Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.

Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw

Date: 03-12-2013

Case Style: Michael L. Lee v. Raven Resources, LLC

Case Number: CJ-2012-2984

Judge: Bryan C. Dixon

Court: District Court, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma

Plaintiff's Attorney: Stanley M. Ward, Woodrow K. Glass, SCott F. Brockman, R. Ben Houston, Barrett T. Bowers

Defendant's Attorney: Robert J. Haupt for Raven Resources, LLC

Stephen Wilson Elliott for David Stewart

Description: Michael L. Lee sued Raven Resources, LLC and David Stewart seeking a declaratory judgment claiming:

1. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was and now is a resident of Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma.

2. At all relevant times, Defendant Raven was and now is an Oklahoma limited liability company with its principal place of doing business in the City of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma.

3. At all relevant times, Defendant Stewart was and now is resident of Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma, and the managing member of Defendant Raven. Jurisdiction and Venue

4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties to this action.

5. Venue is properly laid in this county pursuant to 12 0.5. § 134.

Fact Allegations

6. In July, 1999, Plaintiffwas workingwith Lorentz Oil & Gas, EEC (“Eorentz”), evaluating oil and gas properties for purchase.

7. As a result of Plaintiffs success in evaluating oil and gas properties, Plaintiff developed a reputation for his expertise in that business specialty.

8. Lorentz was approached in 1999 by TomE. Ward (“Ward”), Rick D. Webb (“Webb”), and Defendant Stewart about allowing them as a group to purchase fifty percent (50%) of any future oil and gas interests Eorentz purchased at the oil and gas asset clearing auction or by private treaty.

9. At the time of these discussions among Ward, Webb and Stewart, Webb was a trustee of the Ward’s Children’s Trust and Webb was the managing member of W-4 Capital. Defendant Stewart was the managing member of Oklamiss Investments, EEC (“Oklamiss Investments”).

10. In August 1999, the Ward’s Children’s Trust, Ward’s entity, W-4 Capital, Webb’s entity and Oklamiss Investments formed Defendant Raven as an Oklahoma limited liability company and Webb and Defendant Stewart were its managing members. However, Defendant Stewart subsequently became the sole managing member of Defendant Raven after Ward’s and Webb’s entities terminated their relationship with Defendant Raven.

11. Thereafter, Defendant Raven commenced to purchase fifty percent (50%) of the oil and gas properties Plaintiff identified and evaluated and that were purchased in Lorentz’ name.

12. Plaintiffalso provided Raven bank financing assistance, cash flow projections, future net value of evaluations, and title document due diligence to assist Raven in borrowing money to grow Raven as a limited liability company.

13. In late November 2000, Lorentz informed Raven that Lorentz planned on a cessation of oil and gas propey purchases temporarily in order to repay its then existing debt.

14. Ward, Webb and Defendant Stewart wanted to continue buying oil and gas properties in order to grow Raven and Defendant Stewart met with Plaintiff at Defendant Stewart’s home in December2000 and Defendant Stewart in the presence ofWard and Webb proposed to Plaintiff that Plaintiffjoin Raven and continue to use his extensive oil and gas expertise to buy oil and gas properties for Raven in order to further build Raven into a substantial oil and gas company.

15. As part of Defendant Stewart’s proposal to Plaintiff, Plaintiff was to evaluate all oil and gas properties for purchase, perform the necessary due diligence, and utilize his contacts in the oil and gas industry and at the clearing house auction to purchase oil and gas interests.

16. Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s proposal and started to work for Defendant Raven on February 1, 2001 and commenced to buy oil and gas interests and assumed the responsibilities of the daily operations including staffing.

17. In July 2001, Plaintiffs efforts culminated in Defendant Raven’s acquisition of approximately eighty (80) oil and gas interests from Marathon Oil Company that included fifteen (15) operated wells and in the Fall of 2001, Defendant Raven started to acquire producing gas wells in the State of Texas.

18. During this period of time that Plaintiff was performing services for Raven, Ward was actively involved as a principal in Chesapeake Energy and Webb was operating his family-owned insurance company.

19. Although Defendant Stewart was physically present at Raven, he had shallow knowledge of the oil and gas business that Raven was conducting and allowed Plaintiff to make the essential and critical business decisions for Defendant Raven.

20. In November2001, Defendant Stewart negotiated on Defendant Raven’s behalf to purchase a fifty percent (5 0%) interest in the Red BluffProspect located in Texas. During that time, Ward and Webb advised Defendant Stewart that they wanted out as members of Defendant Raven as a result of philosophical business differences in the rate of growth of Defendant Raven and because of the fact that they were more debt adverse than was Defendant Stewart.

21. Operations commenced in December2001 on the Red BluffProspect when two locations were started and prepared. Drilling began on the first well in this Prospect and after it was drilled, the rig moved to the second well on the Prospect in January 2002.

Defendant Stewart directed the seller of the Red Bluff Prospect to hold the oil and gas interest assignments until after January 1, 2002 and Defendant Stewart further withheld that information from Ward & Webb in order to exclude their participation in that drilling prospect. Thereafter, sixteen (16) wells were drilled on that prospect and it sold for approximately $10 million.

22. On January 7, 2002, Defendant Raven’s limited liability company members met to discuss the division of Defendant Raven’s assets to be effective January 1, 2002 and to allow.Ward and Webb to disengage as members ofDefendant Raven. A copy of the minutes of that meeting is attached hereto as Exhibit “1” and incorporated by reference herein.

23. Before the meeting occurred on January 7, 2002, Defendant Stewart asked Plaintiff to remain with Defendant Raven and help it to continue to grow and prosper.

24. Paragraph 2 of Defendant Raven’s minutes of meeting of January 7, 2002, provides: 2. The parties agreed that Michael Lee would receive 5,00% percent of the propertiesof Raven Resources, LLC in exchange for services rendered, with Michael Lee assuming 5.00% of the existing Americrest Bank Debt.

25. Webb was the managing member of W-4 Capital and Webb was also the trustee of the Ward Children’s Trust as of January 7, 2002. In addition, Webb and Defendant Stewart were close personal friends and had known each other since each had been in college.

26. As a result of Plaintiff’s skill and efforts to make Defendant Raven financially successful, on January 7, 2002 Webb and Ward agreed with Defendant Stewart to give Plaintiff five percent (5%) ofDefendant Raven’s properties as consideration for his services in making Defendant Raven successful business entity.

