Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 08-26-2020
Case Style:
Matthew L. McClain, II v. State of Indiana
Case Number: 20A-CR-449
Judge: Paul D. Mathias
Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Plaintiff's Attorney: Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Defendant's Attorney:
< b>
Call 888-853-4800 if you need a Criminal Defense Attorney in Indiana.
Description:
 |
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
[2] On September 17, 2019, McClain was in the Newton County Jail serving a
sentence for his previous conviction for Level 6 felony intimidation. Newton
County Jail Commander David Kessler (“Commander Kessler”) decided to
move McClain from one part of the jail to another. Commander Kessler told
McClain about the move, to which McClain replied, “I’m not moving.” Tr. p.
29. Anticipating resistance, Commander Kessler requested the assistance of
other jail officers. Commander Kessler and two other officers then went back to
McClain’s cell and again told him that he would have to move. McClain
repeatedly said that he would not move. Commander Kessler grabbed McClain
by the arm, and he and the two other officers took McClain from the bunk
room of his cell to the “day room” of the cell. Tr. p. 16. There, they placed
McClain against the wall to handcuff him. They then took McClain to an
isolation cell for a few minutes for him to cool off.
[3] Some minutes later, Commander Kessler and the others returned to the
isolation cell, where they observed that McClain had been able to move his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 3 of 13
cuffed hands from behind his back to his front. They placed McClain near the
wall and told him they were going to remove the cuffs. McClain said to
Commander Kessler, “You have the blood of my family on your hands and I’m
going to cut your head off.” Tr. p. 32.
[4] As a result of this incident, the State charged McClain on December 11, 2019,
with Level 6 felony intimidation and also alleged that McClain was an habitual
offender. At the initial hearing set on December 30, 2019, the trial court advised
McClain of his constitutional rights and the nature of the charges against him.
In the court’s order entered following the initial hearing, the court noted:
The Defendant enters a plea of not guilty and advises the Court
[that] counsel stipulate to the psychological reports submitted to the
Court under a separate cause deeming the Defendant competent to stand
trial. The Court having been so advised orders the psychological
reports made part of the record, marking same as confidential[]
and sets this cause for trial with intervention of jury commencing
January 27, 2020 at 10:00 A.M., at which time the Defendant is
ordered to appear.
Appellant’s App. p. 16 (emphasis added).
[5] A jury trial was held on January 27, 2020. McClain did not argue that he was
incompetent to stand trial, nor did he claim that he was not guilty by reason of
insanity. The jury found him guilty as charged and determined that he was an
habitual offender. At the sentencing hearing, McClain’s counsel stated:
Judge, I would like to direct the Court’s attention to the issue
that’s been raised regarding Mr. McClain’s mental health,
understandably that doctors have determined he’s competent, he’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 4 of 13
competent to stand trial and that he was not insane at the time of the
offense. But clearly there are some underlying mental health
issues. Maybe not so much rising to where it would affect his
ability to understand what is going on but doctors did indicate
that there are some underlying diagnoses and some issues with
that. Your Honor, it is my understanding, my belief that this
instant proceeding, along with his former proceedings are []
someway related to the mental health aspect. . . . I would ask that
the Court consider the alternatives, consider the fact that some
mental health treatment would be beneficial to Mr. McClain and
ask that the Court sentence on the lighter end of the sentencing
spectrum to allow Mr. McClain to pay for the crime that he
committed but then also be able to seek some form of mental
health treatment.
Tr p. 63. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced McClain to
the maximum sentence of two and one-half years, to which it added a six-year
habitual offender enhancement, for an aggregate sentence of eight and one-half
years. McClain now appeals.
I. Prior Psychological Evaluations
[6] McClain first argues that the trial court improperly relied on psychological
evaluations that were performed in late 2018 and early 2019 to determine that
McClain was competent to stand trial and was not insane at the time of the
offense.
[7] McClain appears to conflate the issue of competency to stand trial with the
defense of insanity. The former addresses the question of “whether the
defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with defense counsel with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether the defendant has a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 5 of 13
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”
Gross v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1043, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting State v. Davis,
898 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. 2008)). The latter addresses the question of whether
the defendant suffers from a mental illness that rendered him unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense. Galloway
v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ind. 2010) (citing Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(a)).
These are two separate inquiries, and a defendant may be competent to stand
trial but be not guilty by reason of insanity; conversely, a defendant may have
been sane at the time of the offense but incompetent to stand trial. With this in
mind, we address McClain’s arguments.
[8] McClain argues that the trial court erred in relying on the reports of the
previous psychological evaluations to determine his ability to understand his
actions at the time of the offense. McClain, however, did not present an
insanity defense at trial. “Indiana has long held that a defendant may not
submit evidence relating to mental disease or defect except through an insanity
defense.” Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (Ind. 2001). A felony
defendant who intends to interpose a defense of insanity must file a notice of
that intent with the trial court no later than twenty days before the omnibus
date. Ind. Code § 35-36-2-1(1).
1 Here, there is no indication that McClain ever
filed any such notice, nor did he argue insanity at trial. In fact, as noted above,
1
“However, in the interest of justice and upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the filing to be
made at any time before commencement of the trial.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 6 of 13
his trial counsel admitted at sentencing that McClain was not insane at the time
the offense was committed. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court
erred in relying on the prior psychological evaluations when considering the
issue of McClain’s sanity because McClain did not present an insanity defense.
[9] McClain also argues that the trial court erred in relying on the reports of the
prior psychological evaluations to determine his fitness to stand trial. Again,
there is no indication that McClain ever claimed to the trial court that he was
incompetent to stand trial. To the contrary, McClain’s own defense counsel
stipulated that the previous psychological evaluations established that McClain
was competent to stand trial—a position defense counsel reiterated at
sentencing. Appellant’s App. p. 16; Tr. p. 63. At the very least, McClain has
waived his claim that he was incompetent to stand trial by failing to present this
claim to the trial court. See McManus v. State, 814 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2004)
(“[A]lleged errors in determination of competency are subject to the usual rules
of appellate review, and are waived if the defendant proceeds to trial without
objection.”); Stolarz v. State, 445 N.E.2d 114, 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that defendant waived issue of competency where he made no motion regarding
his competency and the trial court was not otherwise appraised of the issue).
[10] Furthermore, by stipulating to the reports, McClain’s counsel invited any error
in the trial court’s reliance thereon. It is well settled that a party may not take
advantage of an error that he invites. Hall v. State, 137 N.E.3d 279, 284 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2019) (citing Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 975 (Ind. 2014)); see also
Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018) (holding that invited error
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 7 of 13
forbids a party from “taking advantage of an error that she commits, invites, or
which is the natural consequence of her own neglect or misconduct”). Because
McClain invited any error in the trial court’s reliance on the prior psychological
evaluations, he cannot now take advantage of this alleged error.
II. Sentencing
[11] McClain also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him
and that his eight-and-one-half-year sentence is inappropriate. As these are
distinct arguments, we address them separately.
A. Abuse of Discretion
[12] As we summarized in Grimes v. State:
Sentencing decisions are within the purview of the trial court’s
sound discretion and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the sentencing
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and
actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. There are several ways
a trial court may abuse its discretion, including failing to enter a
sentencing statement at all, articulating reasons in a sentencing
statement that are not supported by the record, omitting reasons
in a sentencing statement that are clearly supported by the
record, or articulating reasons that are improper as a matter of
law.
84 N.E.3d 635, 643–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 490–91 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218) (internal
quotations omitted), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 8 of 13
[13] McClain contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
“properly” consider his mental illness as a mitigating factor. A trial court is not
obligated to accept the defendant’s arguments as to what constitutes a
mitigating factor, nor is the court required to give the same weight to proffered
mitigating factors as does the defendant. Belcher v. State, 138 N.E.3d 318, 328
(Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Comer v. State, 839 N.E.2d 721, 728 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005), trans. denied), trans. denied.
[14] The trial court here explicitly considered McClain’s mental health issues when
imposing sentencing, stating from the bench as follows:
There is no doubt that there is some mental counseling needed, there’s
some mental flaw that we can’t figure out. I would love to see [you]
go that route. But I have presided in so many of these cases and
you have been given so many opportunities over the years to
make changes. And I recall the one prior case Prosecutor Drinski
made the remark if you are on your medication, there’s no
problem, you’re a pretty decent person. But you have a horrible
record, you really do. You’ve been given every break in the book.
And given your present mental condition, together with these
crimes seem to be accelerating in seriousness; clearly you have
finally reached the pinnacle of the worst of the worst, Matthew. I
hate to say that but you really have. And at this point, given your
record, together with your total lack of cooperation in trying to
help you rehabilitate yourself shows that the interests of society
far outweigh your individual needs. The Court finds that you
should be sentenced to the maximum possible sentence in this
instance. So, the Court is going to impose a sentence of two and
a half years’ incarceration on the underlying charge of
intimidation, and that sentence will be enhanced by an additional
six years for a total of eight and half years I guess. None of which
is to be able to be suspended but you are to be given credit for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 9 of 13
time served awaiting disposition. I hope and I would so recommend
to the Department of Correction that you be afforded any and all
opportunities to undergo any kind of mental health counseling that could
be deemed appropriate, including if they so choose to a mental health
facility. In the event that there be testimony down the road that
you are cured—never totally cured—but to the point where you
can be released back into society, I would love the opportunity to
do so.
Tr. pp. 64–65 (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent McClain argues that the
trial court wholly failed to consider his mental illness, he is incorrect.
[15] McClain’s argument can only be construed as being that the trial court failed to
give this mitigator the proper weight. However, the relative weight or value
assignable to properly found mitigators and aggravators is no longer subject to
review for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1123, 1131 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491), trans. denied. Here, the
trial court considered McClain’s mental illness but declined to give it mitigating
weight. Post-Anglemyer, this is a decision that we may no longer review.2 See id.
B. Appropriateness of McClain’s Sentence
[16] McClain also argues that his eight-and-one-half-year sentence is inappropriate.
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we “may revise a sentence
2 Assuming arguendo that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly consider McClain’s mental
health issues as a mitigator, this would not require us to remand for resentencing. Even if a trial court has
abused its discretion in sentencing, the court on appeal need not remand for resentencing if the sentence
imposed is not inappropriate. Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied; Williams
v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1154, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Windhorst v. State, 868 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ind.
2007)). As explained below, McClain’s eight-and-one-half-year sentence is not inappropriate.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 10 of 13
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.”
[17] Although we may revise a sentence on appeal, we still exercise deference to a
trial court’s sentencing decision because Appellate Rule 7(B) requires us to give
“due consideration” to that decision, and because we understand and recognize
the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Trainor v.
State, 950 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Thus, “[t]he
principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers,
and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with
improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’
result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008).
Moreover, our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) “should focus on the forest—
the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent,
number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. And
the question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate but whether
the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Rose v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1055, 1063 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015).
[18] On appeal, it is the defendant’s burden to persuade us that the sentence
imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Id. (citing Childress v. State, 848
N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)). When we review the appropriateness of a
sentence, we consider “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 11 of 13
crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light
in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224).
[19] McClain was convicted of a Level 6 felony and found to be an habitual
offender. The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is one-half to two and onehalf years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b).
A trial court must sentence a person who is convicted of a Level 6 felony and
found to be an habitual offender to an additional fixed term between two and
six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(2). Thus, the trial court sentenced McClain
to the maximum sentence for a Level 6 felony and imposed the maximum
habitual offender enhancement.
[20] In general, maximum sentences are reserved for the worst offenders and
offenses. Townsend v. State, 934 N.E.2d 118, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing
Johnson v. State, 830 N.E.2d 895, 898 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied. “Although the
maximum possible sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst
offenders, this rule is not an invitation to determine whether a worse offender
could be imagined, as it is always possible to identify or hypothesize a
significantly more despicable scenario, regardless of the nature of any particular
offense and offender. Kovats v. State, 982 N.E.2d 409, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(citing Simmons v. State, 962 N.E.2d 86, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). Instead, “by
stating that maximum sentences are ordinarily appropriate for the worst
offenders, we refer generally to the class of offenses and offenders that warrant
the maximum punishment, and this encompasses a considerable variety of
offenses and offenders.” Id. (citing Simmons, 962 N.E.2d at 92–93).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 12 of 13
[21] There is nothing about the nature of McClain’s offense, such as “restraint,
regard, [or] lack of brutality,” that persuades us that his sentence is
inappropriate. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). To the
contrary, McClain escalated a simple request into a violent encounter requiring
the jail officers to restrain him. While resisting the officers, McClain threatened
one of them with a particularly violent manner of death—beheading.
[22] McClain’s character, as revealed by his extensive criminal history, does nothing
to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. From 2010 through 2019,
McClain accumulated seven misdemeanor convictions and three felony
convictions.3 He was also arrested for and charged with numerous other crimes
that were dismissed as a result of various plea agreements. More concerning is
that two of McClain’s prior felony convictions were for intimidation: the very
offense for which he was again convicted in the present case. Thus, his prior
convictions, as they relate to the current offense, reflect very poorly on his
character. See Simmons, 962 N.E.2d at 93 (holding that defendant’s prior
convictions for drunken driving reflected very poorly on his character as it
related to his current offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated) (citing
3 The presentence investigation report (“PSIR”) included in the record before us does not include McClain’s
most recent convictions for which he was in jail at the time of the instant offense. We take judicial notice of
the resolution of these charges from the chronological case summary for these cases, which is available
publicly on Indiana’s electronic case-management system. State v. McClain, No. 56D01-1706-F6-083,
available at: http://mycase.in.gov [https://perma.cc/EB7S-D72D]; see also Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154,
1162 (Ind. 2016) (holding that court records in Indiana’s statewide electronic case management system are
presumptively sources of facts that cannot reasonably be questioned and are therefore the proper subject of
judicial notice and taking judicial notice of trial court docket in related case showing that defendant had
previously been convicted of Class A misdemeanor battery).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-449 | August 24, 2020 Page 13 of 13
Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 n.4 (Ind. 1999) (noting that a prior
conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated would be a significant
aggravator in a subsequent alcohol-related offense)).
Conclusion
Outcome: As did the trial court, we recognize that McClain suffers from mental health
issues. We also take judicial notice of the fact that McClain is currently
incarcerated in the New Castle Psychiatric Unit, where we hope he is receiving
appropriate treatment for his mental health issues.4 However, under these facts
and circumstances, McClain has not met his appellate burden of demonstrating
that his eight-and-one-half-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of his offense and his character as an offender. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: