Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 09-05-2020
Case Style:
James Randall Williamson v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 01-19-00136-CR
Judge: Gordon Goodman
Court: Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas
Plaintiff's Attorney: John D. Crump
The Honorable Kim K Ogg
Defendant's Attorney:
Call 888-853-4800 if you need a Criminal Defense Attorney in Texas.
Description:
 |
Continuous Sexual Abuse of Young Child or Children
This case concerns the repeated sexual abuse of the complainant, Mary,1 by
her step-grandfather, Williamson. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the evidence shows that Williamson sexually abused Mary on at least three
occasions between March 24, 2009, and March 24, 2012, when Mary was between
seven and nine years old and living with her mother, Rachel, and older sister,
Jane.2
However, Mary did not make an initial outcry of abuse until years later in
2017, when she and Jane were living with their father, Mark. Mary made the
outcry over Father’s Day Weekend, when Mark, Jane, and Mary were on a
camping trip in the Texas Hill Country. There, Mary, then 14 years old, and Jane,
then 17 years old, discussed Mary’s persistent bed-wetting, which had started when
Mary was around seven years old. Mary asked Jane what she thought caused it,
1 To protect their privacy and for ease of reading, we refer to the complainant, her
parents, and her sister by pseudonyms.
2 Mary and Jane’s parents divorced when Mary was 4 years old and Jane was 7
years old.
3
and Jane, in response, asked Mary whether she had ever been molested. Mary then
burst into tears and said that she had—by their step-grandfather, Williamson, who
regularly babysat her and Jane from 2010 to 2012, when they lived with Rachel.
Upon hearing Mary’s disclosure, Jane began to scream, prompting Mark to ask her
what was wrong. Jane responded that Mary had just told her that Williamson had
molested her. Mark then spoke with Mary privately, and Mary confirmed that
when she and Jane lived with Rachel, Williamson would molest her when he
babysat them. Mary said that Williamson stopped molesting her when she and Jane
moved in with Mark in 2012.
Mark, Jane, and Mary drove back home. On the drive, Mark called Rachel
and told her to meet them at his house. There, Mary spoke with Rachel privately
and told her what Williamson had done to her. Mark and Rachel then called the
police, who initiated an investigation and referred Mary to the Children’s
Assessment Center for a forensic interview and medical examination. During the
forensic interview and medical examination, Mary recounted three specific
instances of abuse.
Williamson was indicted for continuous sexual abuse of a child. He pleaded
not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found him guilty and assessed
punishment at 25 years’ confinement. The trial court entered judgment in
accordance with the jury’s verdict. Williamson appeals.
4
Legal Sufficiency
In his first issue, Williamson contends that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support his conviction. Thus, we must review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Williamson, during a period
of 30 or more days, committed at least two acts of sexual abuse against Mary and
(2) at the time of the commission of each act of sexual abuse, Williamson was 17
years of age or older and Mary was 14 years of age or younger. TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 21.02(b) (establishing offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child); Fernandez
v. State, 479 S.W.3d 835, 837–38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (standard of review for
challenge to sufficiency of evidence). If a rational factfinder could have so found,
we will not disturb the verdict on appeal. Fernandez, 479 S.W.3d at 838.
At trial, the State presented testimony from numerous witnesses, including
(1) Mary, (2) the forensic interviewer who interviewed Mary after her outcry, Lisa
Holcomb, and (3) Mary’s parents, Mark and Rachel.
Mary testified that Williamson had abused her “multiple times” when she
was in elementary school and living with her mother. Mary testified that the abuse
occurred when Williamson babysat her and her sister. Mary testified that she
specifically remembered three incidents of sexual abuse. The first occurred in a
bathroom at Mary’s old townhome, where Williamson made Mary touch his penis
5
with her hands, and he touched her vagina with his hands. The second incident
occurred in the living room of the house she lived in after the townhome, where
Williamson again made Mary touch his penis with her hands. The third incident
occurred in Mary’s bedroom at the second house, where Williamson made her
touch and lick his penis and tried to make her put his penis in her mouth. Mary
testified that after each incident of abuse, Williamson told her not to tell anyone
what had happened. Mary testified that she did not tell anyone about the abuse
until the camping trip in June 2017, when she disclosed the abuse to her sister Jane
and then to her father Mark.
Holcomb testified that, during her forensic interview of Mary, Mary
recounted three incidents of sexual abuse: the first of which occurred in a bathroom
at Mary’s old townhome, the second of which occurred in the living room of the
house she lived in after the townhome, and the third of which occurred in Mary’s
bedroom at the second house.
Mark and Rachel provided testimony that confirmed when (1) Williamson
and Mary were born (1956 and 2003, respectively), (2) Mary lived in the
townhome, (3) Mary lived in the second house, and (4) Williamson babysat Mary
(2010–12, when Mary was between seven and nine years old).
The State also presented the notes prepared by the doctor who performed the
medical examination on Mary after her outcry. The notes record Mary as stating
6
that Williamson abused her by touching her vagina and making her touch and lick
his penis. The notes further record Mary as stating that the first incident of abuse
occurred when Mary was six years old and the last incident occurred when she was
eight or nine years old.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence would permit
a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, during a period of 30
or more days, Williamson sexually abused Mary by (1) touching her vagina and
forcing her to touch his penis, (2) forcing her to touch his penis, and (3) forcing her
to touch and lick his penis.3 The evidence would further permit a rational trier of
fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, during this period, Williamson was
older than 17 years of age and Mary was younger than 14 years of age.
Williamson nevertheless argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction because there were certain inconsistencies between the
statements Mary made before trial and the testimony Mary provided at trial. For
example, during her forensic interview, Mary told Holcomb that Williamson made
her lick his penis each time he abused her, whereas at trial Mary testified that
Williamson only made her lick his penis the third time he abused her. The
3 By touching Mary’s vagina and forcing her to touch his penis, Williamson
committed indecency with a child through sexual contact. TEX. PENAL CODE §
21.11(a)(1), (c)(1), (2). And by forcing Mary to lick his penis, Williamson
committed aggravated sexual assault. Id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(v), (2)(B). These acts
constitute sexual abuse. Id. § 21.02(c)(2), (4).
7
resolution of these inconsistencies was the prerogative of the jurors. Buxton v.
State, 526 S.W.3d 666, 675 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). The
jurors resolved these inconsistencies in favor of the prosecution, and we must defer
to their determination on appeal. Id.
Williamson further complains that the trial testimony was not corroborated
by DNA or other forensic evidence. But it is well-established that such
corroboration is unnecessary to support a conviction for continuous sexual assault
of a child. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07 (conviction of continuous sexual
assault of child is “supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim”);
Prestiano v. State, 581 S.W.3d 935, 941 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019,
pet. ref’d) (“The uncorroborated testimony of the child is sufficient, standing
alone, to support a conviction.”); Buxton, 526 S.W.3d at 676–77 (holding that
testimony of complainant, her sister, and medical examiner was legally sufficient
to support finding that defendant committed at least two acts of sexual abuse
against complainant during period of 30 or more days).
We hold that Williamson’s conviction is supported by legally sufficient
evidence. Therefore, we overrule Williamson’s first issue.
Hearsay
In his second issue, Williamson contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in overruling his objection to and admitting into evidence Mary’s
8
hearsay statement through the testimony of Jane. During the State’s examination of
Jane, Jane testified that on the first night of their Father’s Day camping trip in June
2017, she and Mary had a conversation. The State then asked, “And what was the
subject matter of that conversation?” Williamson objected on hearsay grounds, and
the trial court overruled his objection, stating, “[Jane] can answer that question
without saying what [Mary] told [her].” Jane then answered the State’s question,
stating that the conversation was about whether Mary “had ever been molested
before.” Williamson argues that the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion
because Jane’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay, the erroneous introduction of
which harmed Williamson by bolstering the credibility of Mary. We disagree.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). But Jane did not testify to what Mary
specifically stated during their conservation; instead, she testified to what their
conversation was about in general. Thus, Jane’s testimony was not hearsay. See
Morrow v. State, 486 S.W.3d 139, 162 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref'd)
(holding that witness’s testimony that she had “a conversation with [the
complainant] about [the defendant]’s ‘status in the marriage [and] his fidelity’” did
not constitute hearsay because “no out-of-court statement was offered”).
We overrule Williamson’s second issue.
9
Jury Argument
In his third issue, Williamson complains that the State improperly argued
during closing argument that he bore the burden of proof when it made the
following remarks: “[W]ith these types of cases, with any sex assault type case, it
usually comes down to three main defenses: Either she’s lying, she’s mistaken, or
she asked for it. I want you to think about those three categories and I want you to
think what direction is [Williamson] going with his defense. What category is he
choosing to go with to try and show that this wasn’t him?”
However, Williamson made no objection during closing argument to these
remarks, and when a defendant fails to object to jury argument, he forfeits his right
to raise the issue on appeal. Hernandez v. State, 538 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018) (“The right to a trial untainted by improper jury argument is
forfeitable.”). Because he failed to object to the State’s argument at trial,
Williamson has waived his right to raise the issue on appeal.
We overrule Williamson’s third issue.
Outcome: We affirm.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: