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Date: 10-06-2018
Case Style:
CHRISTOPHER HILL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Case Number: 2017-SC-000562-MR
Judge: MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
Plaintiff's Attorney: Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Defendant's Attorney: Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Description:
Appellant, Christopher Hill, was implieated in the murder and robbery of
Bret Thornberry by his eo-defendant, Romello Rice. On November 29, 2012, a
Kenton County Grand Jury indicted Hill on one count of murder and one count
of robbery in the first degree. On December 6, 2012, a superseding indictment
repeated those charges. Hill was represented by two lawyers from the
Department of Public Advocacy (“DPA”).
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Hill was wearing an ankle monitor at the time of Thornberry’s robbery
and shooting. The record shows that the ankle monitor was not at the crime
scene on the day of Thornberry’s shooting, (TR 198). However, the
Commonwealth alleged that Hill had removed the monitor before he committed
the crimes.
During discovery, defense counsel filed several motions on Hill’s behalf,
including motions; to suppress Rice’s inculpatory statements about Hill; to
compel the Commonwealth to turn over other statements made by Rice; and to
exclude Rice as a witness. However, the trial court denied all of those motions.
On April 9, 2013, the trial court issued an order setting the trial date for
January 14, 2014. On December 4, 2013, defense counsel filed a continuance
motion. Therein, defense counsel cited insufficient time to interview witnesses
and thoroughly inspect data from Hill’s ankle monitor. The trial court denied
defense counsel’s continuance motion.
On January 10, 2014, Hill accepted a plea agreement from the
Commonwealth and entered a guilty plea on both counts. In the agreement,
the Commonwealth offered Hill the minimum 20-year sentence for each crime,
to run concurrently. During the hearing on his guilty plea. Hill stated under
oath that he participated in the robbery. Initially, he did not answer questions
from the court when pressed to describe his participation, but, after speaking
briefly with his attorney. Hill stated that he participated in the robbery and
shot Thornberry. At that time, he did not voice any concern about the
effectiveness of his legal representation.
On February 10, 2014, the trial court held its initial sentencing hearing
but, by agreed order, the sentencing hearing was continued to March 24, 2014.
On February 14, 2014, Hill spoke with defense counsel, whose records
noted, “Chris wants me to tell the prosecutor that Face was the shooter and he
copped [a plea deal because] he was scared of Face.” Notably, on March 14,
2014, Rice spoke with Hill’s attorney. Rice told her that Hill was not his
accomplice. Instead, he stated he committed the crimes with Adam “Face”
Curtly, but laid blame on Hill because he was afraid of “Face,” who had a grisly
reputation.
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, against defense counsel’s
advice. Hill presented a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Hill asserted
that he did not commit the crimes charged, stating that he only pled guilty to
“get it over with,” (VR 3/24/14 at 2:05:59), and “because my lawyer said it was
in my best interest.” [Id. at 2:07:30). The trial court denied Hill’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, entered judgment of conviction on both counts, and
sentenced Hill to twenty years’ imprisonment on each count to be served
concurrently in accord with the plea agreement.
On Februaiy 4, 2015, Hill filed a RCr 11.42 motion pro se, seeking to
vacate his conviction. Hill claimed that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately represent him prior to his plea agreement and during his
plea withdrawal. As part of his motion. Hill attached an affidavit from Rice
attesting that Hill had nothing to do with the shooting or robbery. Hill claimed
that defense counsel’s failure to interview Rice before he made his guilty plea
and to follow up on Rice’s exculpatory testimony was ineffective assistance.
The DPA was again appointed to represent Hill. His new trial counsel
filed a supplemental RCr 11.42 motion on July 12, 2016.
On Februaiy 1, 2017, the trial court found that Hill’s prior attorney’s
conflict of interest surrounding his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea
required his sentence to be vacated. Correspondingly, the court found that he
was entitled to be represented by different counsel at a hearing on his guilty
plea withdrawal motion. Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying the motion
to withdraw his guilty plea was set aside and a new hearing was scheduled to
be held on that motion.
On August 10, 2017, a new hearing was held on Hill’s motion. Hill
testified that defense counsel had informed him that his case was her first
murder trial. He testified that counsel’s lack of preparation—evidenced by her
continuance motion and general inexperience—had a major impact on his
decision to plead guilty. Hill claimed defense counsel encouraged him to plead
because Rice had implicated him and had reached a plea deal to testify against
him. He alleged that defense counsel coerced him to plea out of fear that the
Commonwealth had a strong case against him and that he could face the death
penalty.
Furthermore, Hill stated that he asked defense counsel to speak with
Rice before deciding to enter a guilty plea but claimed they would not. Hill felt
that Rice’s decision to speak with defense counsel on March 14, 2014, at which
point Rice stated that he had implicated Hill out of fear of “Face,” meant Rice
would not have testified against him at trial after all—and, but for Rice’s
damning testimony, he would not have pled guilty.
However, Hill did not call his former attorneys or Rice as witnesses
during his hearing. Instead, he presented his own testimony and the taped
interview between defense counsel and Rice, wherein Rice recanted his
implication of Hill and stated “Face” actually shot the victim.
During cross-examination concerning the taped interview, Hill conceded
that he and Rice were housed in the same correctional facility prior to Rice’s
interview. Hill also conceded that he saw a handwritten letter from Rice during
discovery—prior to his guilty plea—that implicated him in the crimes. He
further conceded that he never told the trial judge that he lacked confidence in
his attorneys or that he pled out of fear of “Face” or his attorneys’ alleged
deficient preparation for trial.
On August 14, 2017, the trial court issued an order denying Hill’s motion
to withdraw, finding that his plea was made voluntarily. In its order, the trial
court noted, “This court finds that Defendant offered nothing to convince this
court that his desire to withdraw his guilty plea was anything other than a
change of heart after the fact.” (TR 448). Therefore, the trial court affirmed its
prior judgment of guilt based upon his guilty plea.
On October 6, 2017, the trial court sentenced Hill to 20 years’
imprisonment. He now appeals his judgment and sentence as a matter of right
pursuant to Section 110(2)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
Analysis
Because “‘the trial court is in the best position to determine if there was
any reluctance, misunderstanding, involuntariness, or incompetence to plead
guilty’ . . . this Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea only for abuse of discretion by ‘ascertain [ing] whether
the court below acted erroneously in denying that appellant's pleas were made
involuntarily.’” Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.Sd 482, 487 (Ky. 2001)
(internal citations omitted). Abuse of discretion occurs when “the trial judge’s
decision [is] arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.Sd 575, 581 (Ky.
2000).
“A guilty plea is valid only when it is entered intelligently and
voluntarily.” Bronk, 58 S.W.Sd at 486. “At any time before judgment the court
may permit the plea of guilty ... to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty
substituted.” RCr 8.10. When a defendant alleges that his guilty plea was
involuntary, then a hearing must be held to determine whether the plea was
voluntary. Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.Sd 8, 10 (Ky. 2002).
In cases where the defendant disputes his or her voluntariness, a proper exercise of this discretion [under RCr 8.10] requires trial courts to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea and juxtapose the presumption of voluntariness inherent in a proper plea colloquy with a Strickland v. Washington inquiry into the performance of counsel . . . the trial court must evaluate whether errors by trial counsel significantly influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty in a manner which gives the trial court reason to doubt the voluntariness and validity of the plea.
Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 486-87.
In reference to the Strickland inquiry, this Court has recognized that:
A showing that counsel's assistance was ineffective in enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in deciding to plead guilty has two components: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process
that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.
Bronk, 58 S.W.Sd at 486-87 (citations omitted).
The crux of Hill’s argument is that defense counsel was not prepared for
trial, demonstrated by her December 4, 2013 motion for a continuance, which
caused him to plead guilty. As examples of her alleged ineptitude. Hill testified
as to defense counsel’s decision not to interview Rice before trial; her failure to
interview other witnesses; her failure to thoroughly inspect data from his ankle
monitor; and her general lack of experience with murder trials.
Rice was a co-defendant in the robbery and murder of Thornberry, whose
admission implicated Hill as his accomplice. Rice was represented by counsel
and took a plea deal but had yet to be sentenced leading up to Hill’s trial. As
part of his plea deal. Rice had agreed to testify that he and Hill had robbed
Thornberry and that Hill was the shooter.
Given Rice’s participation as the Commonwealth’s primary witness
against her client, defense counsel had no reason to believe Rice’s testimony
would help her client. Whether Rice and Hill had truly pled guilty in order to
avert the wrath of “Face” or the pair concocted the new stoiy after both pled
guilty, defense counsel had no reason to suspect that Rice would about-face
prior to trial and change into a defense witness.
In fact, defense counsel made several attempts to protect her client from
Rice’s testimony. For instance, she moved the trial court: to disallow Rice’s
incriminating statements; to permit discovery of further statements made by
7
him to the Commonwealth; and to bar him from testifying as a witness during
Hill’s trial.
Defense counsel adequately conferred with her client and kept him
abreast of information about his case. She discussed the evidence and
discovery materials with Hill. She made attempts to prevent his cohort from
testifying. She moved the court for a continuance to allow for more discovery.
After her efforts were unsuccessful, she informed Hill of her apprehension
about the strength of the Commonwealth’s evidence against him and her
concern about his possible sentence if he was convicted of robbery and
murder—potentially the death penalty or life imprisonment.
Hill cites Commonwealth v. Tigue, 459 S.W.Sd 372, 393 (Ky. 2015), for
the proposition that “pressure tactics” used by counsel to convince a client that
pleading guilty is in the client’s best interest are relevant to the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the client’s decision to enter a plea agreement.
Even though Tigue may stand for such a proposition, we find no such
“pressure tactics” here. Defense Counsel was candid with her client about the
merits of his case. Other than Hill’s contention, the record does not indicate
any attempts to pressure or coerce him into taking a plea deal. It is proper for
defense attorneys to discuss the potential outcome of trials with their clients
and to speak with them about whether plea deals may be in their interest.
Furthermore, the fact that she was preparing for her first murder trial
did not make her representation per se ineffective. Moreover, Hill was
8
represented by both defense counsel and her supervisor. He had the benefit of
representation from both attorneys.
Rather than arguing that defense counsel made serious errors falling
outside the realm of competent legal representation, Hill merely claims that she
should have used a different discovery strategy regarding the witnesses she
interviewed. “‘[AJttempting to denigrate the conscientious efforts of counsel on
the basis that someone else would have handled the case differently or better
will be accorded short shrift in this court.”’ Moore v. Commonwealth, 983
S.W.2d 479, 485 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Penn v. Commonwealth, 427 S.W.2d 808,
809 (Ky. 1968)).
“[A] motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before entry of the final
judgment of conviction and sentence is a ‘critical stage’ of the criminal
proceedings to which the right to counsel attaches.” Tigue, 459 S.W.3d 372 at
384. Given the conflict that arose when Hill moved pro se for his guilty plea to
be withdrawn against defense counsel’s advice, the trial court appropriately
vacated its previous judgment and appointed Hill new counsel to represent him
on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. During the hearing held on his
motion, the trial court allowed Hill to present evidence in support of his claim
that his plea was involuntary. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in reviewing the record, determining Hill voluntarily pled
guilty, and denying Hill’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: