United States of America v. Darell Montrell Trotter

Date: 11-04-2025

Case Number: 22-CR-2-1

Judge: Not Available

Court: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (Jefferson County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: United States District Attorney's Office in Beaumont

Defendant's Attorney:

Description: Beaumont, Texas, criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with distributing fentanyl.

Darell Montrell Trotter pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute
fentanyl pursuant to a plea agreement. Although Trotter’s indictment
alleged that his conduct caused the death of an individual, DS, the plea
agreement did not include this allegation. The agreement did, however,
contain several stipulations, including that “[t]he defendant shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment within the applicable sentencing range
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,” but that “[t]he parties understand
that the Court is not bound by these stipulations.”

The probation officer’s presentence investigation report calculated
the Guidelines’ range as 135–168 months’ imprisonment and recommended
a sentence of 135 months. Trotter filed various objections to the PSR, which
the Government alleges were filed in violation of the plea agreement. Trotter
ultimately withdrew his objections and concurred in the probation officer’s
recommended sentence. The Government filed a sentencing memorandum
asking the court to impose a sentence at the top end of the Guidelines’ range
because “Trotter was a high-volume dealer of deadly pills . . . [and] should
not be absolved of the tragedy of DS’s death simply because he was two steps
above the person who sold DS the lethal pills in the supply chain.”
At sentencing, the Government presented the testimony of DS’s
father, who stated, “[n]othing will bring [my son] back. I just pray that . . . if
you want an easy buck selling deadly drugs and someone dies, you will spend
a lifetime in prison.” The district court then sought clarification from
counsel: “There’s no motion for downward departure or upward departure
of variance by the Government; is that correct?” Both the prosecutor and
defense counsel confirmed that this was correct.

Nevertheless, the prosecutor argued that the Guidelines
underrepresented the extent of Trotter’s involvement and the harm his
conduct caused, urging the court to consider an upward variance under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). The prosecutor conducted a “thought experiment”—a
hypothetical dinner conversation between laypersons—to illustrate that legal
causation requirements prevented application of the twenty-year statutory
minimum for an offense resulting in death, despite the potency of the drug,
the scope of Trotter’s conduct, and the victims affected. He described DS’s
father’s comments as a “helpful wake-up call” and cautioned against “legal
tunnel vision” or “guideline myopia,” emphasizing a “pretty significant
disconnect between the way a layperson understands responsibility and the
way the guidelines end up coming out.”

The prosecutor stressed that, while the court should use the
Guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors permitted the court to “take a step back”
and “assess[] the totality of the Defendant’s conduct.” He reminded the
court of the statutory sentencing range—“a mandatory minimum of 10 years
and a statutory maximum of life”—and noted that, although the Guidelines
recommended 135–168 months, “the Court has full discretion.” He invited
the court to “take a step back” and consider whether the Guidelines’ range
aligned with how “our fellow citizens” would resolve such cases.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court sentenced Trotter
to 168 months’ imprisonment—the top of the Guidelines’ range—and five
years of supervised release. The court did not reference the prosecutor’s
earlier remarks in pronouncing sentence. This timely appeal followed.
Trotter asserts for the first time that the Government breached the plea
agreement by undermining the proposed Guidelines’ range and advocating
for a sentence above it.

Outcome: Trotter has shown that the prosecutor’s remarks “may have . . . influenced” the court’s decision to impose an upper-level Guideline sentence. See Kirkland, 851 F.3d at 504–05. Trotter’s substantial rights were therefore affected.

Vacated and remanded.

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Defendant's Experts:

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