Date: 11-20-2018

Case Style:

Case Number: 17-1084

Judge: Kelly

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on appeal from the District of Colorado (Denver County)

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Best Personal Injury Lawyer Directory

Defendant's Attorney: Todd Wozniak and Jeffrey M. Lippa for Appellee

Scott A. Moss and Hunter A. Swain for Amici Curiae

Description: Denver, Colorado personal injury lawyer represented Plaintiff-Appellant Rhonda Nesbitt is a former massage therapy student who
attended a for-profit vocational school operated by Defendants-Appellees (�Steiner�).
Ms. Nesbitt, on behalf of a class of former students, brought suit claiming the students
qualified as employees of Steiner under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.
�� 201�219, and alleging Steiner violated the FLSA by failing to pay minimum wage.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Steiner, holding that the students
were not employees of the schools under the FLSA. See Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 217 F.
Supp. 3d 1288, 1298 (D. Colo. 2016). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. � 1291 and
we affirm.
Background
Steiner operated for-profit vocational schools in multiple states. 1 Aplt. App. 6�7;
2 Aplt. App. 129. Steiner schools� curriculum included classroom and clinical education
required for one to become licensed as a massage therapist. 2 Aplt. App. 130�31. The
3
clinical component included approximately 100, fifty-minute massages, which counted
toward the minimum clinical hours necessary for students to acquire their state licenses.
Id. at 131�32. The massages were performed at Steiner facilities on members of the
public, who paid discounted rates for the massages. Id. at 132. Because the Steiner
facilities did not have rooms dedicated to massage training, the students would clear
classrooms of desks and chairs and erect massage tables surrounded by privacy curtains
for clinical training. 4 Aplt. App. 474�75, 482�83. Each student would lead his or her
client to a booth that included a massage table and chair with enough space for the
student to make a circuit around the massage table and perform the massage. Id. at 475�
76. While the massages took place, there ostensibly were clinic managers and teaching
assistants on site to supervise the students and provide feedback on their massages. 2
Aplt. App. 131�32. In theory, these supervisors were available to answer questions from
students and to facilitate the clinic�s operations. Id. The parties dispute the extent to
which these supervisors actually provided feedback or answered questions during the
clinic.1 Compare Aplt. Br. at 24�26, with Aplee. Br. at 24�26. After the students
1 This is one of many factual issues about which the parties disagree. While Steiner
alleges the supervisors were available to answer questions from students and observe
students� work, Ms. Nesbitt contends the opposite. Ms. Nesbitt alleges that the students
were told they were never to leave their stations (thus precluding them from seeking
guidance), and that the supervisors did not observe the students� work because the
students were required to keep their privacy curtains drawn throughout the massages
(thus precluding any observation). See Aplt. Br. at 21�22, 24�26. Ultimately, it is
unnecessary to resolve these factual disputes about the efficacy of Steiner�s supervision
and observation. As we discuss below, the other factors we consider and the nature of
this arrangement compel a conclusion that Ms. Nesbitt and the class she seeks to
represent were not employees, they were students on the path to a career.
4
completed their massages, the clients were asked to provide feedback on the massages
they received, id. at 132, though the parties dispute how often these clients actually
completed their feedback forms and how often feedback was given to students. Compare
Aplt. Br. at 28, with Aplee. Br. at 27. Following each massage, students would lead their
client out and prepare their workspace for the next client. See, e.g., 4 Aplt. App. 438,
442�43, 447. They would typically repeat this process for five clients each clinical day.
See, e.g., id. at 443, 447, 454. Ms. Nesbitt alleges Steiner profited from the clinics with
the students as free labor. Aplt. Br. at 31.
Rhonda Nesbitt brought her class-action suit under the FLSA in the District of
Colorado on April 7, 2014.2 1 Aplt. App. 1. Steiner moved to compel arbitration of the
claims and to prohibit litigation of the issues as a class. Id. at 39�53. The district court
denied that motion, Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1375 (D. Colo. 2014),
and this court affirmed. Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 381 (10th Cir. 2016).
On remand, the district court addressed the issue of whether Ms. Nesbitt and the
students she seeks to represent qualified as employees under the FLSA. The district court
found they did not. Nesbitt, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1298. The district court determined that
the six factors announced in Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d 1023 (10th
Cir. 1993), when considered in their totality, resulted in a finding that the students were
not employees of Steiner. Nesbitt, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1294. The district court came to
2 In addition to her FLSA claim, Ms. Nesbitt brought a number of state-law claims not at
issue on appeal. The district court dismissed the state-law claims, concluding that this
court�s decision on Ms. Nesbitt�s FLSA claim would be dispositive. 9 Aplt. App. 834�
35.
5
that conclusion because (1) the students received vocational training from Steiner, (2) the
training primarily benefited the students because they were required to complete hours of
clinical time for their licenses, (3) the students did not displace regular employees and
worked under supervision of Steiner instructors, (4) there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the profit Steiner made from operating its schools, (5) the students
were not entitled to employment upon completion of their training, and (6) the students
and Steiner both understood that the students were not entitled to wages during their time
spent training. See id. at 1294�98. Accordingly, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Steiner on the question of Ms. Nesbitt�s FLSA claim. Id. at 1298;
see also Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc., No. 14-cv-00990-RBJ, 2017 WL 916453 (D. Colo. Mar.
2, 2017). This appeal followed.
Discussion
We review a district court�s grant of summary judgment de novo. Birch v. Polaris
Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 2015). The legal determination whether an
individual is an �employee� under the FLSA is also reviewed de novo. Reich, 992 F.2d
at 1025.
The FLSA requires that � subject to certain exceptions � every employer pay its
employees a specified minimum wage and time-and-a-half for hours worked over forty in
a workweek. See 29 U.S.C. �� 206�207. The FLSA defines an employee as �any
individual employed by an employer.� Id. � 203(e)(1). In 1947, the Supreme Court
distinguished between employees, who are entitled to wages under the FLSA, and
6
trainees, who usually are not. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153
(1947). In that case, the Court held that prospective railroad brakemen who received onthe-
job training, but were not paid during the training period, were not entitled to wages
under the FLSA. Id. From Portland Terminal, the Department of Labor (DOL)
developed a six-part test for determining whether trainees qualified as employees under
the FLSA,3 and we adopted that test in part in Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District,
992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).
Under Reich, a court assesses: (1) whether the training received is similar to that
which would be given in a vocational school; (2) whether the training is for the benefit of
the trainee or the employer; (3) whether the trainees displace regular employees, or rather
work under close observation or supervision; (4) whether the employer that provides the
training derives an immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees; (5) whether
the trainees are necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of their training period; and
(6) whether the employer and trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to
wages for the time they spend in training. See id. at 1026. These six criteria are all
3 On January 5, 2018, the Department of Labor announced that it was abandoning its sixfactor
test in favor of the more flexible �primary beneficiary� test. See News Release,
U.S. Dep�t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Clarifies When Interns Working at For-
Profit Employers Are Subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act (Jan. 5, 2018),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20180105; see also U.S. Dep�t of
Labor, Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (Jan.
2018), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf. As we have said before,
however, we consider the DOL�s interpretation of the FLSA embodied in its
nonregulatory guidelines merely for its persuasive authority under Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026�27; cf. United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
7
relevant but not conclusive to the determination whether a trainee is an employee � the
determination must be made under the totality of the circumstances and no one factor is
dispositive. Id. at 1026�27.
The district court applied Reich and it determined that Ms. Nesbitt and the other
students were not employees. See Nesbitt, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1294�98. On appeal, Ms.
Nesbitt first argues that the district court erred when it applied Reich as the governing
framework. She contends that the court should have applied the test in Marshall v. Regis
Educational Corp., 666 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1981), where the court held, after looking at
the totality of the circumstances, that student resident hall assistants working for a college
were not employees under the FLSA. Id. at 1328. According to Ms. Nesbitt, Regis
Educational Corp. specifically addresses whether students working for a school are
employees by looking at the full educational context, rather than looking at an exclusive
set of factors.
At the district court, it does not appear that Ms. Nesbitt contended that Regis
Educational Corp. constitutes a stand-alone test distinct from Reich. See generally 4
Aplt. App. 336�55. Regardless, Regis Educational Corp. is merely another application of
the totality of the circumstances test first articulated in Portland Terminal and later relied
upon in Reich to examine the economic reality of the relationship between the entity
providing training and the plaintiffs.
Ms. Nesbitt next invites us to apply the �primary beneficiary� test set forth by the
Second Circuit in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2015), a
case involving unpaid college interns, not a mandatory clinical training program leading
8
to a state-licensed profession.4 We see no need to do so given the breadth of our test,
which relies on the totality of the circumstances and accounts for the economic reality of
the situation.5 As the district court stated:
I have found that at least four and arguably more of the six Reich factors
suggest that plaintiffs were not defendants� employees. But at bottom I look
at the �totality of the circumstances� and of the �entirety of the economic
realities� of the parties� relationship. Put another way, I look at the forest,
not just the trees.
Nesbitt, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1298. Indeed, even if we were inclined to adopt Glatt,
�[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, this panel cannot overturn the decision of another
panel of this court.� United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000). Reich
remains applicable here.
Finally, Ms. Nesbitt argues that even if Reich is the correct test, the district court
erred in its application of the Reich factors and its assessment of the totality of the
circumstances. She primarily focuses on two factors from the Reich test: the adequacy of
the observation and supervision provided by Steiner over the students, and the profit
Steiner allegedly received from having students perform massages without pay.
First, Ms. Nesbitt and Steiner disagree about the level of supervision and
observation required under Reich. Ms. Nesbitt argues that merely having an instructor on
4 To date, four circuits have adopted the primary beneficiary test. See Benjamin v. B&H
Educ., Inc., 877 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2017); Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803
F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2015); Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir.
2015); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011).
5 See Robert J. Tepper & Matthew P. Holt, Unpaid Internships: Free Labor or Valuable
Learning Experience?, 2015 BYU Educ. & L.J. 323, 334�35 (suggesting that such an
analysis is required by Supreme Court precedent).
9
premises during the clinics is not sufficient to satisfy Reich�s �close observation� factor.
Aplt. Br. at 56�61. In particular, she alleges that the students were unable to leave their
posts to seek guidance from clinical instructors and that the instructors on premises never
actually observed students during their massages � making the supervisors� physical
presence illusory. Id. Steiner counters that it has always satisfied state supervision
requirements for clinical instruction, and that the supervision here is sufficient. Aplee.
Br. at 48�49; 54�55. Whatever the minimal supervision necessary to mark one�s status
as a trainee may be, and recognizing that the facts here were controverted, we can say
that floor was met. The �close supervision� factor is meant to distinguish between
regular employees and trainees. At no time did the students function as regular
employees; they were students learning a trade on vocational school premises. The
presence of supervisory licensed massage therapists and teaching assistants to oversee
them sets this case apart from situations where students all but carried out the duties of
regular employees. In any event, given a totality of the circumstances test, the presence
of some supervision when combined with the other factors weighs in favor of finding that
the students were trainees. Moreover, there is no need for each and every one of the six
factors to point toward the same outcome. See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1029 (noting that one
of the six factors pointed toward a finding the plaintiffs were employees, but holding that
a single factor cannot carry the weight under a totality inquiry).
Second, Ms. Nesbitt argues that Steiner � not the students � was the primary
beneficiary of their arrangement. According to Ms. Nesbitt, Steiner was able to profit
from an unpaid workforce while the students were left with almost no beneficial training.
10
See Aplt. Br. at 56�58, 61�62. However, the hours students spent performing massages
as part of their Steiner curriculum allowed them to advance toward their minimum
licensing requirements and provided them an obvious benefit. For example, in order to
receive her Colorado license, Ms. Nesbitt was required to graduate from an accredited
massage therapy school with a combined 500 hours of classroom and clinical training,
and Steiner�s 100-hour minimum clinical requirement clearly provided her a material
benefit. See Colo. Rev. Stat. � 12-35.5-107. This is true regardless of the profit, if any,6
that Steiner may have made from the students� unpaid work. We agree with the district
court that �the clinics had an obvious benefit for [the students].� Nesbitt, 217 F. Supp. 3d
at 1295.
The other factors also weigh in favor of finding that the students were trainees, not
employees. First, we agree with the district court that the training received by the
students was similar to training in vocational school because their training was �literally
�vocational school� training.� Id. at 1294. Ms. Nesbitt and the other students were
required to complete a minimum number of clinical hours to acquire their state licenses.
The training they received at Steiner schools was instrumental to that goal, and the
classroom and clinical components prepared them to be massage therapists. This
distinguishes Ms. Nesbitt�s case from her preferred comparison Glatt, where the unpaid
interns in question alleged they replaced paid employees and any training received was
6 Steiner, for its part, asserts it made no profit from the operation of the massage therapy
program given its overhead and other operational costs. See Aplee. Br. at 27�28; see also
2 Aplt. App. 133.
11
unrelated to their formal education. Cf. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 532�33, 535�36. Second, we
agree with the district court that the students clearly were not entitled to a job upon
completion of their program with Steiner. Nesbitt, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1298. Students
were aware that Steiner operated schools, not massage therapy businesses, and therefore
there could not be any expectation of full-time employment following completion of their
training. Steiner was not an employer of massage therapists, and after the students
completed their educational program they would have to seek employment elsewhere.
And finally, we agree with the district court that both the students and Steiner understood
that the students were not entitled to wages for their time spent training. Id. Not only did
the students receive and sign enrollment agreements that confirmed they were enrolling
in vocational programs that would not provide them with wages, 2 Aplt. App. 150�51,
but it would be illegal to pay the unlicensed students a wage before they completed their
training and state licensing requirements. See Nesbitt, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1298; see, e.g.,
Colo. Rev. Stat. �� 12-35.5-106, 12-35.5-115. Given that background, there can be no
doubt the students understood they were entering an educational program that would not
entitle them to wages.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err when it found that Ms.
Nesbitt and the students she seeks to represent are not employees of Steiner under the
FLSA.

Outcome: AFFIRMED.

The motion of the National Employment Lawyers Association et al.
for leave to file a brief as amici curiae is GRANTED.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: