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Date: 09-25-2020
Case Style:
Milton Eugene Buchanan v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 02-19-00311-CR
Judge: Wade Birdwell
Court: Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth
Plaintiff's Attorney: Joseph W. Spence
John E. Meskunas
Defendant's Attorney:
Fort Worth, Texas Criminal Defense Lawyer Directory
OR
Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.
Description: Fort Worth, TX - Criminal defense attorney , Murder
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After a criminal complaint was filed, the trial court appointed an attorney for
Buchanan. On August 24, 2017, a grand jury indicted Buchanan for murder; it was
alleged that he stabbed and killed Latonia Partee. On September 24, 2018, a grand jury
re-indicted Buchanan.
Despite his appointed counsel, Buchanan filed upwards of 60 “pro se” motions
over the nearly two years that the case was pending.
1
None was a motion to proceed
pro se, and Buchanan did not otherwise request to proceed pro se during the lengthy
pretrial history of the case, which included multiple continuances, appointment of new
1
At a hearing early in the case, the trial court explained that it would not consider
the motions because Buchanan was represented by counsel.
3
counsel for Buchanan, and a competency exam that led the trial court to deem him fit
to stand trial.
But on the morning of June 14, 2019—the day that trial would eventually
begin—Buchanan requested to proceed “sui juris” with a “leguleius,”2 terms that, to
Buchanan, essentially meant he would represent himself with the assistance of an
attorney advising him. He orally requested a continuance in order to prepare to
represent himself.
The trial court explained that Buchanan had every right to represent himself, and
it arranged for appointed counsel to stand by in the courtroom to advise Buchanan.
But the court explained that there would be no continuance. The court made note that
the case had been pending since August of 2017 and that there had been multiple
settings and continuances. “So,” the court said, “any preparation that needed to be
made for this case needed to be done prior to today. We will proceed to trial today.”
The trial court then attempted to engage in a Faretta3 colloquy to ensure that
Buchanan understood the risks of self-representation, that he knew he would be
expected to comply with all applicable rules, that he was knowingly and voluntarily
2
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sui juris” as “of full age and capacity” and
“possessing full social and civil rights.” Sui juris, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
It lists “leguleius” as a variant of “leguleian,” which it defines as “a pettifogging lawyer.”
Leguleian, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A “pettifogger” is in turn defined as
“a lawyer whose methods are petty, underhanded, or disreputable.” Pettifogger, Webster’s
Third New Int’l Dictionary Unabridged (2002).
3
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 (1975).
4
waiving his right to representation, etc. Buchanan became upset and obstinate, and he
refused to directly answer the judge’s questions and instead gave nonsensical, legalsounding responses, many of which cited civil law concepts inapplicable to his criminal
case.4
Nonetheless, the trial court believed that it had adequately admonished
Buchanan and that he had clearly invoked his right to self-representation, so the court
informed Buchanan that he would be handling voir dire (while rejecting Buchanan’s
protests that he was unprepared). The trial court instructed Buchanan, “you will only
have the opportunity to speak when it is your turn to conduct the voir dire examination.
The State will go first, and then it will be the opportunity for you to speak.”
Buchanan halted voir dire as soon as it began, and the panel was excused. In an
extended back-and-forth, the trial court made clear that Buchanan had had nearly two
years to prepare and that there would be no further delay. The court asked, “So at this
time, to be clear, are you asking that Mr. Trammell represent you today as we go
forward?” Buchanan responded, “I have no choice in the matter,” and then, “Yes. I’m
4
Variously, Buchanan insisted that he did not understand even the most
straightforward questions, demanded to know whether the trial judge was a “registered
foreign agent” and where her “documents” were, offered unrelated affidavits, asked
whether the trial judge had “a claim against me” and asked her to “present” it, and
eventually settled into a refrain of “I do not consent” or “I do not consent, and I waive
the benefit” in response to most questions. When the court asked Buchanan how he
pleaded, he responded, “I decline your offer, Your Honor.” The court entered a notguilty plea on Buchanan’s behalf. When Buchanan was asked whether he had heard the
trial court’s admonitions, he responded, “I do not consent for the all-capped name or
the person in the contract, for it is not me.”