27. In order for Plaintiff to receive his 5% interest in Defendant Raven, Ward, Webb and Defendant Stewart who each owned one-third (1/3) of Defendant Raven’s membership interests reduced each of their membership interests to 3 1.66% to total collectively 95%, and they further agreed to record assignments of the oil and gas interests acquired before January 1, 2002, to each take 3 1.66% of all cash associated with their gas hedging gains, and to each assume 31.66% of then existing Defendant Raven debt of approximately $6.5 million.

28.. The next day, January 8, 2002, as a further inducement for Plaintiff to stay employed with Defendant Raven, Defendant Stewart gave Plaintiff an option to purchase twenty percent (20%) of Defendant Raven for the predetermined price of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). A copy of the written option to purchase is attached hereto as Exhibit “2” and incorporated by reference herein.

29. Shortly after January 8, 2002, Ward and Webb each received his 3 1.66% interests in the oil and gas properties and cash of Defendant Raven.

30. Plaintiff opted not to take cash or assignments of his 5% interest in Defendant Raven and instead contributed both the cash and oil and gas properties to the on-going Defendant Raven entity to further assure its success and profitability, and Defendant Stewart did the same with his 31.66% interest.

31. Defendant Stewart further represented to Plaintiff that Exhibit “2” was prepared for Plaintiffs protection in the event something happened to Defendant Stewart.

32. Plaintiff believed Defendant Stewart when he made the aforesaid representations and placed Exhibit “2” in his office desk drawer along with Plaintiff’ s check for $1,000 payable to Defendant Raven.

33. Thereafter, Plaintiff continued to make the critical decisions regarding the evaluation and acquisition of oil and gas properties, to operate the business affairs of then Defendant Raven, and to help make Defendant Raven an extremely viable and successftil oil and gas operating company.

34. In the following years after 2002 when Defendant Raven was financially prospering, Plaintiff discovered that Defendant Stewart was misappropriating moneys and assets belonging to Defendant Raven to further Defendant Stewart’s extremely lavish lifestyle and to purchase real properties, oil and gas interests, and personal luxury property items such as luxury boats and jet airplanes that Defendant Stewart diverted to his own use, benefit and gain.

35. As part of Stewart’s scheme to siphon and divert Defendant Raven’s assets, Stewart formed a series of business entities to acquire and hold real estate interests acquired utilizing Defendant Raven’s assets.

36. When Plaintiff discovered Defendant Stewart’s scheme ofthe conversion and misappropriation of Defendant Raven’s monies and resources as aforesaid, Plaintiff utilized self-help to compensate himself for his twenty percent (20%) interest in Defendant Raven.

37. Plaintiff use of self-help as aforesaid led to Defendant Stewart causing Plaintiff to be criminally prosecuted in the United States District Court and to be sued civilly in the District Court of Oklahoma County.

38. Defendant Stewart provided information to the Unites States Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma and the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma that Plaintiff wrongfUlly took and converted Defendant Raven’s assets without advising either the prosecutor or court of Plaintiff’s ownership interest in Defendant Raven.

39. After Plaintiff agreed to enter a plea to criminal charges, one of Defendant Raven’s employees, Marquita McCray (“McCray”), located Plaintiffs documents evidencing his 20% interest in Defendant Raven and showed them to Defendant Stewart who ordered McCray to shred the papers which MeCray did.

40. Even though Plaintiffs documents were deliberately destroyed by Defendant Stewart as aforesaid, Defendant Raven’s lending institution had copies of Exhibits “I” and “2” that had been provided to it in the ordinary course of business.

41. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon further alleges that his 20% interest in Defendant Raven is worth well in excess of Sixteen Million Dollars ($16,000,000.00).

42. Defendant Stewart now denies that Plaintiff has any right, title or interest in and to Defendant Raven and by a letter dated September 20, 2010, Plaintiff exercised his right to the 20% interest in Defendant Raven. A copy of Plaintiffs letter to Defendant Stewart’s counsel is attached hereto as Exhibit “3” and incorporated by reference herein.

43. Defendants have denied that Plaintiff has any interest in Defendant Raven and have refused to acknowledge Plaintiffs interest or to account for any of the expenditures of moneys or participation of Defendant Raven’s assets for Defendant Stewart’s own personal use and benefit.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein Paragraphs 1 through 43 as though set forth in full.

45. An actual controversy and dispute has arisen by and among Plaintiff and Defendants in that Plaintiff contends and asserts that he is a 20% owner of Defendant Raven, that as a 20% owner, he is entitled to inspect Defendant Raven’s books and records, that he is entitled to an accounting of Defendant Raven’s business financial transactions, and that all assets diverted by Defendant Stewart should be restituted to Defendant Raven.

46. On the other hand, Defendants contend and assert that Plaintiff did not acquire a 5% interest in Defendant Raven on January 7, 2002, that Plaintiffpaid no consideration for the 20% interest in Defendant Raven, that Plaintiff’s option to acquire the 20% interest in Defendant Raven terminated, that Plaintiff is not entitled to inspect the books and records of Defendant Raven, that Defendant Stewart was and is entitled to use the assets of Defendant Raven for his own personal use and benefit, and that Plaintiff is not entitled to an accounting.

47. This action is brought pursuant to 12 O.S. § 1651 et seq. and ajudicial determination is necessary and proper to declare and determine the respective rights and duties of the parties in and to the membership interest of Defendant Raven as evidenced by Exhibits “1” and “2” hereto.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judicial determination and declaration that:

(1) Plaintiff is a 20% owner of the membership interests in Defendant Raven;

(2) Plaintiff is entitled to inspect Defendant Raven’s books and records;

(3) Plaintiff is entitled to an accounting of Defendant Raven’s financial transactions;

(4) Defendant Stewart is obligated to restitute all assets of Defendant Raven that he converted and utilized for his own use and benefit;

(5) For his costs; and,

(6) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - UNJUST ENRICHMENT

48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein Paragraphs 1 through 47 as though set forth in flail.

49. Defendants have been unjustly enriched by their actions depriving Plaintiff of his twenty percent (20%) membership interest in Defendant Raven and by Defendant Stewart’s misappropriation of Defendant Raven’s assets for Defendant Stewart’s own personal use and benefit and to Plaintiffs detriment.

50. As a direct result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff has been damaged in a sum in excess of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00).

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, as follows:

(1) For actual damages in an amount in excess of $75,000.00, and in accordance with the proof at the time of trial;

(2) For interest thereon as provided by law;

(3) For his costs; and,

(4) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Defendant appeared and moved for summary judgment, as follows:

Defendants, Raven Resources, L.L,C. (“Raven”) and David Stewart (“Stewart”) (collectively, “Defendants”), move, pursuant to 12 Okla. Stat. § 2012 and 2056(C) and Rule 13 of the Rules for the District Courts of Oklahoma, to either dismiss this case with prejudice or grant summary judgment in their favor. There is no genuine issue of material fact and Raven arid Stewart are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

INTRODUCTION

This case is both frivolous and shameflul. The plaintiff, Michael L. Lee (“Lee”), now sits in a federal detention facility for having committed and been convicted of crimes that resulted in Raven suffering at least $5,800,103.96 in damages. Lee pled guilty to those federal crimes, but now, incredibly, attempts to re-characterize his criminal activity as having been legitimate “self-help” to protect his alleged interests. See Lee’s Petition, pp. 7-8, ¶f 36- 39.

The U.S. District Court did not see Lee’s actions as legitimate “self-help.” Although Lee undeniably helped himself to more than $5.8 million dollars of Raven’s money, the U.S. District Court ordered Lee to pay $5,800,103.96 in restitution to Raven.

The Oklahoma County District Court did not see Lee’s actions as legitimate “self- help” either and entered a $6,000,000 civil judgment in Raven’s favor against Lee. The Oklahoma County District Court also ordered Lee to assign all real and personal property in which he had an interest to Raven, which Lee did on October 20, 2008. The accrued and unpaid interest on the federal court restitution order far outstrips Lee’s restitution to Raven so far. Likewise, the civil judgment entered against Lee remains unsatisfied.

Nonetheless, Lee has had the gall to reach out from behind the prison’s walls to sue his victims on claims that are absolutely unsupported by, and inconsistent with, both fact and law and which, in any event, he no longer holds. Defendants are yet again being victimized by Lee. Lee’s ongoing victimization of Defendants needs to be stopped immediately.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

1. In August 2008, the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma convicted Lee of one count of bank fraud and one count of monetary transactions with property from an unlawful act, i.e., money laundering. USA v. Lee, Case No. 5:08-CR- 00060-D, United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (the “Raven Criminal Case”), Lx. 1, Judgment in the Criminal Case.

2. The charges against Lee in the Raven Criminal Case, and his guilty plea to them, resulted from, among other things, Lee having forged Stewart’s name during 2003 and through August 2007 on Raven checks totaling $5,800,103.96. Lx. 2, Information, pp. 2-3, ¶ 9 and its subparts; Lx. 3, Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, p. 10, ¶ 49.

3. Lee was sentenced in the Raven Criminal Case to two concurrent 80 month prison sentences and was ordered to pay Raven $5,800,103.96 in restitution. Lx. 1, pp. 2,5, and 6.

4. The following is an excerpt from Lee’s plea hearing in the Raven Criminal Case:

MR. WILLIAMS [Assistant United States Attorney]: . . . It’s a two-count Information. Count One charges a bank fraud under Section 1334 sub 2. Alleges that from March of 2003 to August of 2007, Mr. Lee executed a scheme to obtain money owned by or under the control and custody of a financial institution that maintained accounts insured by the FDIC by means of materially false and fraudulent representations.

In particular, this count alleges that Mr. Lee, using his status as employee of Raven Resources LLC, forged the signatures of an individual with the initials DS [David Stewart] on checks drawn on accounts owned by Raven Resources at three banks, the Legacy Bank, the Bank of Oklahoma, and Coppeimark Bank, all without the knowledge or permission of the banks or of the authorized signatores (sic) of the account.

Further alleges that he obtained over $5,000,000 through the scheme and used the money for his own purposes and not for the benefit of Raven Resources.

The maximum punishment on this count would be imprisonment of not more than 30 years, supervised release of not more than five years, imprisonment of not more than three years in the event of revocation of supervised release, and that’s all in addition to a fine of not more than $1,000,000, a special assessment of $100, and mandatory restitution. Count Two charges money laundering under Section 1957(a) of Title 18. This count alleges that on November 8th of 2006 Mr. Lee knowingly engaged in a monetary transaction by and through or to a financial institution affecting Interstate Commerce, criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000.

Particularly, this count alleges that he used funds in his personal account at Legacy Bank to purchase a silver 2003 Mercedes Benz by writing a check payable to Dallas Roadster in the amount of $39,795.08 after more than $10,000 of those funds had been derived from the bank fraud scheme alleged in Count One.

This is a Class C felony. On Count Two the maximum punishment would be imprisonment of not more than ten years, supervised release of not more than three years, imprisonment of not more than two years in the event of a revocation of supervised release, a fine of not more than $250,000 or twice the amount involved in the transaction, a special assessment of $1.00.

When combined, the original term of imprisonment and any subsequent term of imprisonment that the Court might impose as a result of revocation of supervised could exceed the statutory maximum.

Ex. 4, Reporters Transcript of Plea Proceedings had on March 17, 2008 in the Raven Criminal Case, p. 3, I, IS — p.5, I. 10.

5. Lee’s plea hearing in the Raven Criminal Case continued:

THE COURT: Knowing all the rights that you have and would be waving (sic), and fully understanding the nature of the charges against you and possible punishment, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?

DEFENDANT LEE: Guilty, Your Honor.

Ex. 4, p. 8, 11.4- 8.

6. The following excerpt from Lee’s plea hearing summarizes his plea agreement:

THE COURT: You have entered into a plea agreement with the government; is that correct?

DEFENDANT LEE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Williams, would you please summarize the terms of the agreement.

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor. The plea agreement provides Mr. Lee will plead guilt (sic) to both counts of the Information, and the government has agreed not to prosecute him further for any crime accomplished through the defendant’s forging of checks drawn on any bank account of Raven Resources LLC from March 1, 2005. through August 31, 2007, which would include any laundering of the proceeds of any crime accomplished through the forging of those checks during that time period.

The parties have agreed that Mr. Lee should receive a downward adjustment of as many as three levels for acceptance of responsibility. . . . The parties have agreed that the offense conduct involved an abuse of a position of trust. • . The parties have agreed that the gross losses caused to the victims of the offense by the defendant’s relevant conduct determined with reference to the guidelines total $5,800,103.96, and the parties further agree that as part of the sentence in this case the Court will enter an order of restitution in that amount with any proper credits for items such as the value of money and property returned to the victims by Mr. Lee as of the date of sentencing.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Manchester, do you agree with the summary stated by government counsel?

MR. MANCHESTER: Your Honor, I do . . . •; however, I need to make it clear to the Court, as the government knows, he may work with his former employer, with Raven, in their efforts to track down assets that might have been forfeited and might assist in that regard. . . . I just didn’t want us to be in a situation where he would do something that was contrary to the plea agreement without having first brought out the fact that he intends to continue to cooperate in an effort to recover assets.

THE COURT: Does that raise any issue?

MR. WILLIAMS: I don’t -- As long as it’s an attempt to recover assets --

MR. MANCHESTER: Yeah.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- for the victims, I can’t imagine we could construe that as a violation of this agreement.

THE COURT: . . . Mr. Lee. do you understand the recitation by counsel and do you also agree that that accurately describes the terms of your agreement? DEFENDANT LEE: Yes, Your Honor.

Ex. 4, p. 10, 1. 16—p. 13, 1.22.

7. The following excerpt from Lee’s plea hearing sets out Lee’s characterization of his role with Raven:


MR. WILLIAMS: And what were you -- was your role at the company? DEFENDANT LEE: Evaluating oil and gas properties for purchase.

Ex. 4, p. 14,1. 25—p. 15,1.3.

8. Lee did not claim or assert during the plea proceedings in the Raven Criminal Case that he was a member of Raven or had any other relationship to it, See Ex. 4.

9. In a successful effort to garner a reduced sentence for his client, Lee’s counsel in the Raven Criminal Case told the U.S. District Court:

Mr. Lee’s past broke. He embezzled, spent, and came away with less than nothing. He lost everything. His reputation as an astute oil company executive, his opportunity to own 20 percent of the assets of the company [Raven] he helped build into a multimillion dollar corporation, his family, and now his freedom. Ex. 5, Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings held on August 19, 2008 in the Raven Criminal Case, p.5, II. 10-15.

10. After representing to the U.S. District Court that Lee had lost his opportunity to own 20 percent of Raven, Lee’s counsel concluded with:

It’s over. The supposed friends have moved on and Mr. Lee is here preparing to go to prison, impoverished, depressed, and ashamed.

I’ve done some good things in my life and I’ve done some bad things in my life. This was bad. I helped build a very successful company and have a lot of respect for David and Terry Stewart, and that position of trust that I was in, I - - I disgraced that to do things that I shouldn’t be doing. I’m deeply sorry for the -- the financial loss to them Ex. 5, p.7,11. 14- 20.

14. Lee gave the U.S. District Court no inkling that he purportedly had an interest in Raven or its assets. Instead, he apologized for the losses he had caused Stewart and his wife. ‘a.

15. On August 31, 2007, Raven filed a civil case in the Oklahoma County District Court against Lee and a corporation owned by him, Z Energy Corporation, that was styled: Raven Resources, L.LC. v Michael L, Lee and Z Energy Corporation, Case Number CJ 2007-7547 (the “Prior Civil Action”). Lx. 6, Raven’s Petition in the Prior Civil Action.

16. In the Prior Civil Action, Raven sued Lee for “having repeatedly forged the name of the authorized signature of the Plaintiff [Raven] on checks submitted to its banks in amounts yet to be determined but which appear to be far in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) and payable to Defendant Lee.” Lx. 6, p. 2, ¶ 7.

17. Raven further alleged in the Prior Civil Action that “the payments represented by the forged checks were not authorized by Plaintiff [Raven] and were improper and constitute conversion of Raven’s property to Defendant Lee’s personal use and benefit” and that “[t]he full extent of Defendant’s fraudulent conduct, forgeries and embezzlement is not known at this time.” Ex. 6, p. 2, ¶ 8 and p. 3, ¶ 10, respectively.

18. In a September 24, 2007, letter to Lee’s counsel of record in the Prior Civil Case, Lee was informed Raven considered Lee’s purported “option” to purchase 20% of Raven as “unenforceable, null and void [and notified Lee that] [tb the extent Mr. Lee still believes otherwise, please consider this Raven’s notice that the option is revoked.” Ex. A, September 24, 2007 Letter to Stephen A. Zrenda, to Ex. 7, Affidavit of McGuire, ¶‘ 3, 5, and 6.

19. Lee filed no counterclaims in the Prior Civil Action. Lx. 8, Docket Sheet from the Prior Civil Action; Lx. 7, ¶ 4.

20. After filing the Prior Civil Action, Defendants continued to investigate Lee’s actions. During the investigation, Raven and Stewart discovered at least $9,782,790.12 in damages sustained, in addition to the $5,800,103.96 in restitution damages Lee was ordered to pay in the Raven Criminal Case. Those damages consist of the following:

a. Lee had forged Stewart’s name on a Purchase and Sale Agreement under which certain of Raven’s oil and gas properties were sold to Legacy Reserves, LLC at a price that was at least $6,326,000.00 less than the minimum price for which Stewart would have even seriously considered selling those properties.

b. Lee misrepresented that a well in which Raven owned an interest was producing when, in fact, it was a dry hole. Because Lee misled Raven to believe the well was producing 5 mmcf of gas per day, Raven paid out $556,790.12 to other interest owners in the well as their share of what turned out to be non-existent revenue from non-existent production.

c. Lee obtained $400,000 and $500,000 loans from Legacy Bank and a $2,000,000 loan from Park Cities Bank in Stewart’s name by forging Stewart’s name.

Ex. 9, Motion for Default Judgment and Brief in Support filed in the Prior Civil Action on August 8,2008, pp. 5-8, ¶[ 2 1-25; Ex. 10; Affidavit of Stewart, ¶ 10.

21. Lee’s counsel filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment in the Prior Civil Action in which he represented to the Oklahoma County District Court and Raven that:

Lee has . . . had to marshal what meager resources he had available so as to permit his counsel to concentrate on the [Raven Criminal Casej.

Mr. Lee has been working with Raven in an effort to provide them (sic) with assignments of interest he has/had in various property, including oil and gas interests. . . . He has also been cooperating with the federal government as they continue to recover assets from various people who benefited (sic) from Mr. Lee’s largess. On information and belief, it is asserted that Raven will eventually become the beneficiary of this recovered property or the proceeds thereof.

