Date: 05-20-2016

Case Style: Patrick Ladon Scroggins v. The State of Texas

Case Number: 05-14-01220-CR, 05-14-01221-CR

Judge: Ada Brown

Court: In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

Plaintiff's Attorney: Susan Hawk, Rhys Carson

Defendant's Attorney: Julie Woods

Description: A grand jury indicted appellant for possession with intent to deliver more than one, but
less than four, grams of cocaine and possession of less than one gram of heroin. The indictments
also included allegations that (1) appellant committed the offenses in a drug-free zone, (2)
appellant used or exhibited a firearm in the commission of the offenses, and (3) appellant had a
prior conviction for burglary of a habitation.
At trial, the State presented evidence that police received reports that drugs were being
sold from a Dallas apartment. When they went to the apartment to investigate, a woman, later
identified as Kara Sutton, was sitting on the front step of the apartment. Sutton told police she
lived there and that her “brothers” were inside. Police asked Sutton if they could speak to her
brothers, and she opened the door to the apartment. When she did so, police observed what
appeared to be marijuana and drug paraphernalia on a table inside the apartment. Appellant and
another man were also inside the apartment. Appellant was sitting on a couch and the other man
was standing near him. Police asked appellant for identification, but he said he had none. Police
secured the location while they obtained a search warrant.
After obtaining the warrant, police searched the apartment. They found 3.3 grams of
cocaine as well as a small amount of heroin and some hydrocodone tablets underneath the couch
cushion where appellant had been sitting. The cocaine was in a Crown Royal Bag, which also
contained the hydrocodone. Appellant’s wallet, a loaded revolver, and what appeared to be
additional drug packaging materials were also underneath the couch cushion. Inside the
apartment, police also found razorblades and a plate containing a white residue that appeared to
be cocaine. Police arrested appellant for possession of a controlled substance.
Officer Schiller assisted with the execution of the search warrant. Schiller testified the
cocaine seized was packaged for resale in twisted-off baggies, had a street value of about $300,
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and contained roughly 30 “hits.” According to Schiller, there is no average number of hits a user
consumes on a given occasion, but users usually smoke what they have “till it’s gone.”
According to Schiller, it is conceivable that possession of a gram or less of cocaine could be for
personal use, but his opinion would depend on whether other items were found indicating
delivery.
Schiller testified razorblades are commonly used to cut both heroin and crack cocaine,
but the reason that crack cocaine is cut is to make it smaller for distribution. He also testified
that he believed the plate in the apartment was used for cutting crack cocaine. Finally, Schiller
testified that drug dealers often keep firearms to protect their supply.
The State also presented evidence of portions of a phone call appellant made from jail
four days after his Thursday arrest. On that call, appellant told an unidentified woman that he
had not gone to work “that Thursday” and was “in the house . . . selling drugs.” He said “it
could have been worse;” he could be dead because the police found him with a gun.
Finally, to show appellant committed the offenses in a drug-free zone, the State presented
evidence that the apartment complex where appellant was arrested was within 1,000 feet of a
school. After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant committed the offenses of
possession with intent to deliver cocaine and possession of heroin. The jury also found appellant
committed the offenses in a drug-free zone, but failed to find he used or exhibited a deadly
weapon in the commission of the offenses. At punishment, in each case, appellant pleaded true
to the allegations in the enhancement paragraphs that he had a prior conviction for burglary of a
habitation. After finding the paragraphs true, the jury assessed appellant’s punishment at fifteen
years’ confinement in the possession with intent to deliver cocaine case and two years’
confinement in the possession of heroin case. This appeal followed.
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II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first point of error, appellant asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to support
his conviction in the cocaine case. Specifically, he asserts the State failed to prove he possessed
the cocaine with the intent to deliver it.
A. Applicable Law
In reviewing a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we
examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Carrizales v. State, 414
S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The jury, as trier of fact, is the sole judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 326. The jury is free to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Thomas v. State, 444
S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). If the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume
the jury resolved those conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.
McKay v. State, 474 S.W.3d 266, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
Intent to deliver is a question of fact that may be inferred from the acts, words, or conduct
of the accused. Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). A jury
may also infer intent to deliver from other circumstances, such as the quantity of drugs
possessed, the manner of packaging, and the presence of the accused in a drug house. Taylor,
106 S.W.3d at 831; see also Branch v. State, 599 S.W.2d 324, 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
B. Application of Law to Facts
We begin by noting that, in arguing his sufficiency point, appellant asserts we should not
consider certain evidence that was admitted at trial. Specifically, appellant maintains we should
not consider evidence that a loaded gun was present at the time of the offense or the statements
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he made on his jail call, in which he admitted to both selling drugs and knowing about the gun.
According to appellant, the jury’s failure to make a deadly weapon finding establishes that the
jury did not believe appellant used the gun to protect the drugs and further that it did not give any
weight to the jail call.
However, it is not appropriate for this Court to speculate as to why the jury did not make
a deadly weapon finding. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984) (any attempt to
determine jury’s reasons for reaching inconsistent verdicts would require pure speculation and
involve an improper inquiry into jury’s deliberations); see also Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S.
390, 394 (1932). Instead, in reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to
consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime for which appellant
was convicted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 & n.19
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Therefore, we may not review the evidence in the manner appellant
suggests.
Reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standard of review, we conclude the
evidence is legally sufficient to show appellant possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver it.
Specifically, the jury could have inferred from the amount of cocaine possessed, the manner in
which it was packaged, the presence of other items indicating drug sales, as well as appellant’s
statements on the jail call that he possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver it. We overrule
appellant’s first point of error.
III. Reformation of the Judgments
In his second point of error, appellant asserts the judgment in the cocaine case should be
reformed to correctly reflect the degree of that offense. In that case, appellant was charged with
and convicted of possession with cocaine with intent to deliver in an amount of one gram or
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more, but less than four grams. That offense is a second-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(c) (West 2010); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000). The judgment, however, recites appellant was convicted of a first-degree felony.
This Court has the power to modify incorrect judgments when we have the necessary
information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Therefore, we sustain appellant’s second point of error and
reform the judgment in the cocaine case to show appellant was convicted of a second-degree
felony.
In a cross-point, the State asserts the judgment in the cocaine case contains another error.
The indictments in both cases contained an enhancement paragraph alleging appellant had a prior
felony conviction for burglary of a habitation. Appellant pleaded true to the allegations in the
paragraphs and the jury found the allegations true. However, in the cocaine case, the judgment
states “N/A” where appellant’s plea and the jury’s finding to the enhancement paragraph should
have been reflected. Because the judgment is incorrect and we have the necessary information to
correct it, we reform the judgment to show appellant’s plea of true to the enhancement paragraph
and the jury’s finding that the paragraph was true. Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 529-30.
In his third point of error, appellant contends the judgment in the heroin case is also
incorrect and should be reformed. The judgment in that case identifies the “Offense for which
Defendant Convicted” as “Unlawful Possession of a Controlled substance, to-wit; Heroin 2nd
Drug Free Zone.” (emphasis added). Appellant asks us to delete “2nd” from the name of the
offense because he was not convicted of a second possession of heroin case. The State responds
that the notation was made to show appellant’s conviction was enhanced with a prior felony
conviction. Although the State does not object to reformation, it asserts reformation is not
necessary.
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The trial court’s judgment should include an accurate description of the offense. Davis v.
State, 501 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see also TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § art.
42.01(13) (West Supp. 2015). Although the notation may have been intended to show appellant
had a prior felony conviction, we do not agree that the notation accurately did so.

Outcome: Because the notation was unnecessary, we sustain appellant’s third point of error and reform the trial court’s judgment in the heroin case to delete “2nd” from the description of the offense. As reformed, we affirm appellant’s convictions.

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