[3] The parties own neighboring ranches in Crook County. Both ranches consist of
deeded property as well as lands used pursuant to grazing permits issued by the United
States Bureau of Land Management. By early 1999, the fence between the parties' lands
had deteriorated and would no longer hold livestock in a number of places. On October
12, 1999, Moore mailed to Dorsett the first in a series of letters addressing fence-related
problems. Dorsett received the letter but did not respond. Another letter, dated January
14, 2000, detailed, among other things, problems caused by cattle straying onto Moore's
lands. Moore indicated that he was contemplating fence repairs and that he was "looking
to share the costs equally" with Dorsett. Dorsett did not respond to this letter.

[4] The next letter was dated January 24, 2000. In that letter, Moore detailed the
repairs needed on the fence, indicated he intended to hire a fencing contractor, and stated
that he expected Dorsett to pay one-half the cost. Moore's letter also provided:

If you will not enter a formal agreement with me to pay
for one-half of these repairs, I will give you the opportunity to
arrange for your share of the labor on one-half of each project.
… If you do not take the opportunity to do your share of these
projects, which I have outlined, I will do them for you after
July 1, 2000.

Although Dorsett received this letter, he did not respond. The next letter from Moore was
dated March 3 and suggested the parties hire a reputable fencing contractor to do the work. Again, Dorsett received this letter but did not respond.
[5] In August of 2000, Moore contracted with a fencing company to rebuild the fence.
The fencing company began work on September 10, 2000, and completed the project on
October 6. The contractor rebuilt the fence where it had always been located. On October
26, 2000, Moore mailed a letter to Dorsett requesting payment for one-half of the cost of
the fencing project. There was no response to this letter.

[6] In March of 2001, following a demand letter that went unanswered, Moore, relying
on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-28-106,1 filed this suit to recover, among other things, one-half
of the cost of the fencing project. The case was tried to the bench. Dorsett offered
testimony that, sometime after the complaint was filed, he hired a local engineer to
perform a survey. The survey revealed that the fence was not on the property boundary
line in places, although the record is somewhat confusing regarding where the fence
deviates. When Moore objected to this testimony regarding deviation from the boundary
line, the district c ourt sustained the objection on the ground that Dorsett was estopped from
presenting such evidence. The district court allowed Dorsett to make an offer of proof.
The district court found generally in favor of Moore. It ordered Dorsett to pay Moore
$10,159.71 as one-half of the cost of rebuilding the fence. The district court also ordered
Dorsett to pay Moore $954.00 for grazing fees, but Dorsett does not challenge that portion
of the judgment.

DISCUSSION

[7] Dorsett contends that the district court erred in applying equitable estoppel against
him. This Court has defined equitable estoppel in this fashion:
Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a
party whereby he is absolutely precluded from asserting rights
which might otherwise have existed as against another person who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has been
led thereby to change his position for the worse.

Snake River Brewing Company, Inc. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, 28, 39 P.3d 397,
28 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Petsch, 261
F.2d 331, 335 (10th Cir. 1958)). Dorsett asserts that equitable estoppel is inapplicable
because Moore never changed his position in reliance on Dorsett's conduct. Dorsett claims
that Moore was going to repair the fence regardless of Dorsett's action or inaction. Moore
responds that, if the district court did apply estoppel, it merely estopped Dorsett from his
attempt, at trial, to establish that the fence was not a partition fence because it is not
located on the true boundary line. Moore contends that Dorsett was properly estopped
from arguing the fence should be located other than where it has always been located.

[8] In its oral ruling, the district court stated:

I don't know whether estoppel is the proper word or
not. But certainly Mr. Moore saw a problem, tried to fix it,
wrote letters to his neighbor. Maybe they weren't the best
letters you could write, but they were certainly efforts to reach
out. And what was the response? Well, clearly the response
was no response.

So he still has a problem. And Mr. Dorsett says that
there was a problem with cattle going back and forth. But Mr.
Dorsett does nothing to solve the problem other than rebuild a
fence.

And when it's suggested that maybe it's time for
something more than just a band-aid on what's been going on
over the years because that's not working, Mr. Dorsett doesn't
come in and say, "Wait a minute. I like this band-aid
approach and I don't want to do it this way. I don't think
you've got good bids. I don't think you are going to put the
fence in the right place." A lot of things he could have said,
but he didn't say anything.

And you do have the right to remain silent.

So your silence is being used against you. You've had
the right to remain silent, but it's been used against you
because you used the ostrich approach: I'll just ignore the
problem. I'll ignore the forays of someone trying to solve that
problem, and so you did nothing.

Well, Mr. Moore I think is entitled under the statute to
do something about that and he did something. And maybe he went a little bit more than, quote, just the bare minimum legal fence, but he
didn't have any input from his neighbor even though he tried
to get it. So he did what sounds fairly reasonable, at least it
sounds reasonable for the Court from the testimony I've heard.

[9] Although the district court did not specify the equitable doctrine it applied, we do
not agree with Dorsett that the district court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Instead, we conclude the district court's ruling is properly characterized as an application
of the doctrine of laches, which is simply a form of equitable estoppel. Thompson v.
Board of County Commissioners of the County of Sublette, 2001 WY 108, 6, 34 P.3d 278,
6, (Wyo. 2001); Goshen Irrigation District v. Wyoming State Board of Control, 926 P.2d
943, 949 (Wyo. 1996); Squaw Mountain Cattle Company v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297
(Wyo. 1991). Laches is defined as such delay in enforcing one's rights that it works to the
disadvantage of another. Thompson, 17; Big Piney Oil & Gas Company v. Wyoming Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission, 715 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo. 1986). A claim of laches is
comprised of two elements--inexcusable delay and injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the
defendants or others. Thompson, 17.

[10] The district court ruled that Dorsett's delay in enforcing his rights precluded him
from asserting rights he would otherwise have been able to assert had he acted more
promptly. Dorsett's delay worked a disadvantage to Moore, who completed the fencing
project with his own funds, then was required to resort to litigation to recoup one-half of
the costs from Dorsett. In addition, had Dorsett come forward earlier with his concerns,
any current problems could likely have been avoided. The district court properly applied
the form of equitable estoppel known as laches.

[11] The district court's ruling finds further support in the equitable maxim that "[e]quity
aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights." Application of Beaver Dam Ditch
Company, 93 P.2d 934, 939, 54 Wyo. 459, 482 (Wyo. 1939); Moncrief v. Sohio
Petroleum Company, 775 P.2d 1021, 1025 n.5 (Wyo. 1989). Here, despite Moore's
repeated attempts to resolve the fence problems in a neighborly fashion, Dorsett did not
respond. Having slumbered on his rights, Dorsett was in no position to complain about
Moore's resolution of the problem or the placement of the fence where it had always been.2
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's ruling. Thompson, 7. ("Whether
laches or, by analogy, equitable estoppel is available as a de fense is a question addressed to
the sound discretion of the district court.")

[12] We must also address Moore's requests that this appeal be summarily affirmed
and/or that this Court certify no reasonable cause for this appeal. Moore argues that (1)
the appeal should be summarily affirmed because appellant's brief violates various rules of
appellate procedure; (2) the appeal should be summarily affirmed because the appellant has
not presented a cogent argument; and (3) the Court should certify that there was no
reasonable cause for appeal and award costs and attorney fees. We decline all of Moore's
invitations.

[13] Although Dorsett's brief fails to comply with a number of requirements regarding
format of appellant's brief found in W.R.A.P. 7.01, we do not, in our discretion, find that
these deficiencies require summary affirmance. W.R.A.P. 1.03. In addition, we find
Dorsett's argument is supported by authority and cogent enough, although misguided.
Thus, we will not summarily affirm on that basis or certify no reasonable cause for appeal.
Normally, we will certify no reasonable cause for appeal "only in those rare circumstances
where an appeal lacks cogent argument, where there is an absence of pertinent authority to
support the claims of error, and/or when there is a failure to adequately cite to the record."
Baker v. Reed, 965 P.2d 1153, 1154-55 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938
P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo.1997)); Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 891 (Wyo. 2000). This appeal
does not meet those requirements.

[14] In addition, sanctions under W.R.A.P. 10.05 are usually not available when the
appeal challenges a discretionary ruling made by the district court. Russell v. Russell, 948
P.2d 1351, 1356 (Wyo.1997); Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1268 (Wyo. 1998). This
Court has departed from this general rule in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Barnes v.
Barnes, 998 P.2d 942, 946 (Wyo. 2000) (only purpose served by appeal was "continued
harassment of appellee and the waste of judicial resources"); Meyer v. Rodabaugh, 982
P.2d 1242, 1245 (Wyo. 1999) (appellant waived any claim of error); and Stadtfeld v.
Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996) (appellant failed to provide a record to review).
However, none of those circumstances are presented in this case. Therefore, because we
find the argument to be cogent and supported by authority and because Dorsett challenged
a discretionary ruling, we deny Moore's request that we certify no reasonable cause for
appeal.

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