He lost everything: His reputation as an astute oil company executive; his opportunity to own 20% of the assets of the company [Raven] he helped build into a multi-million dollar operation; his family; and, now, his freedom. [and]

Mr. Lee has acknowledged his culpability and done what he can to assist in the recovery of assets. He knows that prison awaits him and that, when released, he must address the restitution that has already been ordered. In the interim, he will continue to do what he can to assist in the recovery of assets for the benefit of Raven Resources.

Ex. 11, Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment filed in the Prior Civil Action, p. 1, ¶ 4; p. 2, 4 unnumbered paragraph; p. 3, unnumbered full paragraph; p. 4, 4 unnumbered paragraph, respectively.

22. On September 11, 2008, an Agreed Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment and Order of Judgment was entered on the merits by the Oklahoma County District Court in the Prior Civil Case in which:

Defendants [Lee and Z Energy Corporation] should be, and hereby are, ordered and required to execute all assignments of any real property and any personal property to Plaintiff [Raven] and/or David Stewart. . . . All such assignments shall be made within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order of Judgment. Judgment in favor of Plaintiff [Raven] is hereby granted in the amount of Six Million Dollars ($6,000,000.00) . . . It is further ordered that Defendants execute. . . all assignments relating to real or personal property to Plaintiff. Lx. 12, Agreed Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment and Order of Judgment, p. I, ¶ 2; p. 2., decretal paragraph, respectively.

23. Additionally, Raven was awarded $3,500.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs in the Prior Civil Case. Lx. 13, Agreed Order on Plaintiff’s Unopposed Application of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs for Prosecution of Contempt Citation.

24. On October 20, 2008, Lee executed an Assignment of Personal Property under which he assigned to Raven: all right, title, and interest in and to all personal property owned by him. By this Assignment, neither the party of the first part [Lee], nor any person on his behalf, shall or will hereafter claim or demand any right or title to the personal property and shall be from that excluded and forever barred. Said Assignment of Personal Property is effective as of the date below and is intended to comply with the final Judgment entered on September 11, 2008, in Oklthoma County District Court, Raven Resources, LLC v. Michael L. Lee and Z Energy Corporation, Case No. CJ 2007-7547, attached hereto as Lx. ‘A’ and made a part hereof,

This Assignment is intended to assign all personal property of value of the party of the first part [Lee] to the party of the second part [Raven] . .

Lx. B, Assignment of Personal Property, to Ex. 7.

25. Lee now quotes as follows in the Petition in this case from what he identifies as “Raven’s minutes of meeting of January 7, 2002:”


The parties [which did not include Lee] agreed that Michael Lee would receive 5.00% percent of the properties of Raven Resources, EEC in exchange for services rendered, with Michael Lee assuming 5.00% of the existing Americrest Bank Debt. Lee’s Petition, p.5, ¶ 24.

26. Lee alleges he “opted not to take cash or assignments of his 5% interest in Defendant Raven ...,“ but alleges he contributed the same to Raven. Lee’s Petition, p. 6, ¶ 30 (emphasis supplied).

27. Lee alleges Raven’s existing debt [presumably as refened to in the January 7, 2002 Raven Minutes] was approximately $6.5 million. Lee’s Petition, p. 6, ¶ 27. In fact, Raven’s bank debt to Americrest as of January 1, 2002, was more than $8 million. Lx. 10, 1I 7; Lx. 14, Affidavit of Holmes, ¶ 6.

28. Raven’s debt to Americrest Bank was reduced in early 2002 by transactions through which entities owned or otherwise related to Tom L. Ward and Rick D. Webb or their families acquired a portion of Raven’s assets and assumed part of Raven’s debt to Americrest Bank. The reduction in Raven’s debt to Americrest Bank was proportionate to the assets acquired by entities owned or otherwise related to Tom L. Ward and Rick D. Webb or their families and reduced Raven’s debt to Americrest to approximately $3,000,000 as of February 28, 2002, Lx. 10, ¶ 8; Lx. 14, ¶ 7.

29. Leaving aside whether Lee, a non-member of Raven, would have standing to enforce anything that might have been included in Raven’s minutes, Lee does not allege he assumed any of the Americrest Bank Debt. See Lee’s Petition. Moreover, Lee never assumed, or sought to assume, or became a Guarantor of any of Raven’s Americrest Bank Debt, let alone 5.00% of it. Lx, 10, ¶ 6; Lx. 15, Affidavit of Lakely, ¶ 4; Ex. 14, ¶1 8-9.

30. On December 4, 2008, while incarcerated, Lee testified as follows under oath in a deposition by written questions conducted in the case styled: Raven Resources, LLC v. Legacy Reserves Operating, LP, Cause No. CV-46609, pending in the District Court of Midland County. Texas, 385th Judicial District:

THE COURT REPORTER: Are you a Member of Raven Resources, LLC? THE WITNESS: No.

THE COURT REPORTER: If you claim you are a Member of Raven Resources, LLC, please state the amount of money you paid or contributed for your interest, the form of payment, and the date of payment.

THE WITNESS: I’m not a member. I had two options, which are shown in the book as Exhibits, and then a letter stating that that option had been withdrawn. Lx. 16, Deposition of Lee, p. 4,1. 21 — p. 5,1. 7.

31. According to Lee’s Petition, he did not purport to exercise the alleged “option” to purchase a 20% interest in Raven until September 20, 2010, almost three years after the purported “option” was revoked in writing. Lee’s Petition, p. 8, 9142; Ex. A to Ex. 7,991 3, 5, and 6.

32. Lee’s Petition does not include any allegation that Lee paid the alleged $1,000 “option” price. Lee’s Petition.

33. Lee did not ever pay $1,000 to acquire any interest in Raven. Ex. 10, ¶ 4; see also Ex. 16, p. 4,1.21-p. 5, 1.7; see also Ex. 15, ¶ 5.

34, Lee never received any distributions as a member of Raven and Raven never issued aK-I to Lee. Ex. 15,16.

35. The only relationship Lee had with Raven was as an employee. Ex. 15, ¶ 7.

36. Raven has received at most $200,000 in value for application towards satisfaction of either the $6,000,000 Agreed Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and Order of Judgment entered against Lee and in Raven’s favor in the Prior Civil Action, the $3,500.00 award of attorneys’ fees and costs in that case, or the $5,800,103.96 restitution order entered in the Raven Criminal Case. Ex. 10,915.

37. Had Stewart known that Lee claimed he was entitled to any interest in Raven, Stewart would not have agreed to resolve the Prior Civil Action with a $6,000,000 judgment against Lee, but would have instead caused Raven to pursue all claims it had against Lee.

Lx. 10,’3[9,

38. At all relevant times. Stewart was the managing member of Raven. Lee’s Petition, ¶ 3.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A party is entitled to summary judgment in its favor if the Court determines that, when taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, documents, affidavits and evidentiary materials on file and the legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom show that there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 12 OkIa. Stat. § 2056(C); Rule 13 of the Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma (12 OkIa. Stat. Ch. 2, App.); Sellers v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 19840K 11, ¶23, 687 P.2d 116, 120.

In this case, the evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, this case should be dismissed with prejudice or a summary judgment should be entered in Defendants’ favor. Lee has no standin2 to bring this case.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held:

[Sjtanding to raise issues in a proceeding must be predicated on interest that is ‘direct, immediate and substantial.’ Standing determines whether the person is the proper party to request adjudication of a certain issue and does not decide the issue itself. The key element is whether the party whose standing is challenged has sufficient interest or stake in the outcome.

Matter of the Estate of Dowi, 1986 OK 15,17, 727 P.2d 574,576.

In Fern v. Contingenn Review Board, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:

Standing refers to a person’s legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. The three threshold criteria of standing are (1) a legally protected interest which must have been injured in fact- i.e., suffered an injury which is actual, concrete and not conjectural in nature, (2) a causal nexus between the injury and the complained-of conduct, and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable court


decision. The doctrine of standing ensures a party has a personal stake in the outcome of a case and the parties are truly adverse.

Fern v. Contingency Review Board, 20070K 27, ¶7, 163 P,3d 512, 519-520. ‘[S]tanding [must] be determined as of the commencement of suit Lujan v. Defenders of Wildljfe, 504 U.S. 555, 570,11.5, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2142, 119 L,Ed, 351 (1992).

On October 20, 2008, Lee executed an Assignment of Personal Property under which he assigned to Raven: all right, title, and interest in and to all personal property owned by him.

By this Assignment, neither the party of the first part [Lee], nor any person on his behalf, shall or will hereafter claim or demand any right or title to the personal property and shall be from that excluded and forever barred.

This Assignment is intended to assign all personal property of value of the party of the first part [Lee] to the party of the second part [Raven]... Ex.B toEx. 7,16.

Assuming the word “all” in the Assignment of Personal Property means “all,” Lee assigned to Raven on October 20, 2008: a) all rights and interests he may have had under Ex.s I and 2 to his Petition; and b) all claims he may have had against Defendants. Consequently, Lee holds no legally protected interest, has no personal stake in the outcome of this case, and has sustained no injury capable of being redressed by a favorable decision of this Court.

While not yet released for publication in the permanent law reports, the Oklthoma Supreme Court has reiterated the fundamental standing principles set out above in at least 10 cases in 2012 alone. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Alexander, 2012 OK 43, ¶‘fl 17- 18; CPT Asset Backed Certjficates v. Kham, 2012 OK 22, 9f’3[ 16-17. Those cases, and the cases cited in them, demonstrate that Lee lacks standing to bring this case and that this case must therefore be either dismissed with prejudice or Defendants must be granted summary judgment.

Exhibit 2 to Lee’s Petition is unenforceable.

It appears Lee is attempting to enforce an open-ended “option” to purchase a 20% interest in Raven. See Lx. 2 to Lee’s Petition. Under 15 OkIa. Stat. § 173,

If no time is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed. If the act is in its nature capable of being done instantly, as for example, if it consists in the payment of money only, it must be performed immediately upon the thing to be done being exactly ascertained.

15 OkIa. Stat. § 173; see Matter of Estate of Crowl, 1987 OK 13, Supplemental Opinion on Rehearing at 5[ 1, fn. 2, 737 P,2d 911 (applying § 173 to save an open-ended option to purchase from being violative of the rule against perpetuities.)

Leaving aside any other issues that may exist about the enforceability of Exhibit 2 to Lee’s Petition, Lee would have been required under Exhibit 2 to pay $1,000 and, under 15 OkIa. Stat. § 173, would have been required to pay it immediately, i.e., in early 2002. Lee did not ever pay the $1,000, let alone pay it immediately. See Lee’s Petition; Lx. 10, ¶ 4; see also Ex. 16, p.4,1.21 — p. 5, 1.7.

When Lee was directly asked under oath in 2008 whether he was a member of Raven, Lee answered “No” and when asked under oath “the amount of money [he] paid or contributed for [his claimedi interest [in Raven], the form of payment, and the date of payment [Lee answered] Im not a member.” id.; see also Lx. 10, ¶ 4.

Lee did not even purport to exercise any rights under Exhibit 2 to his Petition until September 2010. Lx. 3 to Lee’s Petition. Any rights Lee might have had under Ex. 2 to his Petition would have lapsed in early 2002, admittedly had not been exercised by 2008, and would not have been enforceable in 2010. Certainly, any rights Lee might have had under Lx. 2 to his Petition are not enforceable now. Lee’s Petition should therefore either be dismissed with prejudice or Defendants should be granted summary judgment.

Lee’s “option” was revoked before he allegedly “accepted” it.

As long as an option remains unaccepted, it is unilateral and considered as an offer only. Bobo v. Bigbee, 1976 OK 40, ¶ 27, 548 P.2d 224, 229 (OkIa. 1976). If the


consideration is not actually received, revocation of the option before its acceptance must be considered to have been legally successful. Id. at ¶ 28. Lee does not allege and, in fact, did not ever pay $1,000 to acquire an interest in Raven. See Lee’s Petition; Ex. 10,914; see also Lx. 16, p.4,1.21 — p.5,1.7.

In a September 24, 2007, letter to Lee’s counsel of record in the Prior Civil Case, Lee was informed that Raven viewed his purported option to purchase 20% of Raven as “unenforceable, null and void. . . . [and that] To the extent Mr. Lee still believes otherwise, please consider this Raven’s notice that the option is revoked.” Lx. A to Lx. 7, ¶91 3,5, and 6.

According to Lee’s Petition, Lee did not purport to exercise the alleged option to purchase a 20% interest in Raven until September 20, 2010, almost three years after the purported option was revoked in writing, and never tendering the $1,000 amount stated in Ex.2,p.8,9142;Ex.AtoEx.7,fl3,Sand6;Ex, 10,914.

Under 15 OkIa. Stat. § 72, “[a] proposal may be revoked at any time before its acceptance is communicated to the proposer, but not afterwards.”

A proposal is revoked:

By the communication of notice of revocation by the proposer to the other party, before his acceptance has been communicated to the former.

By the lapse of the time prescribed in such proposal for its acceptance, or if no time is so prescribed the lapse of a reasonable time without communication of the acceptance.

By the failure of the acceptor to fulfill a condition precedent to acceptance.. 15 Ok]a. Stat. § 73, subparts 1,2, and 3.

Each method set out above by which a proposal could be revoked applies here. Lee was given formal written notice the “option” had been revoked, the time for him to have exercised the purported option lapsed by his failure to exercise it immediately (see 15 OkIa. Stat. § 173), and Lee failed to fulfill a condition precedent to acceptance, i.e, payment of the $1,000. See Lee’s Petition; Lx. 2,914; see alsoEx. 16, p.4,1. 21 — p.5,1.7.


Once revoked, Lee could not have successfully accepted the purported option to purchase 20% of Raven. See, e.g., GE Fanuc Intelligent Platforms Embedded v. Brijot imaging Systems, Inc. 51 So-3d 1243, 1245-1246 (FIa. App. 5 Dist., 2011), citing Sullivan v. Econ. Research Props., 455 So.2d 630, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). As a result, this case must be dismissed with prejudice or Raven and Stewart must be granted summary judgment.

Lee holds no enforceable rights under Raven’s Minutes.

Leaving aside whether Lee, a non-member of Raven, would have had standing to enforce anything that might have been included in Raven’s Minutes, Lee does not allege, and in fact never satisfied, the stated condition precedent to his acquisition of any interest in Raven’s properties, i.e., assumption of 5.00% of the existing Americrest Bank Debt. Lx. Ito Lee’s Petition. Lee never assumed any of Raven’s Americrest Bank Debt, let alone 5.00% of it and never sought to assume or become a Guarantor of Raven’s Americrest Bank Debt. Lx. 10,916; see also Ex. 14, ¶91 8 and 9; Lx. 15,914. Instead, Lee alleges he opted to contribute to Raven whatever he was entitled to receive under the Minutes. Lee’s Petition, p. 6, ¶ 30. Nothing in Lx. 1 to Lee’s Petition afforded Lee such a choice. Under the facts, and leaving aside any other issues, Lee was not entitled to anything under Lx. I to his Petition. Therefore, Lx. 1 is a springboard to nowhere for Lee.

Lee’s claim was a compulsory counterclaim

in the Prior Civil Action and his failure to assert it there ban it here.

Lee’s claims are all grounded on the proposition he has some interest in Raven. Defendants submit Lee was required to assert his purported interest in Raven in the Prior Civil Case by way of a compulsory counterclaim, which he did not do, and that, as a result, such a claim is now barred. See Lx. 8, Docket Sheet in the Prior Civil Action; Lx. 7,914. Under 12 OkIa. Stat. § 2013(A), a pleader must assert as a counterclaim any claim that arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. The failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim bars a later action on that demand. McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 19990K 30,17,979 P.2d 252, 255-56.

A compulsory counterclaim requirement is similar in effect to a claim- preclusion bar. The principle of claim preclusion (earlier known as res judicata) teaches that a judgment in an action bars the parties (or their privies) from relitigating not only the adjudicated claim, but also any theories or issues that were actually decided together with those which could have been decided in that action.

Id. (footnotes omitted.)

In the Prior Civil Action, Raven sued Lee for “having repeatedly forged the name of the authorized signature of the Plaintiff [Raven] on checks submitted to its banks in amounts yet to be determined but which appear to be far in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) and payable to Defendant Lee.” Ex. 6, p. 2, ¶ 7.

Raven further alleged in the Prior Civil Action that “the payments represented by the forged checks were not authorized by Plaintiff [Raven] and were improper and constitute conversion of Raven’s property to Defendant Lee’s personal use and benefit” and that “It]he full extent of Defendant’s fraudulent conduct, forgeries and embezzlement is not known at this time.” Ex. 6, p. 2, ¶ 8 and p. 3, ¶ 10, respectively.

In this case, Lee alleges that when he discovered Stewart’s purported “conversion and misappropriation of Defendant Raven’s monies and resources . . . [Lee] used self-help to compensate for his twenty percent (20%) interest in Defendant Raven.” Lee’s Petition, p. 7, ¶ 36. While not encompassing all damages Raven has suffered at Lee’s hands, Lee’s “self- help” involved the very same transactions for which he was sued by Raven in the Prior Civil Action, transactions that resulted in a $6,000,000.00 judgment on the merits being entered against Lee. Ex.6;Ex. ll;Ex. 12. Clearly, if there were any justification for Lee’s “self-help,” it arose out of the transaction or occurrence that were the subject matter of Raven’s claims in the Prior Civil Action and should have been raised as a counterclaim in the Prior Civil Action. Lee’s failure to do so results in those claims being baned here. Therefore, this case must either be dismissed with prejudice or summary judgment must he entered in favor of Defendants.


Res judicata and collateral estopel bar this suit.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction upon a matter properly before it concludes the matter as to the parties to the litigation and their privies arid constitutes a bar to a new action upon the same cause of action in the same or any other court. Dearing v. State ex reL Com’rs of Land Office, 1991 OK 6, ¶ 7, 808 P.2d 661, 664. Res judicara bars claims that were or could have been litigated in a prior action in which a final judgment was entered on the merits. In the Matter of Sneed, 19980K 8,91 13, 953 P.2d 1111, 1116. See al so Miller v. Miller, 1998 0K24,fl22 and 23, 956 P.2d 887, 896.

To bar a case on res judicata grounds, there must be (I) an identity of subject matter, (2) an identity of parties, (3) an identity of the capacity of parties, and (4) an identity of the cause of action. Dearing, supra. at91 8,808 P.2d at 664; Carris v. John R. Thomas &Assoc., 19950K 33,9110,896 P.2d 522, 527.

Defendants submit that the elements necessary to apply res judicata to bar Lee’s claims are present in this case. Raven and Lee were parties to the Prior Civil Action and they appeared there and here in the same capacity. The Prior Civil Action resulted in a final judgment on the merits against Lee. The Prior Civil Action and this case involve the same subject matter and cause of action. Raven sued Lee in the Prior Civil Action for having repeatedly forged Raven checks for his personal benefit. Ex. 6, p. 2, ¶91 7-8. In this case, Lee expressly characterizes those repeated forgeries as “self-help to compensate for his twenty percent (20%) interest in Defendant Raven” and thereby admitted that the Prior Civil Action and this case involve the same subject matter and cause of action. Petition, p. 7, ¶ 36; Lx. 6; Ex. 11; Ex. 12. In any event, the issue whether Lee had any interest in Raven was required to have been litigated in the Prior Civil Action. As a result, Lee is precluded by res judicata from litigating those claims, here. Therefore, this case must either be dismissed with prejudice or summary judgment must be entered in favor of Defendants.


The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion bars a party against whom it is being asserted from re-litigating an issue when the party was either a party to or in privity with a party to a prior action and “the issue subject to preclusion [was] actually adjudicated in a prior case in which the issue was necessary or essential to the outcome.” Hesser v. Central National Bank & Trust Co., 19980K 15, ¶ 17, 956 P.2d 864, 868, quoting Carris v. John R. Thomas & Associates, P.C., 1995 OK 33, ¶11, 896 P.2d 522, 527-528. Collateral estoppel may be used defensively. Anco Mfg. & Supply Co. Inc. v. Swank, 1974 OK 78, 524 P.2d 7.

Further, the elements necessary to apply collateral estoppel to bar Lee’s claims in this case are present, too. An adjudication that Lee had no interest in the funds he took from Raven was necessary, essential, and inherent in the outcome of the Prior Civil Action. If Lee had an interest in those funds, judgment could not have been properly entered against him in the Prior Civil Action. As a result, this case must either be dismissed with prejudice or summary judgment must be entered in favor of Defendants. Lee’s claims are barred by judicial estoppeL

Lee was successfully sued by Raven civilly and prosecuted by the United States Attorney criminally for having taken millions of dollars from Raven and Lee never hinted in either of those prior proceedings that he had any enforceable interest in Raven or its assets. To the contrary, his counsel repeatedly represented that Lee’s “opportunity to own 20 percent of the assets of . . . [Raven]” had been lost. Ex. 11; see also Lx. 5, p. 5, II. 10-15. Lee’s counsel further represented to the Oklahoma County District Court that:

Mr. Lee has acknowledged his culpability and done what he can to assist in the recovery of assets. He knows that prison awaits him and that, when released, he must address the restitution that has already been ordered. In the interim, he will continue to do what he can to assist in the recovery of assets for the benefit of Raven Resources. Lx. 11.

Oklahoma jurisprudence recognizes the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which provides that a party who has knowingly assumed a particular position dealing with matters of fact is estopped from assuming an inconsistent position to the detriment of the adverse party. The doctrine applies to inconsistent positions assumed in the course of the same judicial proceeding or in subsequent proceedings where the pasties and questions are identical. The doctrines purpose is ‘to protect the integrity of the judicial process’ by ‘prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment,’

Bank of the Wichitas v. Ledford, 2006 OK 73, ¶ 23, 151 P.3d 103, 112 (footnotes and citations therein omitted). An indispensable element of judicial estoppel is that the party taking the inconsistent position must have been successful in maintaining its prior factual position. To establish this element, the party asserting the defense must prove that the other party received some clear benefit or unfair advantage from maintaining its prior factual assertion in the same proceeding or a previous one.

Barringer v, Baptist Healthcare of Oklahoma, 2001 OK 29, at ¶ 19, 22 P.3d 695 (Okla. 2001) (internal citations omitted.) In this case, Lee is trying to claim a 20 percent interest in Raven. Lee’s efforts to recover in this case are absolutely inconsistent with his counsel’s statements in two different courts. In those courts, Lee represented he had lost the opportunity to acquire an interest in Raven and a feigned intent to continue to cooperate in efforts to recover assets for Raven’s benefit to redress his criminal actions. Lee adopted those positions knowingly in proceedings involving Raven and those positions were adopted by Lee to gamer benefits in both the civil and criminal proceedings. In the former, Lee’s position lulled Raven into not pursuing all claims it had against him; in the latter, it garnered Lee a much lighter sentence (up to three levels lower) and allowed him to escape entirely what could have been a $1,000,000 plus fine. Ex. 10, ¶ 9; Ex. 4, p. 11,11.5—7; p. 13, 11. 4-8; Ex. 5, p. 11,1.7; 18 U.S.C. § 1334 and 1957.

Defendants submit that barring Lee’s claims in this case is necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting him from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.


Lee’s claims are time-barred.

The Second Count of Lee’s Petition is denominated as being for “unjust enrichment.” Ordinarily, unjust enrichment claims are subject to the two-year limitations period of 12 OkIa, Stat. § 95(A)(3). 12 OkIa. Stat. § 95(A)(3); Paddyaker v. Gr(fflth, 2011 OK CIV APP 97, at ¶ 9, 260 P.3d 1276; see also City of Tulsa v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A., 2011 OK 83, at 9{ 20,.... P.3d —.

Lee has known since at least late September 2007, almost five years before this case was filed, that neither Defendant was recognizing his purported “option” to acquire a 20% interest in Raven. Lx. A to Lx, 7, fi 3, 5, and 6. If Lee had any rights under the “option,” he would have known no later than September 2007 when his counsel received a letter revoking the purported “option” that he had suffered an identifiable loss or injury. Thus, any cause of action he might have had for unjust enrichment would have accrued no later than September 2007. See also Lx. 5, p.5,11. 10-15; Lx. 11; Lx. 16, p.4,1.21 —p.5,1.7. which demonstrate that Lee’s counsel and Lee, himself, undeniably knew no later than 2008 that the “option” had been revoked. Since Lee did not file this suit until May 2012, his claims for unjust enrichment are time-haired by 12 Okla. Stat. § 95(A)(3). See City of Tulsa v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A,, 2011 OK 83, at TIE 21 and 22, — P.3d —. Therefore, this case should either be dismissed with prejudice or Defendants should be granted summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

There are a multitude of reasons this case should be dismissed with prejudice or summary judgment should be entered against Lee and in favor of Defendants. There is no reason this case should be allowed to continue and no reason Lee should be allowed to further victimize Raven and Stewart, Defendants, Raven Resources, L.L.C. and David Stewart pray the Court dismiss this case with prejudice or grant summary judgment in their favor, and that they have such other and further relief as is just and proper, including recovery of their costs and attorneys’ fees.


Outcome: Motion for summary judgment granted.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments:



Find a Lawyer

Subject:
City:
State:
 

Find a Case

Subject:
County:
State: