Bryan M. Santini v. Colonel Joseph H. Fuentes

Appellant Bryan M. Santini appeals from two final

decisions of the District Court for the District of New Jersey:

(1) its September 18, 2013 decision granting summary

judgment against him and (2) its May 6, 2014 decision

denying his motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s

September decision. Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-639-

JAP, 2013 WL 5554257, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2013);

Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-639-JAP, 2014 WL

1789545, at *4–5 (D.N.J. May 6, 2014). Appellant challenges

only one key ruling of the District Court. Because we believe

there are outstanding issues of material fact, we are

3

compelled to vacate in part the decisions of the District Court

and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

1. Santini’s Version of the Facts

Because we are reviewing an order granting summary

judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees and a motion to

reconsider that order, the following factual summary is based

on the facts as averred by Plaintiff-Appellant Bryan Santini

(“Santini”).1 This appeal arises from an altercation between

Santini and several members of the New Jersey State Police

that took place on February 3, 2009. (Deposition of Bryan

Santini (“Santini Dep.”) 54:14–17). On that day, Santini was

working at his family’s dairy farm in Harmony Township,

Warren County, New Jersey, where he milked cows in the

farm’s milk house. (Santini Dep. 58:19–59:1). Between 5:00

and 5:30 pm that evening, a fight broke out in the farm’s milk

house between two women—Tiffany Drake and Crystal

Knighton. (Id. at 54:21–55:7). Santini witnessed the fight. (Id.

at 56:12–13). There were approximately ten other witnesses

to the fight. (Id. at 57:25–58:2). One of those witnesses called

the police to report the incident. (Id. at 57:22–24).

1 Santini’s account is primarily drawn from his sworn

deposition, response to interrogatories, and his plea colloquy,

all of which have been sworn to or submitted under oath.

4

Shortly thereafter, police officers from Greenwich

Township, Lopatcong Township, and the state police arrived

at the Santini family farm. (Id. at 59:17–60:1). Santini

estimates that approximately twenty officers were present;

three to five of those officers were from the state police. (Id.

at 60:5–13). By the time the police arrived, the fight between

Drake and Knighton had ended. (Id. at 60:18–23). Ms. Drake

told the police that Santini had recorded the fight on his cell

phone. (Deposition of Trooper J. Fuhrmann (“Fuhrmann

Dep.”) 39:5–12).2 Santini—standing outside of the milk

house—then spoke with an officer from Greenwich Township

to describe what he had witnessed. (Santini Dep. 61:17–21).

During that conversation, an officer from the state

police, Trooper J.L. Fuhrmann (“Fuhrmann”), called Santini

over. (Id. at 61:7–24). As Santini began to describe what he

had witnessed to Fuhrmann, the Trooper yelled at Santini to

take his hands out of his pockets. (Id. at 62:1–5). Santini

maintains that he complied and explained that his hands were

cold because he had been working in water all day milking

cows. (Id. at 62:7–9). Fuhrmann responded: “I don’t care.

Keep them where I [can] see them.” (Id. at 62:9–10). Santini

continued his story; however, after Santini’s hands “went

back in [his] pockets,” Fuhrmann again told Santini to keep

his hands where the Trooper could see them. (Id. at 62:11–

18). Santini maintains that he again immediately complied

and apologized, saying: “I’m sorry, I only have my cell phone

and my wallet.” (Id. at 62:18–20).

2 Ms. Drake subsequently denied telling the officers

that Santini recorded the incident. However, numerous other

sources corroborate her original story.

5

Santini continued his story. However, while he was

speaking, he pulled his hands into the sleeves of his

sweatshirt. (Id. at 62:25–63:4). Santini maintains that he

pulled his hands into his sleeves on instinct alone because his

hands were cold. (Id. at 63:12–14). At that point, Fuhrmann

yelled at Santini about his hands for the fourth time. (Id. at

63:4–5; 64:20–21). In response, Santini told Fuhrmann that

he was going to return to work because he had already told

the other officers his story. (Id. at 64:20–24). Santini then

began to walk back to the milk house. (Id. at 64:23–24). At

that point, Fuhrmann said “[c]ome here” and grabbed

Santini’s right wrist. (Id. at 65:1–13). The two men fell to the

ground, where Santini landed on his side and then rolled onto

his stomach. (Id. at 65:14–21). As Santini struggled to return

to his feet, one officer—who Santini believes was

Fuhrmann—jumped on top of Santini and told him to put his

hands behind his back because he was under arrest. (Id. at

65:23–66:3).

As that officer spoke, other officers were on top of

Santini, punching him and beating him with nightsticks. (Id.

at 66:3–6). At the time, Santini’s hands were pinned beneath

his body. (Id. at 66:7–10). While Santini was facedown, the

officers surrounding him instructed Santini to stop resisting.

(Id. at 67:21–24). Santini understood that their instruction

meant for him to remove his hands from beneath his stomach.

(Id. at 67:25–68:9). In his deposition, Santini states that he

was unable to remove his arms because of the weight of the

officers on top of him. (Id.). However, in Santini’s plea

colloquy, he admitted that he resisted arrest. (Santini Plea

Colloquy3 8:22–9:8).

3 Santini’s Plea Colloquy begins at page 79 of the

6

An officer then sprayed Santini with pepper spray.

(Santini Dep. 67:10–12; 68:12–22).4 Santini states that he was

sprayed for thirty seconds to one minute and that two bottles

of spray were used. (Id. at 68:15–22). After the pepper spray

was used, the officers were no longer on top of Santini, he

was able to free his arms, and he was subsequently

handcuffed. (Id. at 68:20–22). After handcuffing Santini, the

officers ceased punching, kicking, hitting with batons, and

pepper spraying him. (Id. at 69:10–16). Santini was then

taken to Warren County Jail. (Id. at 78:22–23). There, Santini

was treated with Tylenol and eye drops. (Id. at 79:5–6). He

maintains that he had “marks everywhere” after the incident.

(Id. at 79:2). However, his medical records from the incident

reveal no permanent or lasting injuries. (See generally App.

125–45).

2. The Troopers’ Version of the Facts

The Troopers’ story differs from Santini’s in three

ways.5 First, they maintain that Santini was not cooperative

Appendix.

4 Santini cannot identify exactly which officers

punched him, hit him with batons, or pepper sprayed him.

(Santini Dep. 66–67).

5 The Troopers’ account is primarily drawn from the

depositions of Troopers Fuhrmann and Sickles, both of which

have been sworn to or submitted under oath, and also from

the Supplemental Investigations Report prepared by each

Trooper.

7

with Fuhrmann during the exchange between the two men.

(Fuhrmann Dep. 39:14–40:6). They maintain that Santini

refused to look at Fuhrmann while Fuhrmann questioned him.

(Id.). They also claim that Santini never mentioned that his

hands were cold from milking cows. (Id. at 46:6–10). Second,

the Defendants maintain that the physical altercation between

Santini and Fuhrmann began when Santini resisted

Fuhrmann’s attempt to remove Santini’s hands from his

pockets. (App. 197). Notably, they assert that during the

“grasping match” between the two men, Santini struck

Fuhrmann with an open palm on the right shoulder. (Id.).6

Third and finally, the Defendants allege that as Santini

resisted Fuhrmann’s attempts to control his hands, Santini

tackled Fuhrmann and grabbed his right leg, bringing the two

men to the ground. (Id.; Fuhrmann Dep. 51).

3. State Court Proceedings Against Santini

As a result of his arrest, Santini was brought before a

Grand Jury in Warren County, New Jersey on May 13, 2009.

(App. 124). The Grand Jury returned a True Bill against

Santini, and he was indicted for aggravated assault under

N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1b(5)(a). (Id.). In August of 2009—two

days before a scheduled pretrial conference—the State

brought two additional charges against Santini: obstruction of

justice and resisting arrest. (Santini Plea Colloquy 3). On

August 12, 2009, Santini pleaded guilty to the resisting arrest

charge only; the aggravated assault and obstruction of justice

charges were dismissed as part of his plea agreement. (Id. at

3–4). During his plea colloquy, Santini admitted that while he

6 Fuhrmann does not make any reference to this open

palm contact in his deposition.

8

was on the ground with various officers on top of him, he

resisted their efforts to pull his arms out from beneath him.

(Id. at 8:22–9:8).

4. Federal Proceedings

On February 3, 2011, Santini filed a six-count

Complaint in federal district court for the District of New

Jersey alleging that his rights under the federal Constitution,

the New Jersey state constitution, and New Jersey state law

were violated by members of the Greenwich Township,

Lopatcong Township, and New Jersey State police forces.

Specifically, the Complaint alleged (1) violations of Santini’s

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, (2) a

violation of N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2, (3) violations of the New

Jersey state constitution, (4) false imprisonment, false arrest,

and malicious prosecution, (5) civil conspiracy, and (6) a

violation of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (N.J.S.A. § 59:1-

1 et seq.). On September 12, 2011, the District Court

dismissed some of the named defendants7—leaving Troopers

Fuhrmann and Sickles (together, “the Trooper Defendants”),

Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes, and the State of New Jersey as the

only remaining defendants.

On September 18, 2013, the District Court issued a

final order granting summary judgment in favor of the

Trooper Defendants and the State of New Jersey and

7 The following defendants were dismissed with

prejudice: Defendants Greenwich Township, Sergeant David

Voll, Patrolman Dennis Cahill, Chief Richard Guzzo,

Lopatcong Township, Detective Michael Patricia, and Chief

Scott Marinelli.

9

dismissing the case. Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-639-

JAP, 2013 WL 5554257, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2013). The

District Court dismissed Santini’s federal claims8 finding that

(1) the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2)

no individual defendant was a “person” under §§ 1983, 1985;

(3) defendants could defeat Santini’s claims for malicious

prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment; (4) § 1983

precludes recovery solely on the basis of respondeat superior;

and (5) the Trooper Defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity. Id. at *4–5 & n.3. The District Court then declined

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Santini’s remaining

state law claims (Counts II, III, and VI). Id. at *5.

Santini filed a motion asking the District Court to

reconsider granting summary judgment in favor of the

Trooper Defendants in their individual capacities as to Counts

I–III of the Complaint.9 Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-

639-JAP, 2014 WL 1789545, at *1 (D.N.J. May 6, 2014).

Santini argued that questions of material fact existed as to

whether excessive force was used against Santini. Id. at *2.

The District Court denied that motion in an Order dated May

8 The District Court characterized three counts as

federal: Count I (alleging violations of civil rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments), Count IV (alleging false imprisonment, false

arrest, and malicious prosecution), and Count V (alleging

civil conspiracy).

9 Santini did not mention the State of New Jersey in his

motion for reconsideration. Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No.

11-639-JAP, 2014 WL 1789545, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. May 6,

2014).

10

6, 2014. Id. at *4–5. This timely appeal followed. On appeal,

Santini’s arguments mirror those found in his motion for

reconsideration—namely that summary judgment against the

Trooper Defendants in their individual capacities was

inappropriate because there are genuine issues of material fact

related to Santini’s claim that excessive force was used

against him by the Trooper Defendants.

II. DISCUSSION10

1. Standard of Review

This Court exercises plenary review over a district

court order granting summary judgment. Bushman v. Halm,

798 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 1986). Therefore, our review is

identical to the review performed by the district court. Id.

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is

“material” under Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence

might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable

substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if

“a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id.

10 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear Santini’s

federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. §

1343(a)(3). It had jurisdiction over his state law claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction to review

final orders of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

11

The moving party bears the burden of identifying

specific portions of the record that establish the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden,

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the

pleadings and “come forward with ‘specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). When determining a motion

for summary judgment, we must construe all evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). We are also mindful

that “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence

and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 249.

We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration

for abuse of discretion. Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann,

Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).

2. Background: Qualified Immunity

Santini argues on appeal that the District Court erred in

finding that the Trooper Defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity with respect to his federal claims. Santini’s federal

claims primarily arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

provides a cause of action to any individual who has been

deprived of his rights under the Constitution or other federal

laws by a person acting “under color of law.” Curley v. Klem,

499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2007). “Police officers,

embodying the authority of the state, are liable under § 1983

when they violate someone’s constitutional rights, unless they

12

are protected by qualified immunity.” Id. The doctrine of

qualified immunity shields government officials who perform

discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). The purpose of qualified immunity is to “avoid

excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution

of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” Id.



This Court performs a two-step inquiry to determine

whether a particular government official is entitled to

summary judgment based on qualified immunity. First, we

ask whether the facts—taken in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party—show that a government official violated a

constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). Second, we ask whether that right was clearly

established at the time of the official’s actions. Id. This twostep

process has more particularized requirements in an

excessive force case such as this one.



In an excessive force case, we determine whether a

constitutional violation has occurred using the Fourth

Amendment’s objective reasonableness test. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Curley, 499 F.3d at 206–

07. To determine objective reasonableness, we must balance

the “nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s

Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 390 U.S. at 396

(quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).



13



While this inquiry is highly individualized and fact

specific, the Supreme Court has provided three factors to

guide us through it: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2)

whether the suspect poses an imminent threat to the safety of

the police or others in the vicinity, and (3) whether the

suspect attempts to resist arrest or flee the scene. Graham,

390 U.S. at 396; see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810,

822 (3d Cir. 1997) (providing additional factors including

“the possibility that the persons subject to the police action

are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the

action, whether the action takes place in the context of

effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be

armed, and the number of persons with whom the police

officers must contend at one time”). We evaluate objective

reasonableness from the perspective of the officer at the time

of the incident and not with the benefit of hindsight.

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). In sum, we

employ a “totality of the circumstances” approach for

evaluating objective reasonableness. Curley, 499 F.3d at 207.



During the second step of the Saucier inquiry, we

inquire whether—even though an officer violated an

individual’s constitutional right—immunity should still

protect that officer from liability. Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. To

answer that question, we must determine whether the right

violated by the officer was clearly established at the time of

the violation. Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). To make

that determination, we engage in another reasonableness

inquiry: “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Like the reasonableness inquiry

conducted in step one, this inquiry is objective and fact

specific. Despite these similarities, the step two inquiry is



14



distinct from the inquiry conducted in step one. Id. at 205.



Saucier highlighted this distinction by noting that the purpose

of the step two inquiry is to acknowledge the reality that

“reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints

on particular police conduct.” Curley, 499 F.3d at 207

(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205) (internal quotation mark

omitted). Put another way,



[T]he first step of the analysis addresses whether the

force used by the officer was excessive, and therefore

violative of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or

whether it was reasonable in light of the facts and

circumstances available to the officer at the time. This

is not a question of immunity at all, but is instead the

underlying question of whether there is even a wrong

to be addressed in an analysis of immunity. The

second step is the immunity analysis and addresses

whether, if there was a wrong, such as the use of

excessive force, the officer made a reasonable mistake

about the legal constraints on his actions and should . .

. be protected against suit[.]



Curley, 499 F.3d at 207.



Saucier mandated that its two-step inquiry be

performed in sequential order, Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201,

which created “perplexing logical and practical” issues for the

lower courts, Curley, 499 F.3d at 208. The Supreme Court

remedied those issues in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

236 (2009). After Pearson, district and appellate courts have

discretion to perform the Saucier inquiry in the order we

deem most appropriate for the particular case before us. Id.





15



3. The District Court’s Decision



Here, the District Court made only a fleeting reference

to qualified immunity in its September 18, 2013 Opinion:

It should be noted that, in finding Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were not violated, Troopers

Fuhrmann and Sickles are entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. However,

the Court need not analyze this issue[, qualified

immunity,] because for the reasons set forth above,

Defendants’ [sic] are already entitled to judgment on

Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims.



Santini, 2013 WL 5554257, at *5 n.3 (citation omitted).11 It

addressed qualified immunity in more detail in its May 6,

2014 Opinion denying Santini’s motion for reconsideration.



In that opinion, the District Court found that Santini did not

satisfy the first step of the Saucier inquiry: establishing that a

constitutional violation occurred. Santini, 2014 WL 1789545,

at *3–4. Based on that finding, the court did not proceed to



11 This footnote demonstrates the District Court’s

initial misunderstanding as to the scope of two of its findings:

(1) that § 1983 cannot override the Eleventh Amendment’s

prohibition of suits against government officials in their

official capacity and (2) that government officials acting in

their official capacity are not “persons” under § 1983. Both of

these findings extend only to government officials acting in

their official—as opposed to individual—capacity. Santini’s

Complaint explicitly stated that he was bringing charges

against the Trooper Defendants in their official and individual

capacities. (Complaint ¶¶ 2–4).



16



the second Saucier step. Id. The District Court relied on two

facts to find that Santini’s constitutional rights were not

violated: “Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that he refused to

take his hands out of his pockets despite Trooper Fuhrmann’s

instructions to do so, and further admits the fact that he

attempted to resist arrest.” Id. at *4.



For the reasons detailed below, we find that while the

District Court stated the appropriate test to determine

qualified immunity, it failed to properly construe all facts and

inferences in Santini’s favor. As our analysis below shows,

when all facts and inferences are taken in Santini’s favor, a

reasonable factfinder could find that Santini’s constitutional

rights were violated. Therefore, the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment on that issue was inappropriate. We

accordingly vacate in part the court’s decisions dated

September 18, 2013 and May 6, 2014 and remand them for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



4. Analysis



At the outset, we emphasize that in reviewing an order

granting summary judgment, we must construe all facts and

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—in this case:

Santini. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962).

We have discretion to perform the two steps of the

Saucier qualified immunity inquiry in the order we deem

appropriate. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We proceed first with

the constitutional violation inquiry to remain consistent with

the District Court’s May 6, 2014 Opinion. We employ the

Graham totality of the circumstances test and begin with an

17

analysis of (1) the severity of Santini’s crime, (2) whether

Santini posed an imminent threat to the safety of the police or

others in the vicinity, and (3) whether Santini attempted to

resist arrest or flee the scene. Graham, 390 U.S. at 396.

Construing all facts in Santini’s favor, a reasonable

jury could find that the severity of crime factor weighs in his

favor. The police arrived to the Santini family farm in order

to investigate a fight between two women—not any sort of

criminal activity on the part of Santini. Accordingly, Santini

was initially only a witness to, not a suspect of, a crime.

Nevertheless, after the altercation with Fuhrmann, Santini

was charged with aggravated assault under N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-

1b(5)(a), a fourth degree crime in New Jersey. (App. 222).12

However, under Santini’s version of the facts, he did not

commit that offense. (See Santini Dep. 65–66).13 Further, the

12 “Crimes are classified by degree. Degrees range

from first to fourth degree offenses. A First degree crime

carries the potential penalty of 10-20 years in prison. A

Second degree crime carries a potential penalty of 5-10

years. Defendants who are convicted of first and second

degree crimes face a presumptive term of incarceration. It is

assumed that they will be sentenced to serve time in prison. A

Third degree crime may result in 3-5 years if convicted,

while Fourth degree crimes carry a potential penalty of up to

18 months in jail. There is a presumption of non-custodial

sentences on 3rd and 4th degree offenses.” The Criminal

Justice Process, NEW JERSEY COURTS, available at

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/crproc.htm.

13 The Eastern District of Michigan confronted a case

with some similarities to Santini’s in Cervantes v. Torbett,

18

aggravated assault charge was subsequently dropped. (Santini

Plea Colloquy 4). Ultimately, Santini pleaded guilty to one

count of resisting arrest, a disorderly persons offense in New

Jersey.14

Under Santini’s averment of the facts, a reasonable

jury could also find that the imminent threat factor weighs in

his favor. We again emphasize that at the beginning of

Santini’s encounter with the police, he was not suspected of

criminal activity. Santini does admit that he did not obey

Fuhrmann’s commands to keep his hands in plain sight.

However, under our totality of the circumstances approach,

this fact does not compel us to find against Santini. First,

Santini maintains that he initially complied with each of

Fuhrmann’s requests to show his hands. Moreover, he

contends that he explained to Fuhrmann that he was only

covering his hands because they were cold. His action of

No. 08-14390, 2010 WL 743045 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 1, 2010)

(unpublished). There, the district court found that the severity

of crime factor weighed in favor of the plaintiff—who was

also the nonmoving party on a motion for summary

judgment—where she was charged with assaulting an officer,

but, under her version of the facts, an assault never occurred.

Cervantes, 2010 WL 743045, at *7.

14 Disorderly persons offenses “carry less restrictive

punishments upon conviction.” The Criminal Justice Process,

NEW JERSEY COURTS, available at

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/crproc.htm. In New

Jersey, a resisting arrest conviction carries with it a maximum

of six months in prison and a $1,000 fine. (Santini Plea

Colloquy 6).

19

balling his hands into his sleeves is consistent with that

explanation. Finally, the police, including Fuhrmann, initially

wanted to speak to Santini because they believed he had

recorded the incident between Drake and Knighton on his cell

phone. During their conversation, Santini informed Fuhrmann

that he had his cell phone in his pocket. Therefore, to the

extent that Fuhrmann observed a hard object in Santini’s

pocket, a jury could find that an objectively reasonable officer

in his position would have thought that object was Santini’s

phone. This inference is further supported by the absence of

other facts suggesting that Santini was armed or otherwise

posed a threat to officer safety.

The final Graham factor—whether the suspect

attempts to resist arrest or flee the scene—is somewhat

inconclusive in this case. While Santini did admit to resisting

arrest in his plea colloquy (Santini Plea Colloquy 8:22–9:8),

his resistance was not violent.15

Under Graham, we ultimately weigh the invasion on

Santini’s individual rights against the interests of the Trooper

Defendants. Under Santini’s version of the facts, this balance

15 A reasonable jury could also find under Santini’s

version of the facts that several of the Sharrar v. Felsing

factors weigh in Santini’s favor. For example, there was a

limited possibility that Santini was violent, as he was only a

witness to—rather than a suspect of—a crime. Further, by the

time Fuhrmann was speaking with Santini, the fight between

Drake and Knighton had ceased and the situation was calm.

Trooper Fuhrmann had no other individuals to contend with

other than witnesses, and there were multiple other officers at

the scene.

20

tips in his favor. Again, taking all facts and inferences in his

favor, the infringement on Santini’s rights was great: he was

grabbed, tackled, punched, kicked, and pepper sprayed.

Conversely, there was only limited justification for the

government’s actions as Santini was a witness to a crime, he

did not threaten violence against the officer, the scene that the

officers were confronted with was peaceful at the time of the

Santini interaction, and there were many officers at the scene.

Therefore, material factual disputes exist as to whether

Santini’s constitutional rights were violated. The existence of

those disputes compels us to find that the District Court’s

grant of summary judgment was inappropriate, as was its

denial of Santini’s motion to reconsider that decision. See

Curley, 298 F.3d at 278 (“Just as the granting of summary

judgment is inappropriate when a genuine issue exists as to

any material fact, a decision on qualified immunity will be

premature when there are unresolved disputes of historical

fact relevant to the immunity analysis.”). We also find that

those factual issues must be resolved by a jury, not a judge.

See id. (“[T]he existence of disputed, historical facts material

to the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct will

give rise to a jury issue.”). We accordingly vacate in part the

decisions of the District Court and remand this case for

further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

5. Santini’s State Law Claims

The District Court declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Santini’s state law claims based on its

dismissal of his federal claims. We instruct the court to

reconsider that decision on remand based upon its resolution

of Santini’s federal claims.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate in part the

decisions of the District Court dated September 18, 2013 and

May 6, 2014 and remand them for further proceedings

consistent with this Opinion.