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Date: 06-28-2021
Case Style:
STATE OF LOUISIANA Vs. TERRY LEN JOSEPH
Case Number: KA -0020-0287
Judge: ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
Court: STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
Plaintiff's Attorney: Hon. M. Bofill Duhe
District Attorney, Sixteenth Judicial District
W. Claire Howington
Assistant District Attorney
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Lake Charles, LA - Criminal defense attorney represented Terry Len Joseph with vehicular homicide and possession of weapon by a convicted felon charges.
On the evening of January 1, 2011, the defendant, Terry Len Joseph, was
driving westbound on Louisiana Highway 96 in St. Martin Parish. His passenger
was the victim, Anessia Baldwin. He was driving at approximately eighty-six miles
per hour when he reached a curved area, exited the roadway into a ditch to his left,
struck a culvert, then three trees. The truck rotated so that when it finally came to a
stop, it was facing east. The pair was trapped in the vehicle. A paramedic who
arrived on the scene found that Miss Baldwin was dead. Emergency personnel
extricated the defendant from the truck and airlifted him to a hospital in Lafayette.
Testing revealed his blood-alcohol level to be 0.228.
On February 18, 2011, the state filed a bill of information charging the
defendant with vehicular homicide, a violation of La.R.S. 14:32.1, and possession
of weapon by a convicted felon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. The district court
held a number of pretrial hearings, including a motion to suppress hearing on
November 25, 2013. As will be discussed later, the court denied the motion.
The defendant was tried only on the vehicular homicide charge. The parties
began selecting a jury on March 6-7, 2018. The jury began hearing evidence on
March 8. On March 10, it found the defendant guilty as charged.
On June 14, 2018, the district court sentenced the defendant to twenty years
at hard labor, with ten years suspended and five years of supervised probation.
There were also several conditions of probation. The defendant filed a written
motion to reconsider sentence, which the district court denied on July 6, 2018.
The defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence, assigning three
errors. 2
ERRORS PATENT
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by
this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record,
we find two errors patent. Additionally, the court minutes of sentencing require
correction.
First, when imposing the defendant’s conditions of probation, the trial court
stated, “All of the usual conditions of probation will be met as well as the usual
conditions of parole.” Although the court did not impose any specific conditions
of parole, it imposed the “usual conditions.” The trial court lacks the authority to
impose conditions of parole. State v. Franco, 08-1071 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/09), 8
So.3d 790, writ denied, 09-1439 (La. 2/12/10), 27 So.3d 843; State v. Kotrla, 08-
364 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 1224. Accordingly, we amend the
defendant’s sentence by deleting the imposition of the “usual conditions of parole”
and instruct the trial court to make an entry in the court minutes reflecting this
amendment.
Next, the trial court imposed a $5,000.00 fine “to be paid during the period
of time that [the defendant] is on probation at a time that we will set at a later date
depending on his ability and a new hire.” The case must be remanded for the
establishment of a payment plan. In State v. Arisme, 13-269, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3
Cir. 10/9/13), 123 So.3d 1259, 1262, this court stated:
In State v. Wagner, 07-127, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996
So.2d 1203, 1208, this court held in pertinent part:
When the fines and costs are imposed as a
condition of probation, but the trial court is silent as to
the mode of payment or the trial court attempts to
establish a payment plan, this court has required a
specific payment plan be established. See State v.
Theriot, 04-897 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/9/05), 893 So.2d 1016
(fine, court costs, and cost of prosecution); State v.
Fuslier, 07-572 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 970 So.2d 83 3
(fine and costs); State v. Console, 07-1422 (La.App. 3
Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 875 (fine and court costs).
We view this procedure as no different from
payment plans for restitution. See State v. Dean, 99-475
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99), 748 So.2d 57, writ denied, 99-
3413 (La. 5/26/00), 762 So.2d 1101 (restitution only),
State v. Reynolds, 99-1847 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 772
So.2d 128 (restitution, fine, and costs), State v. Stevens,
06-818 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/07), 949 So.2d 597
(restitution, fine, court costs, and reimbursement to
Indigent Defender Board), and State v. Fontenot, 01-540
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/01), 799 So.2d 1255 (restitution,
court costs and payments to victim’s fund, Indigent
Defender Board, and District Attorney).
We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court
for establishment of a payment plan for the fine, noting
that the plan may either be determined by the trial court
or by Probation and Parole, with approval by the trial
court. See Stevens, 949 So.2d 597.
Similarly, the trial court’s ordering the payment to
the crime lab fund during the period of probation is an
insufficient payment plan. We also remand the case to
the trial court for establishment of a payment plan for
these costs, noting that the plan may either be determined
by the trial court or by Probation and Parole, with
approval by the trial court. See Stevens, 949 So.2d 597.
This issue has been similarly resolved in other cases. See State
v. LaCombe, 09-544 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 25 So.3d 1002, and
State v. Snelling, 09-1313 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 36 So.3d 1060, writ
denied, 10-1301 (La. 12/17/10), 51 So.3d 16. Accordingly, we remand
this case to the trial court for the establishment of a payment plan for
the fee, noting that the plan may either be determined by the trial court
or by the Department of Probation and Parole with approval by the
trial court. See Stevens, 949 So.2d 597.
Accordingly, while we affirm the conviction and sentence, we
remand to the trial court for the establishment of a payment plan for
the fine, court costs, and payment to the Public Defender’s Office
imposed as conditions of probation. The payment plan may either be
determined by the trial court or by the Office of Probation and Parole
with approval by the trial court.
Thus, the defendant’s case is remanded to the trial court to establish a
payment plan for the fine imposed as a condition of probation. The payment plan 4
may be determined by either the trial court or by the Office of Probation and Parole
with approval by the trial court.
Finally, the court minutes of sentencing state that the defendant is to make
“reasonable reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for damage or loss
caused by the offense in an amount to be determined by the court.” The sentencing
transcript does not indicate that the court imposed restitution. “[W]hen the minutes
and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La.9/21/01),
797 So.2d. 62. Accordingly, the trial court is ordered to amend the court minutes of
sentencing to delete this provision requiring the payment of restitution.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. The State failed to meet its burden of proof that Terry Len Joseph
was guilty of vehicular homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. A. The trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence in this
vehicular homicide case. The death of Terry Len Joseph’s friend in
the accident was a tragic, devastating loss for him, as well as the
victim’s family. A lengthy sentence serves no useful purpose under
these circumstances.
A twenty-year sentence subjects Terry Len Joseph, a dedicated father
and hard worker, to cruel, excessive and unusual punishment in
violation of the U.S. and Louisiana constitutions and statutory law.
B. The trial court failed to give sufficient weight to factors in
mitigation in particularizing the sentence to this offender, thus the
sentence violates the guidelines of La. C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1.
3. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the
statement of Terry Len Joseph which was not freely and voluntarily
given due to his medical condition and the circumstances at the time.
4. The maximum period of probation for an offender such as Terry
Len Joseph is three years, thus the trial court erred in imposing a
five-year period of probation.5
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction for vehicular homicide. He states, “The
issue was whether the accident was caused by inattention unrelated to the
consumption of alcohol.” The general analysis for insufficiency of the evidence
claims is well-established:
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100
S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King,
436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982);
State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact
finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility
determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations
under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino,
436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228
(La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however,
the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.
The elements of the crime are set forth in La.R.S. 14:32.1; at the time of the
crime, it stated in pertinent part:
A. Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human being caused
proximately or caused directly by an offender engaged in the operation
of, or in actual physical control of, any motor vehicle, aircraft,
watercraft, or other means of conveyance, whether or not the offender
had the intent to cause death or great bodily harm, whenever any of the
following conditions exists and such condition was a contributing
factor to the killing:
(1) The operator is under the influence of alcoholic beverages as
determined by chemical tests administered under the provisions of R.S.
32:662.
(2) The operator’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.08 percent or
more by weight based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic
centimeters of blood.6
(3) The operator is under the influence of any controlled
dangerous substance listed in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V as set forth in
R.S. 40:964.
(4) The operator is under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
(5)(a) The operator is under the influence of a combination of
alcohol and one or more drugs which are not controlled dangerous
substances and which are legally obtainable with or without a
prescription.
The defendant acknowledges that the evidence showed his blood-alcohol
level exceeded the legal limit and that he used “bad driving tactics,” but he argues
the state must show that his intoxication was “a contributing factor” regarding the
victim’s death. More specifically, he argues the record shows that he and the
victim were not fully dressed; thus, he suggests some sort of sexual activity may
have been taking place and this distracted him. Essentially, he is arguing the
evidence suggests sexual activity, rather than alcohol consumption, distracted him
and caused the accident, and thus there is reasonable doubt regarding his guilt.
He acknowledges that he was speeding and was inattentive. He argues it
would be appropriate for this court to vacate his conviction for vehicular homicide
and enter a conviction for the responsive verdict of negligent homicide.
The state notes the supreme court’s analysis from 2019:
The plain text of the statute now requires the state to prove four things:
1) the killing of a human being; 2) caused proximately or caused
directly by an offender engaged in the operation of, or in actual
physical control of, any motor vehicle; 3) a prohibited degree of
intoxication; and 4) a link between the intoxication and the killing.
Most importantly, the link between the intoxication and the
killing does not have to be a “proximate cause,” but simply a
“contributing factor.”
A “proximate cause” is one that directly produces an event and
without which the event would not have occurred. See Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). By contrast, a “contributing cause” is a
factor that - though not the primary cause - plays a part in producing a
result. See id. A “factor” is an agent or cause that contributes to a
particular result. See id.; see also “Factor,” American Heritage 7
Dictionary (5th ed. 2019) (“One that actively contributes to an
accomplishment, result, or process”). Therefore, the 2008 amendment
was a subtle but important change for vehicular homicide cases.
Nonetheless, we fully agree with the Court’s statement in
Taylor that “[t]he evident purpose of the vehicular homicide statute is
to curb traffic fatalities caused by the consumption of alcohol.”
Taylor, 463 So.2d at 1275. Thus, we find it is reasonable to hold
intoxicated drivers to a higher standard of care in order to discourage
that behavior and effectuate the legislative intent.
To further clarify, this interpretation of the statute in no way
absolves the state from its burden of proving every element of
vehicular homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. Just as with other
offenses, however, the exact nature of the proof the state is required to
submit will vary on a case-by-case basis. In some instances, the state
likely would have to introduce expert testimony concerning the
probable physiological effects of the intoxicant ingested by the
defendant, especially in a case involving a prohibited substance other
than alcohol. In other situations--perhaps where a defendant has an
exorbitant BAC, loses consciousness while driving, and causes an
accident as a result--proof of the BAC and associated acts would
almost certainly prove sufficient.
State v. Leger, 17-2084, pp. 10-11 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So.3d 609, 615-16 (footnote
omitted).
The state also cites a recent majority opinion by this court:
The fact of the presence of these drugs in the defendant’s blood
and urine does not allow the jury to assume the defendant was
impaired or that the presence of those substances was a contributing
factor in the accident. The jury can, however, consider the
surrounding circumstances, including the reckless manner in which
the vehicle was being operated, the speed at which the vehicle was
being operated, and the defendant’s inability to respond to a vehicle
slowing down in her lane. The jury knew the vehicle immediately
behind the defendant’s vehicle, which was admittedly operating over
the speed limit, was able to come to a complete stop to avoid the
accident. The jury heard eyewitness testimony as to how the accident
occurred. When viewing the evidence under the Jackson standard,
there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the
drugs impaired her ability to respond and was thus a contributing
factor in the accident which took Mr. Johnson’s life.
State v. Trahan, 19-873, p. 24-25 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/23/20), 304 So.3d 966, 978.
The jury could rationally conclude that the defendant’s intoxication was a
contributing factor in the accident. Although there was evidence that the victim 8
was partially undressed, the record does not support or establish that sexual activity
was taking place at the time of the accident. Any argument along this line is
merely speculative. The evidence established that the defendant was operating his
vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. His blood alcohol level
was 0.228, more than twice the legal limit. The evidence established the pain
medication administered at the hospital could not have altered or affected the blood
alcohol level. The evidence established that the defendant was driving at
approximately 86 mph–more than twice the suggested speed of 35 mph for the
curve he failed to negotiate–which resulted in the collision that killed the victim.
The state clearly presented sufficient evidence to the jury to support the finding
that the defendant’s judgment was impaired by alcohol at the time of the wreck
which caused him to drive at an excessive speed and to lose control of the vehicle,
resulting in the deadly crash. This assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In his second argument in brief, the defendant argues the district court erred
by denying his motion to suppress a statement he made after the accident while he
was in the hospital. He claims his statement was not free and voluntary, as he was
on medication at the time the state troopers spoke with him. The defendant
acknowledges that a district court’s ruling on the voluntariness of a confession will
not be reversed unless said ruling lacks evidentiary support. State v. Jackson, 381
So.2d 485 (La.1980). Citing State v. Williams, 46,842 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/14/12), 87
So.3d 949, the state contends that such rulings will be reversed only when the
district court has committed manifest error.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:451 provides: “Before what purports to be a
confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it
was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, 9
intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.” See also State v. Hunt,
09-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746. The defendant contends he had some degree
of head trauma from the accident and had morphine in his system due to the
medical treatment he was receiving.
Intoxication will not necessarily prevent a statement from being voluntary. It
must be to such a degree that it negates a defendant’s comprehension; the
determination of this question is a matter for the district court. On review, a district
court’s determination will be reversed only when the evidence does not support it.
State v. Stevenson, 05-52 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/28/05), 908 So.2d 48, writ denied, 05-
2592 (La. 6/2/06), 929 So.2d 1247.
At a motion to suppress hearing held on November 25, 2013, the parties
dealt with statements made to state troopers on January 2, 2011, from his hospital
bed after the accident. Trooper Trent Hanks testified that when he met with the
defendant in the hospital, the defendant appeared to be conscious and alert.
Likewise, Trooper Arnie Hanks testified that the defendant was alert and agreed to
speak after being Mirandized. Trooper Sergeant Bo Comeaux also testified that the
defendant was alert and aware of his surroundings when he met with him at the
hospital.
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court noted that medical records
indicated that the defendant had received morphine, but there was no testimony
regarding its effects. The trial court ruled that the testimony of the troopers formed
a basis to find that the defendant’s statement was free and voluntary. We find no
error in the trial court’s ruling.10
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
In the third assignment of error, the defendant contends that his twenty-year
sentence, with ten years suspended and five years of supervised probation, is
excessive. The 2011 version on La.R.S. 14:32.1 set forth a sentencing range of
five to thirty years; thus, the unsuspended portion of the defendant’s sentence is in
the lower third of the potential range.
The defendant sets forth an incorrect sentencing test. He contends that the
record must show first that the district court considered the sentencing factors set
forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1; next, the sentence must not be constitutionally
excessive. The defendant cites State v. Smith, 93-402 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 237.
Smith does not call for such a test. Further, the Smith case discussed the Louisiana
Sentencing Guidelines that were repealed in 1995.
The state correctly cites this court’s opinion in State v. Decuir, 10-1112
(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 61 So.3d 782, noting there is no requirement for the
district court to itemize the sentencing factors of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, as
long as the record shows that the court considered such factors in particularizing
the sentence. As the state also points out, the district court discussed the
defendant’s personal and family situations in some detail. After acknowledging
that the district court stated it was not penalizing him for the delay in the
proceedings, the defendant argues that the court did actually so. The court merely
discussed the situation of the victim’s family as a contrast to pleas for leniency
from the defendant’s family, which raised various emotional and financial
considerations. The core of the argument for a lenient sentence was the difficulties
the defendant’s incarceration will cause for his family members. The court simply
pointed out that the victim’s family also must face emotional pain, as their family
member is dead. 11
The analysis for excessive-sentence claims is established:
Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be
reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367
So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-
838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the
review of excessive sentence claims, stating:
La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or
that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more
than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d
124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00), 765 So.2d 1067.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its
broad sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539
(1996).
Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate
court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d
57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-
433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562
(La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:
While a comparison of sentences imposed for
similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well
settled that sentences must be individualized to the
particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1
Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the
trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial
judge “remains in the best position to assess the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by
each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674
So.2d 957, 958[, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct.
615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996) ].12
State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002,
1005-06, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261 (first alteration in
original).
The nature of the crime is obviously serious — it is a form of homicide.
However, it is a homicide that is not based on an intentional killing. As for the
nature of the offender, the district court observed that the defendant had a prior
felony conviction for aggravated criminal damage to property that was “pled
down” from attempted murder. The defendant received a ten-year sentence with all
but two years suspended. The court also noted that the defendant successfully
completed his probation for the charge. Further the defendant pled to a
misdemeanor domestic violence charge in 2010 and at the time of sentencing had
other matters pending that were related to domestic violence or other “crimes
against a person.” The court noted that the defendant was a thirty-four-year-old
man, and the victim was seventeen.
Comparing this sentence to sentences in other cases for the same offense, we
note that in State v. Heins, 51,763 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 245 So.3d 1165, the
second circuit upheld a twenty-five-year sentence for a defendant who was seeking
substance abuse treatment (she was on her way to a rehabilitation center at the time
of the accident) but had a long history of substance abuse; in State v. Gordon, 17-
846 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/28/18), 240 So.3d 301, this court upheld three consecutive
eighteen-year sentences for a defendant who killed three members of the same
family—the court noted that he had no criminal history but had killed almost an
entire family. These sentences show that the current sentence does not fall outside
the norms of Louisiana jurisprudence, especially considering that the district court
suspended half of the term. 13
Having considered the nature of the offense and the offender and the
prevailing sentencing norms revealed by reference to other cases, we find that the
sentence is not excessive.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR
In the fourth error he assigns, the defendant argues that the five-year period
of probation he received is statutorily improper. Louisiana Code Criminal
Procedure Article 893, as it existed in 2011, allowed for up to five years of
probation. After the defendant committed the offense for which he was convicted,
the legislature amended La.Code Crim.P. art. 893 in 2017, changing the
probationary period from one to five years to not more than three years. As a
general rule, the jurisprudence has held since at least 1944 that “the law in effect at
the time of the commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty which the
convicted accused must suffer.” State v. Gros, 205 La. 935, 938, 18 So.2d 507,
507 (1944). In State v. Sugasti, 01-3407 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518, the supreme
court held that a statutory amendment permitting a probated sentence for a
conviction of possession of heroin was not retroactive when a defendant committed
the offense prior to the effective date of the amendment. The law in effect at the
time of the commission of the offense determines the penalty. Id. The length of
time an individual is subjected to oversight by the state is a part of the penalty. Id.
The legislature has repeatedly amended La.Code Crim.P. art. 893 and given such
amendments retroactive effect (See La.Acts 2008, No. 104; La.Acts 1996). The
legislature made no such determination in La.Acts 2017, No.280, which changed
the term of probation in La.Code Crim.P. art. 893. We find no error in the trial
court’s determination that a five-year period of probation is legal since that is what
the law provided at the time the offense was committed. Therefore, the assignment
lacks merit.
Outcome: The defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. The defendant’s
sentence is amended by deleting the imposition of the “usual conditions of parole”
and the trial court is hereby instructed to make an entry in the court minutes
reflecting this amendment. Additionally, the defendant’s case is remanded to the
trial court for the establishment of a payment plan for the fine with the plan to be
determined by either the trial court or by the Office of Probation and Parole with
approval by the trial court. Finally, the trial court is ordered to amend the court
minutes of sentencing to delete the provision requiring the payment of restitution.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: