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{¶2} Foreman gave birth to J.B. on March 15, 2018. (Nov. 26, 2018 Tr. at
10). After J.B. exhibited symptoms of neonatal-abstinence syndrome, he was tested
for the presence of illegal substances. (Id. at 12-13). J.B.’s toxicology report
revealed the presence of cocaine in his urine, cocaine in the umbilical-cord tissue,
and cocaine, marijuana, amphetamines, and buprenorphine in his meconium. (Id.
at 15). On July 25, 2018, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Foreman on one
count of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(4)(a), a fifthdegree felony. (Doc. No. 1). On July 27, 2018, Foreman appeared for arraignment
and entered a plea of not guilty. (Doc. No. 6).
{¶3} The case proceeded to a bench trial on November 26, 2018. (Nov. 26,
2018 Tr. at 1). At the conclusion of all evidence, the trial court found Foreman
guilty of the count of the indictment. (Doc. No. 24). On January 17, 2019, the trial
court sentenced Foreman to three years of community-control sanctions. (Doc. No.
25).
{¶4} Foreman filed her notice of appeal on January 31, 2019. (Doc. No. 30).
She raises two assignments of error for our review, which we will discuss together.
Case No. 13-19-01
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Assignment of Error No. I
The trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s Ohio Crim. R. 29
Motion to Dismiss because the court lacked jurisdiction over the
State’s case-in-chief as there was insufficient evidence presented
in the record that Appellant ingested, used, controlled, or
otherwise possessed Cocaine- either actually or constructively –
in Seneca County, Ohio in violation of R.C.§2925.11(A)(1)(c)
[sic].1
Assignment of Error No. II
The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, or alternatively
the trial court ruled against the manifest weight of the evidence in
finding that Appellant unlawfully possessed cocaine in violation
of R.C.§2925.11(A)(1)(c) [sic] because there was no evidence
presented in the record that Appellant ingested, used, controlled,
or other wised possessed – either actually or constructively – in
Seneca Count, Ohio and thus the Court lacked jurisdiction over
the matter.
{¶5} In her assignments of error, Foreman argues that her possession-ofcocaine conviction is based on insufficient evidence and is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. In particular, she contends that the State failed to produce
sufficient evidence to establish Seneca County as the proper venue, and therefore,
the trial court erred by denying her Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. Foreman also
argues that the evidence presented at trial weighs against the conclusion that she
knowingly possessed cocaine in Seneca County.

1
R.C. 2925.11(A)(1)(c) does not exist.
Case No. 13-19-01
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Standard of Review
{¶6} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). Thus, we address each legal concept individually.
{¶7} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 (1997), fn. 4.
See State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-276, 2019-Ohio-1010, ¶ 14
(“Because a Crim.R. 29 motion questions the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[w]e
apply the same standard of review to Crim.R. 29 motions as we use in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence.’”), quoting State v. Hernandez, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
09AP-125, 2009-Ohio-5128, ¶ 6, and citing State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255,
2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37 and State v. Hubbard, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-945,
2013-Ohio-2735, ¶ 16; State v. Lightner, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-08-11, 2009-Ohio544, ¶ 37, citing State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 553 (1995). Accordingly, “[t]he
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
Case No. 13-19-01
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the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the
syllabus. “In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary
conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for
the trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571,
2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33, citing State v. Williams, 197 Ohio App.3d 505,
2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No.
4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19 (“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy
rather than credibility or weight of the evidence.”), citing Thompkins at 386.
{¶8} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,
“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of
witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing
court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.
Case No. 13-19-01
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Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v.
Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Analysis
{¶9} Foreman was convicted of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C.
2925.11, which provides, in its relevant part, “[n]o person shall knowingly obtain,
possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” R.C.
2925.11(A) (Sept. 14, 2016) (current version at R.C. 2925.11(A) (Mar. 22, 2019).
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is
aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or
will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of
circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances
probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact
is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence
and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid
learning the fact.
R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶10} “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or
substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance
through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance
is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K) (Sept. 29, 2017) (current version at R.C. 2925.01(K)
(Oct. 17, 2019). “The issue of whether a person charged with drug possession
knowingly possessed a controlled substance ‘is to be determined from all the
attendant facts and circumstances available.’” State v. Brooks, 3d Dist. Hancock
Case No. 13-19-01
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No. 5-11-11, 2012-Ohio-5235, ¶ 45, quoting State v. Teamer, 82 Ohio St.3d 490,
492 (1998).
{¶11} At trial, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Christian Meade (“Dr.
Meade”), a general pediatrician at Tiffin Mercy Hospital, who treated J.B. after his
birth. (Id. at 10). Dr. Meade identified State’s Exhibit 1 as a copy of J.B.’s
toxicology-screening results. (Id. at 14); (Doc. No. 1). Dr. Meade testified that the
results of J.B.’s toxicology-screening reflect that (as relevant to this case) cocaine
was discovered in J.B.’s umbilical cord, urine, and meconium. (Id. at 15-16). Dr.
Meade further testified that the “[m]econium is the * * * first stool that a newborn
passes. It’s * * * retained by the fetus and accumulates substances for * * * several
months, usually the second or third trimester, so it’s more or less reflective of what
the baby has been exposed to in the second or third trimester.” (Id. at 16). Dr.
Meade clarified that a fetus accumulates the substances “[t]hrough the placenta from
the mother” and testified State’s Exhibit 1 further reflects that “[d]etection of drugs
in umbilical cord tissue is intended to reflect maternal drug use during pregnancy.”
(Id.); (State’s Ex. 1).
{¶12} Next, Megen Steyer (“Steyer”), a protective-services caseworker for
Seneca County Job and Family Services, testified that she initiated an investigation
after she was notified that J.B. was “born with illegal substances in [his] system.”
(Id. at 20). As part of her investigation, Steyer interviewed Foreman during the time
Case No. 13-19-01
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that she was a patient at the hospital after giving birth to J.B. (Id. at 22). According
to Steyer, Foreman reported the following: (1) “that she used cocaine 6 to 12 times
throughout her pregnancy; (2) “that she used every two to three weeks during her
pregnancy”; (3) “that she used a week and a half to two weeks” prior to J.B.’s birth;
(4) “that her fiancé did not know that she was using the cocaine as she would use it
while he was at work”; (5) “that she never used it in front of her children” and (6)
“that she did not use it in her home in Green Springs.” (Id. at 22-23). Through her
investigation, Steyer learned that Foreman resided in Green Springs, Seneca
County, Ohio with her fiancé, Matthew Bucklew (“Bucklew”). (Id. at 21-25).
Bucklew’s “drug screen was positive for cocaine and THC”; however, Foreman
refused a drug test from Steyer. (Id. at 23-24).
{¶13} We first review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Foreman’s
possession-of-cocaine conviction. State v. Velez, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-10,
2014 Ohio-1788, ¶ 68, citing State v. Wimmer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-98-46, 1999
WL 355190, *1 (Mar. 26, 1999). Because it is Foreman’s only argument on appeal,
we review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting only whether the State
produced sufficient evidence that she knowingly possessed cocaine in Seneca
County.
{¶14} “‘Venue commonly refers to the appropriate place of trial for a
criminal prosecution within a state.’” State v. Potee, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
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CA2016-06-045, 2017-Ohio-2926, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Stone, 12th Dist. Warren
No. CA2007-11-132, 2008-Ohio-5671, ¶ 16, citing State v. Meridy, 12th Dist.
Clermont No. CA2003-11-091, 2005-Ohio-241, ¶ 12. Under R.C. 2901.12(A),
venue is generally placed in the territory in which an offense is committed. See
State v. Brentlinger, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-23, 2017-Ohio-2588, ¶ 56.
{¶15} “Although venue is not a material element of any criminal offense, it
must nevertheless be proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, unless waived.”
State v. Patterson, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-11-15, 2012-Ohio-2839, ¶ 73, citing
State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d 88, 90 (1981). See also Ohio Constitution, Article
1, Section 10. “‘[V]enue need not be proved in express terms so long as it is
established by all the facts and circumstances in the case.’” Patterson at ¶ 73,
quoting State v. Lee, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-06-18, 2006-Ohio-6091, ¶ 14, citing
State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 477 (1983), and citing State v. Connell, 6th Dist.
Huron No. H-03-026, 2005-Ohio-3202, ¶ 14.
{¶16} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence that Foreman knowingly
possessed cocaine in Seneca County. A rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Foreman possessed the cocaine discovered in J.B.’s
umbilical cord, urine, and meconium, which were collected after his birth at Tiffin
Mercy Hospital on March 15, 2018. See State v. Harris, 178 N.C.App. 723, 727,
Case No. 13-19-01
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632 S.E.2d 534 (2006) (holding that a “positive urine screen gives rise to the
inference that defendant ingested cocaine”). Importantly, our sister appellate
districts have concluded that it is of no consequence whether the controlled
substance is discovered in a defendant’s pocket or in any cellular matter expelled
by his or her body. See State v. Scott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 63234, 1994 WL
173716, *3 (May 5, 1994) (“‘Whether that cocaine was in appellant’s pocket or in
his urine is of no effect.’”), quoting State v. Shrimplin, 5th Dist. Knox No. 90-CA32, 1991 WL 42504, *2 (Mar. 25, 1991). See also State v. McGowan, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 63491, 1993 WL 311372, *2 (Aug. 12, 1993) (“The fact that the
State did not find cocaine ‘on’ Appellant’s person, does not negate the fact that the
State found high levels of cocaine metabolites ‘in’ his person.”); State v. Napper,
3d Dist. Marion No. 9-91-11, 1991 WL 256521, *3 (Nov. 27, 1991); State v. Moyar,
3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-06-10, 2006-Ohio-5974, ¶ 5, 17. But see Harris at 726
(holding “that a positive urine test, without more, does not satisfy the intent or the
knowledge requirement inherent in our statutory definition of possession”). Thus,
we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence that Foreman possessed
cocaine in Seneca County.
{¶17} Moreover, the State presented sufficient evidence that Foreman
knowingly possessed cocaine in Seneca County. Indeed, Steyer testified that
Foreman admitted that she used cocaine 6-to-12 times or every two-to-three weeks
Case No. 13-19-01
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during her pregnancy and that she last used cocaine one-and-a-half-to-two weeks
prior to J.B.’s birth. Consequently, a reasonable trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Foreman knowingly possessed the cocaine
discovered in the umbilical cord and J.B.’s urine and meconium collected upon
J.B.’s birth at Tiffin Mercy Hospital on March 15, 2018. See Harris at 727
(concluding that the State presented sufficient evidence that Harris knowingly
possessed cocaine because “the positive urine screen gives rise to the inference that
defendant ingested cocaine, and [a witness’s] testimony that she saw defendant snort
cocaine provides corroborating evidence that defendant exercised the power and
intent to control the substance’s disposition or use, and that he was aware of its
presence”); Napper at *3 (concluding that “the testimony of Ricky Young, the
availability of Appellant, the cocaine and paraphernalia in her residence, and the
analysis of her urine along with the testimony regarding the time that cocaine
metabolites remain in the urine * * * amounted to sufficient evidence before the jury
from which it could reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one
element of the offense occurred in Marion County”); Moyar at ¶ 14 (concluding that
Moyar’s possession convictions were based on sufficient evidence after controlled
substances were discovered his blood and urine because “the ‘when, where, and
how’ of ingestion is not required in order for the jury to find that he possessed
cocaine and heroin beyond a reasonable doubt” when there is additional
Case No. 13-19-01
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circumstantial evidence presented demonstrating that Moyer knowingly possessed
the substances).
{¶18} For these reasons, we conclude that the State presented sufficient
evidence that Foreman knowingly possessed cocaine in Seneca County and the trial
court did not err by denying her Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal.
{¶19} Having concluded that the State presented sufficient evidence that
Foreman knowingly possessed cocaine in Seneca County, we next address
Foreman’s argument that her conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Velez, 2014-Ohio-1788, at ¶ 76. Foreman contends that Steyer’s
testimony that Foreman’s “fiancé did not know that she was using the cocaine as
she would use it while he was at work,” “that she never used it in front of her
children,” and “that she did not use it in her home in Green Springs” weighs against
the conclusion that she knowingly possessed cocaine in Seneca County. (Nov. 26,
2018 Tr. at 23). However, based on our conclusion relative to Foreman’s
sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments, the trier of fact did not clearly lose its way
and create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Foreman’s possession-ofcocaine conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. In other words, the
evidence that Foreman contends weighs against the conclusion that she knowingly
possessed cocaine in Seneca County does not negate her admission to using cocaine
coupled with the evidence of the cocaine that was discovered in the umbilical cord
Case No. 13-19-01
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and J.B.’s urine and meconium collected upon J.B.’s birth at Tiffin Mercy Hospital
on March 15, 2018. Therefore, the evidence does not weigh against the conclusion
that Foreman knowingly possessed cocaine in Seneca County and her possessionof-cocaine conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶20} Foreman’s assignments of error are overruled.

Outcome: } Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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