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Date: 07-11-2021
Case Style:
Dominique Curry v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 01-19-00942-CR
Judge: Richard Hightower
Court: Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas
Plaintiff's Attorney: Daniel C. McCrory
The Honorable Kim K Ogg
Eric Kugler
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Houston, Texas - Criminal defense attorney represented Dominique Curry with a Murder charge.
The complainant in this case, Brenae Thompson, was dating Curry. In August
2016, Thompson was living at the Catalina Village Apartments in Harris County,
Texas. On the morning of August 7, 2016, Thompson entered the apartment complex
driving her black Toyota Camry at 6:11 a.m., and a security video showed that she
was driving with an unidentifiable person in the passenger seat. One of Thompson’s
downstairs neighbors, Sammy Curtis, heard something like “tussling” or fighting—
a frequent occurrence at Thompson’s apartment—and then a pop that sounded like
a gunshot. The gunshot woke Sammy Curtis’s wife, Tamika Curtis, and they heard
someone walking down the stairs. Sammy Curtis went to look out his window and
saw a man get into the black Camry and drive away. Tamika Curtis likewise saw the
black Camry speed away. Security videos showed that the vehicle exited the
complex at 6:23 a.m.
Thompson’s next-door neighbor, April Morris, walked out of her apartment
at approximately 6:30 a.m. on her way to work, and she saw Thompson laying on
the ground outside her own apartment bleeding from what appeared to be a head
wound. Morris called 9-1-1, but Thompson was already dead when the paramedics 3
arrived. The paramedic who responded to the phone call opened Thompson’s
apartment door. He saw a gun just inside the apartment and decided to wait for police
to arrive before searching for additional victims.
Houston Police Department Detective C. Hogue testified that he was called to
the scene of the shooting to investigate what had been categorized as a “suspicious
suicide.” Once he arrived, however, he determined that the shooting was a homicide,
based on the facts that Thompson’s body was outside her apartment, the door was
closed, and the weapon was inside the apartment. He did not believe the scene of the
shooting was consistent with a suicide. Police found a .40 caliber black and silver
handgun at the scene with an empty casing nearby.
Police were able to determine that Thompson’s vehicle was missing and began
a search for the Camry. Thompson’s vehicle was recovered from a hotel parking lot
three days after the shooting. The keys, with her blood on them, were in the ignition
and her glove box was open. Her wallet, containing identification and credit cards,
was in the glove box.
During the subsequent investigation, police determined that Curry and
Thompson had been in a dating relationship. The police also traced the handgun
recovered at the scene of the shooting to its original purchaser, who in turn pointed
them toward Curry. The police interviewed Curry, who told police that Thompson
had picked him up and drove them to her apartment. Curry said that she was mad at 4
him because he had been cheating on her, and she threatened him with the gun—a
gun he acknowledged belonged to him. He told police that he tried to leave, and then
she committed suicide. He stated that she fell in the living room, and he panicked
and left in her car. Curry denied shooting Thompson.
Curry was indicted for Thompson’s murder based on allegations that he shot
her with a firearm. At trial, in addition to the above evidence, the State presented
testimony from the medical examiner. He testified that Thompson had been shot in
the face, with the bullet fracturing several of her teeth before perforating her left
carotid artery and jugular vein and then traveling to her chest cavity and perforating
a lung. The medical examiner stated that the trajectory of the projectile was
“downwards, front to back and right to left.” Based on other damage and stippling
at the entry site, the medical examiner testified that the gun was not touching her
face at the time it was fired but it also could not have been more than two to five feet
away. The medical examiner further testified that the manner and cause of death was
homicide with a firearm, and he stated that the wound trajectory was not consistent
with a self-inflicted gunshot.
Kristina May, a forensic chemist, testified that Thompson’s hands were tested
for gunshot residue. Thompson tested positive for gunshot residue on her right hand,
and she was negative for gunshot residue on her left hand. May specifically testified
that there were eight gunshot residue particles on the swab from Thompson’s right 5
hand, “which is a positive result for gunshot residue indicating that the individual
likely had some sort of association with the discharge of a firearm.” May further
explained that “association with the discharge of a firearm” “can mean that they fired
the weapon, were in close proximity to the weapon when it was fired, or touched
something that had [gunshot residue] on it.”
Nikitra Pace, who had also dated Curry, testified that she had seen Curry with
a gun on two occasions. She described it as a black and silver handgun, .40 or .45
caliber. On one occasion, Curry had left his gun out while a friend’s young child
visited, and Pace “was upset” that the child could reach it, so she put it away. On
another occasion, she observed Curry and a friend “playing like they were going to
shoot each other.” She also knew that Curry and Thompson were acquainted,
because she had seen Thompson’s contact information in Curry’s phone and had
seen the two having conversations. She testified that Curry called her several times
on the day that Thompson was murdered. Curry gave her some dirty clothes and a
cell phone to get rid of, and she complied. She threw the clothing away because the
items were muddy, wet, and “smelled bad.” She gave the phone to a friend, but after
police contacted her, she retrieved the phone and turned it over to police. The police
did not obtain any information useful to the investigation from the cell phone.
After the State rested, Curry moved for a directed verdict on the basis that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of Thompson’s murder. The trial court 6
denied the motion. The jury convicted Curry of murder, and the trial court assessed
his punishment at 40 years’ imprisonment.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue on appeal, Curry argues that the trial court erred in denying
his timely motion for directed verdict because the evidence was legally insufficient
to support his murder conviction.
A. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a motion for directed or
instructed verdict as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Canales
v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Williams v. State, 582 S.W.3d
692, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). When determining
whether there is sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction, we consider
the combined and cumulative force of all admitted evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the
reasonable inferences therefrom, a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Tate
v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We examine all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether any “rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. 7
Crim. App. 2007). In our sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the
record, whether direct or circumstantial, properly or improperly admitted, or
submitted by the prosecution or the defense. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be
attached to the testimony of witnesses, and juries may draw multiple reasonable
inferences from the facts so long as each is supported by the evidence presented at
trial. Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413.
B. Analysis
Curry argues that there was no evidence that he committed the offense of
murder and that the forensic evidence and testimony of the State’s experts created a
reasonable doubt about the manner of Thompson’s death. He asserts, “Ultimately,
the evidence was legally insufficient to prove: 1) what type of conduct caused her
death; 2) whose conduct caused the death; and 3) whether the conduct was
committed with the requisite mens rea.” Curry asserts that the evidence that
Thompson was murdered, rather than committed suicide, was based on “little more
than the fact that [the] medical examiner concluded that the manner of death was
homicide based on an estimation of the trajectory of the gunshot.” This is a
mischaracterization of the evidence.
Security videos from the apartment complex showed that someone was with
Thompson when she arrived at the apartment complex just minutes before the 8
shooting and that someone left in her car immediately after. Thompson’s downstairs
neighbor, Sammy Curtis, heard a scuffle or fight followed by a pop that sounded like
a gun shot. Curtis looked out his front window and saw a man get into a black Camry
and speed away. Whoever fought with Thompson fled without calling for help;
rather, Thompson’s neighbor, Morris, found her and called 9-1-1. Thompson’s body
was laying outside her apartment, and the gun was found inside the closed apartment,
several feet away from her and behind a closed door. Her car was found abandoned
days later, with her blood on the keys, indicating that someone who had interacted
with her bleeding body had also touched the keys and driven the car. Detective
Hogue testified based on his training and experience that he believed Thompson’s
death was a homicide, rather than a suicide. The medical examiner traced the
trajectory of the bullet—from its entry at Thompson’s lower lip, “downwards, front
to back and right to left” through her neck to her left lung—and testified that it was
not consistent with a self-inflicted wound. This evidence is sufficient for a jury to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Thompson was murdered. See Jackson,
443 U.S. at 318–19; Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750.
Curry points to testimony from Kristina May, the forensic chemist, that
Thompson had gunshot residue on her right hand. May testified that the “positive
result for gunshot residue indicat[ed] that the individual likely had some sort of
association with the discharge of a firearm.” May further explained that “association 9
with the discharge of a firearm” could mean that she “fired the weapon, [was] in
close proximity to the weapon when it was fired, or touched something that had
[gunshot residue] on it.” This testimony does not compel a conclusion that
Thompson shot herself. The jury could have concluded that she came into contact
with gunshot residue because the firearm was fired in close proximity to her body or
as part of the “tussle” or fight overheard by neighbors. When considered along with
the combined and cumulative force of all admitted evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we cannot conclude that the gunshot-residue evidence was
so significant as to prevent the jury from concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that
a murder occurred. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413.
Curry further asserts that the State “had no DNA evidence to tie [him] to the
scene or to the vehicle belonging to [Thompson].” He points out that, although there
were several witnesses at the apartment, none of them could identify him as being
involved with the shooting. We observe, however, that neither eyewitness testimony
nor DNA evidence is necessary to support a conviction for murder. See Gardner v.
State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that evidence was
sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant murdered victim despite
lack of eyewitness testimony); Pena v. State, 441 S.W.3d 635, 641 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (holding that Texas law does not require DNA 10
or fingerprint evidence to support criminal conviction and that lack of such evidence
does not affect sufficiency of other evidence introduced at trial).
The State presented evidence that Curry and Thompson had a dating
relationship. Curry made a statement to police indicating that he was present when
Thompson shot herself.1 He further acknowledged owning the gun recovered from
the scene, and Pace likewise testified that Curry owned a gun like the one that killed
Thompson. The jury was entitled to believe Curry’s statement that he was present at
the time of the shooting but discredit his account of who pulled the trigger, especially
in light of the medical examiner’s testimony that Thompson’s injury was not
consistent with a self-inflicted gunshot. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (jury may reject any part or all of witness’s testimony in
order to reconcile conflicts); see also Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413 (holding that jury is
sole judge of credibility and weight of witnesses’ testimony and may draw multiple
reasonable inferences from facts so long as each is supported by evidence presented
at trial).
Finally, Curry argues there was no evidence that he knowingly or intentionally
killed Thompson. Mental state can be inferred from actions, including actions such
as use of a deadly weapon and fleeing the scene instead of calling for assistance. See
1 Although Curry makes a passing statement that his statement to police was
“incredibly coercive,” he does not challenge the admissibility of the recorded
statement.11
TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(17) (providing that firearm is deadly weapon); Guevara
v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Intent may also be inferred
from circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and the conduct of the
appellant.”); see also Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(recognizing that flight is circumstance from which inference of guilt may be
drawn); Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
(recognizing that jury may infer defendant’s intent to commit murder from his use
of deadly weapon in deadly manner and such inference is almost always conclusive);
Womble v. State, 618 S.W.2d 59, 64–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (“[W]here a deadly
weapon is fired at close range and death results the law presumes an intent to kill.”).
We overrule Curry’s sole issue
Outcome: We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: