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Date: 04-27-2020
Case Style:
John M. Byrd, Eugene Moore, Chris Navarro and Joseph Michael Williams v. State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Developmen
Case Number: 53,308-CA
Judge: Shonda Stone
Court: COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Plaintiff's Attorney:
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Defendant's Attorney: JEFFREY M. LANDRY
Attorney General State of Louisiana, DOTD
DARRELL J. SALTAMACHIA
ANDREW C. SALTAMACHIA
Special Assistant Attorney Generals
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This matter arises out of a car accident on September 17, 2004, wherein
John Byrd was driving a pickup truck and was unable to negotiate a sharp left
2
curve and violently crashed, striking several trees.1
Jamie Starr, Chris Navarro,
Joseph Williams, and Mr. Moore (collectively, the “plaintiffs”) were
passengers in the pickup truck at the time of the crash. Jamie Starr died at the
scene of the accident, and the other passengers were seriously injured. Mr.
Moore suffered a catastrophic brain injury and is the sole plaintiff remaining in
this matter.
The plaintiffs filed suit against the DOTD in the 37th JDC, and obtained
a judgment which, in relevant part, states:
Judgment is rendered in favor of Hilton Eugene Moore and
against the [DOTD] for future medical expenses in the amount of
[$1,392,000], which are to be paid pursuant to La. R.S.
13:5106B(3)(c)2 and La. R.S. 39:1533.2, together with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) from date of judicial
demand until date of judgment and judicial interest applied
thereafter until paid in full. (Emphasis added).
The personal injury case was appealed to this court.3 With one
exception, not relevant here, we affirmed the 37th JDC’s judgment in favor of
Mr. Moore and the other plaintiffs. However, the issue of interest on future
medical expenses was not raised by the parties, nor was it otherwise addressed
by this court.
1 The facts of the case are summarized from this Court’s opinion in Starr v. State ex
rel. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 46,226, 46,227 (La. App. 2 Cir. 06/17/11), 70 So. 3d 128,
writs denied, 11-1835 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So. 3d 386, 11-1952 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So. 3d 387,
11-1625 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So. 3d 388.
2
In relevant part, La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) provides:
In any suit for personal injury against the state or a state agency
wherein the court pursuant to judgment determines that the claimant is
entitled to medical care and related benefits that may be incurred
subsequent to judgment, all such medical care and related benefits
incurred subsequent to judgment shall be paid from the Future Medical
Care Fund as provided in R.S. 39:1533.2. Medical care and related
benefits shall be paid directly to the provider as they are incurred.
(Emphasis added).
3 Starr, supra.
3
In July 2012, the Legislature appropriated the monies to satisfy the
February 17, 2010, judgment.4 Specifically, the Legislature awarded Mr.
Moore “[m]onies . . . for future medical expenses [that] shall be payable as
incurred from the Future Medical Care Fund pursuant to R.S. 39:1533.2.”
On September 7, 2012, Mr. Moore and his coplaintiffs sought a writ of
mandamus in the 37th JDC stating that the Legislature has provided money for
the judgment but the DOTD “has refused to pay any of the funds that the jury .
. . ordered to be paid.” The DOTD filed an exception of improper venue,
which was ultimately granted, and the action was transferred to the 19th JDC.5
In the 19th JDC, the plaintiffs filed a “First Amended Petition for Writ
of Mandamus,” wherein Mr. Moore claimed $497,935.56 in judicial interest on
the future medical expenses award from the Future Medical Care Fund (the
“FMCF award”). The DOTD filed a “Reconventional Demand Asserting
Petition for Declaratory Relief,” requesting that the 19th JDC declare that “no
legal interest is due on the future medical care award.” The 19th JDC
ultimately dismissed Mr. Moore’s petition for writ of mandamus and the
DOTD’s reconventional demand. The DOTD appealed that judgment, but Mr.
Moore did not.
On appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that Mr.
Moore’s FMCF award in the prior judgment is ambiguous in that it purports to
award interest and incorporate La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) and La. R.S.
39:1533.2. Byrd v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 15-0597 (La. App. 1
4 Act 13 of the 2012 Legislative Session.
5 Meanwhile, on May 29, 2013, in the 37th JDC, the DOTD and Mr. Moore filed a
“Partial Satisfaction of Judgment,” which purportedly resolved all issues except whether Mr.
Moore is entitled to interest on his FMCF award
4
Cir. 06/03/16), 2016 WL 3127191, writ denied, 16-1578 (La. 11/18/16), 213
So. 3d 386. The First Circuit further held that a declaratory judgment action is
a viable avenue for resolving the ambiguity in the prior judgment, but
transferred the action back to the 37th JDC for decision on that issue. Id. at 3.
In the 37th JDC, the DOTD filed an MSJ claiming, among other things,
that the prior judgment is paid in full and no interest is due to Mr. Moore on his
FMCF award. Mr. Moore filed an exception of res judicata arguing that the
DOTD is precluded from litigating that issue because the prior judgment is
final. The trial court granted the MSJ in favor of the DOTD and denied Mr.
Moore’s exception. This appeal ensued.
In his appeal, Mr. Moore asserts the following assignments of error: (1)
the trial court erred in granting the DOTD’s MSJ; (2) the trial court erred in
denying his exception of res judicata; (3) the trial court erred in ruling that Mr.
Moore is not entitled to interest on future medical expenses as awarded by the
jury and never challenged by DOTD; (4) the trial court erred when it found
contradictory provisions in the judgment; and (5) the trial court erred in
“retroactively” applying the rationale of Fecke v. Bd. of Supervisors of La.
State Univ., 15-1806 (La. 09/23/16), 217 So. 3d 237. Additionally, Mr. Moore
asserts in his brief to this court that the DOTD has no cause of action for
declaratory judgment.
The DOTD filed an answer to Mr. Moore’s appeal making the following
assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in not including language in the
instant judgment explicitly stating that Mr. Moore is liable to the DOTD for
return of the interest that the DOTD paid on Mr. Moore’s award in the prior
5
judgment for loss of future earnings; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion
in taxing all costs to the DOTD.
Mr. Moore’s exception of no cause of action
In support of this exception, Mr. Moore argues that, because La. C.C.P.
art. 1872 does not specifically authorize declaratory judgment as a means of
resolving an ambiguity in a prior judgment, there is no cause of action. As
explained below, this argument is meritless.
La. C.C.P. art. 1871, in part, states: “Courts of record within their
respective jurisdiction may declare rights, status, and other legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed,” and regardless of whether
“another adequate remedy” exists. La. C.C.P. arts. 1872-1874 enumerate
specific instances in which use of the declaratory judgment action is
authorized. As already pointed out by the First Circuit in Byrd, supra, La.
C.C.P. art. 1875 states explicitly that the enumeration in articles 1872 through
1874 is nonexclusive:
The enumeration in Articles 1872 through 1874 does not
limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred
in Article 1871 in any proceeding where declaratory relief is
sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the
controversy or remove an uncertainty.
Thus, La. C.C.P. art. 1875 contradicts Mr. Moore’s argument, and when read in
pari materia with La. C.C.P. Art. 1871, authorizes use of the declaratory
judgment action to resolve an ambiguity in a prior judgment. “Courts… may
declare rights, status, and other legal relations,” La. C.C.P. 1871, “in any
proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree
will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty,” La. C.C.P. 1875.
(Emphasis supplied).
6
Furthermore, as also already pointed out by the First Circuit in Byrd,
supra, the declaratory judgment action has already been jurisprudentially
recognized as a proper avenue for resolving an ambiguity in a judgment.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Younger, 158 So.2d 341 (La. App. 3d
Cir.1963). Indeed, the Younger court involved a declaratory judgment action
seeking determination of whether the judgment debtor (the tortfeasor’s insurer)
owed interest to the injured plaintiff under the provisions of the judgment.
We hold that the resolution of an ambiguity in a prior judgment may
properly be sought through the declaratory judgment action provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, Mr. Moore’s argument to the contrary lacks
merit and is rejected.
All of Mr. Moore’s remaining assignments of error
Louisiana’s law of res judicata is set forth in La. R.S.13:4231,
which states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final
judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on
appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
…
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the
defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between
them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and
determined if its determination was essential to that
judgment. (Emphasis added).
For a judgment to be valid, it must be “precise, definite, and certain.” Burch v.
Burch, 51, 780 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 245 So. 3d 1138; State in Interest of
M.D., 2017-1361 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/29/18). Because an ambiguous judgment
does not provide certainty regarding of the rights and liabilities of the parties, it
7
is not valid – and does not provide the basis for an exception of res judicata.
Id.; Davis v. Farm Fresh Food Supplier, 2002-1401 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/03),
844 So. 2d 352; Parkerson v. R-5, Inc., 305 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1974),
writ denied 309 So.2d 679 (La. 1975).
Thus, to dispose of Mr. Moore’s exception of res judicata, we must
determine whether Mr. Moore’s FMCF award in the prior judgment is
contradictory or ambiguous. The prior judgment’s statement that the FMCF
award is made pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) contradicts the provision
for interest on that award. As a matter of law (and basic mathematical logic)
interest cannot accrue in respect to an award made pursuant to La. R.S.
