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David Johnson, et al. v. City of Aiken, et al.

Date: 01-23-2002

Case Number: 01-1826

Judge: Wilkins

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Plaintiff's Attorney: John Christopher Mills of J. Christopher Mills, L.L.C.,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Defendant's Attorney: Andrew Frederick Lindemann of Davidson, Morrison & Lindemann, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants.

Description:
The City of Aiken, South Carolina and Officers Truxton
Umstead and C. W. Clark appeal an
award of attorneys' fees and costs against Clark and in favor of David
Johnson and Amanda Vickers under 42 U.S.C.A. S 1988(b) (West
Supp. 2001). Because we conclude that the only appropriate fee here
was no fee at all, we vacate the award and remand for further pro-
ceedings.


I.


The events that gave rise to this lawsuit arose from the execution
of a search warrant on a residence in which several juveniles were
present. The primary claims concerned entry by City law enforcement
officers into the residence without warning by throwing an exploding
device into the house, then storming in with masks on and guns drawn
without immediately identifying themselves as law enforcement.
Johnson, Vickers, and three other juveniles present at the time (collec-
tively, "Appellees") asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (West
Supp. 2001) against the officers in their individual capacities, con-
tending that because the information the officers possessed did not
justify their tactics, the entry violated Appellees' Fourth Amendment
rights ("the federal entry claim"). Appellees additionally alleged con-
stitutional violations as a result of the officers' detention of them dur-
ing the search ("the federal detention claim"), the City's maintenance
of a custom or policy that allowed unconstitutional entries into homes
("the federal policy claim"), and the officers' arrest of them, without
probable cause, for possession of alcohol by a minor ("the federal
arrest claim"). Finally, Johnson and Vickers asserted Fourth Amend-
ment claims based on searches of their automobiles by Clark after the
premises had been secured ("the federal vehicle search claim").1
Invoking supplemental jurisdiction, Appellees also asserted a state
law claim for assault based on the conduct underlying the federal
entry claim ("the state law assault claim") and a state law claim for
false arrest ("the state law arrest claim") based on the conduct under-
lying the federal arrest claim; both of these claims named the City as
the sole defendant.2 Appellees sought compensatory and punitive
damages and attorneys' fees and costs under S 1988.

Appellants denied Appellees' allegations and additionally asserted,
inter alia, that they were entitled to qualified immunity and that their
actions were objectively reasonable in light of existing law. Following
the conclusion of their case, Appellees voluntarily withdrew the state
law arrest claim, and the district court granted judgment as a matter
of law against them on the federal detention claim. After deliberating,
the jury awarded Appellees compensatory and punitive damages from
Umstead and Clark on the federal entry claim and compensatory and
punitive damages from Clark on the federal arrest claim. The jury
found in favor of the City on the federal policy claim but against it
on the state law assault claim, awarding each Appellee $50,000 in
compensatory damages. Finally, the jury awarded Johnson and Vick-
ers 35 cents each in nominal damages against Clark individually on
the federal vehicle search claim. The court subsequently awarded
Appellees $81,994.61 in attorneys' fees and costs.


On appeal, we vacated the judgments on the federal entry and fed-
eral arrest claims, concluding that Clark and Umstead were entitled
to qualified immunity on those claims because their actions were not
unconstitutional. See Johnson v. City of Aiken, 217 F.3d 839, 2000
WL 263823, at *5-*12 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
However, we affirmed the award against the City on the state law
assault claim. See id. at *12-*15. Thus, after appeal only two awards
remained: the state law assault claim award of $50,000 to each Appel-
lee against the City and the federal vehicle entry claim award of 35
cents each to Johnson and Vickers against Clark.4 Because of the
change in Appellees' degree of success, we vacated the S 1988 award
of attorneys' fees and costs and remanded for reconsideration of the
amount to be awarded.


On remand, the district court noted that plaintiffs who do not pre-
vail on their federal claims but achieve success on supplemental state
law claims are not prevailing parties under S 1988, and are therefore
not entitled to an award under that statute. On this basis, the district
court ruled that the three Appellees who recovered under the state law
assault claim but failed on all of their federal claims were not entitled
to any S 1988 award. As for Vickers and Johnson, the district court
determined that even though they lost on all but one of their federal
claims (the federal vehicle search claim not appealed) and won only
nominal damages against Clark on that claim (35 cents each), they
were nevertheless entitled to an award of $98,828.28 in attorneys'
fees and costs5 against Clark. We discuss the analysis of the district
court later in this opinion.

II.

Section 1988(b) provides that in federal civil rights actions, "the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."6
Because Johnson and Vickers obtained relief on one of their S 1983
claims, Appellants do not dispute that Johnson and Vickers were "pre-
vailing parties." Rather, Appellants argue that the only reasonable fee
here is no fee. We review an award of attorneys' fees for abuse of dis-
cretion. See McDonnell v. Miller Oil Co., 134 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir.
1998); see also Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir.
1997) (noting that error of law constitutes abuse of discretion).

In determining the proper fee to be awarded against Clark, the dis-
trict court followed the process outlined in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424 (1983). In Hensley, the plaintiffs asserted several constitu-
tional claims and eventually prevailed on some but not all of the
claims. The district court awarded fees under S 1988 but refused to
eliminate from the award fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims.
After the Eighth Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court vacated the
award and remanded for reconsideration of the amount to be awarded.

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full text of the
Court's opinion.

Outcome:
Reversed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Unknown
Defendant's Experts:
Unknown
Comments:

E-mail suggested corrections, comments and/or corrections to:
Kent Morlan





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About This Case

What was the outcome of David Johnson, et al. v. City of Aiken, et al.?

The outcome was: Reversed.

Which court heard David Johnson, et al. v. City of Aiken, et al.?

This case was heard in United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, SC. The presiding judge was Wilkins.

Who were the attorneys in David Johnson, et al. v. City of Aiken, et al.?

Plaintiff's attorney: John Christopher Mills of J. Christopher Mills, L.L.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.. Defendant's attorney: Andrew Frederick Lindemann of Davidson, Morrison & Lindemann, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants..

When was David Johnson, et al. v. City of Aiken, et al. decided?

This case was decided on January 23, 2002.