YouTube platform to disseminate a terrorist message. Claims five and six simply attempt to repackage this theory under a different name. All of these claims fall within the scope of the CDA's immunity provision and are thus barred. As Plaintiffs have already been given an opportunity to amend the complaint to avoid CDA immunity, all of their claims other than the revenue sharing claims are dismissed with prejudice. Since the court cannot conclude that further amendment of Plaintiffs' revenue sharing claims would be futile, they are granted one final opportunity to amend those claims in a manner consistent with Rule 11. Any amended complaint shall be filed within 14 days of the date of this order. The fourth amended complaint may not contain any claims for relief that the court has already dismissed.

Which court heard Reynaldo Gonzalez v. Google, Inc.?

This case was heard in United States District Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco County), CA. The presiding judge was Donna M. Ryu.

Who were the attorneys in Reynaldo Gonzalez v. Google, Inc.?

Plaintiff's attorney: Click Here to Watch How To Find A Lawyer by Kent Morlan Click Here For The Best * Lawyer Directory If no lawyer is listed, call 918-582-6422 and MoreLaw will help you find a lawyer.. Defendant's attorney: Brian M. Willen, David H. Kramer.

When was Reynaldo Gonzalez v. Google, Inc. decided?

This case was decided on August 15, 2018.