13:5106(B)(3)(c). Fecke, supra. Thereunder, the plaintiff does not obtain a
money judgment, as in general tort; instead, his or her post-judgment medical
expenses are paid from the FMCF to the plaintiff’s healthcare providers, and
payment is made only if and when medical expenses are actually incurred. No
plaintiff has any vested right to any portion of the trust funds. Likewise, the
FMCF has no obligation to pay until medical expenses are actually incurred:
interest cannot accrue on a debt when that debt is not yet owed. For both these
reasons, there is no principal on which interest can accrue. Id.
The contradiction in the judgment creates a substantial ambiguity
regarding the rights and obligations of Mr. Moore and the State. It requires a
determination of which provision shall be given effect, the incorporation of La.
R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) or the provision for interest; the two are mutually
8
exclusive. Accordingly, the trial judge was correct in denying Mr. Moore’s
exception of res judicata.6
Furthermore, the trial court was correct in holding, pursuant to Fecke,
supra, that the prior judgment does not award interest on the FMCF award. Mr.
Moore’s argument that the trial court erred in “retroactively” applying Fecke,
supra, is devoid of merit. As stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Bush v.
Nat’l Health Care of Leesville, 2005-2477 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So. 2d 1216,
1219:
[A]s a general rule, a court decision “operates both
prospectively and retrospectively, except that it will not be
permitted to disturb vested rights.” The court restated that
principle in Succession of Clivens, 426 So. 2d 585,
594 (La.1982), in which it held “[g]enerally, unless a
decision specifies otherwise, it is given both retrospective
and prospective effect.” (Emphasis in original).
As previously stated, the ambiguity regarding interest on Mr. Moore’s FMCF
award in the prior judgment precludes it from being a valid final judgment on
that point. Therefore, Mr. Moore cannot have a vested right to interest on the
FMCF award. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not limit Fecke, supra, to
having only prospective effect. The trial court was right to apply Fecke, supra,
even if it is assumed that doing so constituted a retroactive application. For this
reason alone, Mr. Moore’s argument is meritless.
Furthermore, Fecke, supra does not make new law; it merely declares
the original meaning of legislation which preexisted Mr. Moore’s cause of
6 Mr. Moore points out that a panel of this court referred to the subject judgment as
“final and definitive” in its 2012 writ disposition granting the DOTD’s exception of
improper venue raised in response to the plaintiffs’ filing a mandamus action in the 37th
JDC. That statement was incorrect regarding whether Mr. Moore’s FMCF award accrues
interest. The issue involved herein was not before the court at that juncture, and therefore
has no binding effect on this decision.
9
action. In light of the statutory framework surrounding the FMCF, this court
would likewise hold that the FMCF awards do not and cannot accrue interest,
even without the guidance of Fecke, supra.
The prior judgment does not grant Mr. Moore interest on his FMCF
award. The State of Louisiana does not owe Mr. Moore interest—from any
source – in connection with his FMCF award.
The DOTD’s request for decretal language
The DOTD argues that the trial court erred by not including in the
instant judgment decretal language: (1) stating Mr. Moore’s liability to the
DOTD for return of interest paid on Mr. Moore’s award for loss of future
earnings; and (2) decreeing that the prior judgment is satisfied in full, and
ordering the clerk of court of the 37th JDC to cancel the prior judgment. The
DOTD correctly points out that its MSJ, which the trial court granted “as
prayed for,” included prayers for both of these items of relief. However,
because the instant judgment does not contain decretal language specifying that
the DOTD is entitled to these items of relief, it does not validly grant the
DOTD these items of relief. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech.
Coll. v. Mid City Holdings, L.L.C., 2014-0506 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/15/14), 151
So. 3d 908, 910 (“The specific relief granted [must] be determinable from the
[face of] the judgment without reference to an extrinsic source such as
pleadings or reasons for judgment”). Accordingly, these issues are properly
addressed to the trial court rather than this court. We accordingly decline to
address them.
10
The trial court’s taxing of costs
The trial court taxed all court costs to the DOTD. The DOTD argues that
such constituted an abuse of discretion, given that the DOTD prevailed on
summary judgment. We agree. While the DOTD was apparently remiss in not
sooner realizing the contradiction in the prior judgment, it ultimately prevailed
against the plaintiff in rectifying that contradiction. Moreover, the plaintiff’s
attorney, in zealously opposing those meritorious efforts by the DOTD,
increased the burden of this litigation. The trial court should have taxed court
costs equally to each party.
Outcome: The trial court’s instant judgment holding that the prior judgment’s
award of payment of Mr. Moore’s future medical expenses does not and cannot
award interest on those future medical expenses is AFFIRMED.
The trial court’s taxing of all costs to the DOTD is VACATED. Those
costs are taxed one-half to Mr. Moore and one-half to the DOTD. Costs of this
appeal are likewise taxed one-half to each party
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Defendant's Experts:
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