M.R.; J.R., Parents of Minor Child, E.R. v. Ridley School District

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,

a parent of a child with a disability can bring administrative

and judicial proceedings to challenge a school district’s

alleged violations of the Act, and, if the parent emerges as “a

prevailing party,” the parent is then eligible for an award of

attorneys’ fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). This case

presents the question whether a fee award is available to

parents who, after unsuccessfully challenging a school

district’s proposed educational placement for their child, later

obtain a court order requiring the school district to reimburse

them for the costs of the child’s “stay put” placement—the

“then-current educational placement” in which the Act

permitted the child to remain while administrative and

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judicial proceedings were pending. Id. § 1415(j). We answer

this question in the affirmative and conclude, consistent with

the Act’s text and with the opinions of this Court and the

other Courts of Appeals, that a court-ordered award of

retrospective and compensatory relief, even if awarded under

the Act’s “stay put” provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), confers

“prevailing party” status. We therefore will reverse the

District Court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

This case pertains to a long-running dispute between

Appellants, the parents of E.R., and Appellee, the Ridley

School District, concerning E.R.’s schooling and Ridley’s

obligations under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482. Before turning to

the details of that dispute, we briefly review the statutory

framework from which it arose.

A. Statutory Context

The IDEA is a comprehensive statutory scheme

enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have

available to them a free appropriate public education.”

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To that end, the Act allocates

federal dollars to assist the states’ educational services for

children with disabilities. Id. § 1411(a)(1). In return,

recipient states must provide a “free appropriate public

education” to children with disabilities residing in their states,

an “individualized education program” (“IEP”) for each child

with a disability, and specified procedural safeguards for

children with disabilities and their parents. Id. § 1412(a)(1),

(4), (6).

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One consequence of the IDEA’s requirements is that

school districts must sometimes reimburse parents of children

with disabilities for educational expenses made on their

children’s behalf. Specifically, because an IEP must account

for a child’s “strengths,” the parents’ “concerns” about the

child’s education, the child’s most recent disability

evaluation, and the child’s “academic, developmental, and

functional needs,” id. § 1414(d)(3)(A), an IEP that meets the

Act’s requirements may require the child to be placed in a

private school. If so, the IDEA obliges the school district, in

providing the child with a “free appropriate public

education,” to reimburse the parents for the child’s

private-school tuition and related expenses. See Sch. Comm.

v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 363, 369-70 (1985); see also

20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(10)(B), 1415(i)(2)(C).

This reimbursement obligation exists not only when

the school district and the parents agree that the child should

be in private school but also sometimes when they do not.

See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C). For example, even

when parents place a child in a private-school setting to

which the school district will not consent, the school district

remains liable for the private-school costs if an adjudicator

later determines that the private school was the appropriate

educational placement for the child. See Sch. Comm., 471

U.S. at 372-74. And even if, on appeal, a court were

ultimately to determine that the private school was not the

appropriate educational placement, the child is entitled to

“stay put” in the “then-current [private] educational

placement” during the pendency of the appeal. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(j). In that circumstance, as long as the child is

twenty-one years of age or younger, see 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(1)(A); Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis,

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480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007), the school district must

continue reimbursing the child’s parents until the point, if

ever, that the “proceedings,” including on appeal, resolve in

the school district’s favor, M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist.

(Ridley IV), 744 F.3d 112, 117-19, 124-28 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)).

School districts have one more economic reason to

adhere to the Act’s requirements: although under the

“American Rule” parties typically pay their own attorneys’

fees, district courts can order school districts that lose IDEA

disputes to pay “reasonable attorneys’ fees” to “a prevailing

party who is the parent of a child with a disability.”

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); P.N. ex rel. M.W. v. Clementon

Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006). The scope of

school districts’ potential liability for fee awards is the subject

of this appeal, the facts of which we recount below.

B. Factual and Procedural Background

1. IEP Litigation

E.R. attended an elementary school in the Ridley

School District for kindergarten and first grade. Ridley

School District v. M.R. (Ridley II), 680 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir.

2012). After identifying E.R.’s learning disabilities during

her first-grade year, Ridley and E.R.’s parents agreed to an

IEP for the remaining months of that academic year. Id. at

265-66. The parties’ IEP negotiations for second grade,

however, were unsuccessful because they disagreed about

what reading aids would be appropriate for E.R., so E.R.’s

parents opted to enroll her in a private school and to file an

administrative complaint accusing Ridley of “fail[ing] to

develop an appropriate IEP.” Id. at 267-77.

