Osama Abdullatif v. Erpile, LLC and Ali Choudhri

In this appeal from the judgment of a Harris County civil court at law, no

one challenges the trial court's judgment regarding the original plaintiff's claim

against the original defendant. Instead, the defendant argues that the trial court

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the intervenor's claims. We agree. We

additionally conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over

three of the defendant's four counter-claims against the intervenor. The trial

2

court's ruling on the merits of the remaining counterclaim has not been challenged

on appeal. We accordingly modify the judgment to dismiss without prejudice

those claims over which the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and

affirm the judgment as modified.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant Osama Abdullatif and appellee Ali Choudhri have a long and

complex litigation history.1 For the purposes of this suit, however, we need

consider only two cases.

A. The Suit in Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 3

In January 2011, Erpile, LLC sued Abdullatif in Harris County Civil Court

at Law No. 3 in a case styled as Erpile, LLC v. Osama Abdullatif and Stephen

Hunt, Cause No. 981824. Erpile alleged that Abdullatif, the previous owner of

100% of the membership interest in Erpile, LLC, had assigned all of his interest in

the company to Richard Wakefield. Erpile stated that despite this assignment,

Abdullatif continued purporting to act on behalf of the company. In particular,

Erpile alleged that Abdullatif was attempting to act on Erpile's behalf in

foreclosing on a property. Erpile alleged that such actions were contrary to a

"Participation Agreement” between Choudhri and Erpile, which provided that any

foreclosure by Erpile would require the consent of both Erpile and Choudhri.

Erpile alleged that neither it nor Choudhri had consented to the foreclosure. Erpile

therefore asked the trial court to declare that Abdullatif has no interest in the

company, and to render injunctive relief.

A few weeks after the suit was filed, Abdullatif and Choudhri signed a

1 See generally Choudhri v. Latif & Co., Nos. 14-14-00235-CV & 14-14-00236-CV,

2014 WL 2854875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 3, 2014, orig. proceeding) (describing

the overlapping litigation between Choudhri and Abdullatif in four trial courts).

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settlement agreement to resolve a number of their business disputes. Among other

things, Choudhri agreed to non-suit a case that was pending in County Court at

Law No. 3. Although Choudhri was not a party to Erpile, LLC v. Abdullatif in

County Court at Law No. 3, and the cause number stated in the settlement

agreement does not match the cause number of that case, the parties all state in

their briefs that this was the suit to which they referred. About two weeks after

Choudhri and Abdullatif signed the settlement agreement, Erpile non-suited the

case without prejudice.

Almost immediately, disputes arose concerning the settlement agreement.

Choudhri maintained that Abdullatif had breached the duty to convey a deed to a

particular property,2 and Abdullatif asserted that Choudhri failed to pay him $1.975

million by a certain date as specified in the settlement agreement. These disputes

led to further litigation.

B. The Suit in Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 4

In May 2011, Erpile filed this suit against Abdullatif in Harris County Civil

Court at Law No. 4. As in the earlier suit filed in a civil county court at law, Erpile

alleged that Abdullatif had assigned all of the membership interests in the company

to Wakefield, who then became the company's manager. Once again, Erpile

sought a declaration that Abdullatif owns no interest in the company. Erpile

specifically stated in its pleading, "This suit is limited to determining the

ownership of property, being Erpile and requests no other relief either directly or

indirectly, other than a restoration of the prior injunction.”3 Erpile later dropped

the request for injunctive relief.

2 Choudhri asserted these claims in a separate suit against Abdullatif and others in the

Harris County 164th District Court. We mention them here only to provide context for the

declarations requested in this suit.

3 Font normalized.

4

Choudhri filed a petition in intervention in the suit. He asked the trial court

to make two declarations about the settlement agreement that ended the earlier

litigation, and later amended his petition to add a request for a third declaration.

The requested declarations were as follows:

1. "The Settlement Agreement is a valid and enforceable

agreement”;

2. "The Settlement Agreement was breached by Osama Abdullatif

prior to the date [that Choudhri was required to pay Abdullatif

$1,975,000] pursuant to ¶ 10 of the Settlement Agreement”; and

3. "Osama Abdullatif's breach excused any further performance

by Ali Choudhri under the Settlement Agreement.”

Abdullatif filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which he challenged the trial

court's subject-matter jurisdiction over Choudhri's claims. After the trial court had

denied the plea and Choudhri had moved for partial summary judgment on his own

claims, Abdullatif filed original and amended counterclaims against Choudhri. In

his original counterclaim, Abdullatif asked for more than $2.3 million in actual

damages and a long list of declarations. He then amended his counterclaim to

request only attorney's fees and the following four declarations:

1. "Choudhri confirmed repeatedly that Erpile owned the Lien on

[a certain real property] in several filings in federal bankruptcy court”;

2. "Choudhri filed a fraudulent Lien release extinguishing Erpile's

security interest in [that property]”;

3. "[Neither] Choudhri nor Erpile have ever repaid Abdullatif the

$2,300,000 he advanced Choudhri”; and

4. "Abdullatif is, and has always been, the rightful owner of the

membership interest in Erpile.”4

The trial court granted Choudhri's motion for partial summary judgment and

issued an order that included the following declarations:

4 These requests were in Abdullatif's first amended counterclaims. The trial court struck

Abdullatif's second amended counterclaims, and he does not challenge that ruling.

5

1. "The Settlement Agreement entered into between

Choudhri and Abdullatif on January 22, 2011, was and is valid and

enforceable”;

2. "Abdullatif committed the first material breach of the

Settlement Agreement”; and

3. "As a result of Abdullatif committing the first material

breach of the Settlement Agreement, Choudhri was and is excused

from performing any further obligations under the Settlement

Agreement.”

After the trial court issued this order, Choudhri and Erpile moved for final

summary judgment on Erpile's claims and on Abdullatif's counterclaims against

Choudhri. Abdullatif filed no response to the motion, and the trial court granted it.

In its final judgment, the trial court made the declaration requested by Erpile that

"Defendant Osama Abdullatif has no ownership interest in Erpile, LLC.” That part

of the judgment has not been challenged on appeal. The trial court also repeated

the three declarations made in the earlier order granting Choudhri's motion for

partial summary judgment, and dismissed Abdullatif's counterclaims against

Choudhri with prejudice.

Although Abdullatif has presented three issues for review, its challenge to

the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction is dispositive.

II. THE SCOPE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

"[S]ubject-matter jurisidiction is essential to a court's power to decide a

case.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000).

Consequently, a court cannot render a binding judgment concerning matters over

which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307

S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding). Determining whether a trial court

had subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo.

City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam).

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For courts of general jurisdiction such as our state district courts, subjectmatter

jurisdiction usually is presumed, absent a showing to the contrary. Dubai

Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (sub. op.). But county courts

at law are courts of limited jurisdiction. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Brite, 215

S.W.3d 400, 401 (Tex. 2007). Because jurisdiction in such courts is not presumed,

the authority to adjudicate the claims presented must be established at the outset of

the case. See Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75. One who files a pleading

asserting a cause of action must "allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the

court's jurisdiction to hear the cause.” See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control

Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). This requirement applies equally to

intervenors and to parties. TEX. R. CIV. P. 61.

In a Harris County civil court at law, original jurisdiction can be based on

the value of the "matter in controversy.” See Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg.,

R.S., ch. 746, § 2, 1991 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2620, 2620 (amended 2011) (current

version at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0003(c) (West Supp. 2014)).

Alternatively, original jurisdiction can be based on the nature of the matter in

controversy. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.1032(c) (West Supp. 2014). In this

category, such a court has jurisdiction to "decide the issue of title to real or

personal property” and to "hear a suit for the enforcement of a lien on real

property.” See id.5

III. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER CHOUDHRI'S CLAIMS

For the reasons described below, we conclude that the amount in

controversy in Choudhri's claims against Abdullatif was not within the trial court's

5 A Harris County civil court at law has original jurisdiction over other matters as well,

but neither we nor the parties have identified any basis other than those listed here on which the

trial court arguably could base the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.

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jurisdictional limits. We further conclude that because Choudhri's claims are

concerned solely with the validity and performance of the settlement agreement,

the claims do not fall within the trial court's jurisdiction to decide the issue of title

to real or personal property or its jurisdiction to hear a suit for the enforcement of a

lien on real property.

A. Value of Choudhri's Claims Against Abdullatif

To determine whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction based on

the value of the matter in controversy, courts look to the amount of damages

alleged in the pleading. See Brite, 215 S.W.3d at 402–03. When Choudhri

intervened, the county civil court at law had jurisdiction over "civil cases in which

the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000, excluding

interest, statutory or punitive damages and penalties, and attorney's fees and costs,

as alleged on the face of the petition.” See Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S.,

ch. 746, § 2, 1991 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2620, 2620 (amended 2011).

Choudhri sought no damages other than attorney's fees under the Uniform

Declaratory Judgments Act; thus, his petition in intervention did not even include a

"statement that the damages sought are within the jurisdictional limits of the court”

as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(b), 785–

86 S.W.2d [Tex. Cases] xli (1990, amended 2013). Because this was not an action

for damages, and attorney's fees are excluded by statute when determining whether

the value of the matter in controversy is within the trial court's jurisdictional limit,

the trial court could not exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over Choudhri's claims

based on the amount of damages sought.6

6 Even if we were to consider the effect of the declarations sought and not simply the

amount that Choudhri sought to recover, the trial court would lack subject-matter jurisdiction.

The settlement agreement imposes financial obligations on both Abdullatif and Choudhri far in

excess of the trial court's jurisdictional limits. The extent to which the obligations imposed by a

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B. Nature of Choudri's Claims Against Abdullatif

Both in Choudhri's original petition and his live pleading when judgment

was entered, the nature of the controversy was identified only from the specific

declarations requested and from the following paragraph:

On January 22, 2011, Intervenor and Defendant Osama

Abdullatif executed a Settlement Agreement to (1) resolve the

litigation in Cause No. 981724, Erpile, LLC v. Osama Abdullatif, in

Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 3, (2) amend an agreement

dated October 27, 2009 involving Erpile, LLC, and (3) settle disputes

regarding the parties' other business dealings. The January 22, 2011

Settlement Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Settlement

Agreement”) is attached hereto and incorporated for all purposes

herein, as Exhibit A. Exhibit A is subject to the cause in which this

intervention is filed.

As can be seen from the nature of the controversy described above and from

the declarations Choudhri requested, this is not "a suit for the enforcement of a lien

on real property.” Choudhri also did not ask the trial court to "decide the issue of

title to real or personal property.” All of Choudhri's claims instead are about the

validity and performance of a settlement agreement.

Choudhri nevertheless argues that the trial court had subject-matter

jurisdiction over his petition in intervention because the court had jurisdiction to

decide the issue of title to personal property, i.e., the membership interest in

Erpile.7 Choudhri asserts that Abdullatif's claim to an ownership interest in Erpile

"was an integral part of Choudhri's intervention,” but this is not supported by the

record. Abdullatif had not asserted any claims in this suit when Choudhri

settlement agreement must be honored is affected by determinations such as those at issue here,

i.e., whether the agreement has been breached, and if so, whether a promised performance is

enforceable or excused. See Advanced Personal Care, LLC v. Churchill, 437 S.W.3d 41, 46–48

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

7 See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.106(a) (West 2012) ("A membership interest in

a limited liability company is personal property.”).

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intervened. Moreover, Choudhri never asked the trial court to decide who owns

the membership interest in Erpile; that was Erpile's issue, and the existence of

subject-matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claims does not mean that the trial

court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the intervenor's distinct claims—

particularly where, as here, the trial court is a court of limited jurisdiction.

Here, only Erpile asked the trial court to decide an issue of title to personal

property. Choudhri did not state such a claim, and the settlement agreement

incorporated into Choudhri's pleadings does not purport to convey title to the

membership interest in Erpile. Indeed, neither Choudhri's pleadings nor the

settlement agreement even mention Erpile's ownership.

Choudhri implicitly acknowledges the difference between his claim and

Erpile's claim, stating in his brief that "Erpile's suit to determine rightful

ownership of the membership rested on the Assignment of Interest signed by

Abdullatif on September 15, 2010,” but "Choudhri's Petition in Intervention raised

the issue from a different direction[:] the enforceability of the Settlement

Agreement whereby Abdullatif released any of his claims 'due to [Abdullatif's and

Choudhri's] dealings with Erpile.'” This is not merely "a different direction”;

these are different claims arising from different contracts and conferring different

rights on different people.

Because his claims are independent of Erpile's claims, the question of

whether the trial court had jurisdiction over Choudhri's claims cannot be answered

by saying that the trial court had jurisdiction over Erpile's claims. See Clark v.

Turner, 92 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1936, no writ) ("An

independent cause of action, it matters not what form the pleadings may take, will

not dispense with the necessity of alleging jurisdictional facts so as to confer

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jurisdiction on the court trying the cause.”).8

Choudhri additionally asserts that the Harris County civil court at law has

jurisdiction over his claims because they are "inherently intertwined” with Erpile's

claims. In support of this argument, he cites Taub v. Aquila Sw. Pipeline Corp., 93

S.W.3d 451 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). That case is

distinguishable.

In Taub, a gas utility filed a condemnation action in a Harris County civil

court at law. Id. at 454. In Harris County, such courts have exclusive jurisdiction

over eminent-domain proceedings. See id. at 456 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.

§ 25.1032(c)). One of the landowners then sued the utility in a district court

concerning the utility's activities on the property. See id. at 454. The utility

counterclaimed for condemnation, asserting the same claim that it had asserted in

the county civil court at law. See id. Both actions were consolidated and tried to a

final judgment in the district court. See id. at 454–55. On appeal, we vacated the

8 In a related argument, Choudhri cites section 5.83 of McDonald and Carlson's Texas

Civil Practice for the proposition that "when an intervenor's rights are incident to the claim

asserted by the plaintiff, and jurisdiction is established by the plaintiff's complaint, the

intervenor need not show independent grounds to support jurisdiction.” But what the cited

source actually states is as follows:

When the intervenor's rights are incident to the claim asserted by the plaintiff,

and the intervenor is aligned either as a plaintiff to share in the recovery, or as a

defendant to resist it, the jurisdiction established by the plaintiff's complaint

supports the intervenor and the intervenor need not show independent grounds to

support jurisdiction of the intervenor's claim or defense standing alone. But if the

intervenor's pleading presents an independent action that might have been joined,

the intervenor must allege and establish jurisdiction.

1 ROY W. MCDONALD & ELAINE A. GRAFTON CARLSON, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE 2d § 5.83 (2d

ed. 2004) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).

Here, the rights that Choudhri claims are not "incident to the claim asserted by the

plaintiff”; he does not seek to share in the plaintiff's recovery or resist it; and he asserts

independent claims and requests for relief. He therefore cannot rely on Erpile's pleadings as a

basis for the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction over his own claims.

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part of the judgment dealing with the condemnation claim and explained that,

because the Harris County civil court at law had exclusive jurisdiction over such

claims, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over it. Id. at 456. The

utility argued that this would lead to separate adjudications of the condemnor's and

the landowner's claims. Id. at 457. After considering the history of this exclusivejurisdiction

provision, we rejected that argument, holding that the Harris County

civil courts at law have jurisdiction "over a landowner's claims, regardless of the

amount in controversy, when those claims are inherently intertwined in an eminent

domain proceeding.” Id. at 458.

Neither we nor our sister courts have applied Taub's holding outside of the

eminent-domain context, and we decline to do so in the dissimilar circumstances

here. In Taub, the plaintiff in the Harris County civil court at law was required to

bring its case in that court because it had exclusive jurisdiction. Here, none of the

claims asserted are within the county civil court at law's exclusive jurisdiction. In

Taub, the additional claim over which the Harris County civil court at law

exercised jurisdiction were asserted by the landowner, a person who necessarily

was already before the court as part of the eminent-domain action. Here, the

claims being challenged on jurisdictional grounds were injected by a non-party

who intervened in the action. And in Taub, the challenged claims were inherently

intertwined with the plaintiff's claims. Here, the claims asserted by Choudhri are

independent of the plaintiff's claims.

Finally, Choudhri points out that Abdullatif did not file a motion to strike

Choudhri's petition in intervention. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 60 ("Any party may

intervene by filing a pleading, subject to being stricken out by the court for

sufficient cause on the motion of any party.”). The question before us is not

whether Choudhri's petition in intervention should have been stricken, but whether

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the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to address Choudhri's claims. Stated

differently, we are not asked to decide whether Choudhri properly made himself a

party to this lawsuit,9 but whether, having become a party, Choudhri asserted

claims within the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. These are distinct

questions. There may be no practical difference in the effect that an appellate

court's adverse ruling on either question might have on an intervenor, but there is a

considerable difference in the way that courts review each issue.10

In sum, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction

over the claims asserted by Choudhri. We accordingly modify the judgment to

dismiss his claims without prejudice. See Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex. v.

Duenez, 201 S.W.3d 674, 675 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (explaining that claims

over which the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction are dismissed without

prejudice).

IV. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

OVER ABDULLATIF'S CLAIMS AGAINST CHOUDHRI

In his brief, Abdullatif concedes that if the trial court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over Choudhri's claims, then it also lacked subject-matter jurisdiction

over Abdullatif's claims. We agree that the trial court lacked subject-matter

9 Absent a motion to strike, one who files a petition in intervention generally becomes a

party to the suit for all purposes. See Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793

S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. 1990) (op. on reh'g).

10We apply a de novo standard of review in determining whether the trial court had

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Rhule, 417 S.W.3d at 442. But when determining whether the

trial court's ruling on a motion to strike was erroneous, we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard

of review. See Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v., 793 S.W.2d at 657. A judgment by a trial court lacking

subject-matter jurisdiction is void. See PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tex.

2012). In contrast, an erroneous ruling on a motion to strike is merely voidable. See Tex. Dep't

of Health v. Buckner, 950 S.W.2d 216, 217–18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no writ)

(reversing and remanding where trial court abused its discretion in granting a motion to strike the

petition in intervention).

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jurisdiction to render judgment on the merits regarding three of Abdullatif's four

requests for declaratory relief. We conclude, however, that one of his requests for

relief was within the trial court's jurisdiction.

A. Value of Abdullatif's Claims Against Choudhri

In Abdullatif's original counterclaim, he sought actual damages of "no less

than $2,300,000”—an amount well in excess of the trial court's upper

jurisdictional limit.11 See Kormanik v. Seghers, 362 S.W.3d 679, 692 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (supp. op.) (explaining that, to determine

whether a Harris County civil court at law had subject-matter jurisdiction, the

appellate court would review the party's original pleading). Abdullatif then

amended his counterclaim to eliminate all claims for damages, requesting only

declaratory relief and attorney's fees under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments

Act or chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2015) (authorizing a party asserting a

contract claim to recover attorney's fees "in addition to the amount of a valid claim

and costs”). But as previously explained, such attorney's fees are excluded from

the calculation of the amount in controversy. Thus, in Abdullatif's original

pleading, he sought damages above the trial court's maximum jurisdictional limit,

and in his amended pleading, he sought no damages at all, thereby falling below

the trial court's minimum jurisdictional limit. The trial court therefore could not

exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over Abdullatif's claims based on the amount

in controversy.

11 By the time that Abdullatif had asserted counterclaims against Choudhri, the upper

limit of the trial court's jurisdiction had been increased to $200,000. See TEX. GOV'T CODE

ANN. § 25.0003(c)(1) (West. Supp. 2014).

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B. Nature of Abdullatif's Claims Against Choudhri

Abdullatif's original counterclaim against Choudhri contained numerous

requests for declaratory relief, but by the time the trial court rendered final

judgment denying Abdullatif's claims, only four remained. Three of these do not

fall within the Harris County civil court at law's jurisdiction to "decide the issue of

title to real or personal property” and to "hear a suit for the enforcement of a lien

on real property.” Specifically, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to

rule on the merits of Abdullatif's requests for declarations that (1) "Choudhri

confirmed repeatedly that Erpile owned the Lien on [a certain real property] in

several filings in federal bankruptcy court”; (2) "Choudhri filed a fraudulent Lien

release extinguishing Erpile's security interest in [that property]”; and

(3) "[neither] Choudhri nor Erpile have ever repaid Abdullatif the $2,300,000 he

advanced Choudhri.” We therefore modify the judgment to dismiss these claims

without prejudice.

His remaining request for declaratory relief, however, was within the trial

court's subject-matter jurisdiction. In asking the trial court to declare that

"Abdullatif is, and has always been, the rightful owner of the membership interest

in Erpile,” Abdullatif was asking the trial court to decide the issue of title to

personal property. Because the legislature has expressly authorized the Harris

County civil courts at law to exercise jurisdiction over such determinations, we

conclude that the trial court did not err by ruling on this issue. We do not address

the merits of the trial court's ruling denying Abdullatif's request for relief and

making the declaration Erpile requested. These competing requests for declaratory

relief are mutually exclusive, and although Abdullatif briefed the question of

whether the trial court erred in dismissing his counterclaims—all of which were

asserted only against Choudhri—he does not challenge the trial court's judgment in

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Erpile's favor on Erpile's own affirmative claim for declaratory relief. We

therefore leave intact that portion of the trial court's judgment in which it declared

that Abdullatif has no ownership interest in Erpile.12

V.

CONCLUSION

Of all of the claims addressed in the final judgment, the Harris County civil

court at law had subject-matter jurisdiction only to address the request for a

declaration about whether Abdullatif does or does not have an ownership interest

in Erpile, LLC. We therefore modify the judgment to dismiss without prejudice all

other claims by Choudhri and Abdullatif, and affirm the judgment as modified.

/s/ Tracy Christopher

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Donovan, and Wise.

12 At oral argument, Abdullatif’s counsel confirmed that (1) the judgment in Erpile’s

favor disposed of Abdullatif’s competing request for declaratory judgment regarding Erpile’s

ownership, and (2) Abdullatif does not challenge that part of the judgment.