Edward M. Lewis, et al. v. Eloise Anderson, et al.

This suit is about a foster
care placement, and later adoption, that failed, because
the host family (and later parents) turned out to be abu-sive.
The plaintiffs are five of six siblings who were placed
with the family. They have sued several officials of the
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services
(DHSS) in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the defendants violated their Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when they
entrusted them to this family. On cross motions for sum-mary
judgment, the district court ruled for the defendants,
holding that the plaintiffs could not show that the state knew or suspected that the foster parents were probable
child abusers, and that such a showing was necessary for
liability. The court dismissed some supplemental state
claims without prejudice.

* * *

The plaintiffs, Edward Max Lewis, Matthew S. Lewis,
Michael G. Lewis, T.L., and O.L., all siblings, were minors
at the time of the relevant events. Defendant Eloise
Anderson was the Administrator of the Division of Com-munity
Services at DHSS. Defendants Sandra Stolle and
April Lancour were social workers for DHSS; they were
supervised by defendant Shirley Bohle.

In 1987, Derwin and Rebecca Lewis were the heads of
a family that included one biological child and one foster
child. In 1988 the couple adopted three "special needs"
children. Later, the Lewises were considering adopting
more children, and so the state undertook a new study
of their suitability, which was completed in 1989. In
1990, DHSS became the legal guardian of the five plain-tiffs
and their sister, and it began searching for adoptive
placement for them. As the children were Native Ameri-cans,
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.,
applied to them. A strong preference had been expressed
for placement of all the children together - a situation
regarded as less traumatic for adopted children.

During the investigation of the Lewis family, DHSS ob-tained
reports from at least three outside sources vouch-ing
for the ability of the Lewises to adopt more children.
All sources ultimately recommended the Lewises as suit-able
adoptive parents, even though one source expressed
some reservations. Prior to the placement of the children
with the Lewises, DHSS also learned that Derwin Lewis, the father, had on one occasion hit one of his children.
Derwin discussed the event with a social worker. This
was the only instance of even arguable rough treatment
that DHSS knew about before the events at issue here.

On May 31, 1990, the state terminated the parental
rights of the children's biological parents and they be-came
wards of the state. Shortly thereafter, in June and
July 1990, they were placed in preadoptive foster care
with the Lewises, largely because the Lewises were (like
the children) Native Americans and they were willing
to take all six children. This placement involved remov-ing
the children from other temporary foster homes where
they were doing well. Furthermore, it left the Lewises
with a family of two parents and 11 children ranging from
ages 5 to 15; of the 11 children, nine had special needs,
including emotional, physical, and behavioral problems. On
April 23, 1991, the Lewises formally adopted all six sib-lings.

The second amended complaint focuses on the time peri-od
between the foster care placement (roughly mid-1990)
and the formal adoption. The children allege that they
were physically abused by the family. Later, after the
adoption, these problems came to light and the children
were removed from the Lewis household and placed with
other foster families. The district court found that during
the foster care period the defendants neither knew nor
suspected that the children would be, or were being, abused
by the Lewises.

II.

As an initial matter, we must consider whether this
suit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See gener-ally
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923). While neither party addressed this point
in the original briefs, the panel raised it at oral argument and requested supplemental memoranda on the
issue. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional in
nature, and thus it may be raised at any time for the
parties and by the court sua sponte, see 4901 Corp. v. Town
of Cicero, 220 F.3d 522, 527 (7th Cir. 2000). Because of the
jurisdictional nature of the doctrine, we must assure
ourselves that it does not bar the suit before we turn to
the merits. Id. See also Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1364
(7th Cir. 1996).

Rooker and Feldman establish the fact that lower fed-eral
courts do not have jurisdiction to conduct direct
review of state court decisions. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416;
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482. Furthermore, the Rooker-Feld-man
principle extends to claims that are "inextricably
intertwined with the state-court judgment [such that] the
federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state
court wrongly decided the issues before it." Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., con-curring);
Edwards v. Illinois Bd. of Admissions to the
Bar, 261 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001). The pivotal ques-tion,
then, is "whether the injury alleged by the fed-eral
plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment it-self
or is distinct from that judgment." Rizzo v. Sheahan,
266 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). To put it another way, the key inquiry
is "whether ‘the district court is in essence being called
upon to review the state-court decision.' " Ritter v. Ross,
992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993), quoting Feldman, 460
U.S. at 483-84 n.16.

The plaintiffs contend that the Rooker-Feldman doc-trine
does not bar their claim because they are not chal-lenging
the final placement decision, but rather the short-comings
of the defendants in their evaluation of the suit-ability
of the Lewis family for both interim and permanent
placement. Labeling a suit as a § 1983 action alleging due
process violations, however, does not automatically re-move
the bar to suit in federal court. See Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2000)
("A plaintiff may not circumvent the effect of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine simply by casting [his] complaint in
the form of a federal civil rights action.") (quotation marks
and citation omitted).

To the extent that the plaintiffs in this case contend
that their constitutional rights were violated by the defen-dants
during the pre-adoption period, they may proceed;
to the extent that they challenge the decision to approve
the Lewises as adoptive parents, they may not (as the
latter decision was taken under the supervision of the
state courts). The decision with respect to the pre-adop-tion
period, however, was not taken pursuant to any court
order, and thus the § 1983 suit cannot be the equivalent
of an attempt to have a lower federal court review a
state court judgment. As to that period, there is no state
court judgment to review; there is only the course of ac-tion
followed by the DHSS officials. No Wisconsin court
has ever entertained a case touching upon the process
whereby the state actors chose the Lewises as foster
parents and monitored their performance in that capac-ity
prior to the adoption. We conclude that DHSS's al-legedly
negligent placement of the children with the
Lewises, as opposed to any other foster family, is not
"inextricably intertwined" with the decision that the
children ought to be placed with a family in the first
place, and thus that there is no Rooker-Feldman bar to
this action.

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full
text of the Court's opinion.

While we are sympathetic to the
unfortunate history of these individuals, we agree with
the district court that the defendants violated no legal
duty to the plaintiffs, and we therefore affirm.

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