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The administrative hearing officer agreed with E.R.’s

parents and, in a report dated April 21, 2009, opined that

Ridley’s proposed IEPs “were inadequate and therefore

denied E.R. a free appropriate public education.” Id. at 267

(internal quotation marks omitted). This decision in the

parents’ favor during the administrative review process

equated to “an agreement between the State and the parents”

and rendered E.R.’s private-school placement her

“then-current educational placement” for purposes of the

IDEA’s “stay put” provision. Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 119

(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)). Beginning at that point,

therefore, Ridley was obliged to reimburse E.R.’s parents for

their private-school costs. See id.

But the administrative ruling in E.R.’s parents’ favor

did not fare well in the District Court or on appeal to this

Court. After Ridley petitioned for review of the

administrative hearing officer’s decision, the District Court

rejected the parents’ contention that the challenged IEPs were

“not based on peer-reviewed research” and were therefore

deficient, Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R. (Ridley I), No. 09-2503,

2011 WL 499966, at *12-15 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2011), and we

affirmed, explaining that “although schools should strive to

base a student’s specially designed instruction on

peer-reviewed research to the maximum extent possible, the

student’s IEP team retains flexibility to devise an appropriate

program, in light of the available research,” Ridley II, 680

F.3d at 275-79.

2. Reimbursement Litigation

E.R.’s parents did not pursue their IEP-related claims

further, but they did ask Ridley to reimburse them for their

private-school expenses between the administrative hearing

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officer’s decision in 2009 and the conclusion of the IEP

appeal in this Court in 2012. See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at

116-17. When Ridley declined, E.R.’s parents filed suit in

the District Court under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision,

20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), seeking “to have the cost of [E.R.’s]

placement paid through final resolution of the dispute over

her educational placement,” App. 23.

This time, the District Court ruled in the parents’

favor. See M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist. (Ridley III), No. 11-2235,

2012 WL 3279230, at *5-13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2012).

Although Ridley asserted a trio of defenses—claim

preclusion, the parents’ alleged failure to bring a compulsory

counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) in

their first suit, and the IDEA’s ninety-day statute of

limitations—the District Court rejected each of them,

concluding that Ridley’s reimbursement obligations began

once the hearing officer issued her decision in E.R.’s parents’

favor and continued through the completion of the appeals

process. See id.

On appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s decision

on the reimbursement issue in full. See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at

120-28. Ridley then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ

of certiorari, which was denied on May 18, 2015. See Ridley

School District v. M.R., 135 S. Ct. 2309 (2015). Only after

that denial did Ridley reimburse E.R.’s parents as the District

Court had ordered in 2012.

3. Attorneys’ Fees Motion

Having finally obtained the reimbursement they

sought, E.R.’s parents filed a motion for an award of

attorneys’ fees under the IDEA’s attorneys’ fees provision,

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20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), but the District Court denied the

motion, holding that reimbursement for the costs of E.R.’s

temporary “stay put” placement was only “interim” relief and

thus E.R.’s parents were not “prevailing parties,” App. 10-11.

This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review1

Although ordinarily we review attorneys’ fees rulings

for abuse of discretion, our review is plenary where, as here,

the district court based its denial on legal conclusions. Raab

v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016). That

is, the District Court here did not deny fees on the ground

that, even if E.R.’s parents were “prevailing part[ies]” under

§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), their success was de minimis; if it had,

then our review would be for abuse of discretion. See Farrar

v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114-16 (1992); id. at 119 (O’Connor,

J., concurring). Instead, the District Court determined, as a

threshold matter, that E.R.’s parents were not “prevailing

part[ies],” so the District Court lacked discretion to award any

fees. Its determination on the “prevailing party” issue is a

legal conclusion over which our review is plenary. See D.F.

v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 495 (3d

Cir. 2012).

III. Discussion

Applying this standard of review, we conclude,

contrary to the District Court’s decision, that E.R.’s parents in

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A). We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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fact are “prevailing part[ies]” under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) and

thus are eligible for a fee award. To provide context for the

reasons behind our conclusion, we first retrace the District

Court’s analysis.

The IDEA attorneys’ fee provision, like various other

statutory fee-shifting provisions, allows courts to award

attorneys’ fees to a “prevailing party.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).2 Because statutory language is generally

interpreted in the same way as its “functional equivalent” in a

similar context in the United States Code, Gomez-Perez v.

Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 481 (2008), we interpret this fee

provision consistently with other federal statutes using the

term “prevailing party,” see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,

Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,

603 n.4 (2001). Thus, to “prevail” under the IDEA, as under

other statutes with “prevailing party” fee provisions, a party

must obtain a “material alteration of the legal relationship of

the parties” that is “judicially sanctioned.” Raab, 833 F.3d at

292 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05). Importantly,

a party achieves a “material alteration” of the parties’ legal

relationship and “prevail[s]” for attorneys’ fees purposes only

if he obtains relief that is “in some way merit[s]-based.” Id.

at 293. Fee-shifting under a “prevailing party” statute is not

appropriate, for example, when a plaintiff wins a preliminary

injunction with respect to a particular request for relief but

2 See also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (certain civil

rights statutes); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (Fair Housing

Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (Americans with Disabilities Act);

52 U.S.C. § 10310(e) (Voting Rights Act of 1965).

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then loses on the merits of that request for relief. See Sole v.

Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 86 (2007).

In the IDEA context, our opinions in John T. ex rel.

Paul T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545

(3d Cir. 2003), and J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Township

Board of Education, 287 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2002), have

applied the requirement of merits-based relief to three

forward-looking injunctive orders: an order requiring a

child’s temporary reinstatement to public school after the

school district had requested home-schooling, J.O., 287 F.3d

at 269-70, a preliminary injunction to preserve supplemental

services previously provided by a school district, John T., 318

F.3d at 549-50, and a contempt order aimed at ensuring the

school district’s compliance with the preliminary injunction,

id. at 551, 554. We held in John T. and J.O. that all three

orders relating to temporary and preliminary relief were not

merits-based and thus could not confer “prevailing party”

status under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). See John T., 318 F.3d at

558-60; J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74.3

3 We acknowledge that our conclusion with respect to

the preliminary orders in J.O. and John T. exists in tension

with the fact that, when a preliminary injunction pertains to a

child’s education, the injunction awards schooling or

supplemental services that cannot be nullified, even if an

adjudicator ultimately holds that those educational services

were not required under the IDEA. See generally N.D. v.

Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2010)

(implying, because the temporary denial of educational

services can create irreparable harm, that even interim

educational services can create lasting benefits);

Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 122 (1st Cir.

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In its diligent attempt to follow our opinions in John T.

and J.O., the District Court here wrote a thoughtful and

thorough opinion, denying attorneys’ fees because, in

comparing the orders in John T. and J.O. to the

reimbursement award here, the District Court reasoned that

the reimbursement award was a form of temporary “stay put”

relief and that, under John T. and J.O., such “interim” relief

could not confer “prevailing party” status. App. 10-11.

Although we disagree with that analysis, we acknowledge the

novelty of the fee motion before the District Court: John T.

and J.O. addressed forward-looking and injunctive IDEA

“stay put” relief, but we have never before addressed

eligibility for fees in a case where a party received backwardlooking

and compensatory relief arising from the IDEA’s

“stay put” provision.

We hold today that such relief is merits-based and

confers “prevailing party” status. In so doing, we draw

support, first, from the IDEA’s text; second, from our case

law; and third, from the persuasive precedent in other

Circuits.

2003) (same). Indeed, a claim for such preliminary and

injunctive educational relief could be viewed as having its

own merits, independent of a dispute over a child’s IEP or

educational placement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). But J.O.

and John T. constrain us to consider preliminary injunctions

in the education context no differently from those outside of

the education context, and we therefore will ignore any

distinctions between educational and non-educational

preliminary injunctions in our discussion below.

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A. Statutory Text

1. “Prevailing Party”

We begin with the IDEA’s text. Kingdomware Techs.,

Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016).

Borrowing from the “prevailing party” fee provision

applicable to suits brought under various federal civil rights

statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the IDEA’s attorneys’ fees

provision states that a district court, “in its discretion, may

award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs . . . to a

prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.”

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).4 For that reason, we interpret

the language of § 1988 and the IDEA attorneys’ fees

provision in “the same way,” In re Cmty. Bank, 418 F.3d 277,

295-96 (3d Cir. 2005), and are bound by our cases addressing

§ 1988—two of which counsel in favor of holding that E.R.’s

parents received merits-based relief that conferred “prevailing

party” status. We discuss those two cases below.

First, in Bagby v. Beal, we held that, because the

plaintiff was afforded a due process hearing, she was the

“prevailing party” under § 1988 with respect to her 42 U.S.C.

4 The text of the IDEA attorneys’ fees provision itself,

by tracking § 1988 nearly verbatim, makes clear that it is

premised on § 1988. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i); cf.

42 U.S.C. § 1988. The legislative history reinforces that

conclusion, as a conference report on the IDEA’s “prevailing

party” fees provision expressly references Marek v. Chesny,

473 U.S. 1 (1985), a Supreme Court case interpreting § 1988.

See H.R. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.); see also

Marek, 473 U.S. at 7-18.

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§ 1983 procedural due process claim, even if she did not

ultimately prevail at the due process hearing. 606 F.2d 411,

414-15 (3d Cir. 1979). We reasoned that the hearing’s

outcome meant only that the plaintiff did not succeed on her

underlying substantive due process claim, even though the

fact of the hearing meant that she had prevailed on her

procedural due process claim. See id.

So too here. Even though E.R.’s parents did not

succeed with respect to their request for a permanent private

school placement, see Ridley II, 680 F.3d at 273-79, they did

prevail with respect to their procedural right to

reimbursement under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 20

U.S.C. § 1415(j). See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 117-19. Indeed,

§ 1415 has the heading “procedural safeguards,” and section

headings are “tools available for the resolution of a doubt

about the meaning of a statute.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v.

Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (quoting

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002)). Bagby thus

counsels in favor of deeming E.R.’s parents’ procedural

success a victory “on the merits” that conferred “prevailing

party” status. Bagby, 606 F.2d at 415.

Second, in People Against Police Violence v. City of

Pittsburgh, we held that the plaintiffs were “prevailing

parties” under § 1988 by virtue of an injunction that had

permanently prevented the defending city from enforcing an

unconstitutional ordinance; had granted the plaintiffs “what

they sought on an enduring basis”; and had been a temporary

or “preliminary” injunction only in the sense that it did not

apply to the city’s later-revised ordinance, which had

remedied the preexisting constitutional defects. 520 F.3d

226, 228-30, 232-36 (3d Cir. 2008). Given that the district

court’s analysis of claims and defenses with respect to the

14

unconstitutional first ordinance was independent of its

analysis with respect to the revised ordinance, we held that

the injunction afforded the plaintiffs “lasting relief on the

merits of their claims,” id. at 229-30, 234, providing “an

example of that rare situation where a merits-based

determination is made at the injunction stage,” Singer Mgmt.

Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir.

2011) (en banc).

Here, likewise, the particular claims and defenses

about E.R.’s educational placement, which the parties had

litigated in the IEP action, were independent of the claims and

defenses about Ridley’s “stay put” obligations, which the

parties litigated in the reimbursement action. Compare Ridley

IV, 744 F.3d at 120-28, with Ridley II, 680 F.3d at 267-83.

Because the presence of independent claims and defenses

signals the presence of independent merits, see People

Against Police Violence, 520 F.3d at 229-30, 234; see also

Sch. Dist. v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd. (In re Sch.

Asbestos Litig.), 842 F.2d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 1988), our

reasoning in People Against Police Violence, like our

decision in Bagby, favors the view that the reimbursement

obtained here, arising from claims and defenses that were

independent of those relating to E.R.’s IEP, conferred

“prevailing party” status to E.R.’s parents.

Read together, Bagby and People Against Police

Violence support an interpretation of “prevailing party” under

42 U.S.C. § 1988 that allows permanent procedural relief,

when the plaintiff has obtained it through an independent

merits determination, to confer “prevailing party” status.

Today we import that analysis into the IDEA context, where,

as we explain below, the IDEA’s statutory context and

“overall object” provide additional support for holding that

15

E.R.’s parents are prevailing parties. Long v. Tommy Hilfiger

U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting

Disabled in Action of Pa. v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d

Cir. 2008)).

2. Statutory Context

We read statutory provisions in context, see King v.

Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015), and must consider any

legislative findings that would “enable us to evaluate

[Congress’s] legislative judgment,” United States v. Lopez,

514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995). Here, Congress expressly

found that “[i]mproving educational results for children with

disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of

ensuring equality of opportunity . . . for individuals with

disabilities,” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1), and thus the statute

seeks to make “the education of children with disabilities . . .

more effective,” to “ensure that all children with disabilities

have available to them a free appropriate public education . . .

designed to meet their unique needs,” and to “ensure that the

rights of children with disabilities and parents of such

children are protected,” id. § 1400(c)(5), (d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B).

Along these lines, the IDEA’s legislative history reflects that

Congress enacted the attorneys’ fees provision specifically to

ensure “that due process procedures, including the right to

litigation if that [becomes] necessary, [are] available to all

parents.” S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985).

These child- and parent-friendly goals are not a reason

for us to interpret “prevailing party” under the IDEA any

differently than we would under other statutes, Buckhannon,

532 U.S. at 610; John T., 318 F.3d at 558, but, in considering

the statutory context, we must consider the practical

consequences of withholding attorneys’ fees in cases like this

16

one, see Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016);

Long, 671 F.3d at 375. After all, courts are “decidedly

receptive” to remedies that are “necessary or at least helpful

to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose.” Cannon v.

Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979).

We accordingly reject Ridley’s contention that any and

all relief relating to the IDEA’s “stay put” provision simply

cannot confer “prevailing party” status. Ridley’s position, if

made law, would render it impossible in many cases for

parents, who ordinarily cannot afford private counsel, to

enforce their “stay put” rights. See generally Kay v. Ehrler,

499 U.S. 432, 436 & n.8 (1991); Newman v. Piggie Park

Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). While we are

confident the vast majority of school districts view their

mission as collaborative, not adversarial, with parents in their

joint endeavor to provide children with meaningful

educational opportunities and appropriate support, we cannot

ignore the reality of occasional lapses. Nor can we allow

school districts that ignore their obligations under the IDEA’s

“stay put” provision to do so with impunity—a result that is

the antithesis of the IDEA’s goals. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d),

1415(f)-(j).

The IDEA’s statutory scheme accords far better with

an attorneys’ fee regime that allows parents to take effective

legal action if necessary to enforce their “stay put” rights.

Granted, fees are not available when parents seek a

forward-looking “stay put” injunction, see John T., 318 F.3d

at 558-60; J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74, but such injunctive relief

is often litigated as part and parcel of the underlying

proceedings about the child’s IEP or educational placement,

see, e.g., John T., 318 F.3d at 549-51, with a commensurate

reduction in the time and burden of litigation. By contrast,

17

when a school district violates its “stay put” obligations and

parents must take action—whether by motion or by separate

complaint—to obtain retrospective compensatory relief, then,

for all practical purposes, the resulting proceedings are

separate from any IEP or educational placement proceedings.

Our customary interpretation of the term “prevailing

party” and the statutory context of the fee provision at issue

compel us to consider not only the course charted by our prior

opinions, but also the real consequences of withholding

attorneys’ fees when parents obtain retrospective

compensatory relief arising from the IDEA’s “stay put”

provision. In situations like these, we conclude that the

parents are “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for an award of

attorneys’ fees under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).

B. Third Circuit Cases

Our previous opinions in the IDEA context buttress

our conclusion in this case. In P.N. ex rel. M.W. v. Clementon

Board of Education, for instance, we held that an award

reimbursing parents for the costs of supplemental services

conferred “prevailing party” status under the IDEA. See 442

F.3d at 850-51, 856-57. Likewise, after affirming the parents’

right to reimbursement for the costs of a child’s “stay put”

placement in Drinker ex rel. Drinker v. Colonial School

District, we stated that the parents were “entitled to renew

their motion for attorneys’ fees” on remand, thereby

confirming that the parents were prevailing parties. 78 F.3d

859, 863-68 (3d Cir. 1996). Even when discussing

reimbursement related to a temporary “stay put” educational

placement, thus, our prior opinions establish that retrospective

and compensatory relief can ground a fee award.

