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Date: 06-22-2019
Case Style:
CURTIS MARCO WILSON vs STATE OF FLORIDA
Case Number: 17-3568
Judge: Michael S. Orfinger
Court: DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT
Plaintiff's Attorney: Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General
Defendant's Attorney: Jorge León Chalela
Description:
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Wilson was arrested and taken to the St. Petersburg Police Department where
Citrus County detectives, investigating a murder, questioned him. Before questioning him,
the detectives read Wilson his Miranda1 rights. Wilson did not request an attorney or
invoke his right to remain silent. Wilson steadfastly denied that he had ever been to
Crystal River where the murder occurred or that he knew the other suspects or anything
about the murder. When one of the detectives showed Wilson a warrant for his arrest for
first-degree murder, Wilson said: “I don’t know what to tell you. I need a lawyer, man.”
The detectives ceased further questioning and Wilson was transported to Citrus County
Jail.
Five days later, the same Citrus County detectives went to the Citrus County jail
and questioned Wilson again. After he was again read his Miranda rights, Wilson agreed
to speak to the detectives, but said that he could not tell them much because he had to
speak to his lawyer first. The detectives urged Wilson to tell them what he knew about the
murder, informing him of the evidence they had against him and telling him that the other
suspects were claiming that Wilson alone had committed the murder. Wilson adamantly
denied having any part in the murder and repeatedly told the detectives that his lawyer
would figure out why the other suspects were trying to blame him for it. He did, however,
admit to being in Crystal River around the time of the murder.
Before trial, Wilson moved to suppress the statements he made during both
interrogations, arguing that both interviews were inadmissible because he had invoked
his right to counsel during the first interrogation, requiring the detectives to cease
questioning him. The trial court denied Wilson’s motion, finding that he had never
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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unequivocally requested the assistance of a lawyer at any time during questioning. At the
subsequent trial, Wilson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress as a mixed question of law
and fact. O’Hare v. State, 263 So. 3d 255, 258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). We defer to the trial
court’s findings of fact as long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence,
but we review de novo a trial court’s application of law to the facts. Delhall v. State, 95
So. 3d 134, 150 (Fla. 2012). Though when reviewing such a motion we defer to a trial
court’s findings of fact, this deference does not fully apply when, as here, the findings are
based mainly on review of videotapes and transcripts as opposed to live testimony. State
v. Carter, 172 So. 3d 538, 539-40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); see, e.g., Almeida v. State, 737
So. 2d 520, 524 n.9 (Fla. 1999) (“The trial court had no special vantage point in reviewing
this tape. Based on our review of the transcript and tape, we conclude that the record
evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding.”).
To resolve this appeal, we must answer two questions. First, did Wilson clearly
invoke his right to counsel? And second, if he did, was the admission of his statements
following his invocation harmful error? We address each question in turn.
“[A] suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an
attorney and to have counsel present during questioning, and . . . the police must explain
this right to him before questioning begins.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457
(1994) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469–73). If the suspect requests an attorney, the police
must immediately cease all questioning. Rhodes v. State, 219 So. 3d 251, 252 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2017).
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The suspect’s request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous. Davis, 512
U.S. at 459. Whether such a request is unambiguous is an objective inquiry designed to
determine if “a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id.; see, e.g., Daniel v. State, 238 So. 3d 1283,
1285-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (finding that suspect’s statement, “Look, can I have a lawyer,
man,” was unequivocal request for counsel); Rhodes, 219 So. 3d at 252 (finding that
suspect’s statement, “I need to see a lawyer,” was unequivocal request for counsel); Bean
v. State, 752 So. 2d 644, 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (concluding that statement, “I should
be able to talk to a lawyer,” was unequivocal request for counsel). “But if a suspect makes
a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in
light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking
the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.” Davis,
512 U.S. at 459; see, e.g., Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 571, 574 (Fla. 2007)
(concluding that suspect’s statement, “I think I may need a lawyer,” followed by suspect
asking police officer if he needed legal counsel was not unambiguous request for
counsel); Spivey v. State, 45 So. 3d 51, 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (finding suspect’s
statement, “I mean if I am being held and I'm being charged with something I need to be
on the phone calling my lawyer,” was not unequivocal request for counsel that would
require termination of questioning).
Applying that standard here, we conclude that Wilson’s statement, “I need a
lawyer, man,” was an unambiguous request for counsel. Florida courts have repeatedly
found similar statements to be an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. And, the
detectives’ own actions also demonstrate that they understood Wilson’s statement to be
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an invocation of his right to counsel because they cut off further questioning and left the
interrogation room shortly thereafter. The trial court correctly denied Wilson’s suppression
motion as to this statement as the detectives stopped the interrogation once Wilson
invoked his right to counsel.
We now examine whether the second round of questioning violated Wilson’s right
to counsel. The second interview took place five days after the first interview, during which
time Wilson remained in custody. Wilson argues that once he invoked his right to counsel,
the police could not reinitiate questioning without his attorney present.
Wilson’s argument correctly states the law. Reinitiation of questioning following a
suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel when the suspect has remained in pretrial
confinement, as was the case here, is inherently coercive and is presumed to violate the
suspect’s Miranda rights. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 148-53 (1990)
(holding that police officers violated defendant’s Miranda right to counsel when
reinterrogating him two days after defendant requested attorney and defendant remained
in county jail between both interrogations); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 678 (1988)
(holding that reinterrogation of defendant, who remained in police custody, three days
after he requested attorney violated defendant’s Miranda right to counsel); Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (holding that when defendant remained in pretrial
confinement, police reinterrogation day after defendant requested an attorney violated
defendant’s Miranda right to counsel). “Once a suspect has requested the help of a
lawyer, no state agent can reinitiate interrogation on any offense throughout the period of
custody unless the lawyer is present,” with a few limited exceptions. Traylor v. State, 596
So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992). These exceptions allow police to reinitiate questioning
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following a suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel when the suspect initiates the
conversation with police, Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, or if the suspect experiences a break
in custody that allows him “to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends
and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.” Maryland
v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010). Both exceptions rebut the implicit assumption that
reinitiated questioning is inherently coercive. See id. at 105.
Neither exception was present here. Wilson did not initiate the second round of
questioning, as the detectives came to the county jail on their own volition to question
him. Likewise, Wilson did not experience a break in custody, as he remained in pretrial
detention for the entire time between the first and second interrogation. Thus, Wilson,
having requested an attorney, should not have been questioned without an attorney
present. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153 (holding that “when counsel is requested, interrogation
must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether
or not the accused has consulted with his attorney”).
We conclude the entire second interview should have been excluded and only
Wilson’s statements made during the first interview, before he invoked his right to
counsel, should have been admitted. However, the erroneous admission of a confession
is not per se reversible error; instead, a harmless error analysis must be conducted.
Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 644 (Fla. 2000). To establish that an error was
harmless, the State must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129,
1135 (Fla. 1986). To determine whether an error was harmless, appellate courts must
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examine the entire record, view the admissible evidence presented to the jury, and
consider how the jury might have been influenced by the improperly admitted evidence.
See id. The analysis “is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly
wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even
an overwhelming evidence test,” see id. at 1139, but instead, compels us to examine the
properly admitted evidence of Wilson’s guilt. Daniel, 238 So. 3d at 1289.
Having carefully reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the admission of the
statements that Wilson made during his second police interview was harmless. The
second statement did not reveal anything incriminating that was not otherwise presented
to the jury. Wilson only told the police during the second interview that he went to Crystal
River with one of the other suspects on the night of the murder, stayed in a motel there,
and that the other suspect dropped him off in St. Petersburg the next day. The State did
not need Wilson’s statements to prove these events because it produced independent
evidence that Wilson had done all these things, including cell tower records and motel
security camera footage.
The only harm that Wilson alleges he suffered from the admission of the second
interview was that it undermined his credibility with the jury because his statements
contradicted what he told police in his first interview—that he had never been to Crystal
River. But this concern is insignificant because with or without the introduction of Wilson’s
second interview, the jury saw the motel surveillance video, cell phone records, and toll
plaza photos that directly undermined Wilson’s earlier statements that he had never been
to Crystal River and did not know the other suspects.
Outcome: The evidence against Wilson was damning. We conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the admission of statements Wilson made to police during his second
interrogation did not affect the jury’s verdict, and thus affirm Wilson’s conviction for firstdegree murder and his life sentence.
AFFIRMED
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