Ex Parte: Mario Enrique Valadez

Kaufman TX - Criminal Defense Attorney, Habeas Corpus





In 2007, appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to the offense of possession

of cocaine in an amount less than one gram. The trial court accepted the plea bargain

agreement, placed appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for

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two years, and assessed a $1,500 fine. Appellant served out the term of community

supervision and was discharged in 2009.

In 2019, appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus contending

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by affirmatively misadvising him about the

deportation consequences of his plea. Appellant supported his writ application with

his own affidavit and an affidavit from counsel.

Appellant’s affidavit set forth his complaints about counsel’s performance and

his lack of understanding of the plea papers, the proceedings, and the deportation

consequences of his plea. Appellant did not offer a justification for the twelve-year

delay in bringing his claim. Counsel’s affidavit averred she has no recollection of

representing appellant and no records of the case because of the passage of time.

In its response, the State argued laches should bar appellant’s claim and,

alternatively, it should be denied on the merits. The State attached to its response an

order showing the trial court gave the Kaufman Police Department permission to

destroy the drug evidence in this case and an affidavit of Detective Jason Stastny, an

evidence technician, who averred the drug evidence was destroyed in 2015.

The trial court denied appellant’s writ application without conducting a

hearing. In its findings of fact, the trial court found counsel’s and Stastny’s affidavits

credible. The trial court found almost twelve years had passed since appellant’s plea

hearing, and the Kaufman Police Department had destroyed all of the evidence in

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the case. The trial court also made a number of findings adverse to appellant’s

position on the merits.

The trial court concluded laches bars appellant’s writ application because he

waited twelve years to bring his claim, he did not justify the delay, and the State had

shown it would be prejudiced if appellant’s conviction was reversed and the case

retried. The trial court also concluded appellant had failed to meet his burden to show

ineffective assistance of counsel and he had failed to rebut the prima facie showing

that his plea was voluntary.

On appeal, appellant contests only the trial court’s findings and conclusions

regarding the merits of his ineffective assistance claim. Appellant does not address

the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusion of law that laches bars his claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the denial of habeas relief, we review the record evidence in the

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and uphold the trial court’s ruling

absent an abuse of discretion. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding

rules or principles. State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

The habeas applicant bears the burden of proving their claim by a

preponderance of the evidence. Ex parte Torres, 483 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016). When an applicant brings a habeas challenge to a conviction that

resulted in community supervision, the application must be filed pursuant to article

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11.072 of the code of criminal procedure. Id. at 42. In reviewing an appeal arising

from an 11.072 writ application, the appellate courts have less leeway to disregard

the trial court’s factual findings. Id. The trial court is the sole finder of fact, and “we

afford almost total deference to a trial court’s factual findings when they are

supported by the record, especially when those findings are based upon credibility

and demeanor.” Id. We defer to the trial court’s fact findings supported by the record

even when such findings are based on affidavits rather than live testimony. State v.

Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). If, however, the trial

court’s determinations are questions of law, or mixed questions of law and fact that

do not turn on an evaluation of witnesses’ credibility and demeanor, then we review

them de novo. Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

ANALYSIS

Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s findings and conclusion that

laches bars his ineffective assistance complaint. Due to appellant’s failure to

challenge an independent ground for the trial court’s ruling, we may accept the

validity of the unchallenged ground and affirm the trial court’s order on that basis.

See Marsh v. State, 343 S.W.3d 158, 161–62 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet.

ref’d); see also State v. Hoskins, No. 05-13-00416-CR, 2014 WL 4090129, at *2

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 19, 2014, no pet.) (not designated for publication)

(appellant must challenge all independent grounds that fully support judgment or

appealable order and appellate court will accept validity of any unchallenged

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independent ground thus rendering harmless any error in grounds challenged on

appeal) (citing Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]

1980) (defendant appealing probation revocation must challenge each independent

ground of revocation)); Sendejas v. State, No. 14-16-00710-CR, 2018 WL 1866049,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (to prevail on appeal from probation revocation,

appellant must challenge all findings supporting revocation to show trial court

abused its discretion) (citing Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926).

Laches may bar habeas relief when an applicant’s lengthy delay in applying

for relief prejudices the State’s position in a manner that outweighs any equitable

considerations militating in favor of granting the applicant relief. Ex parte Perez,

398 S.W.3d 206, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Prejudice to the State requires no

particularized showing and may include anything that places the State in a less

advantageous position such as the diminished memories of trial participants and

diminished availability of evidence. See id. at 215–16. There is no fixed period

beyond which laches necessarily applies, but “delays of more than five years may

generally be considered unreasonable in the absence of any justification for the

delay.” Id. at 216 n.12. The longer an applicant delays in bringing his claim,

especially when the delay exceeds five years after the conclusion of direct appeals,

the less evidence the State must present to show prejudice. Id. at 217–18. In

determining whether laches should apply, a court must engage in a difficult and

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sensitive balancing process considering all relevant circumstances and may consider

such factors as the length of the delay, any reason or justification for the delay, and

the degree and type of prejudice resulting from the delay. See id. at 217.

In this case, the trial court made unchallenged findings that appellant waited

twelve years to bring his habeas application and the State has destroyed the evidence

in the interim. Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion of law that

laches should bar his claim because of the lengthy delay, his failure to justify the

delay, and the State’s showing that it would be prejudiced if the case was retried at

this point. The trial court’s findings and conclusion are supported by the record. See

Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 42 (we defer to trial court’s fact findings supported by record).

Because appellant failed to challenge the trial court’s supported findings and

conclusion that laches bars his claim, we conclude he has not met his burden to show

the trial court abused its discretion in denying his habeas application. See id.; Perez,

398 S.W.3d at 215–17; Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664; Marsh, 343 S.W.3d at 161–62;

see also Hoskins, 2014 WL 4090129, at *2. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

We affirm the trial court’s order denying relief on appellant’s application for

writ of habeas corpus.