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Ridley, however, points to isolated phrases in John T.

and J.O. and contends they oblige us to hold that relief arising

from the IDEA’s “stay put” provision can never confer

“prevailing party” status. Not so. The school district ignores

the procedural postures of those cases, which, as discussed

above, involved forward-looking and temporary injunctive

relief, not backward-looking and compensatory relief that

requires an independent merits determination. See John T.,

318 F.3d at 549-51, 558-60 (preliminary injunction); J.O.,

287 F.3d at 269-70, 273-74 (order granting temporary

reinstatement to public school).

To be sure, the contempt order in John T. awarded

John T.’s parents $1100 as a rough estimate of the value of

services that the school district, in violating the district

court’s preliminary injunction, had refused to provide for a

particular month. John T., 318 F.3d at 551. But that

monetary award, in contrast to the compensatory relief

equating to actual damages awarded here, took the form of a

remedial civil sanction, existing not merely to remedy “losses

sustained due to noncompliance” but also to “coerce

compliance” with the district court’s underlying injunction.

Id. at 554 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v.

Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 735 (3d Cir. 1993)). For that reason,

the contempt order awarded an amount approximating John

T.’s parents’ losses, but did not purport to reimburse their

actual expenses. See McDowell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 423

F.3d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005); John T., 318 F.3d at 554.

As we explained in John T., the contempt order’s close

relationship with the underlying preliminary injunction alters

the nature of the “prevailing party” analysis for such an order:

a contempt order is considered “in . . . relation to the

underlying relief that it enforces” and cannot confer

19

“prevailing party” status unless the underlying relief does.

John T., 318 F.3d at 559-60. Accordingly, when the

underlying relief is forward-looking, injunctive, and

temporary, the contempt order is too. See id. And the basic

equivalence between a contempt order and the underlying

relief it enforces extends not only to the “prevailing party”

analysis, but also to whether the contempt order is appealable:

because “a civil contempt proceeding is a continuation of the

underlying civil action from which it arises,” in most cases

the contempt order is not immediately appealable when the

underlying action is not yet appealable. 3A Charles Alan

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 703, 714

(4th ed. 2017); see John T., 318 F.3d at 559; Halderman v.

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir.

1982). In John T., thus, the contempt order equated to a

rewriting of the underlying forward-looking and temporary

injunction in stronger terms, and hence it did not confer

“prevailing party” status. See John T., 318 F.3d at 559-60.

What we have here is something wholly different.

True, the reimbursement suit arose because of Ridley’s

refusal to obey its obligations under the IDEA’s “stay put”

provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), see Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at

119. But E.R.’s interim forward-looking right under

§ 1415(j) to stay in private school was not at issue, and, in

contrast to a contempt order that we must consider in relation

to an underlying preliminary injunction, cf. John T., 318 F.3d

at 559-60, or forward-looking and temporary injunctive relief,

cf. John T., 318 F.3d at 558-59; J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74,

E.R.’s parents’ reimbursement award equated to

backward-looking compensatory relief intended “to redress

the concrete loss that the plaintiff[s] . . . suffered by reason of

the defendant’s wrongful conduct,” State Farm Mut. Auto.

20

Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). The

reimbursement award, in other words, had its own,

independent merits and sought relief separate from any other

relief that E.R.’s parents had sought from Ridley—

characteristics that confer “prevailing party” status.

C. Other Circuits’ Cases

The distinction we adopt today between

forward-looking injunctive “stay put” relief and

backward-looking compensatory “stay put” relief accords

with the approaches taken by our Sister Circuits. On the one

hand, other Courts of Appeals addressing forward-looking

injunctive orders have held that “stay put” injunctions and

similar temporary orders relating to a child’s educational

placement cannot confer “prevailing party” status, as we did

in John T. and J.O.5 On the other hand, Courts of Appeals

addressing reimbursement awards in the broader context of

the IDEA have held generally that retrospective and

compensatory relief confers “prevailing party” status,6 and

5 See Tina M. ex rel. S.M. v. St. Tammany Parish Sch.

Bd., 816 F.3d 57, 58-62 (5th Cir. 2016); Bd. of Educ. v.

Nathan R. ex rel. Richard R., 199 F.3d 377, 382 (7th Cir.

2000); Bd. of Educ. v. Steven L. ex rel. Andrew L., 89 F.3d

464, 466-67, 469 (7th Cir. 1996); Christopher P. ex rel.

Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 797-98, 804-05 (2d Cir.

1990).

6 See T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d

469, 473, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2003); G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg

Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2003);

Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1433,

1439-40 (10th Cir. 1997).

21

both appellate and district courts have ruled, specifically in

the context of addressing backward-looking “stay put” relief

(analogous to the reimbursement award here) or similar

independent relief obtained under the IDEA, that such relief

does confer “prevailing party” status, consistent with our

conclusion today.7

* * *

For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the

IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), gives rise

to two concomitant rights. First, the provision establishes a

physical right for a child with a disability to “stay put” in her

7 See Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. & Mrs. R.,

321 F.3d 9, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2003); A.D. ex rel. L.D. v. Dep’t of

Educ., No. 12-0307, 2014 WL 692910, at *1, *3 (D. Haw.

Feb. 20, 2014); Dep’t of Educ. v. C.B. ex rel. Donna B.,

No. 11-0576, 2013 WL 704934, at *2-3, *6-7 (D. Haw. Feb.

26, 2013); Student X. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-2316,

2008 WL 4890440, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008); K.R. ex

rel. M.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 66 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450-51

(E.D.N.Y. 1999). Citing to Termine ex rel. Termine v.

William S. Hart Union High School District, Appellants point

out that a Ninth Circuit panel held that a tuition

reimbursement award “in a separate stay-put action” rendered

the parents “prevailing parties.” Appellants’ Br. 21 (citing

Termine, 288 F. App’x 360, 362 (9th Cir. 2008)). While we

agree that the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit panel is

persuasive, pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(a), we cannot

ascribe precedential value to Termine, which is an

unpublished and non-precedential opinion. See 9th Cir.

R. 36-3.

22

“then-current educational placement,” which is a temporary

right to forward-looking injunctive relief that does not

determine the merits of any claim. See Drinker, 78 F.3d at

864. Second, if a school district refuses to provide or pay for

the child’s “then-current educational placement,” the “stay

put” provision establishes the parents’ right to monetary

reimbursement or, alternatively, the child’s right to

compensatory education, both of which are rights to

backward-looking compensatory relief and require an

independent merits determination. See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at

119; see also Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d

865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990).

If the school district violates either right, then the

parents can bring administrative or judicial action to enforce

the violated right, and the parents’ eligibility for a fee award,

if they are successful, depends on the underlying right

enforced. Where the action enforces the child’s physical right

to “stay put” and the parents obtain temporary

forward-looking injunctive relief, there is no determination

“on the merits” and the parents are not eligible for a fee

award. See John T., 318 F.3d at 558-59. But where the

action enforces the parents’ right to reimbursement or the

child’s right to compensatory education and the parents

obtain backward-looking compensatory relief, the action

requires an independent merits determination and the parents

are eligible for a fee award.8

8 In the course of oral argument, the issue was raised

as to whether the “prevailing party” analysis is materially

different for actions commenced at the administrative level

and seeking backward-looking compensatory relief under the

IDEA’s “stay put” provision. For the avoidance of doubt, and

23

E.R.’s parents’ reimbursement litigation falls into the

latter category: When Ridley refused to pay for E.R.’s “stay

put” placement, E.R.’s parents sued for backward-looking

compensatory relief, and, when they won the relief they

sought, they obtained a merits-based victory. See Ridley IV,

744 F.3d at 117-28. E.R.’s parents are therefore “prevailing

part[ies]” under the IDEA and are eligible for an award of

attorneys’ fees, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), to be set by the

District Court.9

given that there is no exhaustion requirement for actions

seeking relief under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, see

Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d

195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2002), we hold that parents who obtain

backward-looking compensatory relief are prevailing parties

under the IDEA, whether they first pursue such relief in an

administrative agency or in a court.

9 In their application for attorneys’ fees and costs in

the District Court, counsel for E.R.’s parents made a lengthy

submission, including multiple declarations concerning the

hours expended and the prevailing rates for attorneys of

comparable experience. While we leave it to the District

Court on remand to consider the amount of E.R.’s parents’

fee award in the first instance, we note that the litigation here

was conducted by highly qualified and experienced counsel

and was itself extensive and protracted, with proceedings

spanning from March 2011 to April 2016 and encompassing

pleadings, motions, and briefing in the District Court; full

briefing and argument in the Court of Appeals; and

opposition to a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand

for proceedings consistent with this opinion.