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Sate of New York v. Miya Ponsetto, a/k/a "SoHo Karen"

Date: 04-12-2022

Case Number: 01101-2021

Judge:

Court: Supreme Court, New York County, New York

Plaintiff's Attorney: Manhattan District Attorney's Office

Defendant's Attorney: Paul D'Emilia

Description:
New York, New York criminal defense lawyer represented Defendant charged with committing a hate crime.



Miya Ponsetto, a/k/a "SoHo Karen," was indicted for unlawfully imprisoning Keyon Harrold, Jr., age 14, after she accusing him of stealing her cell phone.



Defendant Keyon and his father were all guests at the Arlo Soho hotel.



It was later determined that she left her phone in a cab. The phone was returned.



The incident that gave rise to her charge against the Defendant occurred on December 26, 2020.





485.05 Hate crimes.



1. A person commits a hate crime when he or she commits a specified

offense and either:



(a) intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is

committed or intended to be committed in whole or in substantial part

because of a belief or perception regarding the race, color, national

origin, ancestry, gender, gender identity or expression, religion,

religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person,

regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct, or



(b) intentionally commits the act or acts constituting the offense in

whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception regarding

the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, gender identity or

expression, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual

orientation of a person, regardless of whether the belief or perception

is correct.



2. Proof of race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, gender

identity or expression, religion, religious practice, age, disability or

sexual orientation of the defendant, the victim or of both the defendant

and the victim does not, by itself, constitute legally sufficient

evidence satisfying the people's burden under paragraph (a) or (b) of

subdivision one of this section.



3. A "specified offense" is an offense defined by any of the following

provisions of this chapter: section 120.00 (assault in the third

degree); section 120.05 (assault in the second degree); section 120.10

(assault in the first degree); section 120.12 (aggravated assault upon a

person less than eleven years old); section 120.13 (menacing in the

first degree); section 120.14 (menacing in the second degree); section

120.15 (menacing in the third degree); section 120.20 (reckless

endangerment in the second degree); section 120.25 (reckless

endangerment in the first degree); section 121.12 (strangulation in the

second degree); section 121.13 (strangulation in the first degree);

subdivision one of section 125.15 (manslaughter in the second degree);

subdivision one, two or four of section 125.20 (manslaughter in the

first degree); section 125.25 (murder in the second degree); section

120.45 (stalking in the fourth degree); section 120.50 (stalking in the

third degree); section 120.55 (stalking in the second degree); section

120.60 (stalking in the first degree); subdivision one of section 130.35

(rape in the first degree); subdivision one of section 130.50 (criminal

sexual act in the first degree); subdivision one of section 130.65

(sexual abuse in the first degree); paragraph (a) of subdivision one of

section 130.67 (aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree); paragraph

(a) of subdivision one of section 130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse in the

first degree); section 135.05 (unlawful imprisonment in the second

degree); section 135.10 (unlawful imprisonment in the first degree);

section 135.20 (kidnapping in the second degree); section 135.25

(kidnapping in the first degree); section 135.60 (coercion in the third

degree); section 135.61 (coercion in the second degree); section 135.65

(coercion in the first degree); section 140.10 (criminal trespass in the

third degree); section 140.15 (criminal trespass in the second degree);

section 140.17 (criminal trespass in the first degree); section 140.20

(burglary in the third degree); section 140.25 (burglary in the second

degree); section 140.30 (burglary in the first degree); section 145.00

(criminal mischief in the fourth degree); section 145.05 (criminal

mischief in the third degree); section 145.10 (criminal mischief in the

second degree); section 145.12 (criminal mischief in the first degree);

section 150.05 (arson in the fourth degree); section 150.10 (arson in

the third degree); section 150.15 (arson in the second degree); section

150.20 (arson in the first degree); section 155.25 (petit larceny);

section 155.30 (grand larceny in the fourth degree); section 155.35

(grand larceny in the third degree); section 155.40 (grand larceny in

the second degree); section 155.42 (grand larceny in the first degree);

section 160.05 (robbery in the third degree); section 160.10 (robbery in

the second degree); section 160.15 (robbery in the first degree);

section 240.25 (harassment in the first degree); subdivision one, two or

four of section 240.30 (aggravated harassment in the second degree);

section 490.10 (soliciting or providing support for an act of terrorism

in the second degree); section 490.15 (soliciting or providing support

for an act of terrorism in the first degree); section 490.20 (making a

terroristic threat); section 490.25 (crime of terrorism); section 490.30

(hindering prosecution of terrorism in the second degree); section

490.35 (hindering prosecution of terrorism in the first degree); section

490.37 (criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in

the third degree); section 490.40 (criminal possession of a chemical

weapon or biological weapon in the second degree); section 490.45

(criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the

first degree); section 490.47 (criminal use of a chemical weapon or

biological weapon in the third degree); section 490.50 (criminal use of

a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the second degree); section

490.55 (criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the

first degree); or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the

foregoing offenses.



4. For purposes of this section:



(a) the term "age" means sixty years old or more;



(b) the term "disability" means a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits a major life activity;



(c) the term "gender identity or expression" means a person's actual

or perceived gender-related identity, appearance, behavior, expression,

or other gender-related characteristic regardless of the sex assigned to

that person at birth, including, but not limited to, the status of being

transgender.



Outcome:
Defendant pleaded guilty.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of Sate of New York v. Miya Ponsetto, a/k/a "SoHo Karen"?

The outcome was: Defendant pleaded guilty.

Which court heard Sate of New York v. Miya Ponsetto, a/k/a "SoHo Karen"?

This case was heard in Supreme Court, New York County, New York, NY.

Who were the attorneys in Sate of New York v. Miya Ponsetto, a/k/a "SoHo Karen"?

Plaintiff's attorney: Manhattan District Attorney's Office. Defendant's attorney: Paul D'Emilia.

When was Sate of New York v. Miya Ponsetto, a/k/a "SoHo Karen" decided?

This case was decided on April 12, 2022.