Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.

Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw

Amarin Pharma Inc. v. U.S. FDA

Q: What was the outcome of Amarin Pharma Inc. v. U.S. FDA?

The outcome was: Based on the evidence that the parties have presented to the Court at this stage in the litigation, the Court holds that plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Attorney General from obtaining their Schedules B. Most importantly, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment unconstitutional burden claim is not likely to succeed because, on this record, the Attorney General has shown that the Schedule B policy substantially relates to the important governmental interests of enforcing charitable solicitation laws and overseeing charitable organizations for the protection of the public. These interests justify the minimal burdens that the Schedule B policy places on charities’ speech and association rights. Moreover, because the Attorney General does not possess unbridled discretion to impose conditions on the ability of charities to speak, plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their First Amendment prior restraint claim. Nor are plaintiffs likely to prevail on the remainder of their claims. Their due process and SAPA claims lack merit because the evidence in the record shows that plaintiffs had prior notice of the Attorney General’s interpretation of section 91.5, which was promulgated in accordance with SAPA’s notice-and-comment procedures. And because there is insufficient evidence that Congress intended to prevent state attorneys general from obtaining Schedule B directly from charities, plaintiffs are not likely to win their preemption challenge. Finally, plaintiffs have not shown that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, or that a preliminary injunction serves the public interest.

Q: Which court heard Amarin Pharma Inc. v. U.S. FDA?

This case was heard in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, NY. The presiding judge was Sidney H. Stein.

Q: Who were the attorneys in Amarin Pharma Inc. v. U.S. FDA?

Plaintiff's attorney: Leda Dunn Wettre, Christopher N. Sipes, Einar Stole, Michael N. Kennedy, Megan P. Keane. Defendant's attorney: Joel Kurtzberg, L. Howard Adams, Campbell Agyapong, Kevin M. W. Jacobs, David G. Januszewski.

Q: When was Amarin Pharma Inc. v. U.S. FDA decided?

This case was decided on November 15, 2015.

Date: 11-15-2015

Case Number: 14-Cv-3703

Judge: Sidney H. Stein

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Plaintiff's Attorney: Leda Dunn Wettre, Christopher N. Sipes, Einar Stole, Michael N. Kennedy,

Megan P. Keane

Defendant's Attorney: Joel Kurtzberg, L. Howard Adams, Campbell Agyapong, Kevin M. W. Jacobs,

David G. Januszewski

Description:

Amarin is a biopharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware and based in New

Jersey. Compl. ¶ 24. It and four medical doctors resident in New York2 (collectively, “Amarin”)

bring this suit against the FDA, two officials with responsibility over the FDA (Dr. Stephen

Ostroff and Sylvia Matthews Burwell), and the United States (collectively, the “FDA”).3 The

FDA is the federal agency responsible for approving, disapproving, and otherwise regulating

food, drugs, medical devices, and biologics under the FDCA. Id. ¶ 25.

In this background section, the Court first reviews the statutory and regulatory framework

under the FDCA governing the sale and marketing of drugs, the provisions relevant to the off-label

promotion of drugs, and the FDA’s response to date to the Caronia decision addressing the interplay

between these provisions and the First Amendment. The Court then reviews the FDA’s evaluation

of Vascepa and the basis for its decision to not approve it for the off-label use at issue here. The

Court then reviews this lawsuit and Amarin’s application for preliminary relief.

A. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework

1. Brief History of the FDCA

Before 1938, drug manufacturers could market drugs without premarket approval for

safety or effectiveness.4 In 1938, a year after more than 100 Americans died after ingesting a

toxic drug (elixir sulfanilamide), Congress enacted the FDCA.5

medicine in Mt. Kisco and Cortlandt Manor. Id. ¶ 22. Dr. Yung practices internal medicine and endocrinology in the Bronx. Id. ¶ 23. The Court refers to the four collectively as the “doctor plaintiffs.”

3 Dr. Ostroff is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs. Id. ¶ 26. He is the FDA’s most senior official, and is directly responsible for administering the FDCA. Id. Burwell, to whom Dr. Ostroff reports, is sued in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). Id. ¶ 27.

4 Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug Experiences: Congress Had Ample Evidence to Support Restrictions on the Promotion of Prescription Practices, 58 Food & Drug L.J. 299, 300 (2003) [hereinafter, “Waxman, A History”].

5 See Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA Consumer (June 1981), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/

4

As originally enacted, the FDCA required drugs to be approved for safety, but not for

effectiveness, before their introduction into the market. See Drug Industry Act of 1962, S. Rep.

No. 1744, at 37 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884 (reprinted at London Decl., Ex.

Z-4, at 8). As a result, even where the evidence did not support a manufacturer’s therapeutic

claims, the FDA still approved of drugs for general distribution as long as they were shown to be

“safe under conditions proposed for their use in the labeling.” Id.

This regulatory regime led to a profusion of drug advertising that had “a deliberate intent

to mislead.” Id.; see also The Drug Industry Antitrust Act of 1962: Hearings before the Antitrust

Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 67 (reprinted at London Decl., Ex.

AA-1, at 4) (“[T]he physician is bombarded with seductive advertising which fails to tell the

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. This often leads him into prescribing a new

drug without adequate warning or information about its possible side effects and, indeed, without

any solid clinical evidence that the drug is effective or is even as safe as the advertisers claim.”);

Waxman, A History, 58 Food & Drug L.J. at 301–02.

In response to rampant false and misleading advertising of drugs, Congress amended the

FDCA by enacting the Drug Amendments of 1962. These require manufacturers to demonstrate

that their drugs are both safe and effective for their intended uses before they are approved for

distribution. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (“Kefauver-Harris Amendments”); 21

U.S.C. § 355(a), (d).6 Specifically, the FDCA, as amended, provides that: “No person shall

ProductRegulation/SulfanilamideDisaster/default.htm.

6 See also Waxman, A History, 58 Food & Drug L.J. at 301 (“The hearings showed that the pharmaceutical marketplace was filled with misleading promotional material on which physicians relied, [and] that there was no reliable source of evidence from which physicians could tell effective drugs from ineffective drugs”).

5

introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug,” without the FDA’s

approval of a “new drug application,” which must demonstrate the drug’s safety and efficacy

through a series of pre-clinical and clinical trials, and must indicate the proposed labeling for the

drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355. FDA approval is therefore necessary before a manufacturer can

distribute a drug.

2. The Prescription and Use of Approved Drugs for Off-Label Purposes

Significant here, however, the FDA does not regulate doctors. After a drug has been

approved by the FDA, a doctor may lawfully prescribe it for both FDA-approved and non-FDA

approved (“off-label”) uses. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 153 (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’

Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001); Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1989);

John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label

Scientific and Medical Information, 10 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 299, 303 (2010)

(“Physicians may prescribe FDA-approved drugs . . . for any therapeutic use that is appropriate

in their medical judgment.”)).

The prescription of FDA-approved drugs for off-label purposes is widespread. The most

comprehensive study on off-label prescriptions in the United States, conducted in 2001, found

that approximately 21% of prescriptions were for off-label purposes. See Randall S. Stafford,

Regulating Off-Label Drug Use: Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 N. Engl. J. Med. 1427,

1427 (2008).7 In certain fields, off-label prescription is the norm rather than the exception. See

Euni Lee et al., Off-label prescribing patterns of antidepressants in children and adolescents, 21

7 See also Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for Regulating Off-label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 Duke L.J. 377, 388 (2014) (citing this study); Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate Off-label Drug Use, 41 J. L. Med. & Ethics 654, 656 (2013) (citing this as the “leading study tracking off-label uses”).

6

Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 137 (2012) (in 2000-2006 study, more than 90% of

antidepressants prescribed to children and adolescents in an outpatient care setting were for

off-label purposes); Douglas L. Leslie et al., Off-label use of antipsychotic medication in the

department of Veterans Affairs health system, 60 Psychiatric Servs. 1175 (2009) (based on

review of Veterans Affairs databases, more than 60% of prescriptions of antipsychotic drugs in

2007 were for off-label use); see also Ishaq Lat et al., Off-label medication use in adult Critical

care patients, 26 J. Critical Care 89, 91 (2010) (study of medication orders for 414 patients in 37

intensive care units across nation showed that more than 35% were for an off-label purpose and

that 97% of patients received at least one off-label medication).

And the therapeutic—indeed, sometimes life-saving—value of off-label uses of FDA

approved drugs has been widely recognized.

In the area of oncology, for example, doctors commonly prescribe drugs for off-label

purposes. For a doctor treating a cancer patient, the option of waiting years for possible FDA

approval of a new use for an existing drug will often be untenable, and drugs approved by the

FDA to treat one type of cancer have proven effective in combatting others, including by

reducing tumors or enhancing the effectiveness of chemotherapy.8 In 2009, in recognition that

certain drugs may be a cancer patient’s “last hope,” Medicare expanded its coverage of cancer

treatment drugs to include drugs not FDA-approved for that purpose. For example, Medicare

8 Am. Cancer Soc’y, Off-label Drug Use, http://www.cancer.org/treatment/ treatmentsandsideeffects/treatmenttypes/chemotherapy/off-label-drug-use (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).

7

today covers Gemzar, a drug that the FDA has approved to treat only four types of cancer, to

treat a dozen other cancers, including advanced cervical cancer.9

In other areas of medicine, too, there are numerous examples in which drugs have been

successfully prescribed to treat conditions other than those for which the FDA approved them.10

A doctor’s off-label prescription also may involve using a drug for an approved condition

but at an unapproved dosage or directed to an unapproved patient population. For example,

many drugs that the FDA has approved for use by adults have not been approved for pediatric

use, in some instances because of the challenges presented by testing drugs on infants and

children. As a result, the labels on these drugs lack instructions as to pediatric doses.

Pediatricians, however, commonly prescribe such drugs to children;11 this off-label usage has

9 Reed Abelson & Andrew Pollack, Medicare Widens Drugs It Accepts for Cancer, N.Y. Times (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/health/27cancer.html?pagewanted=all.

10 For example: (1) Viagra was originally approved to treat chest pain caused by heart disease, but was later prescribed off-label to treat erectile dysfunction, before it was approved for that use. James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 Annals Health L. 295, 298 (2003). (2) Aspirin also was prescribed off-label to reduce the risk of heart attacks, before the FDA approved that use in 1998. Id. (3) Avastin, a drug approved to treat cancer, has been widely prescribed by ophthalmologists to treat age-related macular degeneration, which causes vision loss and blindness. Press Release, National Institutes of Health, Avastin and Lucentis are equivalent in treating age-related macular degeneration (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.nih.gov/ news/health/apr2012/nei-30a.htm; see also Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, An effective eye drug is available for $50. But many doctors choose a $2,000 alternative, Wash. Post (Dec. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/an-effective-eye-drug-is-availablefor-50-but-many-doctors-choose-a-2000-alternative/2013/12/07/1a96628e-55e7-11e3-8304caf30787c0a9_story.html. And (4) scientists have discovered that patients with moderate to severe eczema can be successfully treated with a rheumatoid arthritis drug. Ziba Kashef, Yale researchers beat untreatable eczema with arthritis drug, YaleNews (July 20, 2015), http://news.yale.edu/2015/07/20/yale-researchers-beat-untreatable-eczema-arthritis-drug.

11 Jeffrey L. Blumer, Off-Label Uses of Drugs in Children, 104 Pediatrics 598, 602 (1999). As of 2014, less than half of FDA-approved drugs included specific labeling for children. Am. Academy of Pediatrics, AAP Makes Recommendations on Use of Off-Label Drugs for Children

8

proven effective in treating children for, among other things, severe emotional and behavioral

disorders,12 respiratory and allergic diseases,13 and pain.14

The FDA itself has long recognized the benefits of using prescription drugs for off-label

purposes. As early as 1982, the FDA stated that:

Once a product has been approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included in approved labeling. Such “unapproved” or, more precisely, “unlabeled” uses may be appropriate and rational in certain circumstances, and may, in fact, reflect approaches to drug therapy that have been extensively reported in medical literature.

U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Drug Bulletin, 12 FDA Drug Bull. 1, 5 (1982). And in 2009,

the FDA acknowledged that: “[O]ff-label uses or treatment regimens may be important and may

even constitute a medically recognized standard of care.”15 Court decisions in the area have

(Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/pages/AAP-MakesRecommendations-On-Use-of-Off-Label-Drugs-for-Children.aspx.

12 See, e.g., Joyce Nolan Harrison et al., Antipsychotic Medication Prescribing Trends in Children and Adolescents, 26 J. Pediatric Health Care 139 (2012).

13 See, e.g., Diana Silva et al., Off-label prescribing for allergic diseases in children, 7 World Allergy Organ. J. 4 (2014).

14 See, e.g., Christopher Wittich, Ten Common Questions (and Their Answers) About Off-label Drug Use, 87 Mayo Clinic Proceedings 982 (2012) (“For example, morphine has never received an FDA indication for pain treatment in children, but it is extensively used for this indication in hospitalized pediatric patients.”); see also Am. Academy of Pediatrics, Off-Label Medications Prescribed to Nearly All Pediatric Intensive Care Patients (Oct. 21, 2012), https://www.aap.org/ en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/Off-Label-Medications-Prescribed-to-Nearly-AllPediatric-Intensive-Care-Patients.aspx (in intensive care unit of an urban children’s hospital, offlabel treatments were ordered for 96% of all pediatric patients, and 100% of patients between ages 13–17, making “[t]reatment with off-label medications . . . the rule rather than the exception in the [pediatric intensive care unit].”).

15 U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Draft Guidance, Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices (2009), http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm.

9

similarly recognized this point. See, e.g., Caronia, 703 F.3d at 153; Wash. Legal Found. v.

Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56–58 (D.D.C. 1998) [hereinafter “Friedman”], amended, 36 F.

Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), appeal dismissed, judgment vacated in part sub nom., Wash. Legal

Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

3. The FDA’s Prohibition on the Promotion of Drugs for Off-Label Use

Notwithstanding the potential benefits of off-label use of approved drugs, the FDA has

long taken the position that a drug manufacturer who markets or promotes an approved drug for

an unapproved use violates the FDCA. This position reflects an application of, rather than an

explicit prohibition within, the FDCA; as the Second Circuit observed in Caronia: “The FDCA

and its accompanying regulations do not expressly prohibit the ‘promotion’ or ‘marketing’ of

drugs for off-label use.” 703 F.3d at 154.

Specifically, the FDA’s position is that a manufacturer who markets or promotes an off

label drug risks criminal liability for “misbranding” under 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), which prohibits

“[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug,

device, tobacco product, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.” Misbranding carries a

term of up to one year imprisonment and a fine of up to $1,000 per occurrence, see 21 U.S.C.

§ 333(a)(1), but if the defendant either acted with “the intent to defraud or mislead” or is a repeat

offender, a term of up to three years imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000 is authorized, see

id. § 333(a)(2).

Under the statute, a drug is misbranded if its labeling does not contain “adequate

directions for use.” Id. § 352(f).16 The FDA has defined “adequate directions for use” as

16 As summarized in Caronia: “A drug is also misbranded if, inter alia: its label is false or misleading; the label fails to display required information prominently; its container is

10

“directions under which the lay[person] can use a drug safely and for the purposes for which it is

intended.” 21 C.F.R. § 201.5. It has defined “intended use” as “the objective intent of the

persons legally responsible for the labeling of drugs”; “intended use” may be demonstrated by

“oral or written statements by such persons or their representatives” and “the circumstances that

the article is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and used for a

purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised.” Id. § 201.128.17

Among the materials that may serve as proof of a manufacturer’s intended use are

promotional statements by the company or its representatives. See id. § 201.5. “Off-label

promotional statements could thus presumably constitute evidence of an intended use of a drug

that the FDA has not approved.” Caronia, 703 F.3d at 155 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.5). FDA

regulations state that a manufacturer that wishes to market or promote an approved drug for a

new use (whether a new condition, dosage, or population) must submit a “supplemental new

drug application”; the drug must undergo new clinical trials to demonstrate its safety and

effectiveness for the new use. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70; Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 55. Until the

FDA has approved the new use, the manufacturer may not promote the drug for that use. 21

C.F.R. § 314.70.

misleading; or it is dangerous to health when used in the dosage, manner, frequency, or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested on the label.” 703 F.3d at 154 n.3 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(a)–(n))

17 The FDCA defines labeling to include all written, printed, or graphic material “(1) upon any [drug] or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such [drug].” 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) & (m). In addition to packaging and inserts, “labeling” has “been construed to include nearly every form of drug company promotional activity, including booklets, pamphlets, mailing pieces, bulletins, and all literature that supplements, explains, or is otherwise textually related to the product.” Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2) (1997); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948); United States v. Vitamin Indus., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 755, 765–66 (D. Neb. 1955)).

11

On the basis of these provisions, in recent years, federal prosecutors, in conjunction with

the FDA, have actively pursued criminal misbranding charges against pharmaceutical companies

and their sales representatives based on their promotion of approved drugs for non-approved

purposes.

For example, in 2012, GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK”) pled guilty in the District of

Massachusetts to introducing two misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, and paid a $1

billion fine and forfeiture. One misbranding charge was based on GSK’s promotion of the drug

Paxil for treating depression in patients under age 18; the FDA had not approved Paxil for

pediatric use. The other was based on GSK’s promotion of the drug Wellbutrin for weight loss,

and to treat sexual dysfunction, substance addictions, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder;

the FDA had approved the drug only to treat major depressive disorder.18 In 2012, Abbott

Laboratories Inc. (“Abbott Labs”) pled guilty in the Western District of Virginia to misbranding

the drug Depakote, and paid a $500 million fine. The FDA had approved Depakote only for

epileptic seizures, bipolar mania, and the prevention of migraines, but Abbott Labs had promoted

it for other uses, including treating schizophrenia.19 And in 2010, Allergan Inc. (“Allergan”)

pled guilty in the Northern District of Georgia to misbranding based on its off-label promotion of

the therapeutic version of Botox, and paid a $375 million fine. The FDA had approved Botox to

18 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraudallegations-and-failure-report.

19 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve Criminal & Civil Investigations of Off-label Promotion of Depakote (May 7, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abbott-labs-pay-15-billion-resolve-criminal-civil-investigationslabel-promotion-depakote [hereinafter, “Abbott Labs DOJ”].

12

treat crossed eyes, involuntary eyelid and neck muscle contraction, excessive underarm sweating,

and adult upper-limb spasticity, but Allergan had promoted it for headache, pain, spasticity, and

juvenile cerebral palsy.20 See also Caronia, 703 F.2d at 154 (listing examples of enforcement

action); Kurtzberg Decl., Exs. 1–3 (same).

In instances where a manufacturer’s statements promoting a drug’s off-label use are

untrue or misleading or may promote unsafe usage, the FDA has explained, such misbranding

actions further public safety. There are many examples in which prescriptions of an approved

drug for off-label use has caused harm. For example, Gabitril, a drug approved to treat partial

seizures, was prescribed off-label to treat psychiatric conditions, but caused patients to suffer

seizures and status epilepticus.21 And the off-label use of quinine for nocturnal leg cramps

caused adverse reactions, including thrombocytopenia and gastrointestinal bleeding.22

More broadly, the FDA has stated, its goal in pursuing misbranding charges against

manufacturers based on the off-label promotion of drugs is to encourage use of the FDA’s drug

review and approval process. Such prosecutions, the FDA has stated, deter manufacturers from

20 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/allergan-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-600-million-resolveallegations-label-promotion-botox [hereinafter, “Allergan DOJ”].

21 Tewodros Eguale et al., Drug, Patient, and Physician Characteristics Associated with Offlabel Prescribing in Primary Care, 172 Archives Internal Med. 781 (2012); see also Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Information for Healthcare Professionals: Tiagabine hydrochloride (marketed as Gabitril) – Seizures in Patients without Epilepsy (February 18, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationfor PatientsandProviders/ucm126114.htm.

22 Eguale, supra note 21; see also Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Drug Safety Communication: New risk management plan and patient medication guide for Qualaquin (quinine sulfate) (July 8, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrug SafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm218202.htm.

13

evading the FDA’s review process for additional uses of approved drugs. For example, in

announcing the settlement with Allergan regarding Botox, the FDA stated: “The FDA approval

process ensures that pharmaceutical companies market their medications for uses that are proven

to be safe and effective, and this case demonstrates that companies that fail to comply with these

rules face criminal prosecution and stiff penalties.”23 And in describing its settlement with

Abbott Labs regarding Depakote, the FDA stated that the settlement reflected the agency’s

commitment to “hold[ing] pharmaceutical companies accountable for marketing practices that

undermine the drug approval process.”24

In addition to facing criminal exposure for misbranding, a drug manufacturer who

promotes a drug for off-label use may face civil suit under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31

U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., on the theory that the company, in the course of its off-label promotion,

caused false claims to be submitted to government health care programs for non-covered and

non–FDA-approved uses.25 In recent years, the Government has brought FCA claims on this

theory, often in conjunction with criminal prosecutions under the FDCA for misbranding.

4. The FDA’s Regulations as to Manufacturers’ Marketing Materials and Responses to Inquiries Regarding Off-Label Usage

A final set of relevant FDA regulations are those relating to a manufacturer’s marketing

materials. When a manufacturer applies for approval to market a new drug, it must submit to the

23 Allergan DOJ.

24 Abbott Labs DOJ.

25 Under the FCA, a person who knowingly “causes to be presented a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or who knowingly makes or causes to be made “a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim” to the United States Government must pay, per claim, a civil penalty of between $5,000 to $10,000, and may also be required to pay treble damages. 31 U.S.C. § 3729.

14

FDA “specimens of mailing pieces and any other labeling or advertising devised for promotion

of the drug product at the time of initial dissemination of the labeling and at the time of initial

publication of the advertisement for a prescription drug product.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(B)(3)(i);

id. § 601.12(f)(4). Otherwise, the FDA generally does not require a manufacturer to seek pre

approval of materials promoting a drug for an FDA-approved purpose.26

The FDA does, however, encourage manufacturers to request advisory comments before

a drug’s launch, with respect to promotional materials aimed at healthcare professionals.27 Such

materials may include sales or visual aids, advertisements in medical journals, and product

websites.28 The FDA’s Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (the “OPDP”) reviews such

materials to ensure, inter alia, that they are not false or misleading; it provides written comments

on proposed materials, reviews complaints of alleged violations, and initiates enforcement

actions as to materials it finds false or misleading.29 The OPDP also operates a “Bad Ad”

26 U.S. Food and Drug Admin., OPDP Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), http://www.fda.gov/ AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm090308.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2015). 27 See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Providing Regulatory Submissions in Electronic and NonElectronic Format—Promotional Labeling and Advertising Materials for Human Prescription Drugs Guidance for Industry (2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidance ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM443702.pdf [hereinafter, “FDA Promotional Guidance”]; 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j)(4).

28 FDA Promotional Guidance, at 8.

29 U.S. Food and Drug Admin., The Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/uc m090142.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).

15

program that receives reports of alleged violations of the FDA’s restrictions on promotion,

including reports of promotion of a drug for an unapproved use.30

The FDA also has issued draft guidance as to how manufacturers should respond to

unsolicited requests for off-label information about prescription drugs.31

If a person makes a private unsolicited request for off-label information, the

manufacturer should disseminate information only to that person and tailored to answer only the

requester’s specific question. The information disseminated must be truthful, non-misleading,

accurate, and balanced. The FDA further recommends that responses to questions or requests for

information about off-label usage be referred to the manufacturer’s medical or scientific

representative or department, and that sales and marketing personnel have no input on the

content of the manufacturer’s response. Manufacturers are required to maintain records of all

such requests for information and of the information that was provided in response.32

If a person makes a public unsolicited request for off-label information (for example, on

an Internet forum), the FDA requires that the manufacturer provide only its contact information,

30 See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Truthful Prescription Drug Advertising and Promotion, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ Surveillance/DrugMarketingAdvertisingandCommunications/ucm209384.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); see also U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Key Points of the Bad Ad Program, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/DrugMarke tingAdvertisingandCommunications/ucm211498.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2015). If the OPDP determines that a promotion is illegal, it will initiate enforcement by issuing an Untitled Letter, a Warning Letter, or a referral for criminal investigation. Id.

31 See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label Information About Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices (2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ Guidances/UCM285145.pdf.

32 Id. at 7–9.

16

and not include any off-label information, even if it is truthful and non-misleading. The FDA

advises the manufacturer to state that the question raised pertains to an unapproved use and that

the individual can contact the manufacturer’s medical/scientific representative or medical affairs

department with the specific unsolicited request to obtain more information.33

5. The Decision in Caronia and the FDA’s Regulatory Response

Before Caronia, only limited First Amendment challenges to the FDA’s policies with

respect to the off-label promotion of approved drugs had reached the courts, and none had

challenged the FDA’s application of the misbranding provisions to truthful and non-misleading

promotional statements.

Most notable of these First Amendment challenges was the 1998 decision in Friedman,

supra. The plaintiff there, a public interest group, sought to enjoin as facially unconstitutional

FDA policies (expressed in guidance documents) that had restricted manufacturers from

distributing textbook excerpts and article reprints from medical and scientific journals to the

extent they (1) addressed off-label uses of FDA-approved drugs and (2) were truthful and non

misleading. The district court rejected the FDA’s argument that these communications proposed

an illegal transaction and thus were unprotected. 13 F. Supp. 2d at 62–65; see Wash. Legal

Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2000). It held that the communications were

commercial speech and that the FDA’s restrictions were unconstitutional under the test for

commercial speech of Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Communication

of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Although recognizing that the FDA’s policies advanced a

substantial government interest in requiring manufacturers to submit supplemental applications

33 Id. at 11.

17

for new drug uses, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70–73, the court held the FDA’s restrictions on such speech

were more extensive than necessary, and thus breached the First Amendment, id. at 65–69, 72–

74. It enjoined the FDA from prohibiting manufacturers from distributing the reprints and

excerpts “regardless of whether such [materials] include[] a significant or exclusive focus” on

off-label uses. Id. at 74–75. However, while the case was on appeal, the FDA adopted a much

narrower construction of its guidance documents. This mooted the controversy and caused the

injunction to be lifted.34

The Second Circuit’s 2012 decision in Caronia addressed, for the first time, the interplay

between the FDCA’s misbranding provisions and the First Amendment. A drug manufacturer’s

sales representative, Caronia, was caught on tape touting to doctors the drug Xyrem, which the

FDA had approved to treat narcoleptic patients, for unapproved uses. Caronia was charged and

convicted of conspiracy to misbrand based on his truthful statements regarding those off-label

34 Specifically, after the injunction had issued, the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (“FDAMA”) took effect. FDAMA permits a manufacturer to disseminate “written information concerning the safety, effectiveness, or benefit of a use not described in the approved labeling of a drug or device,” under certain conditions. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(a)). The FDA took the position that the district court’s application of Central Hudson in Friedman restricted only the FDA guidance documents at issue and did not bear on FDAMA. Friedman, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 18. The district court held, however, that its ruling and injunction applied more broadly than to the specific guidance documents at issue. Id. After supplemental briefing on the constitutionality of FDAMA’s restrictions on manufacturer promotion of offlabel uses, the district court held that those provisions, like the earlier guidance documents, facially violated the First Amendment. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999). The FDA appealed the district court’s rulings both as to FDAMA and the guidance documents. At argument before the D.C. Circuit, the FDA adopted a much narrower construction of FDAMA and the guidance documents than previously articulated; the new construction, the plaintiff agreed, eliminated its claim of a facial First Amendment violation. The D.C. Circuit accordingly dismissed the FDA’s appeal and vacated the district court’s decisions to the extent they had declared FDAMA and the FDA’s guidance unconstitutional. Henney, 202 F.3d at 336–37.

18

uses. Vacating the conviction, the Second Circuit held that a manufacturer’s speech promoting

off-label use is constitutionally protected commercial speech, and that the First Amendment

places limits on a misbranding prosecution to the extent it is based on the truthful promotion of

FDA-approved drugs for off-label use. Applying the principle of constitutional avoidance, the

Circuit held that the FDCA’s misbranding provisions could not be construed “to criminalize the

simple promotion of a drug’s off-label use by pharmaceutical manufacturers and their

representatives because such a construction—and a conviction obtained under [this] application

of the FDCA—would run afoul of the First Amendment.” 703 F.3d at 162. Thus, the Circuit

held, “[t]he government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives

under the FDCA for speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.” Id.

at 169.

Later, the Court reviews Caronia in detail, see infra, pp. 43–53, because, unlike Amarin,

and unlike much secondary commentary,35 the FDA reads that decision narrowly, and as turning

on the particular circumstances of Caronia’s trial. The FDA thereby reads Caronia to preserve

for the Government the ability to bring a misbranding action against a manufacturer or its

representative where the conduct at issue consists solely of truthful and non-misleading speech

promoting an off-label use of an approved drug. This reading of Caronia is reflected in the

position the FDA has taken in this case.

35 Commentators have widely viewed Caronia as consequential in the area of commercial speech and as imposing significant limits on prosecutions for misbranding. See, e.g., Peter G. Neiman, Seth B. Orkand, & Peter K. Vigeland, Revisiting ‘Off-Label’ Drug Promotion Resolutions in Light of ‘Caronia,’ N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 28, 2013); Alison Frankel, Why U.S. is forgoing appeal of landmark 2nd Circuit off-label ruling, Reuters (Jan. 24, 2013); John Bentivoglio, How Caronia Could Reshape Government Investigations, Law360 (Jan. 2, 2013); David Frum, Drug industry’s free speech helps doctors, CNN (Dec. 10, 2012); Katie Thomas, Ruling is Victory for Drug Companies in Promoting Medicine for Other Uses, N.Y. Times (Dec. 3, 2012).

19

In February 2014, the FDA responded to Caronia by issuing updated draft guidance as to

the dissemination of scientific or medical journal articles. The FDA authorized manufacturers to

distribute such articles relating to unapproved uses of drugs, under certain conditions.36 When a

manufacturer distributes journal articles that include information on off-label uses of its drug, the

FDA stated, it will not use the fact of such distribution as evidence of the manufacturer’s intent

that the drug be used for an unapproved use, provided that the manufacturer makes certain

disclosures with the articles. But, the FDA has stated, if a sales representative characterizes an

article to suggest that a drug is safe or effective for an unapproved use, the agency may use such

speech as evidence that the manufacturer intended to promote that use.37

Separately, in June 2014, the FDA agreed, in response to a citizen petition, to conduct a

“comprehensive review [of its] regulatory regime governing communications about medical

products,” with the intent to issue, within a year, new guidance regarding such issues.38 As of

this decision, no such guidance has issued. During this litigation, the FDA told Amarin that

“new guidance will be forthcoming,”39 but at argument on July 7, 2015, the FDA declined to

state what the status or timetable is with respect to such guidance. Tr. 73–74.

36 See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Distributing Scientific and Medical Publications on Unapproved New Uses—Recommended Practices (2012), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm 387652.pdf.

37 Id. at 3.

38 Citizen Petition Response from Leslie Kux, J.D., Assistant Commissioner for Policy, FDA, to Alan R. Bennett, Ropes & Gray, et al., Docket Nos. FDA-2011-P-0512 and FDA-2013-P-1079, FDA (June 6, 2014) (reprinted at London Decl., Ex. Q).

39 See Dkt. 24, Ex. A, at 5–6 (“Woodcock Letter”).

20

B. History of the FDA’s Review of Vascepa

1. Overview

Vascepa was developed by Amarin to improve cardiovascular health. It is composed of

pure eicosapentaenoic acid (“EPA”), an omega-3 fatty acid.40 Amarin has sought FDA approval

for two separate uses of Vascepa.

First, on September 25, 2011, Amarin sought, and on July 26, 2012, received, FDA

approval to market Vascepa for treating adult patients with triglyceride levels above 500 mg/dL

of blood (“severe hypertriglyceridemia,” or “very high triglycerides”). Persons with severe

hypertriglyceridemia have increased risk of pancreatitis and cardiovascular disease. See

Ketchum Decl., Ex. 1 (“FDA Approval Letter”), at 1 (approving new drug application for use of

Vascepa “as an adjunct to diet to reduce triglyceride . . . levels in adult patients with severe . . .

hypertriglyceridemia”); Ketchum Decl., Ex. 2 (“FDA-approved label for Vascepa”); see also

Woodcock Letter, at 1–2. The FDA approved Vascepa based on a showing that Vascepa was

effective in reducing very high triglyceride levels. FDA Approval Letter, at 1.

Second, Amarin has sought approval to market Vascepa for patients with triglyceride

levels between 200 and 499 mg/dL of blood and who are already on statin therapy (“persistently

high triglycerides”). This second use is the off-label use at issue in this case. It is undisputed

that Vascepa is effective in reducing such triglyceride levels, as reflected in an FDA-approved

study (the “ANCHOR study”) of this point and as confirmed by the FDA in correspondence with

Amarin. It is also undisputed that Vascepa is safe, insofar as it is safely used for persons with

severe hypertriglyceridemia and, as discussed further below, the FDA has allowed a chemically

similar dietary supplement to be sold to the public. The FDA, however, has denied Amarin’s

40 Woodcock Letter, at 1.

21

application for approval of this second use because recent scientific studies have left it unclear

whether reducing the triglyceride levels of persons with persistently high triglycerides reduces

cardiovascular risk.

2. Clinical Trials of Vascepa for Patients with Persistently High Triglycerides

The following recaps the relevant history of the FDA’s review of Vascepa for the second

use—for patients with persistently high triglyceride levels.

While completing the study that led to FDA approval of Vascepa for the treatment of

patients with very high triglycerides (the “MARINE” study), Amarin sought to examine the

effect of Vascepa in treating persistently high triglyceride levels. It did so pursuant to the FDA’s

“special protocol assessment,” or “SPA,” program. An SPA agreement is a written agreement

that a manufacturer may enter into with the FDA, which sets out the design and size parameters

for clinical trials of a new drug, and the conditions under which the FDA would approve the

drug.41 For the manufacturer, such an agreement minimizes development risk by providing

regulatory predictability: Provided that the manufacturer follows the procedure set in the SPA

agreement and the drug proves meets the benchmarks for effectiveness set in the agreement, the

FDA must approve the drug. The FDA can rescind an SPA agreement only if “a substantial

scientific issue essential to determining the safety or effectiveness of the drug has been identified

after the testing has begun.”42

41 U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Special Protocol Assessment (2002), at 2, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm080571.pdf [hereinafter, “SPA Guidance”].

42 Id. at 10.

22

Amarin’s SPA agreement with the FDA regarding Vascepa for the second use was

entered into on July 6, 2009. London Decl., Ex. B (“ANCHOR SPA Agreement”). The

agreement set out the design of a clinical trial (the “ANCHOR study”) to test whether Vascepa

was effective at lowering triglycerides in patients with persistently high triglyceride levels.

ANCHOR SPA Agreement, at 1. The ANCHOR study was also designed to test the numerical

effect of Vascepa on other lipid, lipoprotein, and inflammatory parameters relevant to

cardiovascular health, such as non-HDL cholesterol. Id. Amarin also agreed to undertake a

separate clinical study, aimed at testing whether Vascepa was effective in helping prevent major

cardiovascular events in high-risk patients, including those with persistently high triglyceride

levels. This study was called “REDUCE-IT.” The FDA required that Amarin enroll at least

50% of planned patients in the REDUCE-IT study before it would accept for review Amarin’s

application for approval of Vascepa for patients with persistently high triglycerides under the

ANCHOR SPA Agreement.43 This requirement was designed to ensure that the clinical study

aimed at testing Vascepa’s effect on cardiovascular risk reduction was well underway before the

FDA decided whether to approve the use of Vascepa in treating such patients.

Consistent with this, on August 5, 2011, while the ANCHOR test was ongoing, Amarin

entered into another SPA agreement with the FDA, this one keyed to the REDUCE-IT study.

See London Decl., Ex. E (“REDUCE-IT SPA Agreement”). The REDUCE-IT study is ongoing.

It is expected to be completed by the end of 2017, with results to be available in 2018. Ketchum

Decl. ¶ 71.

43 According to Amarin, this enrollment requirement cost the company more than $100 million, and caused a more-than-16-month delay in Amarin’s submission of its supplemental new drug application. Compl. ¶ 66.

23

The ANCHOR study achieved each numeric objective that the SPA Agreement had set:

The results showed that Vascepa produced a statistically significant decrease in triglyceride

levels in persons with persistently high triglycerides, as well as in other lipid, lipoprotein, and

inflammatory biomarkers. Id. ¶ 62; Christie M. Ballantyne et al., Efficacy and Safety of

Eicosapentaenoic Acid Ethyl Ester (AMR101) Therapy in Statin-Treated Patients with Persistent

High Triglycerides (from the ANCHOR Study), 110 Am. J. of Cardiology 984, 985, 987 (2012)

(reprinted in Ketchum Decl., Ex. 5).

On February 21, 2013, Amarin submitted a supplemental new drug application to the

FDA, based on the ANCHOR trial results and the ANCHOR SPA Agreement.44 London Decl.,

Ex. H, at 1 (“Feb. 21, 2013 Amarin SNDA Letter”). Because Amarin had met all requirements

for approval set out in the ANCHOR SPA Agreement, Amarin anticipated that the FDA would

approve Vascepa for the additional use that Amarin sought, i.e., by patients with persistently

high triglycerides. Ketchum Decl. ¶ 79.

However, on October 16, 2013, the FDA convened a public Advisory Committee

regarding Vascepa to determine if reductions in triglyceride levels, as demonstrated in the

ANCHOR study results, would reduce cardiovascular risk. Ketchum Decl., Ex. 109 (“10/16/13

Tr.”); see also Ketchum Decl., Ex. 111 (“FDA SPA Rescind Agreement Letter”). The FDA

noted that three different clinical trials (the ACCORD-Lipid, AIM-HIGH, and HPS2-THRIVE

studies) involving other manufacturers’ triglyceride-reducing drugs (which each used either

44 Amarin and the FDA amended the ANCHOR SPA Agreement in May 2010. The substance of these amendments is not relevant here. References here to the ANCHOR SPA Agreement after May 2010 are to the agreement as amended.

24

fenofibrates or niacin)45 had found that the reduction of triglyceride levels in patients with

persistently high triglycerides had had no impact on the risk of cardiovascular events. Id. at 1.

The FDA Advisory Committee concluded that although Amarin had satisfied the terms of the

ANCHOR SPA Agreement and that Vascepa had reduced triglyceride levels in patients with

persistently high triglycerides, there was “substantial uncertainty” whether reducing triglyceride

levels would significantly reduce the risk for cardiovascular events in such patients. Id. at 2.

On October 29, 2013, the FDA rescinded the ANCHOR SPA Agreement, finding that a

“substantial scientific issue” had arisen as to whether the reduction of triglyceride levels alone

established an effective reduction in overall cardiovascular risk in patients with persistently high

triglyceride levels. Id. Amarin appealed the decision through three successive levels of FDA

review. See London Decl., Ex. G (“April 22, 2014 FDA Appeal Denied Letter”); London Decl.,

Ex. K (“Sept. 11, 2014 FDA Appeal Denied Letter”).

3. The FDA’s April 27, 2015 Complete Response Letter

On April 27, 2015, the FDA issued its Complete Response Letter (“CRL”), a central

document here. See London Decl., Ex. M. The FDA there acknowledged that the ANCHOR

study had been carried out consistent with its specifications. It also acknowledged that Vascepa

had significantly reduced triglyceride levels in patients with persistently high such levels, and

had met the statistical “endpoints,” or goals, set in the ANCHOR study. The FDA noted that the

“primary endpoint” of that study had been the percentage change in triglyceride levels during a

12-week period of usage by such statin-treated patients. It recognized that the patients in the

45 Amarin claims that fenofibrates and niacin are “in different drug classes than Vascepa, work differently in the body, and showed less favorable safety profiles than Vascepa in their clinical trials.” Ketchum Decl. ¶ 82.

25

study who had used Vascepa experienced a 21.5% “treatment difference” over those who had

used a placebo (mineral oil), controlling for all other variables. Id. at 1.

However, the FDA refused to approve Amarin’s proposed new use for Vascepa to lower

triglyceride levels among such patients. It explained that the “clinical rationale,” or premise, of

the ANCHOR study had been that reducing triglyceride levels in that population would reduce

the risk of cardiovascular events. But, the FDA stated, the results of the clinical trials involving

other drugs that had also reduced triglyceride levels had yielded “insufficient data to support a

drug-induced change in serum [triglycerides] as a surrogate for reducing [cardiovascular] risk in

this population.” Id. at 2. These trials “failed to demonstrate any additional benefit” of such

drugs, and although some later analyses had suggested that patients with high triglycerides may

benefit from using such drugs, “this remains to be confirmed.” Id. The FDA added: “Given the

current level of uncertainty regarding the benefits of drug-induced changes in lipid/lipoprotein

parameters on [cardiovascular] risk among statin-treated patients with residually high

[triglycerides], you will need to provide evidence that Vascepa reduces the risk of major adverse

[cardiovascular] events in patients at high risk for cardiovascular disease . . . . We anticipate that

the final results from the REDUCE-IT trial could be submitted to satisfy this deficiency.” Id. at

2. Accordingly, the FDA stated, before it would approve Vascepa for use in patients with

persistently high triglycerides, Amarin would need to supply evidence, such as from the ongoing

REDUCE-IT study, that the drug reduces the risk of cardiovascular events. Id.

The FDA also refused to approve Amarin’s request to include the ANCHOR results in

the Vascepa label. It “reserve[d] comment until the application is otherwise adequate.” Id.

26

In the penultimate sentence of the CRL, the FDA stated: “This product [Vascepa] may

be considered to be misbranded under the [FDCA] if it is marketed with this change before

approval of this supplemental application.” Id. at 4.46 The CRL did not elaborate on this point.

C. This Litigation

1. The Complaint

On May 7, 2015, 10 days after receiving the CRL, Amarin and the doctor plaintiffs filed

the Complaint. Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”). It brought an as-applied First Amendment challenge to FDA

regulations that prohibit Amarin “from making completely truthful and non-misleading

statements about its product to sophisticated healthcare professionals,” including the doctor

plaintiffs. Compl. ¶ 1.

Specifically, the Complaint alleged that Amarin wishes to make truthful statements to

healthcare professionals (hereinafter, “doctors”) regarding Vascepa, including that the ANCHOR

study demonstrates that Vascepa significantly reduces triglyceride levels in patients with

persistently high triglyceride levels. But, it alleged, Amarin is inhibited from doing so by the

FDA’s threat, articulated in the CRL, to bring a misbranding action based on such off-label

promotion.

The Complaint alleged that doctors desire and may act on this information: “[D]octors

across America” commonly prescribe drugs to treat “patients at risk for cardiovascular disease

and who have persistently high triglyceride levels in their blood (i.e., high despite statin therapy)

to lower those patients’ triglycerides and/or non-HDL cholesterol.” Id. ¶ 2. Prescribing such

46 The same day it issued the CRL, the FDA rescinded its approval for the drugs of the other manufacturers (i.e., those containing fenofibrates and niacin) that it cited as having reduced triglyceride levels in patients with persistently high triglycerides. Ketchum Decl., Exs. 118–19, 122. The manufacturers of those drugs were, like Amarin, thus prohibited from promoting their drugs for that patient population. Id.

27

drugs “is a medically-accepted practice supported by numerous national and international

cardiovascular treatment guidelines and position statements”; doctors do so “because, in their

medical judgment, drug therapy is the best course of treatment for these patients.” Id. (footnote

citing treatment guidelines and position statements omitted). Moreover, doctors prescribe such

drugs “even though there is not yet definitive clinical evidence affirmatively demonstrating that

lowering triglyceride levels and/or non-HDL cholesterol levels in such patients ultimately

reduces cardiovascular risk.” Id. ¶ 6. Such doctors, the Complaint alleged, “need truthful and

non-misleading information about these drugs to make informed decisions about what is best for

their patients,” but the “[FDA]’s current regime for regulating the flow of ‘off-label’ information

to doctors about prescription drugs . . . severely restricts medical professionals’ access to

information from the source most knowledgeable about the drugs: the drug manufacturers—in

this case, Amarin.” Id. ¶ 3.

As to Vascepa specifically, the Complaint stated, the FDA does not dispute that an

FDA-approved “double-blind, placebo-controlled trial”—the ANCHOR study—had

“demonstrat[ed] that Vascepa reduces triglyceride levels and has other favorable effects in adult

patients with persistently high triglycerides.” Id. ¶ 7. But, it alleged, because the FDA had

refused to approve Vascepa for use in treating this patient population, “Amarin now finds itself

in a bind”:

Using pharmaceuticals like Vascepa in the treatment of patients with persistently high triglycerides is commonplace in medical practice.47 However, because FDA has refused to approve Vascepa for patients with persistently high triglycerides, Amarin may not communicate truthful and non-misleading information about Vascepa to healthcare professionals such as the Doctor Plaintiffs without fear of criminal prosecution and civil liability. That is because FDA regulations forbid promotion of drugs for unapproved or “off-label” uses, even if such promotion is

47 Amarin has stated that, in the year ending in March 2014, more than 50% of Vascepa prescriptions were for patients with persistently high triglycerides. Ketchum Decl., Ex. 25.

28

entirely truthful and presented in a non-misleading manner. . . . FDA’s treatment of Vascepa therefore operates to keep doctors, such as the Doctor Plaintiffs, and consequently their patients, in the dark about all of the options for drug therapy they are legally empowered to prescribe to treat persistently high triglyceride levels.”

Id. ¶¶ 8–9.

Separately, the Complaint alleged, the FDA’s restrictions on off-label promotion of

Vascepa harm Amarin because the FDA had—until recently—“permitted manufacturers of other

triglyceride-lowering drugs, such as fenofibrates, niacin, and another omega-3 fatty acid-based

drug, to market their drugs for treatment of persistently high triglycerides.” Id. ¶ 9. Amarin,

however, is prohibited from communicating to doctors information about Vascepa, a “treatment

alternative.” Id. Further, the Complaint alleged, the FDA’s ban on off-label promotion of

Vascepa prevented it from making the same “qualified health claim” that the FDA, for more than

a decade, has allowed manufacturers of dietary supplements containing a chemically identical

omega-3 fatty acid to make to consumers: “Supportive but not conclusive research shows that

consumption of EPA and DHA omega-3 fatty acids may reduce the risk of coronary artery

disease.” Id. ¶ 11. This, the Complaint alleged, has led doctors “to advise their patients to take

omega-3 dietary supplements instead of pharmaceuticals like Vascepa.” Id. ¶ 116.

The Complaint therefore sought relief recognizing that the “FDA’s prohibitions on ‘off

label’ promotion, as applied to truthful and non-misleading speech Amarin wishes to make,” are

unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and that Amarin may engage in truthful and

non-misleading speech to doctors about Vascepa free from the risk of criminal prosecution even

if such speech constitutes off-label promotion. Id. ¶ 14. Such a holding, the Complaint stated,

“falls squarely within Second Circuit precedent.” Id. (citing Caronia).

The Complaint sought protection for Amarin’s speech both at a general and a statement

specific level. As to the former, Amarin sought relief confirming that, free from the threat of a

29

misbranding action, it may engage in truthful and non-misleading speech with doctors intended

to promote Vascepa for off-label use, and that its right to engage in such speech includes the

right to initiate discussions on that subject and to engage in a dialogue with doctors about it. See,

e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19. As to the latter, Amarin sought a ruling permitting it to make to doctors,

free from the threat of such an action, specific “carefully-circumscribed, truthful, and

scientifically-accurate statements,” id. ¶ 15, each drawn from either the ANCHOR study, the

CRL letter, or other FDA-approved language. The three specific statements for which Amarin

sought such comfort were48: • Statement #1: “Supportive but not conclusive research shows that consumption of EPA and DHA omega-3 fatty acids may reduce the risk of coronary heart disease.” • Statement #2: “The ANCHOR study demonstrates that Vascepa lowers triglyceride levels in patients with high triglyceride levels not controlled by diet and statin therapy.” • Statement #3: “In the ANCHOR study, Vascepa 4g/day significantly reduced TG [triglycerides], non-HDL-C [non-high density lipoprotein cholesterol or non-“good cholesterol”], Apo B [Apolipoprotein B], VLDLC [very-low-density lipoprotein cholesterol], TC [total cholesterol] and HDL-C [high density lipoprotein cholesterol or “good cholesterol”] levels from baseline relative to placebo in patients with high (≥200 mg/dL and 200 mg/dL and < 500 mg/dL) triglyceride levels. FDA declined to approve this indication because the available evidence does not establish that reducing triglycerides

33

with a drug reduces the risk of cardiovascular events among patients already treated with statins.”; and • FDA Disclosure #3: “Recent cardiovascular outcome trials (ACCORDLipid, AIM-HIGH, and HPS2-THRIVE) each failed to demonstrate incremental cardiovascular benefit of adding a second lipid-altering drug (fenofibrate or formulations of niacin), despite reducing triglyceride levels, among statin-treated patients with well-controlled low-density lipoproteincholesterol.”

Id. at 7. FDA Disclosure #2 thus expanded upon Amarin Disclosure #3; FDA Disclosures #1

and #3 were new.49 The FDA also asked that, “[t]o further protect against misleading the

audience,” Amarin provide copies of the current FDA-approved labeling and, when distributing a

summary of the ANCHOR study, a reprint of a particular journal article. Id. And it asked that

Amarin distribute “such information in educational or scientific settings, and not including such

information with or attached to promotional or marketing materials,” and “by persons with the

appropriate background or training to accurately communicate this scientific information.” Id.

(emphasis added).

Finally, to the extent Amarin chose to provide a summary different from its Exhibit B,

the FDA stated that would not find it false or misleading on the conditions that:

the summary remains factual, does not omit material information, and does not otherwise introduce bias. In particular, the communication could be misleading if it implied or suggested that the ANCHOR study supports the conclusion that lowering triglyceride levels lowers the risk of [cardiovascular disease] in patients already treated with statins or that available evidence establishes that there is a clinical benefit in lowering [triglyceride] levels for patients with high [triglyceride] levels. We also believe that to avoid being misleading any summary would show not only the differences between Vascepa and the mineral oil placebo, but also the changes from baseline to endpoint in each of the treatment groups, as you have done in Exhibit B.

49 As to Amarin’s Disclosures #4 and #5, the FDA stated that it would not object to them, provided they remained truthful and non-misleading. Woodcock Letter, at 7 n.15.

34

Id. at 6–7.

b. Distribution of additional reprints: Amarin, the FDA noted, sought to distribute

13 scientific publications regarding “the potential effect of EPA on the reduction of the risk of

coronary heart disease.” Id. at 8 (citing Compl., Ex. A). The FDA stated that such publications

were covered by its existing guidance, and that it would not object to their distribution as long as

they were accompanied with the same disclosures and were disseminated in the same manner as

the ANCHOR study summary. Id.

c. Coronary heart disease claim: In its Statement #1, Amarin sought to make, to

doctors, the same claim regarding coronary heart disease that the FDA has permitted food and

dietary supplement manufacturers to make directly to consumers on the labels of chemically

similar omega-3 fatty acids. Woodcock Letter, at 8. The FDA, however, objected to Amarin’s

making that statement in connection with Vascepa. Doing so “would be potentially harmful to

the public health, and [the] FDA would consider such conduct to be potentially misleading or

potential evidence of intended use.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). The coronary heart disease

claim, the FDA stated, could cause a physician to prescribe Vascepa in lieu of promoting healthy

dietary and lifestyle changes or prescribing statin therapy. Id. However, the FDA stated, if

Amarin repackaged Vascepa as a dietary supplement, the FDA would not object to including the

coronary heart disease claim, on certain conditions. Id. The FDA distinguished the context of

dietary supplements because a lesser showing is required for health claims on supplement

labeling products than on drug labeling. Id. at 9. The higher standard for drug labeling, the FDA

stated, furthers the public interest, by:

(1) creating incentives to develop robust scientific data regarding the safety and efficacy of a drug for a particular use; (2) requiring review of those data before the marketing of the product for that use to prevent harm to patients, and to ensure that healthcare providers have a sound basis for making treatment decisions before the

35

use is widespread; (3) providing for the review of safety and efficacy data by an independent body to ensure that claims are appropriate supported; (4) requiring the development of labeling that provides information necessary for the safe and effective use of the product; and (5) preventing firms from misleadingly marketing their products.

Id. at 9–10.

4. The FDA’s Opposition to Preliminary Relief

On June 23, 2015, the FDA filed its brief opposing preliminary relief. Dkt. 51 (“FDA

Br.”). It first argued that, if that Amarin accepted the conditions that the FDA had set out in the

Woodcock Letter, the controversy would be moot. So long as Amarin took “the reasonable steps

outlined in the Letter” regarding the substance and manner of distribution of the ANCHOR

summary study and associated reprints, the FDA stated, these would not be bases for an

enforcement action. Id. at 15. And if Amarin also agreed not to make the coronary heart disease

claim, the FDA stated, there would no longer be a “credible threat of prosecution.” Id. at 16–17.

If Amarin did not modify the statements it proposed to make to doctors, however, the

FDA opposed granting preliminary relief. Amarin’s plan to make proactive statements to

doctors regarding an off-label use of Vascepa, the FDA stated, was, a “frontal assault . . . on the

framework for new drug approval that Congress created in 1962.” Id. at 1. Amarin was seeking

“to distribute its drug Vascepa under circumstances which could establish that Amarin intends an

unapproved new use for Vascepa, i.e., a use for which FDA has not determined the drug is safe

and effective.” Id. And, the FDA argued, were it to bring a misbranding claim against Amarin

based on its promotional statements, this would not “prohibit speech.” Id. at 2. Caronia, the

FDA explained, did not block the FDA from using speech as evidence of a manufacturer’s intent

in a prosecution for misbranding. Id. at 3.

36

5. Amarin’s Reply

On June 30, 2015, Amarin replied. Dkt. 67 (“Amarin Reply Br.”). Amarin declined the

FDA’s proposal to moot the controversy. Although it agreed to some disclosures urged by the

FDA, Amarin declined to adopt others, or to accept the FDA’s limits on the manner by which

Amarin distributed summaries and reprints and communicated with doctors. See Ketchum Reply

Decl. ¶¶ 12–13. Amarin asserted the right to “engage in a full and truthful dialogue with

healthcare professionals” aimed at promoting the off-label use of Vascepa. Amarin Reply Br. at

2 (citing Compl. ¶ 93). The FDA’s threat to bring a misbranding prosecution based on its

truthful and non-misleading statements to doctors, Amarin stated, was an attempt to “refight old,

lost battles.” Id. at 3.

As to specific statements regarding Vascepa, Amarin accepted FDA Disclosure #1, but

resisted FDA Disclosures #2 and #3 because these “convey a one-sided and misleading view of

the evidence.” Ketchum Reply Decl. ¶ 13. If the Court determined that additional disclosures

along these lines were necessary, Amarin argued, their text should be modified as follows (the

underlined text denotes Amarin’s proposed additions): • FDA Disclosure #2: Numerous national and international treatment guidelines and position statements recommend drug therapy as an adjunct to healthy dietary and lifestyle changes and statin therapy for patients at risk for cardiovascular disease and who have persistently high triglyceride levels in their blood (i.e., high despite statin therapy) to lower those patients’ triglycerides and/or non-HDL cholesterol. Vascepa is not FDA-approved for the treatment of statin-treated patients with mixed dyslipidemia and high (≥ 200 mg/dL and < 500 mg/dL) triglyceride levels due to current uncertainty regarding the benefit of drug-induced changes in lipid/lipoprotein parameters beyond statin-lowered low-density lipoprotein cholesterol on cardiovascular risk among statin-treated patients with residually high triglycerides. No prospective study has been conducted to test and support what, if any, benefit exists. • FDA Disclosure #3: Recent cardiovascular outcomes trials (ACCORDLipid, AIM-HIGH, and HPS2-THRIVE), while not designed to test the

37

effect of lowering triglyceride levels in patients with high triglyceride levels after statin therapy, each failed to demonstrate incremental cardiovascular benefit of adding a second lipid-altering drug (fenofibrate or formulations of niacin), despite raising high-density lipoprotein cholesterol and reducing triglyceride levels, among statin-treated patients with well-controlled lowdensity lipoproteincholesterol.

Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.

Finally, as to the coronary heart disease claim drawn from the dietary supplement

labeling, Amarin argued that it should be permitted to use the same text. It argued that, if any

change were held necessary to make the claim non-misleading, it consist of adding a sentence

(underlined below):

“Supportive but not conclusive research shows that consumption of EPA and DHA omega-3 fatty acids may reduce the risk of coronary heart disease. Vascepa should not be taken in place of a healthy diet and lifestyle or statin therapy.”

Id. ¶ 31.

6. Argument

On July 7, 2015, the Court heard lengthy argument on Amarin’s application for

preliminary relief. See Dkt. 70 (“Tr.”). The argument highlighted the parties’ disagreement as

to the FDA’s latitude, after Caronia, to bring misbranding actions based on truthful statements

promoting the off-label use of FDA-approved drugs. Argument also focused on the specific

statements Amarin has proposed to make to doctors about Vascepa. The Court draws upon these

arguments as relevant in the ensuing discussion.

II. Discussion

A. Overview

Amarin argues that the FDA’s threat to bring misbranding charges against it if it makes

truthful statements promoting the off-label use of Vascepa is chilling it from engaging in, and

preventing doctors from receiving, constitutionally protected speech. Amarin argues that under

38

Caronia, a misbranding action cannot be brought against a manufacturer for conduct that

consists solely of truthful and non-misleading speech. Amarin argues that either a preliminary

injunction against enforcement action, or declaratory relief recognizing its First Amendment

rights, is necessary to eliminate that chill.

In considering Amarin’s application, the Court is guided by familiar standards. Amarin

must establish that (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable

harm absent preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) preliminary

relief is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

And, because Amarin seeks to alter the status quo, it must show a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits. See N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir.

2013) (citation omitted).

The parties’ dispute centers on the first factor—the likelihood of success on the merits.

The merits issue here—whether a misbranding action can be brought against Amarin for the

speech it proposes, or whether the FDA’s threat of such an action burdens protected speech—

raises general and specific questions. At a general level, the parties disagree whether, under

Caronia, a misbranding action can be brought against a manufacturer whose conduct consists

solely of truthful and non-misleading speech to promote off-label use of an approved drug, and

whether Caronia protects a manufacturer’s proactive promotional speech. At a specific level,

although the parties have narrowed their differences, they disagree about whether certain

statements Amarin proposes to make are, in fact, truthful and non-misleading so as to be

constitutionally protected.

39

The Court addresses the likelihood of success on the merits after first considering, and

rejecting, the FDA’s threshold argument that this case does not present a case or controversy.

After considering the merits, the Court addresses the remaining preliminary relief factors.

B. Case or Controversy

At the threshold, a court “must be sure that there is a justiciable case or controversy under

Article III.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 15 (2010). The plaintiff must

show that “the ‘conflicting contentions of the parties . . . present a real, substantial controversy

between parties having adverse legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical

or abstract.’” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (citation

omitted). “One aspect of this limitation is the requirement that the plaintiff have standing to

sue,” Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 188 (2d Cir. 2013), which requires a claim that:

“1) the plaintiff ‘[has] suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,’ (2) the injury be ‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,’ and (3) it ‘be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’”

Id. (quoting Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)).

In the context of a pre-enforcement challenge on constitutional grounds, a plaintiff “must

demonstrate a genuine threat that the alleged unconstitutional law is about to be enforced against

him.” Brache v. Westchester Cty., 658 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Babbitt, 442 U.S. at

298 (challenge proper when “plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct

arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a

credible threat of prosecution thereunder”). In First Amendment cases, such challenges are

assessed “under somewhat relaxed standing and ripeness rules.” Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v.

Walsh, 714 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2013). A plaintiff must still allege “something more than an

40

abstract, subjective fear that his rights are chilled,” but “a real and imminent fear of such chilling

is enough.” Id. Standing thus has been found where no enforcement threat had been directed to

the plaintiff, and the only bases to perceive a “credible threat” of enforcement action were the

statute’s terms and enforcement history. See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S.

383, 386–393 (1988) (booksellers had standing to challenge new state statute despite lack of

specific threat of prosecution); Holder, 561 U.S. at 9–16 (plaintiffs had standing to challenge

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act based on prior prosecutions under act); see also

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342–43 (2014) (collecting cases).

Amarin clearly has standing to challenge the FDA’s threat to bring a misbranding action

against it if it promotes Vascepa for an off-label use. “[S]tanding is to be determined as of the

commencement of suit.” Fenstermaker v. Obama, 354 F. App’x 452, 455 n.1 (2d Cir. 2009)

(summary order) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571

n.5 (1992)); see also Comer, 37 F.3d at 791. Here, 10 days before Amarin filed suit, the FDA

had expressly threatened in the CRL to bring a misbranding action against it for promoting

Vascepa off-label, i.e., if Amarin marketed Vascepa for persons with persistently high

triglycerides without approval of that use. CRL, at 4. Particularly given the recent history of

misbranding prosecutions against manufacturers based on the same legal theory, this threat gave

Amarin a solid and real basis to fear such enforcement action. See Walsh, 714 F.3d at 689; see

also Compl. ¶¶ 145–154 (alleging that FDA’s threat to bring misbranding charges will, absent

relief, chill Amarin from engaging in protected speech with doctors about off-label use of

Vascepa); id. ¶¶ 163–64 (recounting history of prosecutions of off-label promotion, and FDA’s

public statement of intent to continue “to pursue aggressively” off-label promotion).

41

The FDA argues that the Woodcock Letter largely mooted this controversy, in that the

FDA stated there that it did not object to Amarin’s dissemination of certain information and

would not base an enforcement action on such dissemination. FDA Br. 15–16. But although the

Woodcock Letter removed some of Amarin’s proposed communications to doctors as potential

subjects of enforcement action, it left others in play.

Specifically, the FDA preserved the threat to bring misbranding charges against Amarin

for its truthful speech regarding Vascepa in three sets of circumstances. The first is if Amarin

distributed summaries and reprints of the ANCHOR study in a manner or format other than that

specified by the FDA. Amarin, however, resists these limitations.50 The second is if Amarin

articulated, in connection with Vascepa, the coronary heart disease claim approved for use on

chemically similar dietary supplements. Amarin, however, asserts the right to make this

statement.51 Third, and most sweeping, the FDA reserved the right to bring a misbranding action

against Amarin if it made proactive truthful statements, or engaged in a dialogue, with doctors

regarding the off-label use of Vascepa, because such communications bespeak an intent to

50 The FDA states that it would not object to providing “truthful and non-misleading summaries of the results of the ANCHOR trial” and reprints if Amarin accompanied these materials with the disclosures the FDA asks be made. See Woodcock Letter, at 6 (FDA will not treat distribution as evidence of intended use “[a]s long as the distribution . . . is accompanied with the disclosures”) (emphasis added). Amarin, however, stands on its claim of a right to promote Vascepa for offlabel use without including all of the FDA’s disclosures. See Ketchum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 12–13; Tr. 19–20. The FDA also states that it would refrain from enforcement action if such materials were distributed in “educational or scientific settings,” unaccompanied by “promotional or marketing material,” and made by “persons with the appropriate background or training to accurately communicate this scientific information.” Woodcock Letter, at 7. Amarin has declined to accept these conditions, too. See, e.g., Amarin Reply Br. 5; Compl. ¶¶ 17, 167.

51 The FDA states that it “would potentially consider [Amarin’s] inclusion of the [coronary heart disease] claim . . . in connection with [Amarin’s] distribution of Vascepa as misleading,” unless Amarin repackages re-labels Vascepa as a dietary supplement. Woodcock Letter, at 10. Amarin has declined to do so. See, e.g., Amarin Reply Br. 10–12.

42

promote off-label use. Amarin, however, asserts the First Amendment right under Caronia to

engage in such truthful speech and for the purpose of promoting such use.52

In sum, because Amarin did not accept the conditions set in the Woodcock Letter, that

letter did not vitiate the CRL’s threat of a misbranding action against Amarin or moot this

controversy. See Doe v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 483 F. Supp. 539, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)

(rejecting defendants’ claim of mootness “because their proposed settlement offer does not

remove all ‘live issues’ present in the case”); Doe v. Harris, 696 F.2d 109, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

(similar). Fairly read, the Woodcock Letter sharpened for Amarin the circumstances under

which the FDA reserved the right to bring a misbranding action. It thereby narrowed the range

of communications with respect to which Amarin is exposed to the risk of such an action. But it

did not eliminate that risk, by any means. Because Amarin faces a non-extinguished threat of a

misbranding prosecution for speech it proposes to undertake as to Vascepa, there remains a live

case or controversy.53

52 The FDA states that it will not object to Amarin’s truthful statements regarding Vascepa communications if made in the manner and to the extent specified [in the Letter],” Woodcock Letter, at 6 (emphasis added). And at argument, the FDA confirmed that it reserves its right to bring enforcement action based solely on truthful and non-misleading speech where the context indicates an intent to promote an unapproved use. See, e.g., Tr. 50–51, 83. These statements do not afford Amarin protection for truthful “proactive” statements or the truthful “dialogue” it seeks to undertake with doctors related to the off-label use of Vascepa. See Compl. ¶ 126; Tr. 18.

53 To the extent Amarin separately seeks preliminary relief in connection with potential claims under the False Claims Act, however, the Court does not find a ripe controversy. The CRL did not mention the FCA. And in the Complaint, neither Amarin nor the doctor plaintiffs express an intention to be party to any practice that has been the subject of prior FCA actions. It is, at this time, wholly conjectural that (1) a doctor who prescribed Vascepa for an off-label use would falsely claim, in seeking medical reimbursement, to have done so for an approved use, or (2) the FDA would seek to hold Amarin accountable for such conduct by a doctor.

43

C. Amarin’s Motion for Preliminary Relief

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Amarin makes two arguments—one broad, one narrow—why the FDA’s threat to bring a

misbranding action against it for truthful statements promoting the off-label use of Vascepa

impermissibly burdens its First Amendment rights, such that its lawsuit seeking relief from this

threat is substantially likely to prevail on the merits.

First, Amarin contends, the FDA is wrong to assert the authority to bring a misbranding

action against a manufacturer based solely on truthful and non-misleading statements promoting

an off-label use. In fact, Amarin argues, under Caronia, a misbranding action based on such

statements simply cannot be brought. It follows, Amarin argues, that the FDA may not threaten

to bring such an action against a manufacturer whose truthful promotional statements are made

in a format other than that preferred by the agency.

Second, more narrowly, Amarin contends, the specific statements it proposes to make

about Vascepa are truthful and non-misleading, so as to be protected under Caronia. These

statements, Amarin notes, all derive from the FDA-approved ANCHOR study or writings by (or

approved by) the FDA. Amarin argues that the FDA is wrongly disputing that these statements

are truthful and non-misleading.

The Court addresses these issues in turn.

a. The scope of First Amendment protection for a manufacturer’s truthful and non-misleading promotional statements under Caronia

In the CRL, the FDA first raised the prospect of a misbranding action against Amarin.

But the CRL was unspecific as to the conduct on which the FDA might base such an action. The

FDA stated only that that it might consider Vascepa misbranded if “it is marketed” for use by

persons with persistently high triglycerides before the FDA had approved such use. From this,

44

Amarin inferred that the FDA was threatening to bring a misbranding action based solely on

truthful and non-misleading speech in which Amarin might engage that promoted this off-label

use, e.g., statements reporting the results of the ANCHOR study.

In opposing preliminary relief, the FDA has now confirmed that Amarin’s inference was

correct. The FDA’s brief, and its responses to the Court’s questions at argument, clarify that the

FDA is reserving the right to bring a misbranding action against Amarin where the only conduct

on which that action would be based are truthful and non-misleading statements promoting this

off-label use. In particular, the FDA took the position that, in such an action, it could establish

the intent (mens rea) and act (actus reus) elements of misbranding as follows:

(1) Intent requirement: The FDA may use Amarin’s statements regarding Vascepa’s effect on persistently high triglycerides as objective evidence of Amarin’s intent to promote Vascepa for that off-label purpose, see FDA Br. 13–14 & n.5, 18, 20–22, 26 n.15, 29; Tr. 50–52, 55–56, 58–59, 65; and

(2) Act requirement: The FDA may bring a misbranding action where Amarin’s only acts constituting promotion of Vascepa for an off-label use are its truthful and non-misleading statements about that use, provided that these acts support an inference that Amarin intended to promote that offlabel use, see FDA Br. 13–14; Tr. 51–54, 57, 61–65, 80, 83.54

It is the FDA’s position on the act requirement that raises First Amendment issues under

Caronia. At argument, the Court questioned the FDA whether its position as to that requirement

is consistent with Caronia; the Court stated that it, like Amarin, had read Caronia otherwise.

The FDA responded that it views Caronia as a fact-bound decision that turned on the particular

jury instructions and government jury addresses given in Caronia’s trial. The FDA stated that it

does not read Caronia to preclude a misbranding action where the acts to promote off-label use

54 The FDA’s brief separately notes that it may bring a misbranding action based on misleading speech regarding an unapproved use of an approved drug. See, e.g., FDA Br. 3, 8, 14, 18 & n.11, 23–24, 32. The FDA’s authority to do so, however, is not disputed—or at issue here.

45

consist solely of truthful and non-misleading speech, provided that the evidence also shows that

the drug had been introduced into interstate commerce and that the FDA had not approved it as

safe and effective for the off-label use. Tr. 51–54.

The following exchange was indicative:

THE COURT: [W]e clearly have a very substantial difference of opinion how to read Caronia. The government’s position is that it can [] found a misbrand[ing] case solely based on the transmission of truthful nonmisleading statements. Although given the [FDA’s] regulatory guidance, those statements really need to be initiated by the manufacturer, not made in response to questions from the doctor. Is that correct?

FDA COUNSEL: That’s essentially correct, your Honor. And Caronia was, again, very careful to make that point in emphasizing repeatedly that it was the government’s theory of the prosecution of the case that represented the First Amendment problem and assume[d] without deciding that speech can be used as evidence[.]

Tr. 54–55. Reinforcing the point, the FDA at argument likened misbranding actions based on the

promotion of off-label use to other areas of law in which criminal liability can, consistent with

the First Amendment, be based on speech alone. Tr. 57. Other crimes where “the speech is the

act,” the FDA stated, include jury tampering, insider trading, and blackmail. Id.; see also Tr. 83

(“There are cases in which it’s just speech as is often the case when speech is an element of the

crime”).

In light of the parties’ conflicting readings of Caronia and the FDA’s position that it may

bring a misbranding action against a manufacturer based solely on truthful and non-misleading

speech evincing the intent to promote an off-label use, the Court has closely reviewed Caronia.

The Court’s considered and firm view is that, under Caronia, the FDA may not bring such an

action based on truthful promotional speech alone, consistent with the First Amendment. A fair

reading of that decision refutes the FDA’s view that the Second Circuit’s ruling was limited to

the facts of Caronia’s particular case. To be sure, the Circuit closely reviewed the record of

46

Caronia’s trial—in particular, the jury instructions and the government’s closing argument. But

the Circuit did so to isolate the acts upon which Caronia’s conviction had rested—specifically to

determine whether Caronia’s speech had “served merely as ‘evidence of intent’” or whether

Caronia had been “prosecuted for his speech.” 703 F.3d at 160. The Circuit found the latter,

holding that the record revealed that “the government did prosecute Caronia for his speech.” Id.

at 162. As the Circuit put the point: “[T]he proscribed conduct for which Caronia was

prosecuted was precisely his speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing.” Id.55 This finding, in

turn, led the Circuit to analyze, more broadly, the constitutionality of a misbranding prosecution

based solely on truthful promotional speech.

The issue, the Second Circuit stated, was whether, consistent with the First Amendment,

a misbranding prosecution can be based on such speech—“the simple promotion of a drug’s off

label use.” Id. at 162. The Circuit held that it cannot. And, noting that the FDCA’s misbranding

provisions do not expressly prohibit off-label usage, the Circuit, rather than facially invalidating

these provisions as Caronia had requested, invoked “the principle of constitutional avoidance”

and construed these provisions not to reach such speech. Id. at 160.56 The Circuit’s holding to

this effect was explicit: “To the extent there is any ambiguity as to whether off-label promotion

is tantamount to illegal misbranding, we construe the FDCA narrowly to avoid a seriously

constitutional question.” Id. at 162. It therefore vacated Caronia’s conviction.

55 The truthfulness of Caronia’s promotional statements was undisputed at his trial. See id. at 165 n.10

56 Caronia had sought facial invalidation of the misbranding provisions. See Brief for Appellant in Caronia, Nos. 09-5006-cr, 10-750-cr, 2010 WL 6351495 (2d Cir. Apr. 15, 2010). In vacating his conviction, the Second Circuit noted that its ruling, based on construing those provisions to not reach his conduct, was “for narrower reasons than he urges.” Caronia, 703 F.3d at 160.

47

The Second Circuit’s thoroughgoing First Amendment analysis in Caronia, which led it

to construe the FDCA’s misbranding provisions so as not to reach truthful speech promoting off

label use, further defeats the FDA’s attempt to marginalize the holding in that case as fact-bound.

The Circuit cast the issue as whether a misbranding prosecution that “identified [a defendant’s]

speech alone as the proscribed conduct” is constitutionally permissible. Id. And the Circuit’s

ensuing analysis underscored the categorical, rather than case-specific, nature of its holding that

it is not.

The Second Circuit first noted that “‘[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a

form of expression protected by the . . . First Amendment,’” id. at 163 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS

Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011)). It then applied to such speech truthfully promoting

off-label drug use the four-prong test of Central Hudson, used to determine a restriction upon

commercial speech violates the First Amendment. 703 F.3d at 164–69.

As to the first Central Hudson prong, the Second Circuit stated, promoting off-label drug

use concerns “lawful activity” (off-label drug use) and “the promotion of off-label drug use is

not in and of itself false or misleading.” Id. at 165–66. As to the second prong, the Circuit stated,

the Government’s asserted interests—“preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s

drug approval process” and “reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs”—are

substantial. Id. at 166. As to the third prong, which requires that a regulation directly and to a

material degree advance the interest asserted, id. at 164, the Circuit found it not met. Construing

the FDCA to prohibit truthful off-label promotion, the Circuit held, does not directly advance the

asserted government interests—because off-label use of approved drugs is lawful, because the

FDA’s drug approval process itself contemplates such off-label use, and because “prohibiting the

truthful promotion of off-label drug usage by a particular class of speakers” would not directly

48

enhance “the FDA’s approval process [or] reduc[e] patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective

drugs.” Id. at 166. On the contrary, penalizing truthful statements promoting an off-label use

“‘paternalistically’ interferes with the ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially

relevant treatment information.” Id. (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer

Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). Finally, as to the fourth Central Hudson prong, which

requires that a regulation to be narrowly drawn to further the governmental interests served, the

Circuit held that construing the FDCA to ban categorically “off-label promotion by

pharmaceutical manufacturers is more extensive than necessary” to achieve the Government’s

interests. Id. at 167. Rather, “[n]umerous, less speech-restrictive alternatives are available, as

are non-criminal penalties.” Id. Accordingly, the Circuit held, “[t]he government has not

established a ‘reasonable fit’ among its interests in drug safety and public health, the lawfulness

of off-label use, and its construction of the FDCA to prohibit off-label promotion.” Id. at 168.

This Court therefore rejects the FDA’s reading of Caronia as a mere artifact of that

case’s particular facts and circumstances. By its explicit terms and its clearly-articulated

reasoning, Caronia simply cannot be read as the proverbial “ticket good for one day only.” See

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). On the contrary, the

Second Circuit, at the close of its Caronia analysis, presented its holding as a definitive one of

statutory construction:

[W]e decline to adopt the government’s construction of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions to prohibit manufacturer promotion alone as it would unconstitutionally restrict free speech. We construe the misbranding provisions of the FDCA as not prohibiting and criminalizing the truthful off-label promotion of FDA-approved prescription drugs. Our conclusion is limited to FDA-approved drugs for which off-label use is not prohibited, and we do not hold, of course, that the FDA cannot regulate the marketing of prescription drugs. We conclude simply that the government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.

49

703 F.3d at 168–69 (emphasis added).

Therefore, insofar as Amarin seeks preliminary relief recognizing its First Amendment

right to be free from a misbranding action based on truthful speech promoting the off-label use of

an FDA-approved drug, Amarin has established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits

on this point. Under Caronia, misbranding is unlike the crimes of jury tampering, blackmail, and

insider trading to which the FDA has analogized, in which “the speech is the act.” Tr. 83.

Where the speech at issue consists of truthful and non-misleading speech promoting the off-label

use of an FDA-approved drug, such speech, under Caronia, cannot be the act upon which an

action for misbranding is based.

The FDA makes three counterarguments. None is persuasive.

First, the FDA argues that that protecting truthful speech aimed at promoting off-label

drug use is “a frontal assault . . . on the framework for new drug approval that Congress created

in 1962,” FDA Br. 1, because allowing a manufacturer to promote such use “has to the potential

to eviscerate [the] FDA drug approval regime.” Tr. 41. The short answer is that the FDCA’s

drug-approval framework predates modern First Amendment law respecting commercial speech.

The Supreme Court held in Central Hudson (1980) that the First Amendment gives qualified

protection to commercial speech and in Sorrell (2011) that pharmaceutical marketing qualifies as

such speech. It follows that the provisions of a 1962 statute that implicate such speech, such as

the FDCA’s misbranding provisions, today must be considered, and to the extent ambiguous

construed, in light of contemporary First Amendment law, under which truthful and non

misleading commercial speech is constitutionally protected, subject to the Central Hudson

framework.

50

The Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia reflected a careful Central Hudson analysis.

And the Circuit, in Caronia, identified alternative, and less speech-restrictive, means for the

FDA to achieve its objectives. The FDA’s quarrel is, therefore, ultimately, with Caronia.

Notably, however, despite a vigorous dissent to the effect that the panel majority had “call[ed]

into question the very foundations of our century-old system of drug regulation,” see 703 F.3d at

169 (Livingston, J., dissenting), the Government neither sought rehearing nor petitioned for

certiorari in Caronia.57

Second, the FDA, consistent with its guidance, urges the Court to limit the holding in

Caronia to protect only certain types of truthful and non-misleading statements by manufacturers

regarding off-label use. The FDA looks askance, for example, at statements made proactively to

a doctor as opposed to those responding to a doctor’s query; and at statements made to a doctor

by a sales or marketing employee, as opposed to those by a scientist or physician. See, e.g., FDA

Br. 17; Tr. 53–55, 62–65. As the FDA explains, the types of statements that it disfavors are, by

nature, more likely to reflect a manufacturer’s intent to promote off-label use of a drug as

opposed to being mere responses to requests for information.

But Caronia did not turn on the intent element of misbranding. It turned on the actus

reus requirement. And Caronia’s holding was that the FDCA’s misbranding provisions cannot

constitutionally criminalize, and therefore do not reach, the act of truthful and non-misleading

speech promoting off-label use. The Circuit did not limit that holding to a subset of truthful

57 In its brief, the FDA (FDA Br. 38–41), tracking Judge Livingston’s dissent, takes issue with the panel majority’s discussion of alternative, less-speech-restrictive means by which the FDA could achieve its objectives. But the proper forum for that critique was a petition for rehearing or certiorari in Caronia. This Court cannot override the Second Circuit’s definitive construction of the misbranding statute. See Polestar Maritime Ltd. v. Nanjing Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd., 631 F. Supp. 2d 304, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 484, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).

51

promotional speech, such as statements responding to doctors’ queries or statements by non-sales

personnel. Caronia instead construed the misbranding provisions not to reach any “truthful off

label promotion of FDA-approved prescription drugs.” 703 F.3d at 168–69. And the reasons the

Circuit gave in Caronia for that holding apply across-the-board to all truthful and non

misleading promotional speech. Indeed, the speech on which the Caronia prosecution itself was

based involved the very types of statements promoting off-label use that the FDA most disfavors:

proactive oral statements to a doctor by a manufacturer’s sales representative. See id. at 155–56.

Third, the FDA notes that Caronia does not prohibit the Government from relying on

truthful and non-misleading statements to establish, in a misbranding action, that the defendant

intended to promote off-label use. See, e.g., FDA Br. 3, 23, 26 & n.15; Tr. 52–54. But the

proposition that speech can be admissible in evidence to prove intent or motive in a criminal

case58 is beside the point here. Amarin’s lawsuit is directed instead to the act requirement—the

situation in which a misbranding action takes aim at truthful, non-misleading speech. And

Caronia construed the misbranding statute, categorically, not to reach a manufacturer or its

representative under those circumstances. That construction applies no matter how obvious it

was that the speaker’s motivation was to promote such off-label use. Promoting such use, in

fact, was transparently Caronia’s intent.59

58 The Caronia majority assumed arguendo that the Government can offer evidence of a defendant’s off-label promotion to establish the element of intent, 703 F.3d at 161, and the dissent squarely so stated, id. at 171–77 (Livingston, J., dissenting); see also id. at 171 (“‘The First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent’”) (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)).

59 Caronia’s speech was also in violation of company policy. His company, Orphan Medical, Inc., had a policy that barred him, as a specialty sales representative, from speaking to doctors about off-label uses, and directed him to deflect any questions about off-label use to physicians

52

The Government is of course correct that truthful speech can serve as evidence of intent.

To illustrate, consider a misbranding prosecution of a manufacturer based on promotional actions

other than truthful speech. The manufacturer’s statements promoting off-label use might be

admissible there, to shed light on the intent behind these actions or to present the scheme in full

context. At argument, the Court posed a hypothetical in which a manufacturer paid doctors

money or bought them resort vacations—allegedly to reward them for prescribing a drug for off

label use. Amarin’s counsel agreed that the manufacturer’s truthful statements promoting off

label use could well be admissible to prove that its intent in paying the doctors had been to

promote off-label (as opposed to, say, on-label) use. Tr. 11. Caronia does not limit the

Government’s ability to use promotional speech to establish intent in a misbranding action with a

proper actus reus.

And, contrary to the FDA’s concern, Caronia leaves room for prosecuting off-label

marketing as misbranding. Two limits to Caronia’s holding are worth highlighting. First, the

First Amendment does not protect false or misleading commercial speech. Caronia’s

construction of the misbranding provisions so to exclude truthful promotion speech affords no

protection to a manufacturer that uses false or misleading communications to promote an off

label use. Second, the First Amendment protects expression, not conduct. A manufacturer that

engages in non-communicative activities to promote off-label use cannot use the First

Amendment as a shield. Caronia holds protected, and outside the reach of the FDCA’s

misbranding provisions, off-label promotion only where it wholly consists of truthful and non

misleading speech.

employed by Orphan. Caronia, whose salary was based on individual sales, nevertheless twice promoted Xyrem to doctors for unapproved uses. Id. at 156–57.

53

A final observation: Although the FDA cannot require a manufacturer to choreograph its

truthful promotional speech to conform to the agency’s specifications, there is practical wisdom

to much of the FDA’s guidance, including that a manufacturer vet and script in advance its

statements about a drug’s off-label use. A manufacturer that leaves its sales force at liberty to

converse unscripted with doctors about off-label use of an approved drug invites a misbranding

action if false or misleading (e.g., one-sided or incomplete) representations result. Caronia

leaves the FDA free to act against such lapses. A manufacturer may also conclude that it is

prudent to consult with the FDA before promoting off-label use. Reasonable minds may differ

over whether a given statement is misleading in context; and developments in science or

medicine may make a once-benign statement misleading. Prior consultation with the FDA may

prove a helpful prophylactic, and may avert misbranding charges where the FDA and the

manufacturer would take different views of a statement. In the end, however, if the speech at

issue is found truthful and non-misleading, under Caronia, it may not serve as the basis for a

misbranding action.60

b. Specific communications relating to Vascepa which Amarin seeks to make

The Court turns next to the specific communications relating to Vascepa which Amarin

seeks to make to doctors. As noted, Amarin proposes: • To disseminate reprints of 13 peer-reviewed scientific publications. According to Amarin, each relates to the effect of EPA on the reduction of the risk of coronary heart disease. See Compl., Ex. A. • To disseminate a statement and chart summarizing the ANCHOR study. These set out the parameters of the ANCHOR study and the statistical effect shown in that study of Vascepa on triglyceride levels. See Compl., Ex. B.

60 In light of the Court’s holding, reinforcing Caronia’s construction of the misbranding statute, there is no occasion to address Amarin’s alternative ground for relief, to the effect that the misbranding statute is unconstitutionally vague and thus violates due process.

54

• To disseminate three textual statements and five textual disclosures. These are Statements #1 through #3, and Disclosures #1 through #5, addressed above.

The Court evaluates these categories in turn.

At the outset, the Court notes that Vascepa’s unusual and extensive regulatory history

makes it realistic to determine, at this early stage, the truthfulness of Amarin’s proposed

statements regarding its off-label use.61 Here, the FDA has already reviewed the off-label use at

issue. It approved the ANCHOR study, which tested Vascepa’s effectiveness in reducing

triglyceride levels among patients with persistently high triglycerides. And it has confirmed in

writing, including in the CRL, that Vascepa has proven effective in doing so. Amarin has thus

been able to base its proposed communications about Vascepa almost entirely on statements by

the FDA itself.

i. Reprints

With respect to the reprints of the 13 peer-reviewed scientific publications that address

the effect of EPA (Vascepa’s main component) on coronary heart disease, the FDA does not

claim that these, viewed separately or together, are false or misleading. The FDA instead has

described these as “the types of publications covered by the [FDA’s] existing guidance”

governing reprints of scientific publications. See Woodcock Letter, at 8. The FDA did caution

Amarin not to accompany these reprints with misleading language, i.e., not to characterize an

article as definitive or representative where this was not so, or to falsely imply that a study

described in a reprint involved Vascepa. Id. But Amarin’s proposed statements do not do so.

61 At argument, Amarin and the FDA agreed that the Court can resolve, without discovery, whether the statements at issue are truthful and non-misleading. See Tr. 71, 84.

55

The Court therefore holds, and the FDA does not dispute, that Amarin’s dissemination of these

reprints, under the circumstances proposed, would be neither false nor misleading.62

ii. Summary of the ANCHOR Study

The FDA does not claim that the summary of the ANCHOR study that Amarin appended

to its Complaint as Exhibit B is false or misleading. The FDA has noted that summaries or

excerpts of a study can be misleading if they omit material information or introduce bias. See

Woodcock Letter, at 6. But, the FDA stated, Exhibit B “does not raise those types of concerns.”

Id.; see also FDA Br. 15.

The Court agrees. Exhibit B is an anodyne—and studiously neutral—overview of the

ANCHOR study. It (1) defines—demographically, medically, and numerically—the patient and

placebo groups, and (2) reports, statistically, by means of a chart, the outcomes of the 12-week

study, including the extent to which Vascepa reduced triglyceride and other lipid parameters in

the patient group relative to the placebo group. The Court therefore holds, and the FDA does not

dispute, that Amarin’s dissemination of this summary is neither false nor misleading.63

iii. Agreed-Upon Statements and Disclosures

In neither the Woodcock Letter nor its submissions in this litigation did the FDA object

to Statement #2 and Statement #3 that Amarin proposes in its Complaint to make relating to the

off-label use of Vascepa. To recap, these are:

62 The Woodcock Letter took the position that dissemination of the reprints should be accompanied by the five disclosures set out in that letter. Id. at 8. However, as reviewed below, Amarin has agreed to most of these disclosures, and the Court here has approved the others, with modest modifications.

63 As with the reprints, see supra, n.62, the Woodcock Letter took the position that dissemination of the Exhibit B summary should be accompanied with the five disclosures proposed by the FDA, Woodcock Letter, at 6.

56

• Statement #2: “The ANCHOR study demonstrates that Vascepa lowers triglyceride levels in patients with high (≥200 mg/dL and

Outcome:

Based on the evidence that the parties have presented to the Court at this stage in the litigation, the Court holds that plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Attorney General from obtaining their Schedules B.

Most importantly, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment unconstitutional burden claim is not likely to succeed because, on this record, the Attorney General has shown that the Schedule B policy substantially relates to the important governmental interests of enforcing charitable solicitation laws and overseeing charitable organizations for the protection of the public. These interests justify the minimal burdens that the Schedule B policy places on charities’ speech and association rights. Moreover, because the Attorney General does not possess unbridled discretion to impose conditions on the ability of charities to speak, plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their First Amendment prior restraint claim.

Nor are plaintiffs likely to prevail on the remainder of their claims. Their due process and SAPA claims lack merit because the evidence in the record shows that plaintiffs had prior notice of the Attorney General’s interpretation of section 91.5, which was promulgated in accordance with SAPA’s notice-and-comment procedures. And because there is insufficient evidence that Congress intended to prevent state attorneys general from obtaining Schedule B directly from charities, plaintiffs are not likely to win their preemption challenge. Finally, plaintiffs have not shown that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, or that a preliminary injunction serves the public interest.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of Amarin Pharma Inc. v. U.S. FDA?

The outcome was: Based on the evidence that the parties have presented to the Court at this stage in the litigation, the Court holds that plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Attorney General from obtaining their Schedules B. Most importantly, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment unconstitutional burden claim is not likely to succeed because, on this record, the Attorney General has shown that the Schedule B policy substantially relates to the important governmental interests of enforcing charitable solicitation laws and overseeing charitable organizations for the protection of the public. These interests justify the minimal burdens that the Schedule B policy places on charities’ speech and association rights. Moreover, because the Attorney General does not possess unbridled discretion to impose conditions on the ability of charities to speak, plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their First Amendment prior restraint claim. Nor are plaintiffs likely to prevail on the remainder of their claims. Their due process and SAPA claims lack merit because the evidence in the record shows that plaintiffs had prior notice of the Attorney General’s interpretation of section 91.5, which was promulgated in accordance with SAPA’s notice-and-comment procedures. And because there is insufficient evidence that Congress intended to prevent state attorneys general from obtaining Schedule B directly from charities, plaintiffs are not likely to win their preemption challenge. Finally, plaintiffs have not shown that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, or that a preliminary injunction serves the public interest.

Which court heard Amarin Pharma Inc. v. U.S. FDA?