State of New Jersey v. Amrit Singh, a/k/a Andy Singh

Trenton, NJ - Criminal defense attorney represented Amrit Singh with appealing, by challenging the detective's testimony as "improper lay-witness opinion testimony as to the content of the surveillance video and the identity of the robber.”.

The Court considers whether a detective's testimony at the trial of defendant

Amrit Singh requires reversal of defendant's convictions. Specifically, the Court

considers whether it was plain error for the trial court to allow the detective to make two

references to "the defendant” in narrating the surveillance footage of a robbery for the

jury and whether the detective's testimony concerning defendant's sneakers violated

N.J.R.E. 701, when the sneakers and the video were both admitted into evidence.

In January 2015, a man entered a gas station store wielding a machete and told the

cashier to give him the money. The man took the money and fled. The cashier described

the man as wearing dark clothes and gloves. The events were captured on the gas

station's surveillance video, which police retrieved that night.

Officers dispatched to the scene noticed and chased an individual in dark clothing.

After losing sight of the suspect, one of the officers found an individual -- later identified

as defendant -- wearing dark clothing, sweating, and breathing heavily in a nearby

backyard. Defendant resisted arrest. Detective Jorge Quesada, who also responded to the

dispatch, joined the effort to subdue defendant. Investigators found a machete and the

robbery proceeds in the area where defendant was arrested. Police recovered a

sweatshirt, one glove, and sneakers with a white sole and stripes from defendant.

At defendant's trial, the cashier narrated the gas station's surveillance footage for

the jury. Detective Quesada testified next, and he also narrated the footage, which he

reviewed prior to testifying. During the narration, he referred to an individual depicted in

the video as "the defendant” twice. Defense counsel did not object. While showing

surveillance footage, the prosecutor asked about "the defendant's shoes.” Detective

Quesada described the shoes as having white soles and three white stripes. The

prosecutor next showed the detective a pair of sneakers admitted into evidence and

Detective Quesada testified, "[t]hese were the sneakers that the defendant was wearing at

the time of his arrest.” Defense counsel objected, but the trial judge permitted Detective

Quesada to testify about the similarities between the sneakers he saw on the video and the

sneakers worn by defendant at the time of his arrest.

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Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and other offenses. On appeal,

he challenged Detective Quesada's testimony as "improper lay-witness opinion testimony

as to the content of the surveillance video and the identity of the robber.” The Appellate

Division affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. The Court granted certification

limited to the lay-witness opinion issue. 240 N.J. 259 (2019).

HELD: The detective should not have referenced defendant in his summary of the

surveillance footage. Here, however, that fleeting reference did not amount to plain error

in light of the other evidence produced. And the detective's testimony regarding the

sneakers was proper. He saw the sneakers on the video prior to testifying and had firsthand knowledge of what the sneakers looked like because he saw defendant wearing

them on the night of his arrest. N.J.R.E. 701 requires only that testimony be rationally

based on the witness's perception and that such testimony help the jury.

1. N.J.R.E. 701 governs the admission of a lay witness's opinion testimony. The first

prong of that Rule requires the testimony to be based on the witness's "perception,”

which rests on the acquisition of knowledge through use of one's senses. The second

requirement of N.J.R.E. 701 is that lay-witness opinion testimony be limited to testimony

that will assist the trier of fact either by helping to explain the witness's testimony or by

shedding light on the determination of a disputed factual issue. (pp. 17-18)

2. The Court reviews in detail cases in which it considered police officer opinion

testimony. In State v. McLean, an officer saw the defendant hand some small items to a

second person, who then handed defendant what appeared to be money. 205 N.J. 438,

443-44 (2011). At trial, the officer testified as to what he saw during the surveillance,

identified the defendant by name, and stated he saw "hand-to-hand drug transactions.”

Id. at 445. The McLean Court concluded that the officer's testimony regarding drug

transactions was improper "both because it was an expression of a belief in defendant's

guilt and because it presumed to give an opinion on matters that were not beyond the

understanding of the jury.” Id. at 463. In State v. Lazo, the Court noted that "lay witness

testimony is permissible where the witness has had sufficient contact with the defendant

to achieve a level of familiarity that renders the lay opinion helpful.” 209 N.J. 9, 22

(2012). The Lazo Court held that an officer's lay opinion testimony as to whether the

defendant's arrest photo closely resembled a composite sketch of the defendant should

not have been allowed because it was not based on the officer's prior knowledge, but

rather "stemmed entirely from the victim's description.” Id. at 23-24. (pp. 18-21)

3. In contrast, a police officer's lay opinion testimony was found admissible in State v.

LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 191 (1989). Noting that the officer conducted his own

investigation of an automobile accident, the LaBrutto Court held that his testimony "was

rationally based on what he observed . . . and it was helpful to the jury's full

comprehension of the facts in question.” Id. at 202. Significantly, the Court found no

merit in the position that the officer's opinion on the point of impact invaded the province

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of the jury or was "unnecessary because the average juror can readily determine the point

of impact from the officer's description of the physical evidence.” Id. at 199. (pp. 21-22)

4. Here, Detective Quesada referred to defendant as "the defendant” only twice in

narrating the surveillance footage, and defense counsel did not object those references.

Although those references were error, they were not so prejudicial as to meet the plain

error standard, in light of the circumstantial evidence of the robber's identification. The

Court stresses, however, that in similar narrative situations, a reference to "defendant,”

which can be interpreted to imply a defendant's guilt, should be avoided in favor of

neutral, purely descriptive terminology. (pp. 22-24)

5. Admitting Detective Quesada's testimony about the sneakers was not improper.

N.J.R.E. 701 does not require the lay witness to offer something the jury does not possess

or prohibit testimony when the evidence in question has been admitted. Detective

Quesada's testimony satisfied N.J.R.E. 701 as written. First, he had first-hand knowledge

of what the sneakers looked like; therefore, his lay witness opinion as to the similarities

between the sneakers from the footage and the sneakers he saw that night was rationally

based on his perception, in accordance with Lazo. Second, his testimony was helpful to

the jury even though the jury may have been able to evaluate whether the sneakers were

similar to those in the video, in keeping with LaBrutto. Detective Quesada's testimony

did not include an ultimate determination as to defendant's guilt, unlike in McClean, and

it assisted the jury in determining the robber's identity. (pp. 24-27)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.