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Date: 02-18-2021
Case Style:
Carroll Gene Henderson v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 05-19-00372-CR
Judge: BILL PEDERSEN, III
Court: Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Plaintiff's Attorney: Karla Baugh
James Brett Smith
Defendant's Attorney:
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Description:
Dallas, TX - Criminal defense attorney represented Carroll Gene Henderson with an Aggravated Sexual Assault charge.
Appellant was indicted on two counts. The first count—aggravated sexual
assault of a child—charged that he penetrated the sexual organ of six-year-old E.S.S.
with his finger. The second count—indecency with a child—charged that he engaged
in sexual contact with seven-year-old D.N.D. by touching the child’s anus. Because
both appellate issues pertain to appellant’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault
of a child, we limit our discussion of the facts and the evidence accordingly.
Before trial, the trial court conducted an outcry witness hearing pursuant to
article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. With respect to E.S.S., the
State offered two outcry witnesses. The first outcry witness was Taylor Holcomb,
E.S.S.’s mother. She stated that she was the first person E.S.S. told that appellant
put his hand in her panties and used his hand to squeeze her vagina hard. The second
outcry witness was Brittany Martin Barker, Executive Director for the Grayson
County Children’s Advocacy Center. Barker conducted the forensic interview of
E.S.S. She testified that E.S.S. told her that appellant stuck his hand “in there” and
pointed to her vagina. Upon ascertaining that the outcries to Holcomb and Barker
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pertained to the same event, the trial court concluded that the State could designate
only one outcry witness with respect to that event. The State requested that Barker
be designated as E.S.S.’s outcry witness regarding penetration. The trial court
designated Barker as the outcry witness over appellant’s objection.
At trial, Brandon Hughes, a Corporal with the Sherman Police Department,
testified that at the time of the alleged offense, he was working in the Family
Services Division investigating sex crimes and crimes against children. He was
assigned to investigate allegations of possible sexual assault against two children.
When he arrived at the apartment, he spoke to the mothers of both alleged victims
and was told what the children claimed had happened. He also learned there had
been two men in the apartment with the children—one was the father of D.N.D. and
the other was appellant. He arranged for the children to go to the Children’s
Advocacy Center for forensic interviews. Based on statements made by E.S.S.
during her forensic interview, Hughes then arranged for her to have a SANE3
examination. He also sent swabs and clothing to be tested at the Texas Department
of Public Safety crime laboratory in Garland, Texas.
Hughes also interviewed appellant. Hughes testified that during this interview,
appellant admitted penetrating E.S.S.’s vagina with his finger. The jury watched the
video of appellant’s police interview which included this admission. Hughes
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A SANE examination, conducted by a certified sexual assault nurse examiner, includes obtaining a
history and conducting a head-to-toe medical examination.
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testified that as part of his investigation, he learned of allegations that appellant had
abused other children when he lived in Tennessee.
Holcomb testified at trial. She explained that at the time of the alleged offense,
she and her fiancé Gary shared an apartment with Jerrell Daw, the father of D.N.D.,
and three children. She stated that appellant had been a close family friend for almost
ten years. She saw appellant every day and at times, he stayed overnight at their
apartment. She stated that it was not unusual for her to leave E.S.S. with appellant,
as she did on the night in question. While she was out, she received a telephone call
from E.S.S. that made her feel that something was not right. As a result, she
immediately returned home. Upon arrival, she went into the bedroom to use the
attached bathroom. She saw appellant lying on the bed with E.S.S. sitting on top of
him, straddling him. Appellant was pushing E.S.S. against himself and was rubbing
against her. Holcomb asked what was going on and told E.S.S. to come into the
bathroom with her. After questioning E.S.S., Holcomb told appellant to get out of
their apartment and she called the police.
Barker described the forensic interview process to the jury. E.S.S. was six
years old at the time she was interviewed. Barker described E.S.S. as timid and quiet
but after a few minutes, she was able to answer Barker’s questions in an ageappropriate way. Barker confirmed that E.S.S. referred to the appellant by name and
stated that he stuck his hand “in there,” while pointing to her vagina. Barker testified
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that based on E.S.S.’s statement, she and Corporal Hughes determined it necessary
to refer E.S.S. for a SANE examination.
E.S.S. testified at trial. She said that she remembered a time when appellant
got in trouble. She described the places that people are not supposed to touch. She
calls the front part her “castle” and the back part her “butt.” When asked if there was
ever a time that appellant touched her in any of those places, she said yes. But when
asked if she had a memory of that, she said no.
Julia Griffin testified that she is a registered nurse and a certified adult and
pediatric sexual assault nurse examiner. She conducted the SANE examination of
E.S.S. During the history portion of the exam, she asked E.S.S. what happened. She
read from her report that E.S.S. said that her “castle” was hurting, that she woke up
with someone touching her “castle,” and she thought appellant was pushing on her
“castle” really hard. E.S.S. said that she thought appellant rolled over like he was
asleep and pinched it with his hands. She also told Griffin, “I think he put his finger
in, that’s why it hurts.” During the physical exam, Griffin did not note any trauma.
She found mild redness of the labia majora. She said that E.S.S. complained of pain
at the female sex organ and had tenderness at the vaginal opening. Griffin sent swabs
to the lab. On cross-examination, Griffin agreed that there was no way to know what
caused the redness.
Chelsea Wingate testified that she is a forensic scientist and works for the
DNA Section of the Texas Department of Public Safety crime lab in Garland, Texas.
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Wingate explained that the DPS crime lab received a sexual assault kit in this case
that included buccal swabs from the victim, vaginal and anal swabs from the victim,
and the victim’s clothing. The lab also received buccal swabs from appellant. She
tested E.S.S.’s vaginal and anal swabs. With respect to the vaginal swab, the
detection of male DNA was inconclusive. Male DNA was present on the anal swab.
Jimmy Ferrer testified that he is a licensed forensic scientist in the DNA
discipline at the Texas Department of Public Safety. He was given three items of
E.S.S.’s clothing to test—her t-shirt, her shorts, and her underpants. He described
the testing process whereby he first used an alternative light source to scan for stains.
Any stains are then tested with an acid phosphatase solution which turns purple in
the presumptive presence of semen. In this case, a stain was found on the t-shirt, a
sample was tested, and Ferrer confirmed the presence of semen. In scanning the
child’s shorts, he found two different stains that may have been semen; however, he
did not extract samples to confirm that the stains were semen because he had already
confirmed the presence of semen on the t-shirt. His testing did not indicate the
presence of semen on the underwear.
Lauren Jones, Senior Forensic DNA Analyst at the University of North Texas
Health Science Center, testified that UNT has a contract with the Garland DPS lab
to work on DNA samples from backlogged sexual assault kits. She explained that
once Garland DPS has determined there is male DNA or sperm on items, those items
are sent to her to compare to the DNA sample from the defendant. In this case, she
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received anal swabs and a cutting from a t-shirt. Her testing of the anal swab revealed
a partial Y-STR profile consistent with either appellant or a male patrilineal relative
of appellant. Jones further testified that the data indicated with a high degree of
confidence that appellant was the source of the major contributor DNA in the sperm
found on the cutting of E.S.S.’s t-shirt.
The jury convicted appellant as charged, and the trial court assessed
punishment. Appellant filed this appeal with respect to his conviction for aggravated
sexual assault of a child.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Lesser Included Offense
In his first issue, appellant complains about the jury charge pertaining to the
first count of aggravated sexual assault of a child. He argues that the trial court’s
refusal to charge the jury with the lesser included offense of indecency with a child
was jury charge error. Review of alleged jury charge error is a two-step process. The
reviewing court must first decide whether error exists and if so, must then determine
whether the accused was harmed by the error. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If no error exists, the review ends there and no harm
analysis is necessary. Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003). Here, the analysis ends with the first prong.
The two-step test for determining whether a trial court is required to give a
requested instruction on a lesser included offense is well established. Bullock v.
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State, 509 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524,
535–36 (Tex. Crim. App 2007). We first determine if the requested instruction
pertains to an offense that is a lesser included offense of the charged offense.
Bullock, 509 S.W.3d at 924. This is a question of law and does not depend on the
evidence produced at trial. State v. Meru, 414 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). An offense is a lesser included offense if “it is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(1); see Sweed v. State, 351
S.W.3d 63, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In this case, the first step is satisfied because
“indecency with a child is a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault of
a child when both offenses are predicated on the same act.” Evans v. State, 299
S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Martinez v. State, 524 S.W.3d 344,
347 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. ref’d) (“Indecency with a child by touching
the child’s genitals can be a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault of
a child by penetrating the child’s sexual organ if the same act is used to prove both
the touching and the penetration.”).
In the second step of the analysis, we determine if there is evidence in the
record that supports giving the instruction to the jury. Bullock, 509 S.W.3d at 924–
25. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense when there
is some evidence in the record that would permit a jury to rationally find that, if the
defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser included offense. Id. at 925 (citing
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Rice v. State, 333 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). “The evidence must
establish that the lesser-included offense is a valid rational alternative to the charged
offense.” Id. The second step is a fact question and is based on all of the evidence
presented at trial. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
A defendant is entitled to the instruction on anything more than a scintilla of
evidence, but “it is not enough that the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence
pertaining to the greater offense, but rather there must be some evidence directly
germane to the lesser included offense for the finder of fact to consider before an
instruction on the lesser included offense is warranted.” Bullock, 509 S.W.3d at 925.
When reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we cannot consider the credibility of the
evidence and whether it conflicts with other evidence or is controverted. Id.
Accordingly, “the standard may be satisfied if some evidence refutes or negates
other evidence establishing the greater offense or if the evidence presented is subject
to different interpretations.” Id. (quoting Sweed, 351 S.W.3d at 68).
In considering whether a lesser offense is a valid, rational alternative to the
charged offense, we compare the statutory requirements between the greater
offense—here, aggravated sexual assault of a child—and the lesser offense—here,
indecency with a child by contact—to determine whether evidence exists to support
a conviction for indecency with a child by contact but not aggravated sexual assault
of a child. A person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child when that person
causes the penetration of the sexual organ of a child by any means. TEX. PENAL CODE
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ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i). A person guilty of indecency with a child by contact
when that person engages in sexual contact with a child who is younger than 17 years
of age. Id. § 21.11(a)(1). Sexual contact is defined as the touching by a person,
including through the clothing, of the breast, anus, or genitals of a child, with the
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. § 21.11(c)(1).
In his brief, appellant argues that although E.S.S. testified at trial, she could
not recall the events of the date in question. He argues that although Barker testified
that E.S.S. told her that appellant put his hands “in there” and pointed to her vagina,
Barker did not clarify whether E.S.S. was referring to penetration of her vagina or
merely to appellant putting his hands in her pants. Appellant acknowledged the
SANE nurse’s testimony that E.S.S. told her that she thought appellant put his finger
in her castle and that is why it hurt, but he argues that no statements were definitive
as to what occurred. In his police interview, appellant admitted to Corporal Hughes
that he penetrated E.S.S.’s vagina with his finger. However, on appeal, appellant
argues that his admission was not corroborated by physical evidence. He argues that
a rational jury could have concluded from this circumstantial evidence that he
touched E.S.S.’s genitals with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desires but
did not penetrate her vagina.
At trial, the defense did not refer the trial court to any evidence that would
permit a jury to rationally find that the defendant was guilty only of the lesser
included offense of indecency because genital touching, but not penetration, had
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occurred. See Bullock, 509 S.W.3d at 925. He questioned the sufficiency of the
evidence pertaining to the greater offense, but he did not point to any evidence that
refuted or negated other evidence establishing the greater offense. On the record
before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury
on the lesser included offense because it was not supported by the evidence and did
not constitute “a valid rational alternative to the charged offense.” Id. We overrule
appellant’s first issue.
B. Outcry Witness Testimony
In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court designated the
wrong outcry witness for E.S.S. We review a trial court’s admission of testimony
from an outcry witness under an abuse of discretion standard. See Garcia v. State,
792 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Gibson v. State, 595 S.W.3d 321, 325
(Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.). A court has “broad discretion” in determining
who qualifies as a proper outcry witness, and we will uphold the trial court’s ruling
if it is reasonably supported by the record and within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. See Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 92; Tear v. State, 74 S.W.3d 555, 558
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d).
At the hearing on the admissibility of outcry testimony, the State argued that
both Holcomb, E.S.S.’s mother, and Barker, the forensic interviewer, qualified as
outcry witnesses. The State explained that the child made an outcry to Holcomb of
touching but not penetration. The child made an outcry of penetration to Barker. The
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defense objected, arguing that Holcomb was the proper outcry witness because she
was the first person to whom E.S.S. described an offense in a discernible manner.
The defense argued that Barker was not the proper outcry witness because E.S.S.
simply told Barker more details or told Barker what happened in a different way.
After ascertaining that E.S.S.’s outcry to Holcomb and her outcry to Barker
concerned the same event, the trial court determined that it was not proper to have
both of the witnesses testify as outcry witnesses. The court further concluded that
Barker would be the outcry witness at trial because in her outcry to Barker, E.S.S.
described in some discernable manner the offense that was actually charged in count
one. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in designating Barker, and
not Holcomb, as E.S.S.’s outcry witness.
Generally, hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the rules of
evidence or by statute. See TEX. R. EVID. 802. However, article 38.072 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure allows admission of certain hearsay testimony in the
prosecution of offenses committed against children younger than fourteen years of
age. CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072; see Buentello v. State, 512 S.W.3d 508, 517 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d). The statute allows the designation of an
outcry witness to testify about a child’s disclosure of abuse but requires that the
outcry witness be the “first person, 18 years of age or older, other than the defendant,
to whom the child . . . made a statement about the offense.” CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072
§ 2(a)(3); see Bays v. State, 396 S.W.3d 580, 581 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The
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outcry witness “may recite the child’s out-of-court statements concerning the
offense, and that testimony is substantive evidence of the crime.” Martinez v. State,
178 S.W.3d 806, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
“To be a proper outcry statement, the child’s statement to the witness must
describe the alleged offense in some discernible manner and must be more than a
general allusion to sexual abuse.” Sims v. State, 12 S.W.3d 499, 500 (Tex. App.—
Dallas, pet ref’d) (citing Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91). The outcry witness designation
is event-specific, not person-specific. Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). Thus, “[t]here may be only one outcry witness per event.” Id.
In this case, appellant was indicted for the specific offense of aggravated
sexual assault of a child by causing the penetration of the child’s sexual organ with
his finger or hand. See PENAL § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i). There was no evidence that
E.S.S. told her mother that appellant put his finger in her vagina. Holcomb only
recounted E.S.S.’s statement that appellant put his hand in her panties and pinched
her vagina hard. The State’s second outcry witness, the forensic interviewer, testified
that E.S.S. told her that appellant put his hand “in there” and pointed to her vagina.
Although E.S.S.’s statement to Barker was not lengthy or overly-detailed, it
contained sufficient information about the nature of the act and the perpetrator. The
trial court reasoned that Barker was the first adult that E.S.S. told what happened in
a discernible manner that described the alleged offense of penetration. We conclude
that the trial court acted within its broad discretion in overruling appellant’s
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objection to Barker’s being designated as the outcry witness. See Buentello, 512
S.W.3d at 517. We overrule appellant’s second issue.
Outcome: Having overruled appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: