Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.

Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw

Date: 08-25-2020

Case Style:

Daimia Anderson v. State of Indiana

Case Number: 20A-PC-585

Judge: Edward W. Najam, Jr.

Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Plaintiff's Attorney: Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Samuel J. Dayton
Deputy Attorney General

Defendant's Attorney:

< b>

Call 888-853-4800 if you need a Criminal Defense Attorney in Indiana.

Description:















In Anderson’s direct appeal, this Court stated the facts and procedural history
as follows:
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 21, 2004, Sarlaji Warren
went to the Hillcrest Bowling Alley in Fort Wayne. After
midnight, when the bowling alley closed, Sarlaji and her friends
drove to Jazmin’s, a nearby bar. Suemiko Underwood was
driving, Rydrikia Warren was in the front seat, and Sarlaji and
Kandice McGown were in the back seat. When the young
women arrived at the bar, they parked in [a] nearby parking lot,
sat in the car[,] and talked.
Five to ten minutes later, Anderson and Tara Meriweather
arrived in the same parking lot. Meriweather was driving and
Anderson was in the passenger’s seat. Meriweather stopped her
car directly in front of Underwood’s car. McGown exited the car
and approached Meriweather’s car. When McGown and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 3 of 16
Meriweather exchanged words, Anderson pulled out a gun and
fired two shots into the air. McGown returned to the car where
her friends were waiting, and Meriweather drove her car to the
back of Underwood’s car. Anderson pulled out a gun and fired a
shot into Underwood’s car. The back windshield shattered, and
the bullet hit Sarlaji in the back of the head. She died two days
later.
Anderson was charged with murder for killing Sarlaji, criminal
recklessness for firing the two shots in the air, and carrying a
handgun without a license. At trial, witness Chiquitia Warren
testified that Anderson fired the gun straight at Underwood’s car.
In addition, McGown testified that Anderson was holding the
gun “straight out” when she fired it at Underwood’s car. Tr. P.
451. Anderson admitted firing the two shots in the air.
However, she testified that after she fired those shots, she was
just “messing with” the gun, and it went off. Tr. P. 767. A jury
convicted Anderson as charged.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 241-42. The trial court entered judgment of
conviction and sentenced Anderson to an aggregate term of sixty-one and onehalf years, including a five-year enhancement under Indiana Code Section 35-
50-2-11 for Anderson’s use of a firearm during the commission of the murder.
On direct appeal, Anderson raised one issue for our review, namely, whether
the State had presented sufficient evidence to support her murder conviction.
We affirmed her conviction.
[4] In April 2018, Anderson filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. In
that petition, Anderson alleged that she had received ineffective assistance from
both her trial and appellate counsel. After a fact-finding hearing, the post-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 4 of 16
conviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it
denied Anderson’s petition for post-conviction relief. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[5] Anderson appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition for postconviction relief. Our standard of review in such appeals is clear:
“The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden
of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Campbell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 271, 273-74 (Ind. 2014).
“When appealing the denial of post-conviction relief, the
petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative
judgment.” Id. at 274. In order to prevail on an appeal from the
denial of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the
evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion
opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Weatherford v.
State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993). Further, the postconviction court in this case entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction
Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-conviction
court’s legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s findings
and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear
error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d
102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we
apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). See Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind.
2009). To satisfy the first prong, “the defendant must show
deficient performance: representation that fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 5 of 16
defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.” McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002)
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). To satisfy the second
prong, “the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable
probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694).
Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 681-82 (Ind. 2017).
Issue One: Trial Counsel
[6] Anderson first asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it denied her
petition because she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Anderson
alleges ineffective assistance from her trial attorney on four grounds. Anderson
alleges that counsel: should have asserted a self-defense argument at trial in
addition to her defense alleging accident; should have tendered a voluntary
manslaughter instruction; should not have alluded to Meriweather’s invocation
of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and should not have
waived Anderson’s right to a jury trial on the sentence enhancement. We
address each contention in turn.
Self-defense
[7] Anderson contends that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient because
he did not know that Indiana law permits a defendant to simultaneously assert
the defense theories of self-defense and accident. See Gunn v. State, 174 Ind.
App. 263, 65 N.E.2d 1234 (1977). During trial, after Anderson had testified
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 6 of 16
that she had not seen Sarlaji the night of the shooting and that she had only
accidentally fired the gun that killed Sarlaji, the State moved to strike evidence
that had already been presented by Anderson showing that she had shot Sarlaji
in self-defense.1
Anderson’s trial counsel argued that the evidence showed selfdefense, but the trial court granted the State’s motion. And the court
subsequently denied Anderson’s proffered jury instruction on self-defense. In
her post-conviction petition, Anderson asserted that, had trial counsel
supported his argument to the trial court with a citation to Gunn, the court
would have permitted Anderson to pursue both theories of self-defense and
accident. Further, Anderson maintains that trial counsel was deficient for not
making the same argument in support of her proffered self-defense jury
instruction when the trial court denied it.
[8] As our Supreme Court has stated,
[a] valid claim of self-defense is a legal justification for an
otherwise criminal act. Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840
(Ind. 2000). “A person is justified in using reasonable force
against another person to protect himself or a third person from
what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful
force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 (200[4]). A claim of self-defense
requires a defendant to have acted without fault, been in a place
where he or she had a right to be, and been in reasonable fear or
apprehension of bodily harm. White v. State, 699 N.E.2d 630,
635 (Ind. 1998).
1
The trial court had permitted Anderson to present evidence that she had a protective order against Sarlaji,
as well as threatening voicemail messages from Sarlaji “in the days before the crime[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 43.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 7 of 16
* * *
The ‘reasonableness’ of a defendant’s belief that he was entitled
to act in self-defense is determined from that point in time at
which the defendant takes arguably defensive action. That belief
must be supported by evidence that the alleged victim was
imminently prepared to inflict bodily harm on the defendant.
Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277-78 (Ind. 2003).
[9] The post-conviction court concluded, and we agree, that the evidence presented
at trial, including Anderson’s own testimony, showed that she “was not
lawfully acting in self-defense.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 149. While she may
have been in a place where she had a right to be, the evidence does not show
either that Anderson acted without fault or that she had a reasonable fear of
bodily harm. See Henson, 786 N.E.2d at 277. First, Anderson testified at trial
that she did not know Sarlaji was in the car when she fired the gun at the car.
Thus, to the extent Anderson now claims she was defending herself against
Sarlaji, that claim is simply not credible.
[10] Second, “‘[t]he amount of force used to protect oneself must be proportionate to
the urgency of the situation.’” Brand v. State, 766 N.E.2d 772, 777 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002) (quoting Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999)), trans. denied. “‘Where a person has used more force than necessary to
repel an attack the right to self-defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result is
that the victim then becomes the perpetrator.’” Id. Anderson does not contend
in her brief on appeal that her firing the gun was “proportionate to the urgency
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 8 of 16
of the situation.” See id. Indeed, at trial, Anderson testified that she was scared
for her life because a crowd of people had surrounded the car, but she testified
that no one else had a weapon and that they were making only verbal threats
towards her. Anderson was sitting in the car when she fired the gun, after
which Meriweather drove Anderson away from the scene. We cannot say
either that Anderson acted without fault or that she had a reasonable fear of
bodily harm. See Henson, 786 N.E.2d at 277.
[11] This Court has stated that “[c]ounsel will not be held deficient for not pursuing
a defense which appears contrived or totally unrealistic.” Wilson v. State, 565
N.E.2d 761, 765 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Given the dearth of evidence to
support a self-defense theory, we hold that Anderson has not demonstrated
either that she was entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense or that her trial
counsel’s performance was either deficient or prejudiced her.
Voluntary Manslaughter Instruction
[12] Anderson next contends that her trial counsel should have proffered a voluntary
manslaughter instruction. Anderson maintains that there was “appreciable
evidence” that she had acted under sudden heat such that “voluntary
manslaughter was a stronger alternative to reckless homicide, especially after
the Court excluded her self-defense evidence and instruction.” Appellant’s Br.
at 45-46. Anderson asserts that the jury would not have convicted her of
murder had it been instructed on voluntary manslaughter.
[13] On this issue, the post-conviction court found as follows:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 9 of 16
[Trial counsel] tendered an instruction on reckless homicide as a
lesser included offense of murder; the Court decided to give that
instruction upon finding that there was a serious evidentiary
dispute as to whether “the lesser offense of reckless homicide was
committed and not the greater offense of murder.” Tr. 867-868.
[Trial counsel] did not request an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. At the postconviction hearing, [trial counsel] testified that the decision
to argue for conviction of reckless homicide as a lesser included
offense, and not to pursue voluntary manslaughter as a possible
alternative, was made after extensive consultation with
[Anderson], and that she herself favored an argument for reckless
homicide and not for voluntary manslaughter. Record of
Hearing on Post-Conviction Relief Held on December 21, 2018,
at 7-8.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 144. And the post-conviction court concluded that
trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to proffer a reckless homicide
instruction instead of a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
[14] As the State points out, counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing
strategy and tactics, and we will accord that decision deference. Lambert v.
State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 730 (Ind. 2001). At trial, Anderson testified that the gun
“went off” while she was “messing with it.” Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 19. That
testimony is inconsistent with an assertion that she acted under sudden heat
when she shot Sarlaji. In light of the evidence presented at trial supporting a
voluntary manslaughter instruction, we cannot say that trial counsel’s strategy
constituted deficient performance. Indeed, Anderson’s argument on appeal
does not address the post-conviction court’s conclusion that her trial counsel
acted reasonably in not asking for a reckless-homicide instruction after
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 10 of 16
discussions with Anderson leading up to trial. We will not second-guess a trial
counsel’s reasonable trial strategies. Accordingly, Anderson has not met her
burden on appeal to demonstrate that the post-conviction court’s judgment is
contrary to law on this issue.
Meriweather’s Decision Not to Testify at Trial
[15] During closing argument, Anderson’s trial counsel stated in relevant part as
follows:
In a few moments, the State will have the right to rebut, get the
last chance to try to convince you that their picture is not blurred.
Don’t let them fool you. You’ve listened to all the evidence.
[Counsel for the State], if you didn’t believe [Anderson’s]
testimony, the Judge asked you, “Do you have any rebuttal.”
“No.” Pastor Latham was there. Pastor Jordan was at the police
station. [The State] didn’t call them to rebut anything. [The
State] didn’t call Tara Meriwether.
State: Objection Your Honor.
Court: Sustained.
Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 173-74 (emphasis added). In her post-conviction petition,
Anderson asserted that her trial counsel was ineffective because she brought up
the fact that Meriweather did not testify, which prompted the trial court to
instruct the jury “to disregard [defense] counsel’s comment” and that
Meriweather had “exerted her Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify and
incriminate herself.” Id. at 923. Anderson pointed out that she was harmed
because that instruction supported a reasonable inference “‘that the withheld
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 11 of 16
testimony would be damaging, not only to the witness, but also to the
defendant.’” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 104 (quoting Aubrey v. State, 261 Ind.
692, 310 N.E.2d 556, 558-59 (1974)).
[16] The post-conviction court agreed with Anderson, as do we, that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient in this regard, but the court found that Anderson had
not shown prejudice. In particular, the court found:
[Anderson] has not presented any argument purporting to
establish a reasonable probability that this error had any effect on
the outcome of the proceeding. . . .
[Anderson] does assert that “[Meriweather’s] refusal to testify
‘may well have been the equivalent in the jury’s mind of
testimony,’” but [she] does not venture to specify what testimony
it may well have the equivalent of. In view of the evidence
presented at trial, the jury could have conjectured that Tara
Meriweather might have said highly incriminating things had she
testified—such as that [Anderson] went to Jazmin’s intending to
kill Sarlaji Warren lest Sarlaji kill her first, and that she decided
to fabricate a defense of accident, self-defense, or both. But the
reasons for these particular conjectures would have been obvious:
[Anderson’s] own testimony abundantly supported them, and her
testimony was far less credible than that of the State’s witnesses.
[Anderson] has presented no argument, and none can be
imagined, tending to show a reasonable probability that the
conjectures led to her conviction or murder when the evidence
alone would not have done so.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 155-56 (citations omitted).
[17] On appeal, Anderson maintains that she was harmed
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 12 of 16
because the natural inference the jury would have is that
[Meriweather] would incriminate herself if she had testified. She
drove [Anderson] to the scene, she was with her the entire time
and she helped her evade arrest for a short time. . . . Though
[Meriweather] could have corroborated [Anderson’s]
justifications[ for the shooting], she did not. . . . The
admonishment not only reinforced [Meriweather’s] failure to
corroborate [Anderson] but it implied she would not have done
so. . . .
Appellant’s Br. at 51-52. But Anderson does not address the post-conviction
court’s finding that she did not adequately make that argument in her petition,
and our review of the petition supports the court’s finding on this issue. Her
mere allegation that the jury could have inferred that Meriweather would have
incriminated Anderson, without more, is insufficient to show prejudice.
Indeed, in light of the overwhelming evidence of Anderson’s guilt, including
her own testimony and that of the State’s nine eyewitnesses, we agree with the
State that any error was harmless. We cannot say that the post-conviction court
erred when it found that trial counsel’s performance did not prejudice Anderson
on this issue.
Waiver of Right to Jury Trial
[18] Anderson contends that her trial counsel was ineffective when he did not object
to the trial court’s determination that bifurcation on the issue of the firearm
enhancement was unnecessary “because by finding her guilty of murder, [the
jurors] have necessarily found that she used a firearm in the commission of that
specifically named crime.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 229. Anderson
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 13 of 16
maintains that she was entitled to a jury trial on the enhancement under
Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-11. She asserts that her trial counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced her because he “forfeited her right to argue for acquittal
on the enhancement.” Appellant’s Br. at 55.
[19] First, Anderson has not shown that her trial counsel’s performance was
deficient in this regard. Second, Anderson cannot show prejudice. As the trial
court declared, and as the post-conviction court found, because the jury had
convicted Anderson of murder, and because the evidence was undisputed that
the murder was committed with a firearm, that a jury would have found the
evidence sufficient to support the enhancement was all but a foregone
conclusion. Indeed, Anderson did not testify at the post-conviction hearing that
she would not have waived her right to a jury trial on the enhancement. The
post-conviction court did not err when it found that Anderson’s trial counsel
was not ineffective when he agreed to waive a jury trial on the firearm
enhancement.
Issue Two: Appellate Counsel
[20] Anderson next argues on appeal that she received ineffective assistance from
her appellate counsel when her appellate counsel did not raise on direct appeal
the following three issues: waiver of the right to a jury trial on the firearm
enhancement; Anderson’s right to present her self-defense; and the trial court’s
refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense. We address each contention in turn.
[21] As we have explained:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 14 of 16
As with trial counsel, to establish that appellate counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, a petitioner must show appellate counsel
was deficient in performance and that the deficiency resulted in
prejudice. Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 723 (Ind. 2007).
However, appellate and trial counsel have different tasks, which
result in different kinds of deficient performance and prejudice.
Thus, when the alleged error is that appellate counsel failed to
raise issues, prejudice is based on “whether the issues appellate
counsel failed to raise would have been clearly more likely to
result in reversal or an order for a new trial.” Id. at 724.
Benefield v. State, 945 N.E.2d 791, 802-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Jury Trial Waiver
[22] Anderson first contends that she was denied the effective assistance of appellate
counsel because, had counsel argued on direct appeal that Anderson had not
waived her right to a jury trial on the firearm enhancement, this Court would
have remanded for a jury trial on that issue. In particular, Anderson asserts that
she had a right to a jury trial on the enhancement under Article 1, Section 12 of
the Indiana Constitution and that her personal waiver was required but not
obtained. Thus, she maintains that the absence of her personal waiver required
reversal of the enhancement.
[23] In Horton v. State, our Supreme Court observed that, since 1977, “Indiana
precedent has repeatedly affirmed the personal waiver requirement” for the
right to a jury trial “in a felony prosecution.” 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 2016)
(emphasis added). Anderson does not cite any case law to show that, as a
matter of Indiana constitutional law, the personal waiver requirement applies to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 15 of 16
sentencing enhancements. Thus, Anderson has not shown that her appellate
counsel’s performance was deficient when he did not raise this issue on direct
appeal.
[24] For the first time in her reply brief, Anderson acknowledges that the firearm
enhancement statute, Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-11, did not afford a right to
a jury trial until April 2005, or six months after her trial. Also in her reply brief,
Anderson maintains that her appellate counsel “could have reasonably argued
Anderson was deprived of her right to a jury trial despite the statute’s wording”
as a matter of federal constitutional law based on the holdings in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Reply Br. at 6.
[25] Anderson has waived the issue of a federal constitutional violation for our
review in two respects. First, “[t]he law is well settled that grounds for error
may only be framed in an appellant’s initial brief and if addressed for the first
time in the reply brief, they are waived.” Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks
Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005). Second, Anderson did not make this
argument to the post-conviction court. Waiver notwithstanding, and moreover,
our courts do not require appellate counsel to pursue novel arguments on
appeal. In particular, our Supreme Court has held that “an appellate lawyer
would not be ineffective for proceeding without adding a Blakely claim before
Blakely was decided.” Walker v. State, 843 N.E.2d 50, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),
trans. denied; cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1130 (2007). And this Court has observed
that “[e]ven after Apprendi was decided, there was no basis for [appellate
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-585 | August 24, 2020 Page 16 of 16
counsel] to believe that Apprendi had any impact upon [a defendant’s] jury trial
waiver and sentence.” Wieland v. State, 848 N.E.2d 679, 682 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), trans. denied; cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1038 (2006). Thus, Anderson has not
shown that her appellate counsel was ineffective when he did not raise this issue
on direct appeal.
Self-Defense
[26] With respect to Anderson’s assertion that appellate counsel should have raised
on appeal both her right to assert self-defense and the trial court’s alleged abuse
of discretion in refusing a self-defense instruction, for the reasons set out above,
Anderson’s own testimony undermined her allegation that she acted in selfdefense. Because the evidence, as a whole, presented at trial did not support a
self-defense theory, Anderson cannot show either that her appellate counsel’s
performance was deficient or that the outcome of her appeal would have been
different had these issues been raised. The post-conviction court did not err
when it concluded that Anderson was not denied the effective assistance of
appellate counsel.

Outcome: In sum, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments:



Find a Lawyer

Subject:
City:
State:
 

Find a Case

Subject:
County:
State: