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Date: 12-24-2020
Case Style:
Gabriel Ramos v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 04-19-00692-CR
Judge: Rebeca C. Martinez
Court: Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
Plaintiff's Attorney: Nathan E. Morey
Joe D. Gonzales
Defendant's Attorney:
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Description:
San Antonio, Texas - Criminal defense attorney represented Gabriel Ramos with a Failure to Stop & Render Aid charge.
On February 22, 2015, a traffic accident occurred that left one driver dead. The other driver
abandoned a black and white Chevrolet Tahoe and fled the scene before police arrived. Inside the
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Tahoe, police found a promissory note and a pay stub, both of which listed the name Gabriel
Ramos and his address. Later that day, Detective Steven Castillo of the San Antonio Police
Department went along with another detective to the address listed on the paperwork. There, they
met and spoke with Vanessa Burns.
Detective Castillo recorded the entirety of his conversation with Burns with an audio
recorder. In the recording, Burns states she was Ramos’s girlfriend and that Ramos drove a black
and white Chevrolet Tahoe. She stated that Ramos purchased the vehicle and stated “That’s his
car, not mine.” Burns also told Detective Castillo that sometimes Ramos stayed at her residence
but that she did not know his whereabouts and could not contact him.
On May 10, 2017, Detective Castillo used the information he had gathered to prepare an
affidavit in support of a search warrant. In the affidavit, Detective Castillo described the accident
that occurred on February 22, 2015, and concluded that based on his investigation, Ramos
committed the offense of failure to stop and render aid resulting in death. Detective Castillo drew
his conclusion from several items of paperwork found in the abandoned Tahoe listing Ramos’s
full name and address and from his discussion with Ramos’s girlfriend, Burns, who stated that
Ramos owned the black and white Tahoe and that he was the only known driver of the vehicle.
Detective Castillo sought a search warrant to collect a DNA sample from Ramos for comparison
to the DNA profile obtained from the Tahoe’s airbags at the scene of the accident.
Based on Detective Castillo’s affidavit, the magistrate signed a search warrant for a DNA
sample from Ramos. Analysis of these samples could not exclude Ramos as the source of DNA
collected from the Tahoe. Before trial, Ramos filed a motion to suppress the DNA test results.
Ramos argues the search was without probable cause since Detective Castillo’s affidavit contained
statements made deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth.
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At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Castillo testified that he interviewed
Burns on the night of the accident and was informed that she and Ramos were the only people who
drove the Tahoe but that the Tahoe was not her vehicle. He also testified that Burns did not indicate
that anyone else owned the Tahoe. Detective Castillo testified that he executed the search warrant
approximately ten months after his interview with Burns, and that he did not review the audio
recording of the interview but relied on his memory when he prepared the affidavit. He further
testified that, although the words in the affidavit may not have been word-for-word what Burns
stated, the words contained the same substance as what Burns actually told him and contained the
inferences he made based on her actual words. Although he did not review the recording itself, he
reviewed a transcript of the audio recording with Ramos’s attorney before drafting his affidavit.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Ramos’s motion. Thereafter, Ramos
pled nolo contendere to the offense of failure to stop and render aid resulting in death and was
sentenced to ten years in prison. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.021. Ramos appeals.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his only point of error, Ramos contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion
to suppress. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard.
Hines v. State, 383 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing St. George
v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Hodson v. State, 350 S.W.3d 169, 173
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. ref’d). Although we “review the trial court’s application of
the law de novo,” we must “defer to the trial court’s determination of facts.” Hodson, 350 S.W.3d
at 173. Because the trial court is “uniquely situated to observe first hand the demeanor and
appearance of a witness,” the trial judge serves as “the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility
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of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–
25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citation omitted). The reviewing court views all evidence in a trial
court’s motion to suppress ruling “in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” State v.
Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We affirm the trial court’s holding “if
there is any valid theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court did not base its decision
on that theory.” Hines, 383 S.W.3d at 621 (citing State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002)). We will overturn the ruling only if it is outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. See Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
B. Applicable Law
When a defendant contends an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains false
information or information conveyed in reckless disregard of the truth, we apply the standard
announced in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978):
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement
is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that
a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. In the event that at that hearing the
allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one
side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause,
the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same
extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.
Id. at 155–56; see Harris v. State, 227 S.W.3d 83, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (applying the Franks
standard). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that to be entitled to a Franks
hearing a defendant must satisfy a three-prong test: “(1) Allege deliberate falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth by the affiant, specifically pointing out the portion of the affidavit claimed
to be false; (2) Accompany these allegations with an offer of proof stating the supporting reasons;
and (3) Show that when the portion of the affidavit alleged to be false is excised from the affidavit,
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the remaining content is insufficient to support the issuance of the warrant.” Harris, 227 S.W.3d
at 85.
After conducting a Franks hearing, the trial court must strike from the affidavit all
information the defendant has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be deliberately false
or misleading. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; id. A “truthful” statement that should not be stricken
requires only “that the information put forth [by the affiant] is believed or appropriately accepted
by the affiant as true.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 164–65; see Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 462
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). If the false statement that was stricken was necessary to the finding of
probable cause, then the search warrant must be voided, and the fruits of the search excluded from
the trial. Harris, 227 S.W.3d at 85.
An affidavit in support of a search warrant must provide the magistrate with sufficient
information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the issuance of the
warrant. Jones v. State, 568 S.W.2d 847, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (citing Whiteley v. Warden
of Wyo. Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971)); Burnett v. State, 754 S.W.2d 437, 443 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1988, pet. ref’d). The sufficiency of the affidavit is examined under a “totality
of the circumstances” analysis. Burnett, 754 S.W.2d at 443; cf. State v. Baldwin, No. 14-19-00154-
CR, 2020 WL 4530149, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 6, 2020—no pet. h.) (“[T]he
process of determining probable cause deals with probabilities, not hard certainties.”).
C. Analysis
Ramos argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Detective
Castillo’s affidavit includes a false statement, omits material information, and includes a statement
made in reckless disregard of the truth. Ramos alleges that the detective made a deliberate and
reckless statement in his affidavit, and as an offer of proof, points to certain discrepancies between
Burns’s statement to him after the accident and the statement contained in the affidavit. Ramos
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specifically challenges the statement regarding who had access to the Tahoe. Ramos generally
asserts that these discrepancies amount to a deliberately false or reckless statement.
On this record, we need not decide whether the first two prongs of the test are met. See
Harris, 227 S.W.3d at 85. Instead, we focus on the third prong, that the remaining content in the
affidavit is insufficient to show probable cause. Id. An appellant must show that, when the portion
of the affidavit alleged to be false is excised from the affidavit, the remaining content is insufficient
to support the issuance of the warrant. Id.
Here, Ramos fails to show the challenged statements were necessary to the finding of
probable cause, thus voiding the search warrant and requiring suppression of the DNA search
results. In his written motion to suppress, Ramos failed to argue or demonstrate how the affidavit
would be insufficient if the court excised the challenged portion. See id. (“[S]pecific allegations
and evidence must be apparent in the pleadings in order for a trial court to even entertain a Franks
proceeding). In his appellate brief, Ramos provides an affidavit with the challenged statement
omitted, but does not demonstrate how this affidavit lacks probable cause. Cf. Cates v. State, 120
S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s
attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to crossexamine.” (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171)). We hold that Ramos failed to meet the third prong
of the requisite test. See Harris, 227 S.W.3d at 85 (holding that there was insufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie violation under Franks because the appellant failed to meet the first two
prongs of the Franks test).
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Outcome: We overrule Ramos’s sole point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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Defendant's Experts:
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