Juan Reyna v. The State of Texas

On February 20, 2013, Agent Roberto Montalvo of the Texas Department of Public

Safety—Criminal Investigations Division received a tip from a woman that lives in the

neighborhood who identified herself by name that a male subject was regularly

distributing narcotics on Harold Street near the intersection with Carol Street in Corpus

Christi. That same day, Montalvo drove to Harold Street to investigate; at the time, he

was in an unmarked car and wearing regular civilian clothing. As Montalvo was driving

westbound on Harold Street, he noticed a man, later identified as Reyna, standing in the

middle of the road next to a female. Montalvo testified at the suppression hearing that

both Reyna and the female were acting extremely suspiciously because they were

constantly looking around as if to see if they were being watched. Montalvo stated that

he saw Reyna lean in close to the woman and hand her something very small. Believing

this activity to be consistent with narcotics trafficking, Montalvo made a U-turn, and exited

his vehicle with his weapon drawn for “safety since [he] was out there alone.” Montalvo

identified himself and the female subject fled. Montalvo testified that because he had

received a tip about a male subject distributing drugs, he focused on Reyna instead of

the woman. According to Montalvo, he told Reyna the reason why he was being detained

by stating, “I saw you give dope to that female,” to which Reyna replied, “well, I already

gave it to her.” Montalvo patted down Reyna and found four “20s” of heroin in his front

right coin pocket.1

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Reyna entered an open plea of

guilty to the charged offense and a plea of true to the enhancement paragraphs before

1 Montalvo testified that a “20” is a small amount of any substance worth $20. According to Montalvo, this is a common amount of a substance to be carrying around when dealing drugs.

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the trial court on September 15, 2014. Based on the plea, the trial court sentenced Reyna

to twenty-five years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division.

This appeal ensued.

II. PROBABLE CAUSE

In a single issue on appeal, Reyna argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to suppress the drugs and his statements to Montalvo. Reyna contends that: (1)

Montalvo did not have probable cause to arrest Reyna; (2) his statements are

inadmissible because he was never read his Miranda rights before being questioned; and

(3) Montalvo unreasonably conducted a warrantless search that resulted in discovering

the heroin.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed under a

bifurcated standard of review. See Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. See Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d

17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court's

rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those

facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor; and (2) application-of

law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Amador,

221 S.W.3d at 673. We review de novo the trial court’s pure legal rulings and application

of-law-to-fact questions that do turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d

367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

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A police officer may temporarily detain an individual when the officer has

reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual “actually is, has been, or soon will be

engaged in criminal activity.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Reasonable suspicion exists when the officer has specific and articulable facts that, when

combined with the inferences from those facts, lead the officer to reasonably believe that

the individual is or will soon be engaged in crime. Id. Even though an informant’s tip by

itself will seldom provide reasonable suspicion, a tip can support reasonable suspicion

when coupled with the officer’s personal observations. See Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d

919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “An inverse relationship exists between the reliability

of the informant and the amount of corroborated information required to justify the police

intrusion; the less reliable the tip, the more information is needed.” Id. A tip is considered

significantly more reliable if the informant provides self-identifying information that makes

himself accountable for the intervention. See id.

A police officer may arrest an individual without a warrant only if (1) there is

probable cause with respect to that individual and (2) the arrest falls within one of the

statutory exceptions. Beverly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 103, 104–105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

One of those exceptions provides that “[a] peace officer may arrest an offender without a

warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.” TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The test for probable cause

for a warrantless arrest is whether “at that moment the facts and circumstances within the

officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were

sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed

or was committing an offense.” Beverly, 792 S.W.2d at 105. In other words, probable

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cause requires “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). Police officers may search an arrestee and

everything within his immediate control incident to a lawful arrest. State v. Granville, 423

S.W.3d 399, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

“The Miranda rule generally prohibits the admission into evidence of statements

made in response to custodial interrogation when the suspect has not been advised of

certain warnings.” State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “In the

Miranda context, interrogation means any words or actions on the part of the police . . .

that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id.

(citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). Thus, interrogation includes

express questions and its functional equivalents. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. However,

not “all statements obtained by the police after a person has been taken into custody are

to be considered the product of interrogation.” Id. Interrogation reflects a “measure of

compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” Id. Statements made

voluntarily by a defendant in custody are fully admissible. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 478 (1966).

B. Discussion

Reyna argues that Montalvo did not have probable cause to arrest Reyna,

meaning that the pat-down search of Reyna was unreasonable. However, we give great

deference to the trial court’s determinations on these mixed questions of law and fact

since they rely on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. See Amador, 221

S.W.3d at 673. We find that the trial court did not err in ruling that Officer Montalvo had

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reasonable suspicion to detain Reyna and then developed probable cause to arrest and

search Reyna. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 488.

Montalvo had received a tip from a self-identified woman in the area that a man

was dealing drugs near a certain street corner. Because the tip came from a self

identified woman, the tip is considered reliable; accordingly, less information is required

to support Montalvo’s development of reasonable suspicion. See Martinez, 348 S.W.3d

at 923. Only two blocks from that location, Montalvo witnessed a man meeting that

description interacting with a woman in the middle of the road. According to Montalvo’s

own observations, both the man and the woman were acting suspiciously, standing in the

middle of the road and constantly looking around as if afraid of being watched, and they

exchanged something small. Based on the totality of the circumstances at that point in

the encounter, including the tip that described the general location of the drug-trafficking

along with Montalvo’s observations, the evidence established a reasonable suspicion to

detain Reyna. See Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923; Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 488. Immediately

in response to Montalvo explaining why he was detaining Reyna, Reyna replied, “well, I

already gave it to her.” Under the facts and circumstances known to Montalvo at the time,

he had probable cause to believe Reyna had engaged in criminal conduct. See Beverly,

792 S.W.2d at 105. Having probable cause to arrest Reyna, Montalvo could lawfully

conduct a warrantless search incident to the arrest. See Granville, 423 S.W.3d at 410.

The search was contemporaneous with the arrest and was limited to Reyna’s personal

area of control; therefore, Montalvo conducted a valid search of Reyna incident to his

arrest. See id.

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Reyna also argues that because he was in custody and was not read his Miranda

warnings, any statements he made are inadmissible. Assuming without deciding that

Reyna was in custody for purposes of Miranda, his statements to Montalvo were not the

result of police interrogation or compulsion. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Montalvo testified

that it is common to tell individuals why they are being detained. There is no evidence

that this was a preconceived strategy to induce Reyna to incriminate himself or that

Montalvo should have known that his comment would elicit an incriminating response.

See Cruz, 461 S.W.3d at 536. Reyna’s statement that he had already dealt the drugs

was a voluntary response of his own volition and thus fully admissible. See id.; Miranda,

384 U.S. at 478. We cannot say that Montalvo should have known that his statement to

Reyna was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Cruz, 461 S.W.3d

at 536.

The trial court committed no error in denying Reyna’s motion to suppress.

Therefore, we overrule Reyna’s sole issue.



We affirm the trial court’s judgment.