Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.

Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw

Date: 09-12-2020

Case Style:

BRIAN E. LUSARDI, et al. v. CAESARSCREEK TOWNSHIP BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS

Case Number: 2020-CA-8

Judge: Michael T. Hall

Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

Plaintiff's Attorney: ELIZABETH A. ELLIS

Defendant's Attorney:



Free National Lawyer Directory


OR


Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.


Description: Xenia, OH - Zoning, Land Use

The Lusardis’ farm property comprises 13.55 acres of agricultural-zoned
property in Caesarscreek Township. On the property is a pole barn, a small out-building
overlooking a roughly one-acre pond, a few acres of woodlands, and an eight-acre hay
field that the Lusardis have tended and harvested for the last several years. The farm
does not have livestock. Growing hay is the only agricultural activity.
{¶ 3} In 2016, Senate Bill 75 went into effect with the goal of encouraging the
growth of agritourism in Ohio. The changes made by the bill included limiting the
authority of a board of zoning appeals (among others) to prohibit agritourism through
zoning, applying current agricultural-use valuation to land used for agritourism for
property tax purposes, and establishing civil-law immunity for agritourism providers. The
newly enacted immunity statute, R.C. 901.80, contains the definition of agritourism: “
‘Agritourism’ means an agriculturally related educational, entertainment, historical,
-3-
cultural, or recreational activity, including you-pick operations or farm markets, conducted
on a farm that allows or invites members of the general public to observe, participate in,
or enjoy that activity.” R.C. 901.80(A)(2).
{¶ 4} In 2016, Caesarscreek Township amended its zoning law. The section
governing agritourism, Section 324, requires an agritourism provider to “identify the
educational, entertainment, historical, cultural and/or recreational relationship of the
agritourism operation to the existing agricultural use of the property and the surrounding
agricultural community in general.” Caesarscreek Township Zoning Resolution, Section
324.2.
{¶ 5} In November 2018, the Lusardis filed an application to conduct agritourism
activity on their farm property. The activities described in the application were corn mazes,
hayrides, and celebratory events, like agriculturally-themed weddings and receptions.
According to the application, “[t]he farm setting provides the spectacular visual
background of farm fields and woodlands that exclusively take place on an actual farm;
not a traditional wedding hall.” The description further stated: “Designated areas at our
farm within the hay field, corn maze, woods and/or forth coming pavilion can be used for
anyone to celebrate an agriculturally themed event they wish to commemorate on that
day.”
{¶ 6} In December 2018, the BZA held a public hearing on the Lusardis’
application. The Lusardis testified that the property would offer a tranquil setting in which
guests could enjoy the scenery, walk the hay fields and woods, and learn about the
various plant and wildlife via placards that would be strategically placed throughout the
property. The guests could also have bonfires, play corn hole, fish, and do the kinds of
-4-
things that you can do only on a farm. Brian Lusardi testified that he wanted to have
people get married outside, in the woods and in the hayfield, because they are beautiful.
{¶ 7} The zoning inspector for the township testified and urged the BZA not to grant
the application as to the proposed celebratory events. The inspector said that he had
examined the application and had discussed the matter with the Lusardis. He said that
he had also looked at the definition of “agritourism” in R.C. 901.80 and looked at the
requirements of Section 324 of the Caesarscreek Township Zoning Resolution. It was the
zoning inspector’s opinion that “the Lusardis’ agritourism proposal is an attempt to
circumvent [the] Ohio Revised Code and the Caesarscreek Zoning Resolution in order to
run a non-agriculture based business on their agricultural zoned property.” (Tr. 49.)
According to the inspector, other than the rural setting, the agricultural relationship of the
proposed activities, weddings and receptions, was “not agricultural education, agricultural
entertainment, agricultural history, agricultural culture or agricultural recreation.” (Id. at
48.) In short, “[a] wedding and reception event that is hosted on a property, as described,
holds no basic relationship to the existing agricultural use of the property and the
surrounding agricultural community in general.” (Id.) Rather, “[a] wedding and reception
venue is a business proposition, pure and simple, in which the agricultural use of the
property is incidental, at best.” (Id. at 49.)
{¶ 8} After the hearing, the BZA issued a decision granting the Lusardis’
agritourism application as to corn mazes and hayrides but denying it as to the proposed
celebratory events, finding that the events did not constitute agritourism, because they
were not agriculturally-related activities. The Lusardis filed an administrative appeal in the
-5-
Greene County Court of Common Pleas. On January 16, 2020, the trial court affirmed the
BZA’s decision, saying:
The facts are not disputed in this matter. The BZA’s conclusion that
weddings don’t bear a general relevance to agriculture is. This Court does
not find this conclusion to be unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable or unsupported by the preponderance of the substantial,
reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record. It is understandable
why the BZA approved the Lusardis’ application for a corn maze and hay
rides on their farm but denied it for celebratory events. Corn mazes and hay
rides bear a reasonable relationship to agriculture.
{¶ 9} The Lusardis now appeal to this Court.
II. Standard of Review
{¶ 10} The standards of review used by a trial court and an appellate court in an
administrative appeal are as follows:
* * * “R.C. Chapter 2506 governs appeals to the courts of common
pleas from final orders of administrative officers and agencies of political
subdivisions, including municipal boards of zoning appeals. R.C. 2506.04
governs the standard of review the trial court must apply in such an appeal.
It provides that ‘the court may find that the order, adjudication, or decision
is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or
unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative
evidence on the whole record.’ The statute further provides that the court's
judgment may be appealed by any party to the court of appeals ‘on
-6-
questions of law.’ ” Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, ¶ 22,
quoting R.C. 2506.04.
“The common pleas court considers the ‘whole record,’ including any
new or additional evidence admitted under R.C. 2506.03 * * *.” Henley v.
Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147, 735 N.E.2d
433 (2000). “Thus, R.C. Chapter 2506 confers on the common pleas courts
the power to examine the whole record, make factual and legal
determinations, and reverse the board’s decision if it is not supported by a
preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.” Cleveland
Clinic at ¶ 24, citing Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro. Housing Auth., 58 Ohio
St.2d 202, 207, 389 N.E.2d 1113 (1979).
In contrast, the court of appeals has a standard of review that is
“more limited in scope.” Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 465 N.E.2d
848 (1984). The court of appeals may “review the judgment of the common
pleas court only on ‘questions of law,’ which does not include the same
extensive power to weigh ‘the preponderance of substantial, reliable and
probative evidence,’ as is granted to the common pleas court. Within the
ambit of ‘questions of law’ for appellate court review would be abuse of
discretion by the common pleas court.” Id. at 34, fn. 4, quoting R.C. 2506.04.
An “ ‘abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude that is
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. * * * It is to be expected that
most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply
-7-
unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.”
AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp.,
50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
Penewit v. Spring Valley Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-6, 2019-
Ohio-3200, ¶ 18-21.
III. Analysis
{¶ 11} The Lusardis assign four errors to the trial court:
1. “The trial court erred in affirming the Appellee’s decision as a matter of
law because the trial court failed to address the statutory construction of the
Agritourism statute O.R.C. 901.80.”
2. “The trial court erred in affirming the Appellee’s decision as a matter of
law because the trial court failed to provide any legal analysis whether
celebratory events, such as hayfield weddings or farm-themed weddings
constitute an agritourism activity under O.R.C. 901.80.”
3. “The trial court erred in affirming the Appellee’s decision as a matter of
law because the trial court failed to address whether the Appellee applied
the wrong standard for the criteria to determine if celebratory events, such
as hayfield weddings or farm-themed weddings are considered agritourism
activities under O.R.C. 901.80.”
4. “The trial court erred in affirming the Appellee's decision because the trial
court abused its discretion in concluding the Appellee’s decision was
supported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative
evidence.”
-8-
A. The trial court’s decision, technically
{¶ 12} We begin with the first three assignments of error, considering them
together. In these assignments of error, the Lusardis contend that the trial court failed to
address how to construe the statutory definition of “agritourism,” failed to analyze whether
their proposed celebratory events satisfied the definition, and failed to address whether
the BZA used the correct standard in its determination that the proposed celebratory
events did not constitute “agritourism.”
{¶ 13} “A trial court is not required to issue a detailed opinion in an administrative
appeal, nor is it required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R.
52. Nevertheless, ‘for an appellate court to conduct a meaningful review, sufficiently
detailed reasoning should be specified in the trial court’s order.’ ” (Citation omitted.)
Watson v. City of Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104374, 2017-Ohio-2982, ¶ 14,
quoting Cross v. A-Best Prods. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90388, 2009-Ohio-2039,
¶ 22. Accord B.R. Knez Constr., Inc. v. Concord Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 11th Dist.
Lake No. 2018-L-049, 2019-Ohio-3149, ¶ 46. The trial court’s decision here does not
hamper our review. The court’s ten-page decision lays out the parties’ competing
arguments and the evidence, and though the court does not provide an in-depth analysis,
the basis for the court’s decision is clear.
{¶ 14} Also, a trial court is not required to address each argument raised on
appeal. Abdalla Ents. v. Liberty Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 196 Ohio App.3d 204, 2011-Ohio5085, 962 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), citing Dyke v. Shaker Hts., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 83010, 2004-Ohio-514, ¶ 65. Instead, in reviewing the administrative appeal, the trial
court was required merely to weigh the evidence presented on the whole record and
-9-
determine whether the administrative order was unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable,
and probative evidence. See Shields v. Englewood, 172 Ohio App.3d 620, 2007-Ohio3165, 876 N.E.2d 972, ¶ 28 (2d Dist.). It is clear to us that the trial court here properly
applied this standard in its review.
{¶ 15} Because the court applied the appropriate legal standard when reviewing
the BZA’s decision, we see no technical problem with the court’s decision. The first,
second, and third assignments of error are overruled.
} The fourth assignment of error challenges the trial court’s ultimate
conclusion: that the BZA’s decision that the Lusardis’ proposed celebratory events did not
constitute agritourism was not unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of the substantial, reliable, and
probative evidence in the record. Our limited review considers only whether the trial
court’s conclusion was an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 17} R.C. 901.80(A)(2) defines “agritourism” as “an agriculturally-related
educational, entertainment, historical, cultural, or recreational activity, including you-pick
operations or farm markets, conducted on a farm that allows or invites members of the
general public to observe, participate in, or enjoy that activity.” The township’s zoning law
contains a similar definition. See Caesarscreek Township Zoning Resolution, Section
324.2. The BZA’s position was that the proposed celebratory events (outdoor, farmthemed weddings and receptions) did not constitute “agritourism.” It cited the definition of
“agriculture” in R.C. 519.01, which includes “farming, ranching, algaculture; aquaculture;
-10-
apiculture; horticulture; viticulture; animal husbandry, including, but not limited to, the care
and raising of livestock, equine, and fur-bearing animals; poultry husbandry and the
production of poultry products; dairy production; the production of field crops, tobacco,
fruits, vegetables, nursery stock, ornamental shrubs, ornamental trees, flowers, sod, or
mushrooms; timber; pasturage; any combination of the foregoing; and the processing,
drying, storage, and marketing of agricultural products when those activities are
conducted in conjunction with, but are secondary to, such husbandry or production.”
Brian Lusardi testified that he and his wife wanted to “have people get married outside in
the woods and in our hay fields because it’s beautiful out there. They would—the guests
would get to enjoy—we intend to put little placards out to talk about the fish, the poison
ivy so people, they learn stuff. * * * Different kinds of trees, birds * * * so they can walk
around and they can learn.” (Tr. 37-38.) “Essentially,” said Brian Lusardi, “it’s in the setting
* * * you have to have the farm in order to have a farm-themed wedding.” (Id. at 38.) But
none of this, the BZA pointed out, really relates to “agriculture.” The Lusardis’ property
produces only hay, and the only connection to hay mentioned was that people could stand
in the hay field during an event.
{¶ 18} The BZA did not see a connection between the rural venue and the
agricultural activity occurring on the Lusardis’ property. Just because an activity is done
on agricultural property does not make it “agritourism” and is not, by itself, enough to
make the activity “agriculturally related.” The BZA pointed out that there was no evidence
that any of the crops or flowers grown on the property would be used in the events and
no evidence that the growing of hay was in any way connected to the proposed
celebratory events. The BZA concluded that the Lusardis’ proposal was for an event
-11-
venue with an incidental agricultural theme, rather than an agricultural activity with an
incidental event.
{¶ 19} The evidence supported the BZA’s decision. The Lusardis own some
agricultural property on which they wanted to host celebratory events, like weddings and
receptions. But these events had far more to do with the agricultural setting than with the
agricultural activity on the property. As the zoning inspector pointed out, “[t]he application
refers to the visual setting for a marriage ceremony and reception held on the farm.” (Id.
at 47.) And Brian Lusardi admitted as much when he told the BZA that “[e]ssentially, it’s
in the setting.” (Id. at 38.)
{¶ 20} The Lusardis urge us to decide whether celebratory events constitute
“agritourism” as a matter of law. We decline to do so. The BZA here did not decide
categorically that celebratory events are not agritourism. Rather, it decided only that the
celebratory events proposed by the Lusardis did not constitute agritourism. Whether a
particular activity constitutes “agritourism” is an issue that shades to gray quite quickly,
and it is clear from the hearing transcript that the BZA struggled with the decision. Given
the great variety of factual situations, we decline to rule on whether celebratory events
constitute “agritourism” as a matter of law.
{¶ 21} Given the facts in this particular case, however, we believe that it was
reasonable to find that the proposed celebratory events did not constitute “agritourism.”
Consequently the trial court did not abuse its discretion by affirming the BZA’s decision
denying the Lusardis’ application for agritourism activity as to the proposed celebratory
events.
{¶ 22} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

Outcome: We have overruled all of the assignments of error presented. The trial
court’s judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments:



Find a Lawyer

Subject:
City:
State:
 

Find a Case

Subject:
County:
State: