In February 2012, Williams plead guilty to one count of forgery, four

counts of grand theft, and one count of theft. Williams was sentenced to a term of

incarceration of eight and a half-years (102 months), but placed on community

control in State v. Williams, Stark C.P. No. 2012-CR-0164. Williams violated the

terms of her community control and the sentence of 102 months of incarceration

was ordered into effect. In December 2017, Williams filed a complaint for a

declaratory judgment, in Williams v. Bureau of Sentence Computation, Cuyahoga

C.P. No. CV-17-889847, through which she sought additional credits toward her

sentence based upon R.C. 2967.193 and Ohio Adm. Code 5120-2-06(K)(4). The trial

court, on July 31, 2018, held that:

In her petition for declaratory judgment, filed December 1, 2017,

Williams seeks a declaration regarding the sentencing legislation under

which she was sanctioned to prison. Williams maintains she was

sentenced under House Bill 86 and thus entitled to five days of earned

credit each month of successful participation and completion of

educational programming under R.C. 2967.193(D)(5). Further,

Williams asserts that, pursuant to O.A.C. 5120-2-06(J)(4), she is

entitled to five days of credit for each month of participation. In its

motion for summary judgment, BSC agrees that Williams was

sentenced under House Bill 86, but maintains she is limited to one day

of earned credit per month because her offenses were committed prior

to September 30, 2011. The court finds the argument of BSC to have

merit. For the following reasons, summary judgment is granted in

favor of the defendant BSC and against plaintiff Williams.

The parties do not dispute the facts. Williams was charged on

February 16, 2012 with one count of forgery, four counts of grand theft,

and one count of theft, which offenses were committed against clients

of Williams in her capacity as their attorney between December 21,

2007 and February 28, 2011. Williams pled guilty on February 16, 2012

and was sentenced to five years of community control, among other

sanctions; she also was advised at sentencing that a violation of

community control would result in a maximum consecutive prison

term for each charge, for total of 102 months.

On September 27, 2012 Williams revealed during disciplinary

proceedings that she had violated conditions of her community control

sentence. The trial court subsequently revoked Williams’ probation

and sentenced her to 102 months incarceration. Williams appealed the

consecutive nature of her sentence, and the appellate court determined

that the trial court did not make the requisite findings under

2929.14(C)(4) (as amended by H.B. 86) that consecutive sentences

were appropriate. The case was remanded to the trial court for

resentencing. At resentencing, the trial court found consecutive

sentences were appropriate, made the statutorily required findings,

and sentenced Williams to 102 months incarceration. Williams

subsequently has been awarded one day of earned time credit for each

month that she has been incarcerated for successfully completed

qualifying programs under R.C. 2967.193(A) and (D)(5). In denying

her appeal to receive five days of credit, the Division of the Chief

Inspector on Grievance Appeal at NEPRC mistakenly indicated that he

determined that Williams was sentenced under Senate Bill 2.

House Bill 86 became effective September 30, 2011. The section that

relates to Williams’ sentence states: “except as provided in division (C)

of this section, if the most serious offense for which the offender is

confined is a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree or an unclassified

felony and neither division (D)(2) nor (3) of this section applies to the

offender, the offender may earn one day of credit under division (A) of

this section if the offender committed that offense prior to

September 30, 2011, and the offender may earn five days of credit

under division (A) of this section if the offender committed that offense

on or after September 30, 2011.” R.C. 2967.193 (2012). The statute

remains the same in its current form.

Upon consideration of the relevant law and evidence, the court finds

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and, after construing the

undisputed evidence in light most favorable to the non-moving parties,

reasonable minds can come only to the conclusion that defendant BSC

is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. The court declares

that Williams was sentenced under H.B. 86, and further declares that

Williams is thus entitled to one day of earned credit per month under

R.C. 2967.193 and OAC 5120-2- 06(J)(4) based upon the dates upon

which Williams committed the underlying offenses for which she

currently is incarcerated. Although the Department of Rehabilitation

and Correction has promulgated unartfully worded brochures and

notices regarding earned credit in prison which Williams believes

entitles her to five days credit per month, that does not change the clear

language of the statute indicating that Williams is entitled to only one

day of credit per month due to her offenses being committed prior to

September 30, 2011. BSC’s motion for summary judgment is granted;

Williams’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

Williams appealed the trial court’s judgment and this court, in

Williams v. Bur. of Sentencing & Computation, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107626,

2019-Ohio-997, affirmed the judgment of the trial court and held that:

Williams maintains that she was sentenced under House Bill 86 and

therefore, under R.C. 2967.193(D)(5), she is entitled to five days of

earned credit for each month of successful participation and

completion of educational programming.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that Williams was sentenced

under House Bill 86. BOSCO agrees Williams was sentenced under

House Bill 86. The record is also clear that the appeals court remanded

Williams’s case for the trial court to make appropriate findings, before

imposing consecutive sentences, required following the enactment of

House Bill 86. Williams, 2013-Ohio-3448 at 23-25.

In the trial court’s well-reasoned decision, it stated in pertinent part as

follows: “The Court declares that Williams was sentenced under H.B.

86, and further declares that Williams is thus entitled to one day of

earned credit per month under R.C. 2967.193 and OAC 5120-2-

06(J)(4) based upon the dates upon which Williams committed the

underlying offenses for which she currently is incarcerated.”

The parties agree that R.C. 2967.193(D)(5) determines the amount of

credit to which Williams is entitled. R.C. 2967.193(D)(5) provides:

“Except as provided in division (C) of this section, if the most serious

offense for which the offender is confined is a felony of the third, fourth,

or fifth degree or an unclassified felony and neither division (D)(2) nor

(3) of this section applies to the offender, the offender may earn one

day of credit under division (A) of this section if the offender committed

that offense prior to September 30, 2011, and the offender may earn

five days of credit under division (A) of this section if the offender

committed that offense on or after September 30, 2011.”

It is undisputed from the record that the bill of information that

charged Williams with one count of forgery, four counts of grand theft,

and one count of theft, indicated that the offenses were committed

against her client between December 2007 and February 2011. The

above statute states: “the offender may earn one day of credit under

division (A) of this section if the offender committed that offense prior

to September 30, 2011.” Therefore, based on the plain reading of the

statute, Williams is entitled to one day of earned credit per month, not

five days as she contends.

The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law, which we review de

novo. See, e.g., State v. Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 2015-Ohio-236,

28 N.E.3d 1267, ¶ 6. Where, as here, a statute is unambiguous and

definite, we must apply the plain meaning of the statute as written. In

re J.Y., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 2018-Ohio-2405, 114 N.E.3d 1221,

citing Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 148 Ohio St.3d 483, 2016-

Ohio-7432, 71 N.E.3d 974, ¶ 20 (“‘An unambiguous statute must be

applied in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory

language[.]’”), quoting State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio

St. 3d 78, 81, 1997-Ohio-310, 676 N.E.2d 519 (1997).

Based on the plain meaning of R.C. 2967.193(D)(5) and the date

Williams committed the charged offenses, there is no genuine issue of

material fact and BOSCO was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Therefore, the trial court did not err when it granted BOSCO’s motion

for summary judgment.

Williams, supra at ¶ 12.

On December 24, 2019, Williams filed her complaint for a writ of

mandamus. On January 29, 2020, the BOSC and the ODRC filed a joint motion to

dismiss. For the following reasons, we grant the joint motion to dismiss.

II. MANDAMUS REQUIREMENTS AND ANALYSIS

Williams, in order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, must

demonstrate that: (1) she possesses a clear legal right to have the BOSC and ODRC

recalculate and provide additional credit toward her sentence of incarceration that

was earned as the result of participation in inmate programs; and reclassification

within the internal inmate records kept by the BOSC and the ODRC as a HB 86

offender instead of a SB 2 offender; (2) the BOSC and ODRC possesses a clear duty

to immediately recalculate and provide additional credit toward her sentence of

incarceration that was earned as the result of participation in inmate programs; and

reclassification within the internal inmate records kept by the BOSC and the ODRC

as a HB 86 offender instead of a SB 2 offender; and (3) Williams possesses or

possessed no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex

rel. Kerns v. Simmers, 153 Ohio St.3d 103, 2018-Ohio-256, 1010 N.E. 3d 430; State

ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle, 6 Ohio St.3d 28, 451 N.E.2d 225 (1983). Moreover,

mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is to be exercised with caution and only

when the right is clear. Mandamus will not issue in doubtful cases. State ex rel.

Taylor v. Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 364 N.E.2d 1 (1977); and State ex rel. Connole

v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 87 Ohio App.3d 43, 621 N.E.2d 850 (8th Dist.1993).

Initially, we find that Williams is not entitled to a writ of mandamus

based upon the application of the doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine of res

judicata encompasses the two related concepts of claim preclusion, also known as

res judicata or estoppel by judgment, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral

estoppel. Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions, by the same parties or their

privies, based upon any claim arising out of a transaction that was the subject matter

of a previous action. Where a claim could have been litigated in the previous suit,

claim preclusion also bars subsequent actions on that matter. Issue preclusion, on

the other hand, serves to prevent relitigation of any fact or point that was

determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a previous action between the

same parties or their privies. Issue preclusion applies even if the causes of action

differ. Fort Frye Teachers Assn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392,

692 N.E.2d 140 (1998); Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226

(1995).

The issue of additional earned credit toward the sentence of

incarceration imposed upon Williams has already been litigated by the trial court

and affirmed upon appeal, based upon R.C. 2967.193(D)(5) and Ohio Adm. Code

5120-2-06(J)(4). Thus, the doctrine of res judicata bars any further review of the

issue of additional earned credit toward the sentence of incarceration. State ex rel.

Peoples v. Schneider, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1071; Jackson v. Johnson, 135

Ohio St.3d 364, 2013-Ohio-999, 586 N.E.2d 989.

Finally, in the absence of evidence of any present injury, it is wellestablished that declaratory judgment is an adequate remedy at law to correct prison

records. Turner v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 144 Ohio St.3d 377, 2015-Ohio-2833,

43 N.E.3d 435. A prisoner possesses an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

the law through an action in declaratory judgment filed in the common pleas court

in order to correct a prison record. State ex rel. Earl v. Shafer, 85 Ohio St.3d 370,

708 N.E.2d 714 (1999). Williams has failed to demonstrate any present injury

because the determination of any earned credit toward her sentence of incarceration

was made under HB 86 and not SB 2.

We find that Williams has failed to establish that she possesses a clear

legal right to have the BOSC and ODRC recalculate and provide additional credit

toward her sentence of incarceration and reclassification within the internal inmate

records kept by the BOSC and the ODRC as a HB 86 offender instead of a SB 2

offender. We further find that Williams has failed to establish that the BOSC and

ODRC possesses a clear duty to immediately recalculate and provide additional

credit toward her sentence of incarceration and reclassification within the internal

inmate records kept by the BOSC and the ODRC as a HB 86 offender instead of a SB

2 offender. Finally, Williams has or had an opportunity to avail herself of an

adequate remedy at law through a declaratory judgment and an appeal from any

judgment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Accordingly, we grant the joint motion to dismiss. Costs to Williams.

The court directs the clerk of courts to serve all parties with notice of this judgment

and the date of entry upon the journal as required by Civ.R. 58(B).

Complaint dismissed.

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