Jimmy L. Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Manufacturing Company, Inc.

Phoenix Specialty Manufacturing Company, Inc. (Phoenix) appeals
the district court's determination, made after a bench trial, that the
company terminated the employment of Jimmy Wilson because it
regarded him as disabled by Parkinson's disease, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

We affirm this decision because there is no error in the district court's
findings of fact or conclusions of law. In addition, after considering
Wilson's cross-appeal, we affirm the district court's decision to deny
him an award of front pay. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

I.

The district court tried this case without a jury and made the following
findings of fact. Phoenix, a family-owned company with over
ninety employees, makes specialty washers (perforated disks) that are
used primarily in aircraft manufacturing. The company hired Wilson
as its shipping supervisor in November of 1988. Ten years later he
was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease, a progressive, degenerative
disease of the nervous system that affects both motor and non-motor
functions. On May 16, 2001, Wilson experienced a major panic attack
during a meeting at work. He left immediately to see Marion Dwight,
M.D., who was both the company physician and Wilson's personal
physician. Dr. Dwight referred Wilson to a neurologist, Kenneth Bergmann, M.D., who examined Wilson on May 24, 2001. At that time
Wilson was experiencing anxiety and a loss of motor control in his
right hand. Dr. Bergmann adjusted Wilson's medications and released
him to return to work with no restrictions. When Wilson attempted an
immediate return to his job, a Phoenix official told him that he could
not return until he obtained a release from Dr. Dwight, the company
physician. On or about June 4, 2001, Dr. Dwight, without examining
Wilson, released him to work half days for two weeks. Without further
word from Dr. Dwight, Phoenix allowed Wilson to resume fulltime
work around the third week of June. Notwithstanding Wilson's
Parkinson's symptoms, at all times between his return to work in June
2001 and his termination in August 2002 he was able to perform the
essential functions of his job.

When Wilson returned to work, he was treated differently by senior
management. Harry Wise, a company vice president and Wilson's
immediate supervisor, stopped his practice of joining Wilson on the
loading dock for a "talk over coffee." J.A. 814. Wise "no longer met
with [Wilson] and refused to look at him." Id. Phoenix president,
Robert Hurst, avoided Wilson whenever possible. Hurst required Wilson,
after every visit to the doctor, to report to Wise about his condition
and the expected progression of his disease. In a June 2, 2001,
e-mail to the company's human resources assistant, Hurst stated that
Wilson "qualifies for ADA designation and we will have to consider
accommodations." J.A. 815. Wilson in fact requested a 21-inch computer
screen and help with matters that required writing. The company
provided him with a 17-inch screen, the same as other
supervisors. Although Wilson was eventually given some assistance
in writing employee evaluations, the company made no serious effort
to provide assistance with respect to writing tasks.

Phoenix believed that Wilson's Parkinson's disease rendered him
substantially limited in his ability to see and perform manual tasks.
In November 2001 the company installed a new, complex computer
system that was used company-wide. Senior management believed
that Wilson "had difficulty in adequately utilizing the information on
[a] computer screen" and that he "was unable to adequately key information
into a computer." J.A. 827. Indeed, the company did not provide
Wilson with "substantial training [on the new] system." J.A. 815.
Senior management, fearing that Wilson would make errors, barred
him from inputting data into the computer and from counting washers.

In mid-June 2002 Phoenix's officers met and discussed eliminating
two salaried positions, the shipping supervisor (Wilson's job) and the
press room manager, and replacing them with hourly employees. At
about the same time Phoenix began looking for an additional shipping
clerk. Hurst, the company president, testified that Wilson had
requested another clerk, but the district court "d[id] not find this testimony
to be believable," J.A. 816, finding instead that Hurst decided
on his own to hire the additional clerk. The company filled the new
position by hiring Stacy Nix, a twenty-five-year-old woman with limited
experience. Nix began work on July 8, 2002, and spent the first
three weeks in training.

On August 1, 2002, Hurst informed Wilson that the company was
undertaking a reduction in force. Wilson instantly assumed that Hurst
was going to terminate Nix because she was a recent hire who was
still in her probationary period. Thus, Wilson was quite surprised
when Hurst said that Wilson's position in the shipping department
was being eliminated. Wilson, who was fifty-six years old, asked that
he be allowed to stay on and work in any position, including an
hourly position, but Hurst advised him that an hourly job was not
available to him. (The press room manager, whose job was also eliminated,
was allowed to stay on as an hourly employee.) Within minutes
of terminating Wilson, the company promoted Marviette Hogan, a
shipping clerk, to the newly created position of foreman of the shipping
department.

At the time of his discharge in August 2002, Wilson's symptoms
from Parkinson's "w[ere] stabilized by medication." J.A. 820. Dr.
Bergmann had reported in February 2002 that Wilson's "disease was
‘motor-wise in fairly good control' and that [he] had ‘good control of
his stiffness and tremor.'" J.A. 816. Wilson was still able to write at
the time of his discharge, although apparently with some difficulty.
He was playing golf, coaching youth sports, and driving. Wilson was
never given written or oral notice that his job performance was unsatisfactory.

The district court found specifically that he "was a dependable
employee who often worked six to seven days a week." J.A. 813.
Wilson filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and Phoenix's response to the
charge was introduced at trial. Phoenix claimed in its response that a
downturn in sales to the aircraft industry after the events of September
11, 2001, necessitated a further reduction in its approximately
ninety-person workforce in August 2002, specifically, the elimination
of two supervisory positions, including Wilson's. (The company
stated that it had undergone a reduction in force in June 2001.) The
district court found that the reasons Phoenix gave to the EEOC for
Wilson's termination were not supported by the evidence at trial.

Indeed, the court found that the company did not eliminate the position
of shipping supervisor, but simply changed the name of the position
and promoted Hogan to fill it. The district court rejected as
pretextual the following assertions that Phoenix made to the EEOC.

First, the district court discredited Phoenix's claim that it decided
to implement a workforce reduction in August 2002. Wilson was not
eliminated in a reduction of force, the court found, because "only two
employees were involved," J.A. 816, and the company transferred the
press room manager to another job.

Second, the district court rejected the company's claim that financial
difficulties necessitated a workforce reduction in August 2002.

The company paid bonuses to most employees in 2002. Two months
after Wilson's termination Phoenix's three owners sold the company
at a profit to younger family members. The sellers were paid at least
$1 million for signing covenants not to compete.

Third, the district court discredited the reasons the company gave
for selecting the shipping supervisor's (Wilson's) position for elimination.

The company claimed that Wilson had delegated many of his
job responsibilities to Hogan; that, for example, Hogan often ran shipping
department meetings; and that Wilson had made no attempt to
master the new computer system and could not input data. The court
credited Hogan's trial testimony that she never ran department meetings
and found that Wilson did not delegate his responsibilities, "but
rather received some assistance in performing certain functions." J.A.
821. Hurst admitted at trial that Wilson had genuinely attempted to
master the new computer system. Moreover, the district court found
that the computer tasks the company complained Wilson could not do
were those "such as input of information which the [company had]
specifically instructed him not to handle for fear of an entry error."
J.A. 821.

Fourth, the district court did not believe the company's assertion
that it looked for an open position for Wilson in the shipping department,
but none was available. Likewise, the court did not believe the
company's related assertion that it would have been very reluctant to
put Wilson in an hourly position where he would be a "co-worker
with employees who he had previously supervised with a heavy
hand." J.A. 293. The district court found that the company was in
need of a shipping clerk because it posted an opening for that position
within two weeks of Wilson's termination. Wilson submitted an
application, but the company did not respond. The court accepted the
testimony of one of Wilson's subordinates who (1) denied Phoenix's
allegation that she had complained about Wilson as a supervisor and
(2) stated that he had been a "fair supervisor." J.A. 822.

Fifth, the district court rejected Phoenix's claim that the new shipping
foreman position was non-supervisory. Nix, the new shipping
department clerk, testified that she was supervised by Hogan, the new
shipping department foreman. In addition, Phoenix described Hogan
as a supervisor in her job performance evaluations. The district court
thus found that "Hogan performed all of the duties of Wilson's former
position, including supervisory duties." J.A. 819.

Sixth, the district court rejected the company's assertion that an
independent basis for Wilson's discharge arose on August 2, 2002, his
final day of work and the day after he had been notified of his termination.
Phoenix claims that Wilson ordered ten years' worth of packing
supplies on his last day of work. The district court found that
Wilson had been set up. According to the court, "it appears that someone
wrote over [Wilson's] notes after the fact to make it appear that
he had intentionally ordered more supplies th[a]n necessary. . . .
Instead, he simply ordered supplies that he felt the company would
need over the next several months to help [Phoenix] with the transition
period after his departure." J.A. 821.

At trial Phoenix offered a reason for Wilson's termination that had
not been argued to the EEOC. Hurst testified that Wilson was in
effect replaced by the new computer system. The court found that the
different reasons Phoenix gave for Wilson's discharge were a pretext
for discrimination. According to the district court, the company executed
"a plan to hire a new shipping clerk" (Nix was in fact hired),
"then to fire [Wilson] due to his [perceived] disability, and finally to
re-name his position as a shipping foreman and to promote Ms.
Hogan to shipping foreman with the same duties that [Wilson] had as
shipping supervisor." J.A. 829.

The district court ultimately determined that Phoenix regarded Wilson
as disabled, failed to accommodate his perceived disability as
required by the ADA, and terminated him because of his perceived
disability in violation of the ADA. The court awarded Wilson
$177,783 in back pay from August 2002 through August 2005, when
Wilson became competitively unemployable due to his Parkinson's
disease. After finding that Wilson proved "specific harm to his emotional
state," J.A. 838, including depression and humiliation, as a
result of Phoenix's conduct, the court awarded him $10,000 in compensatory
damages. The court also awarded Wilson $10,000 in punitive
damages based on its finding that Phoenix's discriminatory plan
to terminate Wilson was developed and carried out "with reckless
indifference" to Wilson's federally protected rights under the ADA.1
J.A. 838.

Phoenix appeals, arguing that the district court erred (1) in finding
that the company regarded Wilson as being disabled because the company
did not have a mistaken perception that Wilson's impairment
was greater than it actually was; (2) in finding that the company's
stated reasons for terminating Wilson were pretext; and (3) in concluding
that Wilson was entitled to reasonable accommodation under
the ADA. Wilson cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred
in failing to award him front pay. We review the district court's findings
of fact for clear error, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), and its legal conclusions de novo, Roanoke Cement Company v. Falk Corporation, 413
F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 2005).

II.

A.

The ADA prohibits a covered employer such as Phoenix from "discriminat[
ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual in regard to" matters that include
"the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). A "disability" is defined as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

Id. § 12102(2). Subsection (C), which is relevant here, provides that
having a disability includes "being regarded as having,"
§ 12102(2)(C), "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities," § 12102(2)(A). Subsection
(C)'s "regarded as" coverage includes the circumstance when
the employer "mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities." Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). The employer, in
other words, must entertain a misperception: "it must believe . . . that
[an individual] has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact,
the impairment is not so limiting." Id. "Major life activities" refers "to
those activities that are of central importance to daily life," including
walking, seeing, hearing, and manual tasks that are "central to daily
life." Toyota Mtr. Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197
(2002). Finally, when an employee asserts a subsection (C) claim that
he was regarded as disabled, the analysis "focuses on the reactions
and perceptions of the [employer's] decisionmakers" who worked
with the employee. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123
F.3d 156, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).

Phoenix contends that the record does not support the district
court's ultimate finding that the company regarded Wilson as having
an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. We disagree
because the district court made specific findings, which are not
clearly erroneous, to support its ultimate finding that Phoenix
regarded Wilson as having a disability.

First, the district court found that company president Hurst's statement
in his June 2, 2001, e-mail to an assistant was evidence that
Phoenix believed that Wilson was disabled. Hurst said pointblank that
Wilson "qualifies for ADA designation." J.A. 827. Phoenix argues
that this statement should be discounted because it was made before
Wilson's medication was adjusted, and it did not reflect what the
company believed about Wilson's condition at the time he was terminated.

The district court, however, cited Hurst's e-mail as an early
example of Phoenix's erroneous perception that Wilson was disabled,
a perception that continued, as the court found, until his termination
in August 2002.

Second, the district court found that Phoenix's disability perception
was evident when it ignored the May 24, 2001, opinion of Dr. Bergmann,
the neurologist, who released Wilson to return to work without
restrictions "and instead relied on the opinion of the company doctor
who had not [re]examined" Wilson. J.A. 827. In other words, the
company's firm perception that Wilson was disabled led it to discount
the specialist's medical opinion that Wilson was capable of returning
to work.

Third, the district court credited Wilson's testimony that Phoenix's
senior management treated him "like [he] was a handicapped person"
after his panic attack. J.A. 454. This testimony was accepted because
Hurst and Wise avoided Wilson whenever possible, and Wise even
refused to look at him. This treatment, the court noted, "shows [that]
the very myths and fears about disability and disease" can result in a
person being regarded as having a disability, one problem "Congress
was trying to address with the ADA." J.A. 827.

Ultimately, the district court found that "company officials
believed that Wilson was substantially limited in the major life
activit[ies] of performing manual tasks" and seeing. J.A. 827. This
determination was supported by findings that Phoenix believed that
Wilson (1) "was unable to adequately key information into a computer,
write, and count washers" and (2) could not "adequately
utiliz[e] the information on the computer screen." J.A. 827. Phoenix
argues that it "had the correct perception of Wilson's limitations"
(some difficulty with performing manual tasks and seeing), and
"those limitations did not qualify him as being actually disabled."
Appellant's Br. at 22. Therefore, the company says, "it could not have
‘regarded' him as being disabled." Id. The record, however, supports
the district court's finding that Phoenix perceived Wilson to be substantially
limited in his ability to see and perform manual tasks. In
other words, Phoenix regarded Wilson as disabled.

The court's determination that the company believed that Wilson
could not effectively operate, or see well enough to make use of, a
computer is supported by more specific findings: the company
instructed Wilson not to perform tasks on the computer, such as the
input of information, for fear of entry error; and the company did not
make the effort to give Wilson adequate training on the new computer
system. The district court found that the company believed Wilson
could not write, and this finding is supported by the testimony of the
human resources assistant who testified that she "couldn't really read"
Wilson's handwriting. J.A. 602. Finally, the court found that Phoenix
believed that Wilson could not count washers (the company's product),
and this finding is supported by the testimony of Wise, who
instructed Wilson "not to do counting tasks," J.A. 259, again because
the company was afraid he would make errors.

These perceptions on Phoenix's part about the extent of Wilson's
impairment were inaccurate. The company, in other words, believed
that Wilson's Parkinson's symptoms were substantially more limiting
than they actually were, as indicated in further findings by the district
court and the record. After crediting Dr. Bergmann's report that Wilson's
"disease was ‘motor-wise in fairly good control' and that [he]
had ‘good control of his stiffness and tremor,'" J.A. 816, the district
court found that Wilson's "symptoms were fairly well controlled by
medication" at the time of his discharge, J.A. 826. Although the court
recognized that Wilson "was beginning to have difficulty with his
handwriting and other fine motor functions and with reading the computer
screen," he was "still able to" work and "perform the essential
functions of his supervisory job." J.A. 828. Indeed, the court noted
that Phoenix admitted to the EEOC that Wilson's "Parkinson's disease
did not impact his ability to do his job." J.A. 819. The district
court found that Wilson "was credible," J.A. 823, and Wilson testified
that he was still able to key data into the computer, albeit at a slower
pace. Yet, as the district court found, the company refused to give him
adequate training on the new computer system. Hurst admitted, however,
"that Wilson tried to master the system, and that many other
employees also had problems learning the new system." J.A. 815.

Wilson's handwriting was still legible at the time of his discharge, as
several trial exhibits confirm. And Wilson also testified that he could
still count washers when he was discharged, although he would put
the small, thin ones aside for a shipping clerk to count. Finally, with
respect to general activities in his daily life, Wilson was able to play
golf, coach youth sports, and drive at the time of his termination.
Two of the tasks Phoenix mistakenly believed Wilson could not do
at work - use a computer effectively and write - transcend the
work setting and qualify as activities that are of "central importance
to people's daily lives." Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202. Likewise, the company's
mistaken belief that Wilson could not count washers supports
the district court's finding that "Wilson was perceived by Phoenix as
unable to perform a variety of tasks central to most people's daily
lives." J.A. 827; see Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202. Moreover, as the district
court found, after Wilson's Parkinson's symptoms flared up in May
2001, the company described him as disabled under the ADA, ignored
a specialist's positive assessment of his ability to function, shunned
him, and concocted a plan to eliminate his position and get rid of him.

These factors, taken together, support the district court's ultimate
finding that Phoenix regarded Wilson as having an impairment that
substantially limited him in the major life activities of performing
manual tasks and seeing.2

B.

Phoenix next argues that the district court erred in finding that the
reasons given by the company for discharging Wilson were a pretext
for discrimination. The district court analyzed the evidence under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In the final steps of this analysis, the
trier of fact's "rejection [or disbelief] of the [employer's] proffered
reasons [for its actions] will permit the trier . . . to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-49 (2000).

The district court's disbelief of Phoenix's proffered reasons for
Wilson's termination was based in part on the court's determination
that the reasons the company gave to the EEOC were different than
the one advanced at trial. The company claimed for the first time at
trial that the new computer system had "replaced Wilson's job functions,"
J.A. 830, thereby prompting the company to terminate him.

The court found that all of "the reasons given by Phoenix were merely
a pretext for discrimination." Id. According to the court, Phoenix concocted
and executed a scheme to hire a new shipping clerk (Nix), fire
Wilson because of his perceived disability while pretending to
undergo a reduction in force, and promote Hogan to the newlycreated
position of shipping foreman with the same duties that Wilson
had performed as shipping supervisor. The court's more detailed findings
about the company's false (or pretextual) reasons for terminating
Wilson are set forth in part I, supra at 5-7, and are amply supported
by the evidence.

C.

Phoenix also challenges the district court's determination that the
company failed to make reasonable accommodations for Wilson's
perceived limitations when it refused to provide him with a larger
computer screen and assistance with writing. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (describing the requirement for reasonable accommodations).

As a threshold matter, Phoenix argues that an employer
does not have a duty to provide accommodation to an employee it
simply regards as disabled. There is a pronounced circuit split on this
issue. Compare Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232-
33 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that there is no duty to accommodate
an individual who is regarded as having a disability); Weber v. Strippet,
Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Workman v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) (reaching same
conclusion without analysis); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161
F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); with D'Angelo v. Conagra
Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1240 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that
there is a duty to accommodate an individual who is regarded as having
a disability); Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675
(10th Cir. 2005) (same); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't,
380 F.3d 751, 772-76 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); Katz v. City Metal Co.,
87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (same). We are not required to choose
a side on this issue because the damages awarded to Wilson are tied
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 13
directly to his discriminatory termination and not to Phoenix's failure
to accommodate.

III.

Wilson cross-appeals, contending that the district court erred when
it determined that he was not entitled to an award of front pay. Front
pay is money awarded for the loss of employment after the date of
judgment. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S.
843, 846 (2001). Whether front pay is to be awarded is a matter left
to the discretion of the trial judge. Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d
1413, 1424 (4th Cir. 1991). Based on the uncontradicted testimony of
Wilson's witness, Dr. Bergmann, the district court found that Wilson
was competitively unemployable by the end of 2005, which was six
months before the entry of judgment. Accordingly, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Wilson an award of front wages.

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http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/061818.P.pdf