Date: 07-17-2017

Case Style: Michael Segaline v. State of Washington

Case Number: 76010-6

Judge: Ann Schindler

Court: Washington Court of Appeals, Division III on appeal from the Superior Court, Thurston County

Plaintiff's Attorney: Jean Schiedler-Brown

Defendant's Attorney: Patricia D. Todd

Description: The doctrine of qualified immunity shields a government official
from civil liability and money damages unless the plaintiff shows violation of a
constitutional right that is clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. The
Washington State Department of Labor and Industries and Regional Safety and Health
Coordinator William Alan Croft appeal the jury verdict in favor of Michael Segaline on
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft.1 The Department of Labor and Industries and
Croft contend the court erred by denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law on
qualified immunity and instructing the jury to decide the legal question of due process.
Because Segaline did not show that Croft violated a clearly established right when he
This is the third appeal in this case. See Seqaline v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.,144 Wn. App. 312,
182 P.3d 480 (2008); Seqaline v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.,169 Wn.2d 467, 238 P.3d 1107 (2010);
Seqaline v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.,176 Wn. App. 1012, 2013 WL 6843617, at *1(2013).
No. 76010-6-1/2
issued a trespass notice in 2003, the court erred in denying judgment as a matter of law
on qualified immunity and dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. We reverse the jury
verdict on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and remand to vacate the judgment and award of
attorney fees.
FACTS
The Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (L&1) is responsible
for issuing permits for electrical work. In 2003, William Alan Croft worked as the L&I
Regional Safety and Health Coordinator for the East Wenatchee office. The L&I
Regional Safety and Health Coordinator is responsible for "safety, health, security,
ergonomics, [and] emergency management."
Michael Segaline is a licensed electrician and the owner of an electrical
contracting company located in East Wenatchee, Horizon Electric Inc. Segaline
routinely obtained electrical permits at the L&I East Wenatchee office.
In June 2003, L&I Field Service Coordinator Jeanne Guthrie and L&I Customer
Service Representative Jacqueline Sanchez filed "Safety & Health Security Incident
Reports" about Segaline's threatening and harassing behavior.
Guthrie filed an incident report about Segaline's behavior on June 9. Guthrie
said Segaline called her on June 9 about a "bogus" contractor deposit account.
According to Guthrie, Segaline threatened to "bring a tape recorder in and start legal
proceedings" and said a "lot of people would be behind bars." Guthrie describes the
statements Segaline made as a "[t]hreat."
Sanchez filed an incident report about Segaline's behavior on June 13. Sanchez
said Segaline wanted to pay for an electrical permit. When she told Segaline the permit
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No. 76010-6-1/3
"had already been paid," Segaline told her that was "not `his problem, it was L&I's
problem,' "and L&I "could not refuse to take his money because it was in the RCW's."
Sanchez states Segaline was "very mean and demeaning" and appeared "very
frustrated and very red in the face and just very, very upset with me." Sanchez states
she is "afraid to help him at the counter as to what he might do or say to me." Sanchez
describes Segaline's behavior as "[Narassment."
Guthrie also filed an incident report about Segaline's behavior on June 13. When
Segaline attempted to pay for an electrical permit, Guthrie said she "could not take more
money" because he had already paid. Segaline told Guthrie she "could not refuse to
take the money." According to Guthrie, Segaline accused her of "not following the
RCWs" and said he "would file a tort claim." Guthrie describes Segaline's behavior as
"[Narassment."
According to L&I employee Alice Hawkins, on June 9 and June 13, Segaline was
"quite threatening in his verbal language, very aggressive and threatening and
intimidating, red faced." Hawkins said Segaline "yell[ed]" and told her "one of us is
going to go to jail, that! better get an attorney."
On June 19, L&I Electrical Program Supervisor David Whittle and Croft met with
Segaline about the reported incidents. Segaline abruptly left the meeting and
demanded to speak to Guthrie. Croft called the police and told Segaline to leave the
office. Croft said Segaline appeared "like a balloon that was waiting to pop" with "a real
rage going on underneath." Segaline left when the police arrived. One of the police
officers suggested Croft draft a trespass notice for the police to "enforce in the future."
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No. 76010-6-1/4
Croft had never issued a trespass notice before and was uncertain whether he
could do so for a state agency office. The "primary" reason Croft wanted to issue a
trespass notice was to protect "the safety of our staff." Croft contacted the Wenatchee
Police Department Crime Prevention Unit and the Washington State Patrol trooper
assigned to assist L&I with workplace violence about the procedure for issuing a
trespass notice. Croft also asked the trooper to obtain an opinion from the Washington
State Attorney General's Office. In addition, Croft reviewed the Revised Code of
Washington provisions on trespass and the "workplace violence policy."
Croft drafted a "Trespass Notice." The Notice states Segaline engaged in
"disruptive behavior" and "harassment of staff" and he is not "permitted, invited, licensed
or otherwise privileged to enter or remain at the [East Wenatchee office]." The Notice
states Segaline can "have this notice terminated" by obtaining the written approval of
Whittle. The Trespass Notice provides, in pertinent part:
TRESPASS NOTICE
Date and Time Issued: 6/30/03 9:30 AM
Trespassed Subject: Michael J. Segaline Date of Birth: 10/20/1956
Trespassed for: disruptive behavior, harassment of staff and failure to
follow instructions for contacting the department.
The above individual has been trespassed from the Department of Labor
and Industries, 519 Grant Road, East Wenatchee, WA 98802.
Failure to comply with this notice may result in prosecution for trespass.
The trespass notice was read by or to, and/or a copy of the notice
provided to the above individual. The above individual is no longer
permitted, invited, licensed or otherwise privileged to enter or remain at
the Department of Labor and Industries above location.
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No. 76010-6-1/5
To have this notice terminated, the subject must secure the written
approval of David Whittle, Electrical Supervisor, prior to re-entry of the
East Wenatchee Department of Labor and Industries service location.
This trespass notice remains in effect until this approval is obtained.
Hawkins handed Segaline the Trespass Notice on June 30. When Segaline
refused to accept the Notice, an L&1 employee called the police. After a police officer
handed Segaline a copy of the Trespass Notice, Segaline left the L&I office.
On August 20, Segaline called Guthrie and "yelled" at her about an "emergency
permit." The next day, Segaline went to the office and an L&I employee handed him the
permit. When Segaline went to the office again on August 22, an L&1 employee called
the police. The police arrested Segaline. The city of Wenatchee (City) charged
Segaline with criminal trespass. The City later dismissed the criminal trespass charge.
On August 8, 2005, Segaline filed a lawsuit against the Washington State
Department of Labor and Industries (Department). The lawsuit alleged (1) negligent
infliction of emotional distress, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3)
malicious prosecution, (4) negligent supervision, and (5) violation of his civil rights.
A year later on August 3, 2006, Segaline filed a motion to amend the complaint to
name Croft as a defendant and assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft alleging
violation of his liberty interest to be present in a public place without due process. The
court granted the motion to amend.
The Department filed a motion for summary judgment dismissal of the 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim against Croft. The court ruled the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was barred by
the three-year statute of limitations. The court also ruled, "Croft is entitled to summary
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No. 76010-6-1/6
judgment in that he did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights, and Croft is entitled to
qualified immunity from suit."
The Department filed a motion for summary judgment dismissal of the claims
alleging intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision,
and malicious prosecution. The trial court ruled the Department was immune from suit
under a statute that protects a person from liability for communicating a complaint to a
government agency, RCW 4.24.510. We affirmed dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim against Croft and the claims against the Department. Segaline v. Dep't of Labor &
Indus.,144 Wn. App. 312, 317, 182 P.3d 480 (2008): The Washington Supreme Court
granted review. Segaline v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.,165 Wn.2d 1044, 205 P.3d 132
(2009).
The Supreme Court held that because RCW 4.24.510 did not apply to a
government agency, the Department was not immune from suit. The court reversed
summary judgment dismissal of the claims against the Department alleging intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and malicious prosecution.
Segaline v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.,169 Wn.2d 467, 479, 238 P.3d 1107 (2010).2 The
court affirmed dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft as barred by the
statute of limitations. Segaline,169 Wn.2d at 479. In a footnote, the court declined to
address for the first time on appeal Segaline's argument that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
was "timely under the continuing violation doctrine." Segaline,169 Wn.2d at 476 n.8.
On remand, Segaline argued the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft was not
barred by the statute of limitations on a continuing violation theory. In a letter ruling, the
2 Segaline did not seek review of dismissal of his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.
Segaline,169 Wn.2d at 472 n.2.
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No. 76010-6-1/7
trial court states the Supreme Court decision affirming dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim against Croft as untimely is "the law of this case." The court states it is "too late to
now raise the continuing violation theory." The court entered an order denying the
statute of limitations motion on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft.
The Department filed a motion for summary judgment dismissal of the claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and malicious
prosecution. In response, Segaline conceded there was no evidence to support the
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the motion. The
court entered an order dismissing the lawsuit against the Department and Croft.
Segaline appealed. We affirmed dismissal of the negligent supervision claim but
concluded material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the malicious
prosecution claim. Segaline v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.,176 Wn. App. 1012, 2013 WL
6843617, at *7 (2013). We held the law of the case doctrine did not preclude the trial
court from considering the continuing violation theory. Segaline,2013 WL 6843617, at
*9. We remanded to the trial court to exercise its discretion and decide whether to allow
Segaline to raise the continuing violation theory. Segaline,2013 WL 6843617, at *9.
On remand, the case was assigned to a different judge. Segaline filed a motion
arguing the evidence showed the claim against Croft under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was a
continuing violation that was not barred by the statute of limitations. Segaline also
argued there were material issue of fact about whether Croft was entitled to qualified
immunity. Specifically, whether Croft "knew that the `no trespass' notice might violate
Mr. Segaline's rights." The Department argued there was no evidence of a continuing
violation and the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft was barred by the statute of
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No. 76010-6-1/8
limitations. The Department also argued that as a matter of law Croft was entitled to
qualified immunity.
The court ruled there were material issues of fact as to whether the continuing
violation theory applied and whether Croft was entitled to qualified immunity. The order
states, in pertinent part:
The court rules that there is a genuine issue of material fact that the
continuing violation theory applies and the 42 USC 1983 action against
Alan Croft will be allowed to be presented at trial and argued to have been
timely filed. The court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact
whether Alan Croft is entitled to qualified immunity.
The Department filed a motion for reconsideration. The Department asserted
that because Segaline did not carry his burden of presenting "case law that existed at
the time when the no trespass notice was issued that would have informed Mr. Croft
that his issuance of the no trespass order was a clear violation of due process," Croft
was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The court denied the motion. The
case proceeded to trial on the malicious prosecution claim against the Department and
the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Department filed a CR 50 motion to
dismiss the malicious prosecution claim and the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft.
The Department argued the evidence established probable cause to arrest Segaline for
violating the Trespass Notice.
[T]here was an abundance of probable cause in [the arresting officer]'s
testimony as he indicated the dangerousness, L &I employees appearing
afraid, L &I employees hiding behind walls as if Mr. Segaline would shoot
them, the irrational demands of talking to the Attorney General of the State
of Washington or he would return.
. . . There has been no evidence of malice as legally required to
show ill will, hostility, improper motives, or to gain private advantage.
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No. 76010-6-1/9
The Department asserted that because Segaline did not present evidence or
case law to show the decision Croft made in 2003 to issue the Trespass Notice violated
a clearly established constitutional right, Croft was entitled to qualified immunity and
dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim as a matter of law.
In addition, plaintiff has not fulfilled the burden to establish what
rights Mr. Croft knew he was clearly violating in regards to issuing that
trespass notice. There's also been no case law that this Court has that
establishes the issuing of a trespass notice was a clear violation of any
rights. We know that Mr. Croft consulted law enforcement on at least two
different times, retail security, the Assistant Attorney General. He
reviewed the law, he reviewed Labor & Industries' policies, he acted as a
reasonable official in his position as a safety and health coordinator. He is
entitled to qualified immunity, and if the Court found that, there would be
no civil rights claims remaining.
The court denied the CR 50 motion to dismiss but reserved ruling on the 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The court ruled, in pertinent part:
Now, as to the motion to dismiss the [42 U.S.C. § 1983] action, I
am denying that motion as well. I am not today telling you, at least at this
time, what matters are going to be allowed to be submitted [to] the jury as
far as claims of how the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated;
however, in terms of deciding whether there is a sufficient basis to allow
this matter to go forward, construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, I'm determining that there is, and so I'm denying
the motions at this time. Although as I said, we've got lots of decisions to
make and lots of argument that's going to go forward. I'll be ruling on
those at some later time.
The court later ruled Segaline did not meet his burden of showing Croft violated a
clearly established right in 2003 when he issued the Trespass Notice. The court ruled
the jury would not consider whether the Trespass Notice violated clearly established
law. But instead of dismissing the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft as barred by
qualified immunity, the court ruled the jury would decide whether the Trespass Notice
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No. 76010-6-1/10
violated due process. The court ruled, in pertinent part:
1 am going to rule and find that the trespass notice was not in 2003 an
established legal procedure. There was not an established legal
procedure. There was — there has already been testimony that there was
discussion about what can or can't be done, what should or should not be
done, and there's been argument by the plaintiff that it's clear now, based
on the Green case, 201 that there were mistakes made.
In ruling that I believe that was an ongoing issue that was not
resolved in 2003. I intend to instruct the jury in some way, shape or form
that the legal requirements of the trespass notice is not an issue for the
jury to consider. There may be some argument about the procedure of
giving the notice or telling Mr. Segaline that he could not come to the
office of Labor & Industries in East Wenatchee. I'll address that more in a
moment. But I am not going to instruct as to an alleged violation of [42
U.S.C. § 1983] that the trespass notice was legally ineffective.
Having said that, however, I believe that there still is a [42 U.S.C. §
1983] claim that I'm going to allow to go forward, and that is, and I hesitate
to say that I've got all this absolutely worked out in my own mind, but I'll
just tell you in general terms how I see that. It's a due process claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment[4]. . . that the decision to tell him that he
could not come there did not allow him appropriate remedial — I don't
want to use the term appeal, but an appropriate redress to address that.
The court instructed the jury that Segaline claimed that "by directing him not to
come to the L&I office, Alan Croft deprived Michael Segaline of rights without due
process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."
The court instructed the jury that it could consider the timing of the Trespass
Notice but could not "consider issues as to the legalities or form of the notice." The
court instructed the jury that to prevail on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, Segaline must
show that from June 2003 through October 2003, Croft deprived him of his liberty
3State v. Green,157 Wn. App. 833, 239 P.3d 1130 (2010).
4 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
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No. 76010-6-1/11
interest without due process.5 Over the objection of the Department, the court
instructed the jury on the legal factors to consider in deciding whether Croft violated due
process.
The court instructed the jury that to prevail on the malicious prosecution claim,
Segaline must prove there was no probable cause to charge him with criminal trespass
and malice.6
By special verdict, the jury found in favor of the Department on the malicious
prosecution claim. The jury found in favor of Segaline on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
The jury found Croft "violate[d] Michael Segaline's Fourteenth Amendment Right to
enter a public office." The jury awarded Segaline $203,000 in economic damages and
$750,000 in noneconomic damages.
The Department filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Department
argued that because the court ruled Segaline did not meet his burden to show Croft
violated a clearly established right, as a matter of law Croft was entitled to qualified
5 Jury instruction 12 states, in pertinent part:
To prevail on his [42 U.S.C. § 1983] claim Michael Segaline must prove each of
the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
That Alan Croft subjected, or caused Michael Segaline to be subjected, to
deprivation, of his liberty interest to enter the East Wenatchee Department of Labor and
Industries by keeping him out of the East Wenatchee Department of Labor and Industries
from approximately June through October, 2003;
That Alan Croft was acting under color of law; You are instructed that the parties
agree that Alan Croft was acting under color of law;
That Alan Croft acted intentionally; and
That Alan Croft did not provide Michael Segaline with due process prior to
depriving him of his interest.
6 Jury instruction 15 states, in pertinent part:
There was no probable cause for the institution or continuation of the
prosecution;
The proceedings were brought or continued through malice; and
Mr. Segaline suffered injury or damage as a result of the prosecution.
The court instructed the jury that "probable cause" means "facts and circumstances known to an
employee or officer that are sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious person to believe that an offense
has been or is being committed?
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No. 76010-6-1/12
immunity and dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
Here, the Court ruled before the conclusion of the trial that Alan
Croft was entitled to qualified immunity as to the contents of the trespass
notice. However, there is no case that supports the application of qualified
immunity in this fashion. The government official either has qualified
immunity as to a stated act or not. The contents of the trespass notice
cannot be separated from its issuance or timing. If Alan Croft has
qualified immunity as to the trespass notice he is entitled to qualified
immunity for the actions that flowed from it. . . . Absent a clearly
established right, Mr. Croft is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of
law. . . .
. . . Mr. Segaline has not and cannot come forward with any facts or
case law that satisfies the shifting burden to establish the law was clearly
established in June of 2003 determining what process was due. There
simply was no law that Alan Croft knew or should have known that would
prohibit his attempt to protect his employees. Alan Croft is entitled to
qualified immunity and the jury's verdict should be vacated.
The court denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law.
ANALYSIS
The Department and Croft (collectively, the Department) appeal the verdict in
favor of Segaline on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The Department contends the court
erred by denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law and dismissal of the 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim and by instructing the jury on due process. The Department
asserts Croft was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because Segaline did
not meet his burden to show that Croft violated a clearly established right when he
issued the Trespass Notice in 2003 in response to arguably threatening and harassing
behavior. We agree.
We review a trial court decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law de
novo. Paetsch v. Spokane Dermatology Clinic, PS,182 Wn.2d 842, 848, 348 P.3d 389
(2015); Aleiandre v. Bull,159 Wn.2d 674, 681, 153 P.3d 864 (2007). To grant judgment
as a matter of law, the court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor
12
No. 76010-6-1/13
of the nonmoving party and conclude as a matter of law that " 'there is no substantial
evidence or reasonable inferences to sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party.'"
Paetsch,182 Wn.2d at 848 (quoting Indus. lndem. Co. of the Nw. v. Kalleviq, 114
Wn.2d 907, 915-16, 792 P.2d 520 (1990)).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against an individual who, acting
under color of state law, deprives a person of a federally protected constitutional or
statutory right.7 Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n,496 U.S. 498, 508, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 110 L.
Ed. 2d 455 (1990); Gonzaqa Univ. v. Doe,536 U.S. 273, 284, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 153 L.
Ed. 2d 309 (2002); Durland v. San Juan County,182 Wn.2d 55, 70, 340 P.3d 191
(2014).
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability
and money damages so long as " 'their conduct does not violate clearly established . . .
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v.
Callahan,555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow
v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)); Hernandez
v. Mesa, No. 15-118, 2017 WL 272240917, at *4 (U.S. S. Ct. June 26, 2017) (per
curiam). Qualified immunity balances the need to hold a government official
accountable and the need to shield an official from liability when performing duties
reasonably. Pearson,555 U.S. at 231.
742 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
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No. 76010-6-1/14
Qualified immunity is " 'immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability.'" Pearson,555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth,472 U.S. 511, 526, 105
S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411(1985)); White v. Pauly, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 548,
551-52, 196 L. Ed. 2d 463 (2017) (per curiam). Therefore, the United States Supreme
Court has " 'repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at
the earliest possible stage in litigation.'" Pearson,555 U.S. at 232 (quoting Hunter v.
Bryant,502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S. Ct. 534, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1991) (per curiam)).
Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability unless the plaintiff
shows (1) the official violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was " 'clearly
established' "at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,563 U.S. 731,
735, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011) (quoting Harlow,457 U.S. at 818);
Gallegos v. Freeman,172 Wn. App. 616, 631, 291 P.3d 265 (2013). The doctrine of
qualified immunity applies regardless of whether a government official's error is" 'a
mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and
fact.'" Pearson,555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez,540 U.S. 551, 567, 124 S.
Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004)).
Segaline alleged that by issuing the Trespass Notice, Croft violated his liberty
interest to be present in a public place without due process. Federal courts recognize a
protected liberty interest to enter and remain in a public place. See Vincent v. City of
Sulphur,805 F.3d 543, 548 (5th Cir. 2015) ("there is a general right to go to or remain
on public property for lawful purposes"); Kennedy v. City Of Cincinnati,595 F.3d 327,
336 (6th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff had a liberty interest to remain in a public place); Vasquez
v. Rackauckas,734 F.3d 1025, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2013) (there is a liberty interest in "use
14
No. 76010-6-1/15
of public places").8
Construing the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of Segaline, the
facts show he had a liberty interest to enter and remain in the L&I East Wenatchee
office. But deprivation of a liberty interest is not unconstitutional unless it occurred
without due process. Zinermon v. Burch,494 U.S. 113, 125-26, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L.
Ed. 2d 100 (1990). Procedural due process prohibits the state from infringing on an
individual's protected liberty interests without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Mathews v. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319, 332-33, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976);
Fuentes v. Shevin,407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972).
In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a
constitutionally protected interest in "life, liberty, or property" is not in itself
unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an
interest without due process of law.
Zinermon,494 U.S. at 1258(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
"Whether an asserted federal right was clearly established at a particular time" is
a question of law we review de novo. Elder v. Holloway,510 U.S. 510, 516, 114 S. Ct.
1019, 127 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1994).
The dispositive question is whether issuing the Trespass Notice in 2003 violated
a clearly established right to due process. The qualified immunity analysis "is limited to
'the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers' at the time they engaged in the
conduct in question." Hernandez,2017 WL 272240917, at *4 (quoting White,137 S. Ct.
at 550). "Facts an officer learns after the incident ends—whether those facts would
support granting immunity or denying it—are not relevant." Hernandez,2017 WL
8We note the liberty interest to be in a public place is not unfettered. See Reza v. Pearce,806
F.3d 497, 505-06 (9th Cir. 2015) (government official may remove an individual from a limited public
forum if the individual is disruptive).
9 Emphasis in original.
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No. 76010-6-1/16
272240917, at *4. "A clearly established right is one that is 'sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'"
Mullenix v. Luna, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2015) (quoting
Reichle v. Howards,566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 182 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2012)).
A government official's conduct violates a clearly established right only when, at
the time of the challenged conduct, "'[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear'"
that every " 'reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates
that right.'" Ashcroft,563 U.S. at 7411° (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,483 U.S. 635,
640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)). There must be either " 'controlling
authority' "or a "robust 'consensus of cases of persuasive authority.'" Ashcroft,563
U.S at 741-42 (quoting Wilson v. Layne,526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S. Ct 1692, 143 L. Ed.
2d 818 (1999)). "[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate." Ashcroft,563 U.S. at 741.
The Supreme Court has " 'repeatedly told courts. . . not to define clearly
established law at a high level of generality.'" Mullenix,136 S. Ct. at 30811 (quoting
Ashcroft,563 U.S. at 742); White,137 S. Ct. at 552. The inquiry " 'must be undertaken
in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.'"
Mullenix,136 S. Ct. at 30812(quoting Brosseau v. Haugen,543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.
Ct. 596, 160 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2004)). The question is "'whether the violative nature of
particular conduct is clearly established.'" Mullenix,136 S. Ct. at 30813(quoting
Ashcroft,563 U.S. at 742); White, 137 S. Ct. at 552; see Brosseau,543 U.S. at 198-99.
10 Alterations in original.
11 Alteration in original.
12 Internal quotation marks omitted.
13 Emphasis in original.
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In Anderson,the Supreme Court cites the right to due process as an example of
a right that is at too high of a level of generality to meet the test of a clearly established
right. Anderson,483 U.S. at 639.
[T]he right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due
Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that
violates that Clause. . . violates a clearly established right. . . . But if the
test of "clearly established law" were to be applied at this level of
generality, it would bear no relationship to the "objective legal
reasonableness" that is the touchstone of [qualified immunity].
Anderson,483 U.S. at 639 (quoting Harlow,457 U.S. at 818-19). Because procedural
due process analysis requires balancing a number of legal factors, "the law regarding
procedural due process claims 'can rarely be considered "clearly established" at least in
the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.'" Brewster v. Bd. of
Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist.,149 F.3d 971, 983 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Baker
v. Racanskv,887 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir.1989)); see also Shinault v. Hawks,782 F.3d
1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015) (same).
The cases cited by Segaline do not establish the level of specificity needed to
place "beyond debate" the proposition that the decision in 2003 to issue the Trespass
Notice violated the right to due process. Ashcroft,563 U.S. at 741. Segaline cites a
number of cases for the proposition that there is a liberty interest to remain in a public
place. Those cases do not address whether a government official violates an
individual's right to due process by issuing a trespass notice in response to arguably
threatening and harassing behavior.
Segaline relies heavily on a 1996 federal district court case, Wayfield v. Town of
Tisbury,925 F. Supp. 880 (D. Mass. 1996), to argue he met his burden to show a
clearly established right to due process. In Wayfield,the plaintiff argued on summary
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judgment that the decision to suspend his library privileges without a hearing violated
due process. Wayfield,925 F. Supp. at 881. The court concluded that under Mathews,
the library "did not afford [the plaintiff] adequate due process." Wayfield,925 F. Supp.
at 888-89 (citing Mathews,424 U.S. at 321). The district court decision does not
establish Croft violated a clearly established right. Wayfield,925 F. Supp. at 889. The
decision of a district court "is not 'controlling authority' in any jurisdiction, much less in
the entire United States," and "falls far short of. . . a robust 'consensus of cases of
persuasive authority.'" Ashcroft,563 U.S. at 741-42 (quoting Wilson,526 U.S. at 617).
Segaline also cites a number of federal and state cases, including State v.
Green,157 Wn. App. 833, 239 P.3d 1130 (2010), that were decided after 200314 to
argue Croft violated a clearly established constitutional right. But as previously noted,
the court does not "consider later decided cases" in determining whether a right was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Plumhoff v. Rickard, U.S.
, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1056 (2014); Brosseau,543 U.S. at 200 n.4
(cases postdating the conduct in question are "of no use in the clearly established
inquiry"); Gallegos,172 Wn. App. at 634 n.12.
We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that Segaline did not establish that
Croft violated a clearly established constitutional right to due process when he issued
the Trespass Notice in 2003. The court ruled neither the facts nor Green showed a
clearly established right to due process.
Segaline concedes Green was decided in 2010 but argues the cases cited in
Green that were decided before 2003 show a clearly established right to notice and an
14 See, e.o., Kennedy,595 F.3d at 337-38; Hunger v. Univ. of Haw.,927 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1016
(D. Haw. 2013); Anthony v. State,209 S.W.3d 296, 307-08 (Tex. App. 2006).
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opportunity to be heard before issuing a trespass notice. The cases cited in Green do
not support his argument.
In Green,a school district issued a no-trespass notice based on the disruptive
behavior of the mother of a student. Green,157 Wn. App. at 838. The notice prohibited
the mother from going to her child's elementary school except in limited circumstances.
Green,157 Wn. App. at 838-39. The State charged the mother with criminal trespass.
Green,157 Wn. App. at 841. At trial, an attorney for the school district testified about
the reasons for issuing the trespass notice but admitted he had no personal knowledge
of the underlying events. Green,157 Wn. App. at 852. We reversed the conviction.
We concluded the testimony did not establish a factual basis to revoke the mother's
statutory right to access to the schoo1.15 Green,157 Wn. App. at 852-53. We held that
"absent a determination based on competent evidence that the restrictions were lawfully
imposed and absent minimal notice of due process rights," the State did not prove
criminal trespass. Green,157 Wn. App. at 852 (citing State v. R.H.,86 Wn. App. 807,
813, 939 P.2d 217 (1997)).
The court in Green cited Mathews and Nguyen v. Department of Health, Medical
Quality Assurance Commission,144 Wn.2d 516, 29 P.3d 689 (2001), for general due
process principles. Green,157 Wn. App. at 847. Green states Mathews uses a
balancing test "to determine whether additional procedures are required to meet
procedural due process requirements." Green,157 Wn. App. at 847. Green cites
15RCW 28A.605.020 states:
Every school district board of directors shall, after following established procedure, adopt
a policy assuring parents access to their child's classroom and/or school sponsored
activities for purposes of observing class procedure, teaching material, and class
conduct: PROVIDED, That such observation shall not disrupt the classroom procedure
or learning activity.
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Nguyen for the proposition that "[p]rocedural due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the government can take a person's liberty or property
interests." Green,157 Wn. App. at 847. The other case cited in Green, R.H., is also
unpersuasive and distinguishable.
In R.H., a restaurant manager told several youths who were skateboarding and
loitering in the restaurant parking lot to leave, but they did not comply. R.H., 86 Wn.
App. 808. R.H. was not part of the group. R.H. arrived at the restaurant later to wait for
a friend and eat at the restaurant. R.H., 86 Wn. App. 808-09. At the manager's
request, a police officer told all of the youths, including R.H., that they would be arrested
for criminal trespass if they did not leave. R.H., 86 Wn. App. 809. When R.H. did not
leave, he was arrested and charged with criminal trespass. R.H., 86 Wn. App. 810.
The evidence at trial established R.H. repeatedly told the arresting officer he was
waiting for another customer and if R.H. had been planning to eat at the restaurant, he
had permission to be on the premises. R.H., 86 Wn. App. 811. We held the State did
not prove R.H. committed criminal trespass because he complied with "'all lawful
conditions imposed on access.'" R.H., 86 Wn. App. at 812 (quoting RCW
9A.52.090(2)).
Because Croft was entitled to qualified immunity, the court erred in denying the
motion for judgment as a matter of law to dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Where
"the law did not put the [government official] on notice that his conduct would be clearly
unlawful," it is improper for a trial court to allow the claim to proceed to trial, even if there
is an issue of fact on an alleged constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz,533 U.S. 194, 202,
121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001).
20
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Although we need not reach the challenge to instructing the jury on due process,
we conclude the court erred by instructing the jury on the legal factors to consider in
deciding whether Croft violated due process. Jury instruction 13 states:
Due Process is a flexible concept and that the procedures required
depend upon the facts of a particular circumstance. Due process requires
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner.
You may consider the timing of the trespass notice but are not to consider
issues as to the legalities or form of the notice. In determining the
reasonableness of the opportunity for hearing, you should consider;
The nature of Mr. Segaline's interest;
The risk of a wrongful deprivation by the procedures, if any, that
were used and the value of additional procedures;
and the government's interest, including the burdens that
accompany additional procedures.
You should also consider whether there was notice and opportunity
to be heard available to remedy any wrongful deprivation.
Jury instruction 13 essentially asks the jury to consider the Mathewsfactors and decide
whether as a matter of law, Croft violated Segaline's right to due process.
What process is due under the Constitution is a legal question that the
judge should resolve. The judge then should put to the jury any factual
questions relating to the application of that standard.
McGee v. Bauer,956 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1992); see also State v. Chambers,81
Wn.2d 929, 932, 506 P.2d 311 (1973) (A court errs by asking the jury to resolve
"questions of law inherent in the factual situation.").
Because Segaline did not meet his burden to show a clearly established right
when Croft issued the Trespass Notice in 2003, as a matter of law Croft was entitled to
qualified immunity and dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Outcome: We reverse the jury verdict on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Croft and
remand to vacate the judgment and award of attorney fees.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: