Quentorius Tremaine Simmons v. The State of Texas

Houston, TX - Criminal defense attorney represented Quentorius Tremaine Simmons with aCapital Murder charge.

Three men broke into a home at night, and one of them shot the complainant

in the living room. A neighbor heard the shooting and called the police. As the

neighbor waited for the police to arrive, she saw two of the three men tussling in the

driveway of the complainant's home. The men eventually got into different cars and

drove away.

The police arrived on scene to find the front door kicked in and the

complainant unresponsive on the floor, bleeding from a single gunshot wound to the

chest. The police initiated life-saving procedures, but the complainant ultimately

succumbed to his injuries.

In the course of securing the scene, the police also encountered Chakira Floyd,

the complainant's girlfriend, who was visibly in shock. Floyd later explained that

she had been at home at the time of the shooting, but she did not see any of the

intruders. She had been asleep during the break in, and she was awoken when two

of the intruders entered her bedroom and began nudging her and asking her where

the complainant kept his money. Too afraid to move, she never lifted her head from

the pillow. She knew that the complainant was a drug dealer, but she did not know

where he hid his cash. She heard the men rummaging through her belongings and

ransacking her room, until they all suddenly ran out. When she inspected the home

later, she noticed that the intruders had taken a PlayStation console, but they had left

the power cord behind.

The police developed a lead in the case after finding a gallon-sized bag of

marijuana outside the front door, which was believed to have been taken during the

break in. An analysis of the bag yielded a fingerprint, which was positively linked

to appellant.

3

Appellant was apprehended several months later and charged with capital

murder. He pleaded not guilty, and his case proceeded to a trial by jury.

During the trial, the prosecution was unable to identify any of the men

involved in the capital murder, other than appellant. Also, the prosecution did not

produce any direct evidence that appellant was the principal actor who shot the

complainant. Instead, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence that

appellant was a party to the offense.

The circumstantial evidence began with the testimony from Floyd, who

recounted what she had initially told the police. She added that she did not see

anything in the driveway when she returned home that evening, which suggested

that the bag of marijuana that had been found there by the police must have been

dropped by the intruders as they were fleeing the scene. She also said that she did

not know appellant or ever recall seeing him in her home with the complainant.

The prosecution then turned to the testimony of Chase Cope, who provided

temporary housing for appellant. According to Cope, appellant mentioned that he

was wanted for questioning in the complainant's capital murder. Appellant told Cope

that he was innocent, but he admitted that he was present for the offense. He said

that he was at the complainant's house playing video games when the three intruders

broke in.

Even though Cope repeatedly asserted his own personal belief that appellant

was innocent, Cope still described other conversations that implicated appellant in

the offense. For example, according to Cope, appellant knew the name of the shooter

and that the murder weapon had been tossed in a lake. Also, appellant admitted that

he took the bag of marijuana and dropped it outside. Appellant likewise admitted

that he took the PlayStation and eventually had it pawned by "a Mexican guy.”

4

Additional testimony about the PlayStation was elicited from Marica

Campbell, who was appellant's ex-girlfriend. She testified that appellant texted her

shortly after the capital murder, asking if he could give a PlayStation to her children.

She agreed, but she said that the PlayStation was lacking a power cord, which she

had to purchase herself.

Campbell also testified that appellant later reclaimed the PlayStation without

any sort of warning. A police detective explained that appellant likely reclaimed the

PlayStation and then disposed of it because a media release indicated that the

authorities were actively searching for it.

Using a serial number, the detective was eventually able to track the

PlayStation to a pawn shop. The pawn ticket showed that the PlayStation had been

pawned by a man with a Hispanic surname, which is consistent with Cope's

testimony that appellant had the PlayStation pawned by "a Mexican guy.”

Appellant did not testify during the trial. His only defense witness was a

prosecutor who testified that Cope, who was facing a criminal charge of his own,

should receive favorable consideration in his separate case because Cope cooperated

with the prosecution against appellant.

ANALYSIS

Appellant raises several points within his sufficiency issue, with the common

theme being that there is no evidence that he was the principal actor who murdered

the complainant. But we need not determine whether the evidence was sufficient to

convict appellant as a principal if we can determine instead that there was sufficient

evidence to convict him as a party. See Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013) ("When the charge authorizes the jury to convict the defendant on

5

more than one theory, as it did in this case, the verdict will be upheld if the evidence

is sufficient on any theory authorized by the jury charge.”).

Appellant likewise contends that there is insufficient evidence to convict him

as a party, and because of that alleged insufficiency, he argues in his second issue

that the trial court reversibly erred by submitting a charge instruction on the law of

parties. We consider this charge error complaint together with appellant's

sufficiency challenge, because if there was sufficient evidence to raise the law of

parties, then the trial court's charge could not be erroneous and the conviction may

be upheld on the theory of party culpability. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 564

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ("In general, an instruction on the law of parties may be

given to the jury whenever there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict that

the defendant is criminally responsible under the law of parties.”).

The conviction can be upheld on a theory of party culpability if there was

sufficient evidence that a capital murder was committed by a principal actor other

than appellant, and that appellant solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted

to aid that principal actor with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of

the capital murder. See Tex. Penal Code § 7.02(a)(2). When deciding whether these

essential elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we consider all of the

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's decision. See Temple v. State, 390

S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

As a threshold matter, we note that there was an abundance of evidence that a

capital murder was committed by a principal actor. The record established that the

complainant was shot and killed during the course of a home invasion and robbery

where property was actually taken. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2) (defining a

capital murder as an intentional murder committed during the course of a burglary

or robbery).

6

The prosecution produced no direct evidence that appellant was the principal

actor, but such evidence was unnecessary because the record supported a finding

that appellant at least aided in the commission of the capital murder. This finding is

based on the cumulative force of several witness statements and the reasonable

inferences that can be made from those statements.

The analysis begins with the testimony of Chakira Floyd, who was present

during the home invasion. She testified that there was more than one intruder, and

that they were jointly searching for the complainant's money and other valuables.

Because a rational person could determine that this joint action by the intruders was

intended to assist in the commission of a burglary or robbery, which was an essential

element of the capital murder, the jury could have likewise concluded that all of the

intruders were criminally responsible as parties to the capital murder. See Hanson v.

State, 55 S.W.3d 681, 688–90 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref'd) (holding that the

defendant was culpable as a party to capital murder where there was legally

sufficient evidence that the defendant knew about the plan to rob the complainant,

the defendant took property from the complainant, and the defendant provided the

weapon that was used to kill the complainant).

The jury could have also concluded that appellant was one of these intruders

because his fingerprint was found on a gallon-sized bag of marijuana in the

complainant's driveway. The jury could have reasonably determined that this bag

had belonged to the complainant, a known drug dealer, because the bag contained

more marijuana that what is traditionally kept for personal use. Also, because Floyd

testified that she did not see anything in the driveway in the hours before the capital

murder, the jury could have reasonably determined that appellant took the bag during

the course of the capital murder, and that he dropped it outside as he was fleeing the

scene.

7

Appellant responds that the jury could only speculate that he was one of the

intruders because there was no explanation for how or when his fingerprint was left

on the bag. But this point is squarely resolved by the testimony of Chase Cope, who

said that appellant admitted to taking the bag on the night of the capital murder.

According to Cope, appellant also admitted to dropping the bag. The jury could have

reasonably accepted this testimony because it comports with the testimony from the

neighbor, who said that the intruders were tussling in the driveway and that they fled

the scene in a hurry. Even though the neighbor did not specifically see the intruders

carrying anything, the neighbor's description of tussling provides a logical

explanation for how the bag could have fallen out of appellant's hands.

Appellant also suggests in his brief that the jury could not reasonably accept

Cope's testimony because Cope was a felon and he had an incentive to lie. But these

points merely attack the weight and credibility of the evidence, which we do not

reevaluate in a sufficiency analysis. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

Even without Cope's testimony, the jury could have determined that appellant

was one of the intruders based on the evidence surrounding the PlayStation. Floyd

testified that the intruders took the complainant's PlayStation, minus the power cord,

which had been left behind, still plugged in the wall. And Marica Campbell,

appellant's ex-girlfriend, testified that appellant delivered a PlayStation to her

children shortly after the capital murder occurred. Because Campbell further

testified that the gifted PlayStation was missing a power cord, the jury could have

reasonably concluded that the PlayStation that appellant had given her children was

the same PlayStation that had been taken in the capital murder. That conclusion is

strengthened by the other evidence that appellant reclaimed the PlayStation after a

media release alerted the public that the authorities were actively searching for the

8

PlayStation. The jury could have reasonably determined that appellant reclaimed the

PlayStation and then pawned it through a third party as a means of distancing himself

from the capital murder.

Based on all of this circumstantial evidence, we conclude that there was

sufficient evidence to raise the issue of party culpability, which means that the trial

court did not err in submitting a charge instruction on the law of parties. And based

on the same set of circumstantial evidence, we further conclude that there was

sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that appellant aided in

the commission of the capital murder, thereby making him criminally responsible as

a party.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.