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Date: 05-16-2021
Case Style:
LEON RUCKER v. State of Indiana
Case Number: 20A-CR-02356
Judge: Edward W. Najam, Jr.
Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Plaintiff's Attorney: Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Steven J. Hosler
Deputy Attorney General
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Indianapolis, IN - Criminal defense attorney represented Leon Rucker with a invasion of privacy charge.
Rucker and S.H. were in a relationship, and they have one young child
together, who resides with S.H. On October 20, 2020, Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Officer Nicolas Modesto responded to a report of a
“disturbance” between a male and a female at S.H.’s residence. Tr. at 6. When
he arrived, Officer Modesto spoke with S.H., who was “upset” and “angry.”
Id. at 7. S.H. told Officer Modesto that she “was having an argument” with
Rucker. Id. While he was speaking with S.H., Officer Modesto saw Rucker
exit S.H.’s house, and he observed Rucker to be “pretty cool, calm and
collected.” Id. at 10. Officer Modesto then learned that S.H. had a no-contact
order against Rucker.
[3] The State charged Rucker with invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor.
At his ensuing bench trial, the State presented as evidence the no-contact order
the court had issued on September 3, 2020, prohibiting Rucker from contacting
S.H. See Ex. at 14. The State also presented the testimony of Officer Modesto
that Rucker had been at S.H.’s house while S.H. was home on October 20. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-2356 | May 13, 2021 Page 3 of 6
[4] Rucker then testified in his defense. Rucker testified that he had received a
phone call from the woman who was watching his child. The woman told
Rucker that the child was “having trouble breathing” and that she was unable
to reach S.H. Tr. at 17. Rucker testified that, following that phone call, he
“dropped everything and went straight” to S.H.’s house to check on the child.
Id. Rucker then stated that he was able to speak with the caregiver but that he
“realized” that his child was not there. Id. at 18. And he testified that he did
not encounter S.H. until he left the house.
[5] On cross-examination, the State asked Rucker if he had considered calling 9-1-1
instead of going to S.H.’s house himself. Rucker responded that he had not.
See Tr. at 19. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found that Rucker
had committed invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor, and entered
judgment of conviction accordingly. The court then sentenced Rucker to
eighty-eight days. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Rucker asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well
settled:
For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
[judgment]. Drane v. State, 687 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We
do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.
We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-2356 | May 13, 2021 Page 4 of 6
could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).
[7] In order to convict Rucker of invasion of privacy, the State was required to
prove that Rucker had knowingly or intentionally violated an order issued
under Indiana Code Section 35-33-8-3.2. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(11)
(2020). On appeal, Rucker does not dispute the fact that there was a no-contact
order in place prohibiting him from having any contact with S.H. Nor does he
dispute that he went to her house on October 20, 2020, despite that order.
Rather, Rucker asserted that he “established the defense of necessity” and that
the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut that defense. Appellant’s
Br. at 7.
[8] In order to prevail on a claim of necessity, the defendant must show:
(1) the act charged as criminal must have been done to prevent a
significant evil, (2) there must have been no adequate alternative
to the commission of the act, (3) the harm caused by the act must
not be disproportionate to the harm avoided, (4) the accused
must entertain a good faith belief that his act was necessary to
prevent greater harm, (5) such belief must be objectively
reasonable under all the circumstances, and (6) the accused must
not have substantially contributed to the creation of the
emergency.
Dozier v. State, 709 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). To negate a claim of
necessity, the State must disprove at least one element of the defense beyond a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-2356 | May 13, 2021 Page 5 of 6
reasonable doubt. Clemons v. State, 996 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
Where a defendant has been convicted despite his claim of necessity, this Court
will reverse the conviction only if no reasonable person could say that the
defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[9] Here, Rucker asserts that he was legally justified in going to S.H.’s house that
night because he had “received a phone call from [his] child’s caregiver that his
one[-]year[-]old baby was having trouble breathing” and that the caregiver was
unable to reach S.H. Appellant’s Br. at 8. He maintains that, during this
Covid-19 pandemic, “the information that his one[-]year[-]old daughter suffered
from breathing problems would require . . . him to see his daughter
immediately.” Id. at 9. Thus, he maintains that he proved all of the elements
of the defense.
[10] But that argument is simply a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence,
which we cannot do. The evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment
demonstrates that the child was not present at S.H.’s house when Rucker went
there. See Tr. at 18. The evidence further demonstrates that, despite a nocontact order, Rucker went to S.H.’s house and proceeded to argue with S.H. to
the point that officers received a call about a disturbance. And, when Officer
Modesto observed Rucker exit S.H.’s home, Rucker’s demeanor was “pretty
cool, calm and collected[.]” Tr. at 10. Based on that evidence, a reasonable
fact-finder could conclude that Rucker had not gone to S.H.’s house in violation
of the no-contact order in order to check on his ill daughter. In other words, the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-2356 | May 13, 2021 Page 6 of 6
State presented evidence to rebut Rucker’s claim that he had gone to S.H.’s
house to prevent a significant evil. Dozier, 709 N.E.2d at 29.
[11] But even if we were to agree with Rucker that he only went to S.H.’s house
because he believed that his daughter was there and experiencing a medical
emergency, that does not support his defense of necessity. Rucker could have
called 9-1-1 and had trained medical professionals check on the health and
welfare of his child without violating the no-contact order. See Davis v. State, 74
N.E.3d 1215, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that a defendant’s argument
that he drove at a high rate of speed to prevent his car from overheating did not
support his defense of necessity where the defendant could have called a tow
truck or pulled over to the side of the road). Indeed, on appeal, Rucker
acknowledges that “he could have called 911.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. As such,
Rucker did not show that there was no adequate alternative to him violating the
no-contact order.
[12] In sum, a reasonable person could conclude that the State presented sufficient
evidence to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt Rucker’s claim that he had
acted out of necessity. We therefore hold that there was sufficient evidence to
support his conviction for invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor.
Outcome: Affirmed
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: