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Date: 02-06-2019
Case Style:
United States of America v. John Pablo Martinez-Martinez, a/k/a Daniel Martinez Aguilar
Case Number: 18-5072
Judge: Nancy L. Moritz
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on appeal from the Northern District of Oklahoma (Tulsa County)
Plaintiff's Attorney: Charles Martin McLoughlin
Defendant's Attorney: Barry L. Derryberry - FPD
Description:
After Juan Pablo Martinez-Martinez pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the
United States for a third time, the district court sentenced him to 21 months’
imprisonment. Martinez-Martinez appeals, arguing his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
Martinez-Martinez is a native and citizen of Mexico who has voluntarily
returned to Mexico or been removed from the United States on several occasions.
Between 2000 and 2002, Martinez-Martinez voluntarily returned to Mexico seven
times. In 2002, he pleaded guilty to improper entry, and the government removed
him. In 2008, authorities discovered him in the United States and removed him again.
In 2010, he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry; the district court sentenced him to eight
months’ imprisonment, and the government then removed him. In 2012, he pleaded
guilty to illegal reentry for the second time; the district court sentenced him to 15
months’ imprisonment, and the government removed him once more.
Additionally, Martinez-Martinez incurred several drug- and alcohol-related
convictions while in the United States. In 2005, he pleaded guilty to possession of
marijuana and public intoxication. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to driving under the
influence of alcohol (DUI). And in 2010, he pleaded guilty to a second DUI.
In October 2017, law-enforcement officers arrested Martinez-Martinez in
Oklahoma. During routine booking procedures, the officers determined that
Martinez-Martinez was unlawfully in the United States. As a result, Martinez-
Martinez again pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a)—his third such conviction.
Based on a Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment, see U.S.S.G.
§ 2Ll.2(a), the district court sentenced Martinez-Martinez to 21 months’
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imprisonment. In support, the district court cited several factors, including Martinez-
Martinez’s reentry “after seven voluntary returns and four [removals]”; his “four
drug[-] or alcohol-related convictions”; his “history of physical[-] and mental[-]
health issues”; and his most recent illegal-reentry sentence of 15 months’
imprisonment. R. vol. 3, 39–40. Martinez-Martinez appeals, arguing that his
21-month sentence is substantively unreasonable.
“We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013). A district
court abuses its discretion only if it imposes a sentence that “is arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180,
1236 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1146
(10th Cir. 2008)).
In reviewing Martinez-Martinez’s sentence for substantive reasonableness, we
ask “whether the length of [his] sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of
the case in light of” the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v.
Singer, 825 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Craig, 808
F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2015)). Among other things, these factors include the
nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the
defendant; the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and
promote respect for law enforcement; the need to deter criminal conduct; and the
need to protect the public from future crimes. See § 3553(a). Further, because the
district court sentenced Martinez-Martinez within the Guidelines range, we presume
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that his sentence is reasonable. United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th
Cir. 2011).
Seeking to overcome the presumption of reasonableness, Martinez-Martinez
asserts the district court overemphasized the severity of his criminal history—in
particular, by focusing on his 2010 DUI conviction—when weighing the factors
listed in § 3553(a).1 Cf. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1) (allowing for downward departure if
“defendant’s criminal[-]history category substantially over[]represents [1] the
seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or [2] the likelihood that the
defendant will commit other crimes”). Martinez-Martinez suggests this conviction is
“minimal,” Aplt. Br. 9, because the state court never sentenced him for this offense.
But we see no indication that, by focusing on Martinez-Martinez’s 2010 DUI
conviction, the district court improperly inflated the severity of his criminal history.
Indeed, the state court never sentenced Martinez-Martinez for this offense because,
after the state court deferred sentencing for one year, Martinez-Martinez failed to
appear for his subsequent sentencing hearing. If anything, the circumstances of the
2010 DUI support, rather than undermine, the district court’s focus on this offense.
Moreover, we note that in addition to the 2010 DUI conviction, Martinez-
Martinez had a long list of other convictions, including two prior illegal-reentry
convictions and three other alcohol- and drug-related convictions. Further, for each
1 Martinez-Martinez doesn’t challenge the calculation of his Guidelines range,
essentially conceding that the 2010 DUI conviction was properly counted in his
criminal-history category.
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of the prior illegal-reentry convictions, he received sentences shorter than his current
sentence—8 and 15 months, respectively. Thus, it’s clear that neither the convictions
themselves nor the relatively short sentences Martinez-Martinez received as a result
of those convictions was sufficient to deter him from illegally reentering the country.
The district court was therefore justified in imposing this longer sentence as a
deterrent. See § 3553(a)(2)(B) (allowing district court to consider need for sentence
to “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”); United States v. Guardado-
Panuco, 746 F. App’x 784, 785 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (finding 24-month
sentence substantively reasonable because it would “provide the appropriate level of
deterrence” where defendant had two prior illegal-reentry convictions).
Accordingly, we see no indication that by focusing on Martinez-Martinez’s
2010 DUI conviction, the district court overstated the severity of his criminal history.
As such, Martinez-Martinez fails to overcome the presumption that his Guidelines
sentence is substantively reasonable, and the district court didn’t abuse its discretion
in imposing Martinez-Martinez’s sentence.
Outcome: Affirmed
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: Editor's Comment: The typical sentence for illegal re-entry is time served before deportation.