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Curtis M. Adkins, et al. v. Labor Ready, Inc., et al.

Date: 09-03-2002

Case Number: 01-2304

Judge: Wilkinson

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Plaintiff's Attorney: Mary Georgia McQuain, LAW OFFICES OF STUART
CALWELL, P.L.L.C., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants.

Defendant's Attorney: Carl H. Trieshmann, SCHNADER, HARRISON, SEGAL & LEWIS,
L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Description:
Curtis Adkins filed suit against Labor Ready, Inc. and Labor Ready
Mid-Atlantic, Inc. (collectively "Labor Ready") alleging violations of
federal and state labor laws. Labor Ready responded with a motion
to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by
Adkins. The district court granted the motion, Adkins v. Labor Ready,
Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.W. Va. 2001), and dismissed the case.
Because the arbitration agreement is enforceable and all of Adkins'
claims are arbitrable, we affirm.

I.

Labor Ready is a temporary employment agency that provides
manual day labor to companies throughout the United States. It has
hundreds of dispatch offices, all of which operate under a strictly regi-mented
"Work Today, Paid Today" employment procedure. Tempo-rary
employees report to work at the Labor Ready office before the
start of the workday, where they wait on the premises until jobs are
assigned to them. They receive work tickets at the home office and
then travel to a Labor Ready customer's job site. At the end of each
workday, the customer signs the employees' work tickets, whereupon
the employees return to Labor Ready to receive immediate payment.
Employees can choose payment either by check drawn upon a non-local
bank or by cash. For cash payments, a fee of between one and
two dollars is deducted.

Adkins alleges that Labor Ready's dispatch and payroll procedures
violate the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq., West Virginia's Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours
Standards for Employees, W. Va. Code § 21-5C-1 et seq., and West Virginia's Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va. Code § 21-5-1
et seq. He brought this suit as a proposed FLSA class action, filing
approximately sixty-three consent forms from current and former
Labor Ready employees wishing to join the action as plaintiffs.

Adkins contends that Labor Ready employees were statutorily enti-tled
to payment for waiting time at Labor Ready's dispatch office,
travel time between that office and the assigned workplace, and time
spent undergoing required training. Further, he claims that if this
amount of time was added to each employee's workweek, many
employees would be entitled to overtime pay. He also alleges that
Labor Ready employees were entitled to compensation for the cost of
commuting to and from job sites at the prevailing rate of $.35 per
mile. Additionally, he asserts that Labor Ready's means of payment,
involving a deduction for cash payment, was itself contrary to law.

Labor Ready filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay proceed-ings
based on an arbitration agreement signed by Adkins and every
other Labor Ready employee. This agreement, contained in Labor
Ready's Policy Regarding Dispatch Procedures, Employment and
Arbitration ("the Policy"), must be signed by all potential employees
as part of the job application before they may join Labor Ready's pool
of temporary workers. The Policy is contained within an enclosed box
on the employment application. It provides in pertinent part:

I understand that my employment with LABOR READY,
INC. is on a day-to-day basis. That is, at the end of the work
day, I will be deemed to have quit unless and until I request
and receive a work assignment at a later date.

I agree that any disputes arising out of my employment,
including any claims of discrimination, harassment or
wrongful termination that I believe I have against Labor
Ready and all other employment related issues (excluding
only claims arising under the National Labor Relations act
[sic] or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board) will be resolved by arbitration as
my sole remedy. The arbitration shall be conducted by the
American Arbitration Association under its Commercial
Arbitration Rules and the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding. I understand that Labor Ready also agrees
to arbitrate in the same manner any claims which the com-pany
believes it has against me.

I HAVE READ AND AGREE TO THE ABOVE STATE-MENTS.

Relying on the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16,
Labor Ready argues that the arbitration agreement was valid, covered
Adkins' claims, and should be enforced.

The district court agreed and ordered the parties to submit Adkins'
claims to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the arbitration
agreement. The court then dismissed the action on the ground that all
of the issues presented in the suit were arbitrable. See Choice Hotels
Int'l v. BSR Tropicana Resort, 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001).
Adkins appeals.

II.

The FAA reflects "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). Underlying this policy is Congress's view that
arbitration constitutes a more efficient dispute resolution process than
litigation. Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 241 (4th Cir.
2001). Accordingly, "due regard must be given to the federal policy
favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration
clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration." Volt Info. Sciences, Inc.
v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76
(1989).

The FAA requires a court to stay "any suit or proceeding" pending
arbitration of "any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement
in writing for such arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3. This stay-of-litigation
provision is mandatory. A district court therefore has no choice but
to grant a motion to compel arbitration where a valid arbitration
agreement exists and the issues in a case fall within its purview.
United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus mindful of the "clear federal directive in support of arbitra-tion,"
Hightower, 272 F.3d at 242, we proceed to the analysis of the
district court's order compelling arbitration.

III.

In the Fourth Circuit, a litigant can compel arbitration under the
FAA if he can demonstrate "(1) the existence of a dispute between the
parties, (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration provision
which purports to cover the dispute, (3) the relationship of the trans-action,
which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign
commerce, and (4) the failure, neglect or refusal of the defendant to
arbitrate the dispute." Whiteside v. Teltech Corp., 940 F.2d 99, 102
(4th Cir. 1991). Adkins contests the second element, denying the exis-tence
of a binding contract to arbitrate this dispute.

It is clear that "even though arbitration has a favored place, there
still must be an underlying agreement between the parties to arbi-trate."
Arrants v. Buck, 130 F.3d 636, 640 (4th Cir. 1997). Whether
a party agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is a question of state
law governing contract formation. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). We turn initially, therefore, to
West Virginia contract law to determine whether the employment
application mandates arbitration of Adkins' claims as a contractual
matter. We review the trial court's decision on this issue de novo. See
Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 860-61 (W.
Va. 1998).

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full
text of the Court's opinion.

Outcome:
Adkins’ claims amount to little more than an attempt to undermine
repeated pronouncements by Congress and the Supreme Court that
federal law incorporates a liberal policy favoring arbitration agree-ments.
A refusal on our part to heed these pronouncements would be
a dereliction of our duty under law. The judgment of the district court
is therefore affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Unavailable
Defendant's Experts:
Unavailable
Comments:
None

About This Case

What was the outcome of Curtis M. Adkins, et al. v. Labor Ready, Inc., et al.?

The outcome was: Adkins’ claims amount to little more than an attempt to undermine repeated pronouncements by Congress and the Supreme Court that federal law incorporates a liberal policy favoring arbitration agree-ments. A refusal on our part to heed these pronouncements would be a dereliction of our duty under law. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.

Which court heard Curtis M. Adkins, et al. v. Labor Ready, Inc., et al.?

This case was heard in United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, WV. The presiding judge was Wilkinson.

Who were the attorneys in Curtis M. Adkins, et al. v. Labor Ready, Inc., et al.?

Plaintiff's attorney: Mary Georgia McQuain, LAW OFFICES OF STUART CALWELL, P.L.L.C., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants.. Defendant's attorney: Carl H. Trieshmann, SCHNADER, HARRISON, SEGAL & LEWIS, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees..

When was Curtis M. Adkins, et al. v. Labor Ready, Inc., et al. decided?

This case was decided on September 3, 2002.