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Date: 10-13-2018
Case Style:
Tam Thanh Nguyen v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Jared Bromberg
Case Number: 17-3654
Judge: Bibas
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on appeal from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia County)
Plaintiff's Attorney: Earl Raynor
Defendant's Attorney: Josh Shapiro, J. Bart DeLone, Claudia M. Tesoro
Description:
A claim that a search was unconstitutional accrues when the
officer conducts the search, not when a court later declares it
unconstitutional. So the statute of limitations runs from the
time of the search, not the time of the court decision.
Here, Tam Thanh Nguyen sued Pennsylvania State Trooper
Jared Bromberg for a 2012 search and arrest, but only after a
2015 Pennsylvania court decision held that search unconstitutional.
Nguyen’s suit thus arrives more than a year late and is
time-barred, so we will affirm.
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I. FACTS
In January 2012, Nguyen caught a ride home from a New
Year’s party with his friend, David Kung. Around 3:15 a.m.,
Trooper Bromberg and his partner clocked the car driving 18
miles per hour over the speed limit. After tailing the car for a
bit, they pulled it over.
Bromberg checked Kung’s license and registration as well
as Nguyen’s ID. Bromberg asked Kung to step out of the car,
talked with him briefly, gave him a warning, and said he was
free to go. Both started to return to their cars. But the trooper
had second thoughts because Kung was nervous and because
his check of Nguyen’s ID revealed his history of drug arrests.
So Bromberg turned around and began to question Kung again.
Bromberg asked for permission to search the car, and Kung
consented. Bromberg then asked Nguyen to step out of the car
and asked him to consent to a pat-down. Nguyen consented.
The pat-down revealed a cellphone, a large bundle of cash, and
small baggies of pills. Nguyen admitted that the pills were OxyContin.
So Bromberg arrested Nguyen. A search incident to
arrest turned up bags of powder cocaine and jars of crack cocaine.
Pennsylvania prosecuted him, and Nguyen moved to suppress
the drugs. Commonwealth v. Nguyen, 116 A.3d 657, 662
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). The trial court denied the motion, but the
appeals court reversed, holding that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 669. The court reasoned that, by
reengaging Kung, Bromberg had seized him anew, and that this
second seizure required its own justification (beyond the initial
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speeding violation). Id. It found no reasonable suspicion for the
second seizure, so it held the seizure and resulting search of
Nguyen unconstitutional. Id. Pennsylvania then dismissed the
charges.
A few months later, in September 2015, Nguyen sued Bromberg
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserted that, by stopping the
car, searching him, and arresting him, Bromberg had (1) conducted
an unreasonable search and seizure, and (2) made a
false arrest, both in violation of Nguyen's Fourth Amendment
rights.
The District Court granted Bromberg’s motion for summary
judgment. Ngyuen v. Pennsylvania, No. 15-5082, 2017 WL
5113229, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2017). It reasoned that Bromberg’s
search and arrest comported with the Fourth Amendment;
that even if it did not, qualified immunity applied; and
that the statute of limitations barred Nguyen’s claims. Id. at *4.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Thomas
v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FROM THE TIME
OF THE SEARCH
We need not address Nguyen’s Fourth Amendment or qualified
immunity claims because his suit is untimely.
Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, but
borrows the statute of limitations from state personal-injury
torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). So Pennsylvania’s
two-year limitations period for personal injuries governs.
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 Pa.
5
Cons. Stat. § 5524(2). Nguyen thus had two years to file this
suit.
Up to this point, the parties agree. But Nguyen argues that
the limitations period began to run when the Pennsylvania
court held the search unconstitutional, not when the search
happened. We disagree.
Federal law, not state law, determines when a limitations period
begins to run. Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. Under federal law,
the statute of limitations runs from the moment that a claim
accrues. Id. And a claim accrues when the last act needed to
complete the tort occurs. Id. For a search, that is the moment
of the search. For a false arrest, that is the moment when legal
process justifies the detention or, absent legal process, the moment
of release. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390-91.
Here, the last act was Bromberg’s search of Nguyen, not the
Pennsylvania court decision invalidating the search. And Nguyen
was charged and held over for legal process that same day.
So the causes of action accrued, and the limitations period began
to run, in January 2012. Two years from then is January
2014. So Nguyen’s suit, filed in September 2015, came a year
and a half too late.
Outcome: Finally, Nguyen has not sought to toll the limitations period.
So his claim is time-barred. We will affirm.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: