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Date: 12-28-2020
Case Style:
Adrian Aldon Keaton v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 05-19-01369-CR
Judge: ERIN A. NOWELL
Court: Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Plaintiff's Attorney: James Brett Smith
Karla Baugh
Defendant's Attorney:
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Description:
Dallas, TX - Criminal defense attorney represented Adrian Aldon Keaton with a Assault charge.
On September 3, 2018, Officer Brandon Ozuna of the Howe Police
Department responded to a call about a domestic disturbance at an apartment
complex. When he knocked on the apartment door, a man answered; he also saw a
woman inside. Neither of them had marks or scratches on their bodies. The man
was “really drunk” and the woman was less so. Both people were cooperative and,
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Ozuna left shortly thereafter. When Ozuna’s shift ended, he was replaced by
Sergeant Keith Milks. Ozuna told Milks about the domestic disturbance call.
Later the same day, Milks was called to the apartment complex. When he
arrived, appellant’s girlfriend and the apartment manager were standing outside near
the parking lot. Appellant was sitting in a parked SUV and was not causing a
disturbance. As Milks went to talk to the apartment manager and appellant’s
girlfriend, appellant exited the SUV. Milks told him to return to the vehicle. Milks
testified that as appellant turned back toward the SUV, appellant said “coward.”
Milks promptly put appellant into handcuffs and told appellant he was being
detained for public intoxication. During his testimony, Milks conceded that at the
time he arrested appellant, appellant was not posing a danger to himself or others;
rather, appellant was complying with Milks’s instruction.
According to the body camera footage from Milks’s camera, after putting
appellant in handcuffs, Milks told appellant to sit in a chair outside of an apartment;
appellant refused to do so. Milks then pushed appellant to the ground and placed his
knee in appellant’s back. Appellant lodged numerous verbal insults at Milks and
called him profane names. Appellant told Milks he would “put [Milks] in court so
bad, you’re going to be fucked up;” “I’d fucking throw you off of me if you weren’t
a cop. I respect you, man;” and “take these [handcuffs] off for a second and let me
and you go one on one.” Appellant told Milks to take off his badge and act like a
man because, without the handcuffs, Milks could not “take” appellant.
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As Milks placed appellant, who was still in handcuffs, in a patrol car, appellant
yelled: “Take that badge off, and then let’s fucking fight.” He followed his statement
with more profane insults and then said: “I’ll beat your fucking teeth in. . . . I’ll beat
your - -.” While yelling more profane insults, appellant kicked Milks. Milks
testified appellant kicked his hand forcefully and deliberately, and he immediately
felt a sharp pain.
Milks was in pain overnight. The following day, he went to Medical City to
have his hand examined, and he was diagnosed with a wrist sprain. Milks testified
“[t]here was a subcutaneous hematoma underneath there where the lacerations [sic]
was. Basically a deep bruising.”
The jury saw the video footage from Milks’s body camera showing the
encounter.
LAW & ANALYSIS
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on a criminal offense
for which the State has the burden of proof under the single sufficiency standard set
forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621,
624–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Under this standard, the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony,
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to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate
facts. Id. Therefore, in analyzing legal sufficiency, we determine whether the
necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force
of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. When
the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume the factfinder resolved the
conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Id. Direct and
circumstantial evidence are treated equally: circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence
alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Id.
As applicable in this case, a person commits the offense of assault on a public
servant if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to a person
the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging
an official duty. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1). The penal code defines
“bodily injury” as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”
Id. § 1.07(a)(8). Further, a person commits the offense of retaliation if the person
intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in
retaliation for or on account of the service or status of the other person as a public
servant. Id. §36.06(a)(1)(A). The offense is a second-degree felony if the actor’s
conduct results in the bodily injury of a public servant. Id. §36.06(c).
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In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction for assault on a public servant. He asserts Milks’s body camera footage
shows appellant “kicked at” Milks, but did not actually kick Milks.
The evidence shows Milks was a police officer, a public servant, who was
driving a marked car and wearing his police uniform when he encountered appellant.
After being handcuffed, appellant yelled profane names at Milks and expressed a
desire to fight. While the body camera footage does not show whether appellant’s
foot made contact with Milks’s hand, Milks testified appellant deliberately kicked
him and he immediately felt pain. Milks was diagnosed with a sprained wrist and
bruising the following day. Additionally, the apartment manager testified appellant
threatened to “kick [Milks’s] butt” and then intentionally kicked Milks. After
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude any
rational trier of fact could have found appellant knew Milks was a public servant and
he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Milks while Milks
was lawfully discharging an official duty. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
In his second issue, appellant asserts the evidence is insufficient to convict
him of retaliation because his threats against Milks were conditioned on Milks not
being a police officer. The evidence shows that after Milks placed appellant into the
police vehicle, appellant continued yelling profane insults at Milks. Appellant then
yelled: “I’ll beat your fucking teeth in. . . . I’ll beat your - -” before kicking Milks.
Based on the evidence, the jury could have concluded appellant was threatening
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Milks because Milks, a public servant, handcuffed appellant and placed him in a
patrol car. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
conclude any rational trier of fact could have found appellant intentionally or
knowingly harmed or threatened to harm Milks by an unlawful act in retaliation for
or on account of Milks’s status as a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§36.06(a)(1)(A). We overrule appellant’s second issue.
Outcome: We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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Defendant's Experts:
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