Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

Plaintiff Claire A. Straughn urges us to vacate several summary judgment rulings which ultimately prompted the district court to dismiss her claims against Delta Airlines, Inc., alleging gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2001, et seq., race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and breach of contract, wrongful termination, and defamation under New Hampshire law. Lastly, she seeks to set aside the summary judgment entered against her on Delta's counterclaim for reimbursement of certain workers' compensation benefits inadvertently disbursed to her in the first instance. We affirm the district court judgment in all respects.

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Straughn began her employment with Delta in October 1983, as a reservations agent. In January 1995, she became a sales representative in its Boston Marketing Office, responsible for an area which includes Vermont and Western New Hampshire. She was one of five women, as well as the only African American, among the fourteen sales representatives in the Boston Marketing Office. Her immediate supervisor was Zone Manager Helen Meinhold, who reported directly to Lou Giglio, District Marketing Manager.

On January 19, 1996, while on a sales call for Delta, Straughn fell and broke her wrist, which disabled her from work for most of the ensuing period through March of 1997. Although she returned to work during this period, on each occasion she was unable to continue for more than a few days.

Under the applicable Delta employment policy, employees injured on the job were entitled to thirteen weeks' accident leave, as well as accumulated sick leave, vacation time and full salary. Nevertheless, these employees were obligated to reimburse Delta for all workers' compensation benefits received while absent on accident leave, pursuant to the following Delta policy statement:

Personnel who receive weekly benefits for occupational injury or illness under the provisions of applicable Worker's (sic) Compensation laws must reimburse the Company in an amount equal to the sum of all such weekly benefits received for the period during which the Company pays the employee's wages, in whole or in part, under accident leave, sick leave, and disability benefit policies.

ESIS, the third-party administrator of Delta's self-insured workers' compensation plan, makes an independent determination as to whether an employee is eligible for workers' compensation benefits, based on the controlling workers' compensation laws and the circumstances surrounding the work-related injury. ESIS disburses workers' compensation benefits directly to the eligible Delta employee, notwithstanding the fact that the employee continues to receive full salary from Delta pursuant to its accident leave policy. While the pertinent policy statement, supra, obligates an employee absent on accident leave to reimburse Delta for all workers' compensation benefits received from ESIS while on full salary, once an employee's accident leave, accumulated sick leave and vacation time have been exhausted the employee is removed from the Delta payroll and thereafter retains whatever workers' compensation benefits are received from ESIS.

Thus, Straughn received three forms of remuneration while on accident leave. First, during the fourteen-month period she was unable to work, she received her regular Delta salary. Second, from January 25 through July 4, 1996, she received $11,608.86 in workers' compensation benefits through ESIS. Third, she received periodic checks from ESIS as reimbursement for medical expenses directly related to her injury, including medical bills, prescription costs, and travel expenses to and from medical appointments.(1) Notwithstanding her obligation to remit the $11,608.86 in workers' compensation benefits received from ESIS during her absence from work, Straughn failed to do so.

Meanwhile, Delta inadvertently continued to disburse Straughn's full salary from July 5, 1996, until her eventual return to work in March, 1997, even though her entitlement to full salary had expired on July 4, 1996, pursuant to the accident leave policy. Furthermore, the administrative employees responsible for disbursing Straughn's salary were neither aware that she had received and retained workers' compensation benefits, along with her regular Delta salary, from January 25 through July 4, 1996, nor that her Delta salary continued to be disbursed some nine months beyond the time she was entitled to receive it.(2) In March of 1997, upon discovering its error, Delta conducted a thorough review of all amounts disbursed to Straughn since her injury.

Shortly after returning to work in April of 1997, Straughn was asked by Giglio, on two separate occasions, whether she had received workers' compensation benefits in addition to her salary while absent on accident leave.(3) On each occasion, Straughn denied receiving workers' compensation benefits, explaining instead that she had received money which she used for meals and other expenses relating to her injury.(4)

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Where, as here, no direct evidence of discrimination was proffered by the plaintiff, we apply the McDonnell Douglas - Burdine - Hicks burden-shifting analysis to the Title VII and Section 1981 claims. See Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1999). Under that familiar regimen the plaintiff "must carry the initial burden . . . of establishing a prima facie case of . . . discrimination." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

In employment discrimination cases, the plaintiff must make a prima facie

. . . showing that: (1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [her] employer took an adverse employment action against [her]; (3) [she] was qualified for the employment [s]he held; and (4) [her] position remained open or was filled by a person whose qualifications were similar to [hers].

Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Conward, 171 F.3d at 19)).

We shall assume, without deciding, that Straughn proffered sufficient competent evidence to establish prima facie claims based on race and gender discrimination. At that point it became necessary for Delta to articulate "a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action[,]" id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Shorette v. Rite Aid of Maine, Inc., 155 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1998)), by identifying enough admissible evidence to "support a [rational] finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." Feliciano, 218 F.3d at 5-6 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Delta proffered competent evidence that Straughn was dismissed due to her dishonesty in repeatedly attempting to mislead a supervisor regarding her wrongful retention of workers' compensation benefits in violation of Delta policy. Richard Ealey, the Delta official ultimately responsible for the dismissal action, attested that though there had been other instances in which Delta employees had not spontaneously surrendered workers' compensation checks in similar circumstances, he was "not aware of any situation where the individual denied [having received such checks] when questioned."

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Affirmed.

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