Date: 07-09-2020

Case Style:

Case Number: 19175

Judge: Roberts

Court: Supreme Court of the United States

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Defendant's Attorney:

Description: In April 2019, three committees of the U. S. House of Representativesissued four subpoenas seeking information about the finances of Pres-ident Donald J. Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses. The House Committee on Financial Services issued a subpoena to DeutscheBank seeking any document related to account activity, due diligence, foreign transactions, business statements, debt schedules, statementsof net worth, tax returns, and suspicious activity identified by Deutsche Bank. It issued a second subpoena to Capital One for similar information. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a subpoena to Deutsche Bank that mirrored the subpoena issued bythe Financial Services Committee. And the House Committee on Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to the President’s personalaccounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP, demanding information related tothe President and several affiliated businesses. Although each of thecommittees sought overlapping sets of financial documents, each sup-plied different justifications for the requests, explaining that the infor-mation would help guide legislative reform in areas ranging frommoney laundering and terrorism to foreign involvement in U. S. elec-tions. Petitioners—the President in his personal capacity, along withhis children and affiliated businesses—contested the subpoena issuedby the Oversight Committee in the District Court for the District ofColumbia (Mazars, No. 19–715) and the subpoenas issued by the Fi-nancial Services and Intelligence Committees in the Southern Districtof New York (Deutsche Bank, No. 19–760). In both cases, petitionerscontended that the subpoenas lacked a legitimate legislative purpose —————— * Together with 19–760, Trump et al. v. Deutsche Bank AG et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
2 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP Syllabus and violated the separation of powers. The President did not, however, argue that any of the requested records were protected by executive privilege.In Mazars, the District Court granted judgment for the House and the D. C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the subpoena issued by the Oversight Committee served a valid legislative purpose because therequested information was relevant to reforming financial disclosure requirements for Presidents and presidential candidates. In Deutsche Bank, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction and the Sec-ond Circuit affirmed in substantial part, holding that the Intelligence Committee properly issued its subpoena to Deutsche Bank as part ofan investigation into alleged foreign influence in the U. S. political pro-cess, which could inform legislation to strengthen national security and combat foreign meddling. The court also concluded that the sub-poenas issued by the Financial Services Committee to Deutsche Bank and Capital One were adequately related to potential legislation on money laundering, terrorist financing, and the global movement of il-licit funds through the real estate market. Held: The courts below did not take adequate account of the significantseparation of powers concerns implicated by congressional subpoenas for the President’s information. Pp. 7–20.(a) Historically, disputes over congressional demands for presiden-tial documents have been resolved by the political branches throughnegotiation and compromise without involving this Court. The Court recognizes that this dispute is the first of its kind to reach the Court; that such disputes can raise important issues concerning relations be-tween the branches; that similar disputes recur on a regular basis, in-cluding in the context of deeply partisan controversy; and that Con-gress and the Executive have nonetheless managed for over two centuries to resolve these disputes among themselves without Su-preme Court guidance. Such longstanding practice “‘is a consideration of great weight’ ” in cases concerning “the allocation of power between [the] two elected branches of Government,” and it imposes on the Court a duty of care to ensure that it does not needlessly disturb “the com-promises and working arrangements” reached by those branches. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 524–526 (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689). Pp. 7–11.(b) Each House of Congress has the power “to secure needed infor-mation” in order to legislate. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 161. This power is “indispensable” because, without information, Con-gress would be unable to legislate wisely or effectively. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 215. Because this power is “justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process,” it is subject to severallimitations. Id., at 197. Most importantly, a congressional subpoena
3 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) Syllabus is valid only if it is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate taskof the Congress.” Id., at 187. The subpoena must serve a “valid legis-lative purpose.” Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 161. Further-more, Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of “law en-forcement,” because that power is assigned to the Executive and the Judiciary. Ibid. Finally, recipients of congressional subpoenas retain their constitutional rights and various privileges throughout the course of an investigation. Pp. 11–12. (c) The President contends, as does the Solicitor General on behalf of the United States, that congressional subpoenas for the President’s information should be evaluated under the standards set forth in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F. 2d 725, which would require the House to show that the requested information satisfies a “demonstrated, specific need,” 418 U. S., at 713, and is “demonstrablycritical” to a legislative purpose, 498 F. 2d, at 731. Nixon and Senate Select Committee, however, involved subpoenas for communications between the President and his close advisers, over which the President asserted executive privilege. Because executive privilege safeguards the public interest in candid, confidential deliberations within the Ex-ecutive Branch, information subject to the privilege deserves “the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.” 418 U. S., at 715. That protection should not be transplanted root and branch to cases involving nonprivileged, private information, which by definition does not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations.The standards proposed by the President and the Solicitor General— if applied outside the context of privileged information—would risk se-riously impeding Congress in carrying out its responsibilities, giving short shrift to its important interests in conducting inquiries to obtaininformation needed to legislate effectively. Pp. 12–14.(d) The approach proposed by the House, which relies on precedents that did not involve the President’s papers, fails to take adequate ac-count of the significant separation of powers issues raised by congres-sional subpoenas for the President’s information. The House’s ap-proach would leave essentially no limits on the congressional power tosubpoena the President’s personal records. A limitless subpoena power could transform the established practice of the politicalbranches and allow Congress to aggrandize itself at the President’s ex-pense. These separation of powers concerns are unmistakably impli-cated by the subpoenas here, which represent not a run-of-the-mill leg-islative effort but rather a clash between rival branches of government over records of intense political interest for all involved. The inter-branch conflict does not vanish simply because the subpoenas seek per-sonal papers or because the President sued in his personal capacity.
4 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP Syllabus Nor are separation of powers concerns less palpable because the sub-poenas were issued to third parties. Pp. 14–18.(e) Neither side identifies an approach that adequately accounts for these weighty separation of powers concerns. A balanced approach is necessary, one that takes a “considerable impression” from “the prac-tice of the government,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401, and “resist[s]” the “pressure inherent within each of the separateBranches to exceed the outer limits of its power,” INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951. In assessing whether a subpoena directed at the Pres-ident’s personal information is “related to, and in furtherance of, a le-gitimate task of the Congress,” Watkins, 354 U. S., at 187, courts must take adequate account of the separation of powers principles at stake, including both the significant legislative interests of Congress and the unique position of the President. Several special considerations inform this analysis. First, courts should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose war-rants the significant step of involving the President and his papers. “ ‘[O]ccasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches’ should be avoided whenever possible.” Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 389–390 (quoting Nixon, 418 U. S., at 692). Congress may not rely on the President’s information if other sources could reasonably provide Congress the information it needs in light of its particular legislative objective. Second, to narrow the scope of possible conflict between the branches, courts should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Con-gress’s legislative objective. The specificity of the subpoena’s request“serves as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into the operation of the Office of the President.” Cheney, 542 U. S., at 387. Third, courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose. The more detailed and substantial, the better. That is par-ticularly true when Congress contemplates legislation that raises sen-sitive constitutional issues, such as legislation concerning the Presi-dency. Fourth, courts should assess the burdens imposed on the President by a subpoena, particularly because they stem from a rivalpolitical branch that has an ongoing relationship with the President and incentives to use subpoenas for institutional advantage. Other considerations may be pertinent as well; one case every two centuries does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list. Pp. 18–20. No. 19–715, 940 F. 3d 710; No. 19–760, 943 F. 3d 627, vacated and re-manded. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
5 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) Syllabus THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.
_________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Nos. 19–715 and 19–760 DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS 19–715 v. MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS 19–760 v. DEUTSCHE BANK AG, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [July 9, 2020] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. Over the course of five days in April 2019, three commit-tees of the U. S. House of Representatives issued four sub-poenas seeking information about the finances of President Donald J. Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses. We have held that the House has authority under the Con-stitution to issue subpoenas to assist it in carrying out itslegislative responsibilities. The House asserts that the fi-nancial information sought here—encompassing a decade’sworth of transactions by the President and his family—will help guide legislative reform in areas ranging from moneylaundering and terrorism to foreign involvement in U. S.

Outcome: Vacated and remanded.

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