5
going to have to because I don’t have time to prepare for it. I have no choice but to.”
When asked to confirm that his choice was representation by counsel, Buchanan said,
“Yes,” and then, “Yes. I have no choice. Yes. I’m not—I need time to prepare to go
to trial, but I can’t get that, so I have to go with what I’m given today. That’s the only
way I can do it.”
Buchanan proceeded to trial with counsel, and the jury found him guilty of
murder. The trial court assessed punishment at 60 years. Buchanan appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s request for self-representation
for an abuse of discretion. Lathem v. State, 514 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2017, no pet.). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, and we imply any findings of fact supported by the record and necessary to
affirm the ruling when the trial court did not make explicit findings. Id.
III. ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
An indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel unless the defendant
competently, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to counsel. Williams v. State,
252 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “The Sixth Amendment also includes the
reciprocal right to self-representation.” Id. The right to self-representation does not
attach until it has been clearly and unequivocally asserted. Id. Once asserted, under
Faretta, the trial judge must inform the defendant about the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing
6
and his choice is made with eyes open. Id. When advising a defendant about the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the trial judge must inform the
defendant that there are technical rules of evidence and procedure, and he will not be
granted any special consideration solely because he asserted his pro se rights. Id.
To assess whether a waiver is effective, courts consider the totality of the
circumstances. Id. This means that courts must examine “the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused.” Id. While a defendant has a fundamental right to represent
himself, representation by counsel is the standard, not the exception, and there is a
strong presumption against the waiver of the right to counsel. Lathem, 514 S.W.3d at
802. The defendant’s request must be unconditional and must not be a calculated attempt
to disrupt, subvert, obstruct, or delay the orderly procedure of the courts or to interfere
with the fair administration of justice. Id. at 803.
In this case, the State asserts that Buchanan’s request to represent himself was
conditional. According to the State, Buchanan conditioned his request on the trial
court’s granting of his oral motion for continuance, and because the invocation of his
right was conditional, the right did not attach.
A similar analysis was advanced by the majority in United States v. Simpson, 845
F.3d 1039, 1047–50 (10th Cir. 2017). There, the defendant presented two motions on
the morning of trial: a request to proceed pro se and a motion for continuance. Id. at
1044. The trial court denied both, and on appeal, a majority affirmed those decisions.
7
See id. As the majority saw it, the defendant “appeared to package together his requests
for self-representation and a continuance.” Id. at 1045. The majority held that it was
rational to view the request for self-representation as being conditioned on the motion
for continuance, and thus the request was not clear and unequivocal. Id. at 1047–48.
The dissent saw matters differently. See id. at 1065 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
Regardless, we need not decide whether Buchanan’s requests were “packaged”
together, with one conditioned on the other. Rather, we will assume without deciding
that Buchanan clearly, unequivocally, and unconditionally invoked his right to selfrepresentation independent of any request for a continuance. Even operating under
that assumption, Buchanan later waived his right to self-representation and requested
counsel, which will become the focal point of our analysis.
IV. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
Buchanan acknowledges that after he was granted permission to represent
himself, he waived this right and elected to go to trial with counsel. But he maintains
that this waiver was not voluntary because the trial court attached impermissible
limitations on his self-representation that forced him to opt for counsel—namely, a
restriction on participating in voir dire and a denial of his motion for continuance.
We agree that the trial court put Buchanan to a choice between representation
by counsel and self-representation with some limitations. However, as we explain, both
of these options were constitutional: representation by competent counsel is not a
constitutionally distasteful option, and the limitations that the trial court placed on
8
Buchanan’s pro se efforts were not as harsh as he alleges. Because both of Buchanan’s
options were constitutional, the trial court did not render Buchanan’s choice
involuntary simply by forcing Buchanan to choose between them.
A defendant may waive his right to represent himself once it has been asserted.
Funderburg v. State, 717 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). “While the record must
reflect that a defendant waived his right to self-representation after it was asserted, it is
not subject to the same stringent standards as the waiver of the right to counsel.” Id.
“A waiver may be found if it reasonably appears to the court that defendant has
abandoned his initial request to represent himself.” Id.
A waiver is ordinarily “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege” and must be the product of a free and meaningful choice.
Lathem, 514 S.W.3d at 811 (quoting Stringer v. State, 241 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007)). Thus, waivers of constitutional rights must be voluntary, intelligent, and
knowing acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. Id.
“There can be no doubt that those who wrote the Bill of Rights understood the
inestimable worth of free choice.” Pazden v. Maurer, 424 F.3d 303, 316 (3d Cir. 2005)
(cleaned up). “The very essence of a voluntary waiver is that it be the product of a free
and meaningful choice.” United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2008)
(en banc) (cleaned up) (quoting McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1981)). “This
does not mean, however, that a court may not, under certain circumstances, require the
9
defendant to select from a limited set of options a course of conduct regarding his
representation.” Id. “A criminal defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly
procedures, to choose between [self-representation] and another course of action as
long as the choice presented to him is not constitutionally offensive.” Id. “If a choice
presented to a petitioner is constitutionally offensive, then the choice cannot be
voluntary.” Pazden, 424 F.3d at 313 (quoting Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir.
1980)).
Our remit, then, is to determine whether the choices that the trial court gave
Buchanan were in themselves constitutionally offensive. The trial court presented
Buchanan with two choices. On the one hand, it offered Buchanan the option to
proceed to trial with an attorney whose preparedness and competency were not
questioned. We do not doubt the soundness of this option. Competent counsel is not
disfavored; it is guaranteed as a fundamental right. Williams, 252 S.W.3d at 355–56.
“The assistance of counsel protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial; counsel ensures
that the prosecution’s case is subjected to meaningful adversarial testing and safeguards
the defendant’s rights.” Id. at 356 (citations omitted). This option was not
constitutionally offensive.
On the other hand, the trial court gave Buchanan the option to proceed pro se
with certain limitations. To assess whether this option was permissible, we evaluate
whether any of these limitations exceeded constitutional bounds.
10
First, Buchanan asserts that the trial court gave an instruction that limited his
ability to participate in voir dire. The contested instruction occurred as Buchanan
impeded the Faretta hearing, repeatedly giving nonsensical answers to the trial court’s
questions about whether he understood his rights. Undeterred, the trial court ended
the hearing, took steps to begin voir dire, and gave Buchanan an instruction:
THE DEFENDANT: I do not consent, and I waive the benefit.
THE COURT: Mr. Buchanan, you would agree that you have heard all
of the admonishments that I’ve given you today. You’re just not
consenting, and you’re waiving the benefit. Would that be correct?
THE DEFENDANT: I do not consent for the all-capped name or the
person in the contract, for it is not me.
THE COURT: All right. Let’s bring the panel in. You may have—
actually, you will stand when the panel comes in.
And just to be clear, . . . at this point, you will only have the opportunity to speak when
it is your turn to conduct the voir dire examination. The State will go first, and then
it will be the opportunity for you to speak.
(Partial venire panel seated.)
[Emphasis added.] On appeal, Buchanan argues that this instruction was an improper
directive to remain wholly silent and to not object as the State conducted voir dire. And
because the trial court prevented him from participating in the State’s voir dire, he
maintains, this instruction renders his choices unconstitutional.
However, that is apparently not how Buchanan interpreted this instruction
during the trial proceedings. As voir dire began, the very first thing to occur was that
Buchanan broke his silence and interrupted, asking whether he could confer with his
11
counsel. The venire was then excused, and Buchanan’s concerns were once again taken
up.
The fact that Buchanan so readily spoke up may indicate that he did not
understand the instruction as a directive not to talk. Or alternatively, if he did believe
that he had been instructed not to speak, the fact that he immediately broke in could
indicate that he did not care—that he intended to obstruct the proceedings further. In
either event, Buchanan’s reaction tends to vindicate the trial court’s instruction.
Other persuasive reasons to reject Buchanan’s argument can be found in State v.
Cunningham, in which the court addressed an analogous instruction. 474 S.E.2d 772,
781 (N.C. 1996). Shortly before closing arguments began, the court admonished the
pro se defendant:
Mr. Cunningham, I am going to Rule according to the Law. I’m going to
let you talk. I’m not going to let you interrupt me. I’m not going to let
you interrupt the other side. I’m not going to let the other side interrupt
you. If you are making an unlawful argument, I will stop you from making
it.
Id. On appeal, the defendant contended that by instructing him that he could not
interrupt the prosecutor’s argument, the court prevented him from objecting to the
State’s improper arguments. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, holding,
“The court did not instruct the defendant that he would not be allowed to make
appropriate objections.” Id. “The court was merely instructing the defendant that he
could not continue to disrupt the proceedings as he had been doing for the duration of
the trial.” Id. It was further noted that the instruction did not materially impact the
12
defendant because “[t]he defendant made several objections to the jury argument by
the prosecutor.” Id.
We agree with this reasoning. We do not view the trial court’s instruction as a
directive not to object, because the trial court never stated that Buchanan was forbidden
from making appropriate objections to the State’s voir dire. Instead, given Buchanan’s
disruption of the Faretta hearing and his seeming unawareness of the relevant law, we
interpret the trial court’s instruction as both (1) a preemptive and reasonable attempt
to keep Buchanan from disrupting voir dire and (2) helpful advice about how voir dire
would unfold (the State would go first, followed by the defense). This supposed
limitation on Buchanan’s participation in voir dire was no limitation at all—or at least,
that is how Buchanan treated it when he immediately spoke up as voir dire began. Thus,
this instruction did not saddle Buchanan’s self-representation with an unconstitutional
burden.
Next, Buchanan contends that the trial court impermissibly limited his selfrepresentation when it denied his motion for continuance. Buchanan orally requested
a continuance to be able to prepare his defense, to arrange for expert testimony, to
review discovery, and to prosecute various motions related to the jurisdiction of the
court and the fairness of the proceedings. The trial court denied the request. On appeal,
Buchanan asserts that the denial unlawfully restrained his right to self-representation.
However, Buchanan never filed a written, sworn motion for continuance. “A
criminal action may be continued on the written motion of a party for sufficient cause
13
shown.” Harrison v. State, 187 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (emphasis
added). “The motion must be sworn to by someone who has personal knowledge of
the facts relied on for the continuance.” Id. Ultimately, an unsworn, oral motion
preserves nothing for review. Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). Thus, multiple courts have held that there are no grounds for reversal when a
trial court refuses a pro se defendant’s unsworn, oral motion for more time to prepare
his or her defense. See Johnson v. State, No. 01-16-00548-CR, 2017 WL 2255724, at *2
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 23, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication); Cerf v. State, 366 S.W.3d 778, 786–87 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no
pet.); Colomb v. State, No. 10-08-00039-CR, 2009 WL 1163413, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco
Apr. 29, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Thomas v. State,
Nos. 05-04-01289-CR, 05-04-01290-CR, 2006 WL 1624393, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas
June 13, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Calhoun v. State,
No. 14-02-00765-CR, 2003 WL 21911176, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 12, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
Regardless, even assuming that Buchanan had preserved his motion for
continuance, he would not prevail. As we explain, the trial court’s denial of continuance
was within constitutional bounds.
“Not every restriction on [the] time or opportunity to investigate . . . or otherwise
to prepare for trial violates a defendant’s” constitutional rights. Morris v. Slappy, 461
U.S. 1, 11, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 (1983). “Trial judges necessarily require a great deal
14
of latitude in scheduling trials.” Id., 103 S. Ct. at 1616. “[O]nly an unreasoning and
arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’
violates” the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 11–12, 103 S. Ct. at 1616 (quoting Ungar v.
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S. Ct. 841, 849 (1964)).
In order to show reversible error predicated on the denial of a pretrial motion
for continuance, a defendant must demonstrate both that the trial court erred in denying
the motion and that the lack of a continuance harmed him. Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d
838, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a
denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate” the Constitution. See Rosales v. State,
841 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S. Ct.
at 850). “The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case,
particularly the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.”
Id.
In Ex parte Windham, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals listed several factors
that should inform the trial court’s decision whether to grant a continuance to obtain
an attorney of the defendant’s choice:
(1) the length of delay requested, (2) whether other continuances were
requested and whether they were denied or granted, (3) the length of time
in which the accused’s counsel had to prepare for trial, (4) whether another
competent attorney was prepared to try the case, (5) the balanced
convenience or inconvenience to the witnesses, the opposing counsel, and
the trial court, (6) whether the delay is for legitimate or contrived reasons,
(7) whether the case was complex or simple, (8) whether the denial of the
motion resulted in some identifiable harm to the defendant, [and] (9) the
quality of legal representation actually provided.
15
Id. (quoting Ex parte Windham, 634 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)); James v.
State, 506 S.W.3d 560, 565 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). Many of
the Windham factors apply with equal force to the scenario we face here: the flip side
of the Sixth Amendment coin, in which the trial court has denied a pro se defendant’s
request for a continuance for more time to prepare his own defense. See Cantu v. State,
Nos. 03-05-00660-CR, 03-05-00661-CR, 2006 WL 2084644, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin
July 28, 2006, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(applying these factors to a pro se defendant’s request for continuance). It is not our
role to reweigh the factors, but to determine whether the trial court could reasonably
have balanced them and concluded that the fair and efficient administration of justice
weighed more heavily than appellant’s interest in preparing his defense. Rosales, 841
S.W.2d at 375.
Here, the trial court could have reasonably determined that nearly all of the
Windham factors weighed against a continuance:
(1) Buchanan did not specify the length of delay he sought;
(2) multiple continuances had already been granted, some at Buchanan’s
behest;
(3) Buchanan had nearly two years to decide to proceed pro se and to prepare
his own defense, and yet he waited until the morning of trial to initiate this
process;
16
(4) a competent attorney was prepared to try the case, but Buchanan would
need time to learn even the basics of criminal law and practice;
(5) presumably the balance of convenience and inconvenience from
rescheduling the trial tilted toward inconvenience, given that there were
twenty-one witnesses in the State’s case on guilt–innocence alone and that,
according to the trial court, the State had “scheduling issues” in bringing
those witnesses together;
(6) Buchanan’s stated reasons for delay were unsatisfactory,5 and he did not
raise any specific objection to his appointed counsel;
(7) the case was complex;
(8) the record does not show that the court’s denial of the request resulted in
identifiable harm to Buchanan; and
(9) Buchanan’s counsel provided him with quality representation.
Because nearly all of these factors support the trial court’s decision, we hold that the
denial of the continuance was not unconstitutional, even assuming that question had
been preserved. Thus, the denial of a continuance did not place an unlawful constraint
on Buchanan’s self-representation. Because both of Buchanan’s options—
5
According to Buchanan, his belated decision to proceed pro se was spurred by
unspecified “things” that he had “just encountered recently,” which caused him to
realize the need to challenge “the nature and the cause of this case and the accusation
with regards to the element of personal jurisdiction, venue, underwriting, and the nature
of the action until . . . the prosecution properly alleges them.”
17
representation by competent counsel and self-representation with reasonable
limitations—were constitutional, his election between them was not rendered
involuntary.6
See Garey, 540 F.3d at 1265.
Nor do the words that Buchanan used to waive his self-representation indicate
that his choice was involuntary. After the trial court made clear that it would not grant
a continuance, Buchanan agreed to have counsel represent him, but he said that he had
“no choice” other than to do so:
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I can’t—I’m not prepared to represent
myself today, if I’m not given time to prepare.
THE COURT: So at this time, to be clear, are you asking that
Mr. Trammell represent you today as we go forward?
THE DEFENDANT: I have no choice in the matter.
6
On a related front, Buchanan argues that his decision to waive selfrepresentation was involuntary because he was treated differently from his attorneys.
Buchanan notes that when his second attorney was appointed, that attorney received a
continuance to prepare the case. By contrast, when Buchanan decided to represent
himself, he received no continuance. And whereas his attorneys’ motions were
considered by the trial court, Buchanan’s barrage of “pro se” motions were not.
Buchanan does not explain how this disparate treatment rendered his waiver of
self-representation involuntary. Regardless, there were good reasons for the disparity.
As to the continuance, Buchanan’s newly appointed attorney was fresh to the case, and
he needed time to familiarize himself with the evidence. By contrast, Buchanan lived
the case and was already well acquainted with the facts of the murder, and by the time
he requested to represent himself, he had already had nearly two years in which to seek
opportunities to familiarize himself with the evidence. As to his hybrid motions, it is
well established that a defendant has no right to hybrid representation, and as a
consequence, a trial court is free to disregard any pro se motions presented by a
defendant who is represented by counsel. Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 902 n.47
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
18
THE COURT: Is that a yes or no? Are you asking Mr. Trammell to
represent you today in this trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I’m going to have to because I don’t have
time to prepare for it. I have no choice but to.
THE COURT: So listen to my question. You have two choices today:
to represent yourself or to have Mr. Trammell [do so]. And what I hear
you saying is that Mr. Trammell—is that you are asking that Mr. Trammell
represent you in this matter.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
. . . .
THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Trammell, as your appointed attorney, will
proceed as your attorney today. Do you understand that? And is that
how you wish to proceed today?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I have no choice. Yes. I’m not—I need
time to prepare to go to trial, but I can’t get that, so I have to go with what
I’m given today. That’s the only way I can do it.
Jones v. Jamrog shows that despite his protest that he had “no choice,” Buchanan’s
waiver was nonetheless voluntary. See 414 F.3d 585, 593 (6th Cir. 2005). There, a local
rule prohibited a defendant from directly reviewing discovery because he was
represented by counsel, so the defendant protested that the local rule left him with no
option but to proceed pro se. Id. at 588. The district court determined that when the
defendant protested that he had “no choice,” this rendered his election equivocal and
involuntary, and the district court thus refused his request to represent himself. Id. On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that this protest—and the circumstances it
reflected—did not render his decision to waive counsel equivocal or involuntary. Id. at
593. “It was unreasonable to interpret these statements to mean that Jones literally did
19
not have a choice—clearly, he did.” Id. The fact that the defendant’s circumstances
were not to his liking did not undo the voluntariness of his choice to waive counsel. Id.
“Surely many defendants electing to proceed pro se would reconsider if they were
guaranteed unfettered access to an attorney of their choosing or, as in this case,
unfettered access to materials they consider important to their cases.” Id. But the Sixth
Circuit held that it was not the district court’s obligation to ensure that these ideal
circumstances were achieved before honoring his request to proceed pro se. Id.
“Instead, the court’s duty is simpler than that: it is to determine whether, in the case
presently before it, however far from ideal the circumstances may be, the defendant’s
decision to proceed pro se is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Id. The court held
that the defendant’s request met these criteria, and his waiver of the right to counsel
should have been honored. Id.
Here, as in Jones, Buchanan undoubtedly had a choice. The options were not his
ideal ones, but they were constitutional, and he is guaranteed no more than that. His
waiver of the right to represent himself was not rendered involuntary simply because
he would have preferred different circumstances. Buchanan’s insistence that he had
“no choice” does not indicate that his decision was involuntary.
After presenting Buchanan with his choices, the trial court asked him to confirm
that he wished for counsel to represent him. Four times, Buchanan clearly said, “Yes.”
We hold that the trial court correctly honored these expressions of intent, regardless of
20
the protests that surrounded them. See Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 642. Buchanan
voluntarily waived his self-representation. We therefore overrule Buchanan’s issue.
Outcome: We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: