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Date: 09-06-2020

Case Style:

Alferis Coby v. The State of Texas

Case Number: 01-18-00991-CR

Judge:

Court: Court of Appeals First District of Texas

Plaintiff's Attorney: Jessica Alane Caird
The Honorable Kim K Ogg
Daniel C. McCrory

Defendant's Attorney:

Call 888-853-4800 if you need a Criminal Defense Attorney in Texas.

Description:















On March 12, 2015, Juan Carlos Ramirez was shot and killed during a robbery
in the parking lot of a bar in downtown Houston. Ramirez’s truck was stolen during
the incident. Police found Ramirez’s body in the parking lot, with a cell phone in his
hand.
Ramirez and his friend Shu-Tin Chloe Ward had gone to the bar to see a friend
perform. After the performance, they walked outside to Ramirez’s pickup truck.
Ward got in the truck to make a phone call, and Ramirez stood outside. Before Ward
could complete the call, she heard a commotion near the truck, including voices she
did not recognize. She heard Ramirez say that he would not give up his keys and that
he was going to call the police. Ward attempted to lock the car and tried to call
police. Before she could complete the call, someone got into the front seat of the
truck, holding a gun in his hand. He lunged at her, put the gun to her head, and
threatened to shoot her if she did not give him her belongings. Ward threw her phone
onto the front passenger side floorboard and ran out of the truck. As she ran toward
the bar for help, she heard Ramirez yell that the police were on their way. She also
heard a gunshot.
Law enforcement developed a description of two suspects. They discovered
that Ward’s cell phone remained active and traced it to a duplex in Houston. Officers
performed surveillance on the location and observed Ramirez’s truck being driven
3
by someone who matched the description of one of the suspects. After following the
car and a brief chase, they arrested Coby’s codefendant. Later, they approached
Coby when he left the duplex. Coby fled and crawled under a nearby house. He
eventually surrendered when threatened with release of a police dog.
After he was arrested, law enforcement realized that Coby was 15 years old.
They took him to a magistrate judge for statutory warnings and then to the police
headquarters downtown. The same detective interviewed Coby and his codefendant
separately. Simultaneously, another officer attempted to notify Coby’s guardian, but
Coby did not give officers a working phone number for his grandmother, and
searches did not recover phone numbers for her.
When interviewed, Coby confessed to the crime. He admitted that he wanted
money to buy something for his girlfriend so he and his codefendant went downtown
intending to rob someone. They walked by a bar and went into the parking lot. Coby
held a gun to a man while his codefendant grabbed the man’s car keys, but the man
grabbed for the gun. The man started chasing his codefendant while Coby got in the
truck and grabbed a phone belonging to the woman inside. She got out of the car and
ran. Coby admitted that he shot the man.
About a month after the murder, Ward identified Coby in a photo array as the
person who got into the truck. Ward also identified her cellphone, which was
recovered in the front passenger seat of the truck. Forensic searching of the phone
4
showed that two contacts had been added after the incident: “Smiley” and “Dino.”
Ward did not know anyone by either name. Police knew that Coby used the
nickname “Smiley.” Calls were made from the phone to “Smiley” on six occasions
in the day after the murder. The phone’s browsing history during that time also
included “Ford car on Houston news” and “man shot and killed during carjacking.”
Coby was indicted for capital murder. He pleaded not guilty. A jury found
him guilty of the lesser-included offense of felony murder and assessed punishment
at 70 years’ imprisonment. He appeals.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, Coby contends that there is insufficient evidence to support
his conviction. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In an appeal of a criminal conviction, we review the challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 318–20 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). Under the Jackson standard, evidence is insufficient when, considered in the
light most favorable to the verdict, no rational factfinder could have found that each
essential element of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009). We consider all evidence in the record, whether it was admissible or
5
inadmissible. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Legal
sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by
a hypothetically correct jury charge. Hernandez v. State, 556 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997)).
We consider both direct and circumstantial evidence as well as all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772,
778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the jury’s credibility and weight
determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We resolve
inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778
(“When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder
resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that
determination.”).
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing
guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Sorrells
v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “Each fact need not point
directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative
force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.”
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If an appellate court
6
finds the evidence insufficient, it must reverse the judgment and enter an order of
acquittal. Estrella v. State, 546 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2018, pet. ref’d).
A person commits felony murder if the person commits or attempts to commit
a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of or furtherance of the
commission, the attempt, or the immediate flight therefrom, he commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL
CODE § 19.02(b)(3).
B. Analysis
As an initial matter, Coby suggests that we should not consider his confession
because the trial court erroneously admitted it. He argues that without the confession,
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. When deciding sufficiency
of the evidence, appellate courts consider all evidence in the record in the light most
favorable to the verdict, whether that evidence was admissible or inadmissible.
Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 767. We consider all evidence before the jury, including
Coby’s custodial statement.
The jury heard sufficient evidence to conclude that Coby committed an act
clearly dangerous to human life in furtherance of the felony offense of robbery. See
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(3) (felony murder). Ward testified that, in the early
morning hours, she and Ramirez were in the parking lot behind a nightclub in
7
midtown Houston. She got in the backseat of Ramirez’s truck to make a phone call.
While she wasin the back seat, she heard a commotion outside that included Ramirez
and a voice she did not know. She tried to lock the truck and call 911, but someone
got into the front seat of the truck, pointed a gun at her, and demanded her
belongings. She threw her phone into the front passenger side floorboard, got out of
the truck, and ran. While she was running, she heard a gunshot. She stayed at the
scene when law enforcement responded, and later told them that when she called her
cell phone, someone answered. Ward later identified Coby as one of the robbers.
Law enforcement found Ramirez dead on the ground, holding his cell phone.
Police located Ramirez’s truck by tracking Ward’s phone. The truck was found near
Coby and his codefendant, and the phone was inside the truck. Officers observed the
truck and surrounding area. When they approached Coby, he ran under a house.
Once threatened that a police dog would come after him under the house, Coby
surrendered.
Ward’s phone was taken into evidence. When they searched the phone,
officers discovered Coby’s contact information had been entered into the phone
shortly after it was stolen, and several calls had been placed to Coby after the murder.
They also discovered searches in the browser history for “Ford car on Houston news”
and “man shot and killed during carjacking.”
8
A medical examiner testified that Ramirez died from a gunshot to the heart
and opined that the person who shot him was at most three feet away.
The jury watched a recording of Coby’s custodial statement. He admitted that
he and his codefendant went to downtown Houston with the intention of robbing
someone. He also admitted that he shot Ramirez. The video included footage of
Coby using an officer’s phone to call family and friends. During the phone calls,
Coby admitted that he had made bad choices and that he “popped” a guy who died
shortly after.
The jury heard sufficient evidence to convict Coby of felony murder. In doing
so, the jury could consider the law of parties. The law of parties establishes that a
person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another
if he aids, encourages, or attempts to aid another person in committing the offense.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a)(2). The jury heard evidence that Ramirez was shot by
Coby or his codefendant when they tried to rob him and steal his car. We hold that
the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for felony murder. We overrule
Coby’s first issue.
Motion to Suppress
In his second issue, Coby contends that the trial court improperly overruled
his motion to suppress and should not have admitted his statement for three reasons:
(1) the interviewing officer did not notify Coby’s grandmother; (2) Coby did not
9
expressly waive his statutory rights by using the word “waiver” or by explicitly
agreeing that he “waived his rights”; and (3) the recording device broke the recording
of the statutory warnings given by the magistrate into a separate file from the
statement Coby gave officers on the same digital recorder. We hold that the trial
court did not err in denying Coby’s motion to suppress.
A. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress a statement for an
abuse of discretion. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
When, as here, the trial court makes factual findings, we determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling supports
those findings. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). At a
suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony. Cantu v State, 817 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991). We give great deference to the trial court’s determination of
historical facts. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d at 549. Mixed questions of law and fact that
turn on the credibility and demeanor of a witness are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, and mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on the credibility
and demeanor of a witness are reviewed de novo. Id. We will affirm if the trial
court’s ruling is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Id. at 548.
10
B. Applicable Law
Because Coby was a juvenile at the time of his arrest, the Family Code
controls certain issues involving his substantive rights. Roquemore v. State, 60
S.W.3d 862, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “The Family Code seeks to strike a
balance between the competing interests of public safety and child welfare. This
balance is struck in part by limiting the investigative function of the police.” Id. at
872 (internal citation removed). Evidence obtained in violation of the applicable
provisions of the Family Code must be suppressed. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
38.23(a) (“No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any
provision of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas . . . shall be admitted in
evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.”); see also Jeffley v.
State, 38 S.W.3d 847, 854 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)
(observing that unlawfully obtained statements are inadmissible against juvenile in
criminal proceedings treating juvenile as adult).
The admissibility of custodial statements made by a juvenile is governed by
section 51.095 of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.095. Subsection
51.095(a)(5) provides that a juvenile’s oral statement is admissible if these
conditions are satisfied: (1) the statement is made while the child is in the custody
of an officer, in a detention facility or other place of confinement, or in possession
of the Department of Family and Protective Services; (2) the statement is recorded
11
by an electronic recording device; and (3) at some time before making the statement,
“the child is given the warning described by Subdivision (1)(A) by a magistrate, the
warning is part of the recording, and the child knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waives each right stated in the warning.” Id. § 51.095(a)(5). Section
51.095 incorporates the warnings required by Miranda, with additional safeguards
in place to protect juveniles. Id. § 51.095; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
479 (1966).
A juvenile’s oral statement made as a result of custodial interrogation without
the benefit of a magistrate warning is inadmissible at trial. See TEX. FAM. CODE §
51.0595(a)(5), (b)(1); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22 § 3. But section
51.095 does not preclude admission of a juvenile’s statement if the statement does
not stem from custodial interrogation. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.0595(b), (d);
Matthews v. State, 513 S.W.3d 45, 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.
ref’d); see also Laird v. State, 933 S.W.2d 707, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) (discussing prior version of statute and explaining that it
“allows an oral statement to be admitted if it is not in response to custodial
interrogation”). Custodial interrogation is “questioning that is initiated by law
enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in any significant way.” Delacerda v. State, 425 S.W.3d 367, 386 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d).
12
C. Motion to Suppress Hearing
Coby’s motion to suppress his statement alleged that police violated his
constitutional rights and the Texas Family Code’s requirements for juvenile
interrogation. The court held a hearing on his motion. Officer Burrow testified that
he interviewed Coby after the Houston Police Department took him into custody.
Before taking Coby’s statement, Officer Burrow took him before a magistrate to
receive the statutorily required juvenile warnings. He took a digital audio recorder
into the judge’s chambers, put the timestamp information on the recording, and left
Coby alone in the room with the judge to receive his warnings. The digital recorder
captured the warnings the judge gave to Coby. Officer Burrow testified that he later
listened to the judge’s discussion with Coby and verified that the warnings were
given. After Coby received the warnings from the judge, he was taken to the juvenile
processing office of the Houston Police Department Homicide Division.
While Officer Burrow interviewed Coby’s codefendant and then Coby,
Officer Rodriguez attempted to contact Coby’s grandmother. He searched databases
and called the best number he could find, but she did not answer. The following day,
another officer with the Houston Police Department Juvenile Division reached her.
Officer Burrow recorded his interview with Coby on the same digital recorder,
and the recorder created two files. Both were timestamped showing the warnings
occurred first, followed by the statement. Officer Burrow explained that when
13
someone presses stop on the digital recorder, it automatically creates a new file,
resulting in two files – the warnings and the interview.
Officer Burrow interviewed Coby for about thirty minutes, ending at
9:00 p.m. Coby then asked to call his girlfriend. Officer Burrow let Coby make the
phone call on his city-issued cell phone and left the room. Coby spoke to his
girlfriend, his grandmother, and at least two other people during the call. Video
recording captured him making the phone call, and the judge viewed it during the
motion-to-suppress hearing. During the call, Coby told his grandmother that he was
taken by police to the Homicide Division. He told her that he had been making bad
decisions, and he had been caught. He admitted to her that the had been out the night
before near a bar downtown with his codefendant. He explained that they tried to
rob a man, but the man fought back, and Coby “popped him in the chest and like
five minutes later he died.” Coby asked her to bring his girlfriend to court so that he
could see her. He told someone else on the call that he had been caught for capital
murder. He also said “that just how it goes down in the jungle.”
Coby testified at the hearing, stating that he did not pay attention to the
magistrate judge’s warnings. He said he signed the paper that was put in front of him
and claimed not to understand the warnings or that he was waiving his rights. He
also testified that he only wanted to get the statement out of the way so that he could
14
go to sleep. He said that if his grandmother told him he was under investigation for
murder, he would not have given a statement.
Coby admitted that he did ask the judge some questions and that he responded
to the judge’s warnings. He also admitted that he talked to his grandmother on the
phone, and that she first visited him three days later.
The trial court reviewed the video of the interrogation and the audio of the
magistrate judge’s warnings. The court denied the motion to suppress and made
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court found Officer Burrow’s testimony
credible and Coby’s testimony not credible. The court found that Coby was taken to
a magistrate judge without unnecessary delay and that he received warnings that
complied with the Family Code’s provisions requiring that the defendant be alone
with a magistrate and that the warnings be recorded. The warnings were completely
explained to Coby in a manner that ensured he understood him, and Coby told the
magistrate that he understood. Coby was repeatedly told that he did not have to talk
to officers. Although he did not use the word “waive,” it was clear to the trial court
that he chose to waive his rights.
The court found that the warnings were recorded using the same recorder that
was used to record his statement, but the recording was not necessarily captured on
the same drive. The court stated that it was unclear what device, such as a USB
thumb drive, was used to capture the warnings, but that the recordings were
15
timestamped, and the court could determine that Coby received the warnings before
he gave a statement. The court found that the process substantially complied with
the Family Code.
The court found that Coby was taken to the homicide division of the Houston
Police Department, which is a designated juvenile processing officer. Officer
Burrow interviewed Coby, and Coby initiated conversation and spoke voluntarily.
While the interview was happening, another officer attempted to contact Coby’s
grandmother but was unsuccessful.
The findings include that Coby was given water and allowed to make phone
calls from the officer’s cell phone. He appeared to contact his grandmother and
advise her that he had been arrested. His grandmother was notified by police the next
day.
The court found that Coby’s statement was freely and voluntarily given after
receiving the statutory warning from a magistrate judge. Coby understood his rights
and voluntarily waived them. His statement was given voluntarily without threats or
coercion. The court found that the Family Code was complied with in most respects
except as it relates to parental notification, but the statement was not automatically
inadmissible for failure to promptly notify a guardian. The court found that there
was no showing of a causal connection between the lack of guardian notification and
16
Coby’s statement. There was no evidence that Coby’s grandmother would have gone
to the police station if she had been so notified.
D. Failure to Notify Guardian
First, Coby contends that the trial court erred in admitting his statement
because police failed to notify his guardian before questioning him. Section 52.02(b)
provides that a person taking a child into custody must promptly notify the child’s
parent or guardian of the person’s action and a statement of the reason for taking the
child into custody. TEX. FAM. CODE § 52.02(b)(1).
Even assuming the police failed to promptly notify Coby’s guardian, we agree
with the trial court that Coby failed to meet his burden to prove a causal connection
between the failure to contact his grandmother and the making of his statement.
Pham v. State, 175 S.W.3d 767, 772–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“We have
expressly held that a causal connection between a violation of section 52.02(b) and
the obtaining of evidence must be shown before the evidence is rendered
inadmissible.”).
Coby testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and the trial court
found that his testimony lacked credibility. He testified that he valued his
grandmother’s advice and that he would not have given a statement had she told him
he was under investigation for murder. The trial court heard a recording of the
magistrate judge informing Coby that he had been accused of evading on foot and
17
that police wanted to talk to him about a murder. The record also reflects that Coby
had been informed from the beginning of the interview with Officer Burrow that
police placed him in custody to investigate a murder. At the beginning of the
interview with Officer Burrow, which the trial court also watched, Coby was told
that the charges would likely be capital murder. Given the evidence that Coby was
told that he was being investigated for murder or capital murder before he made any
inculpatory statements, Coby has not established that his grandmother telling him
the same information would have been likely to change the outcome of his decision.
E. Waiver of Rights
Coby next contends that his statement should have been suppressed because
neither he nor the magistrate judge used the word “waive” to determine whether he
freely decided to speak to police.
The Family Code does not require that the defendant explicitly waive his
rights. See Marsh v. State, 140 S.W.3d 901, 911 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, pet. ref’d); see also Crenshaw v. State, No. 01-09-00791-CR, 2011
WL286126, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 27, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). The question is not whether a defendant
explicitly waived his Miranda rights, but whether he did so knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily. Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 25, (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We
consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether he did so. Id.
18
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation shows that
Coby knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. The magistrate
judge repeatedly explained Coby’s rights. The record reflects that the magistrate
judge told Coby:
You may remain silent and not make any statement at all. That
means, just because they want to talk to you doesn’t mean you
have to talk to them. If they want to ask you questions, doesn’t
mean you have to answer their questions. If you want to, that’s
fine. If you don’t want to, that’s fine too. It’s your right, not
theirs.
The judge told Coby that if he chose to speak to police, his words could later be used
as evidence if he were charged with a crime. The judge explained Coby’s right to a
lawyer before or during questioning, and he informed Coby that if he could not
afford a lawyer, a lawyer would be appointed to represent him without cost. He told
Coby that he could stop talking to the police during an interview if he changed his
mind, became tired, or decided to stop. The judge reiterated, “Just because you start
answering questions doesn’t mean you have to continue answering questions.” The
judge asked Coby if he understood, and Coby responded affirmatively, including
that he had no questions. The judge relayed additional information about what would
happen next, and he repeated the warnings a third time, including: “You’ll have to
make the decision and you’re going to have to tell them yes, I’ll answer the
questions, no, I won’t, or I want to talk to a lawyer first.”
19
The record also reflects that after Coby left the judge’s chambers, he initiated
the conversation with Officer Burrow by asking what would likely happen to him.
The officer responded that it was Coby’s decision. The officer reminded Coby that
the judge had read him his legal warnings.
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Coby knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights, and gave a statement.
F. Recording of the magistrate judge’s warning and the custodial
statement
Finally, Coby argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress because there was a break in the recording between the magistrate judge’s
warnings and his digitally recorded statement.
Section 51.095(a)(5)(A) notes that the magistrate judge’s warning should be
“a part of the recording” when taken as a warned, custodial statement. See TEX. FAM.
CODE § 51.095(a)(5)(A) (“[B]efore making the statement, the child is given the
warning described by Subdivision (1)(A) by a magistrate, the warning is a part of
the recording, and the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives each
right stated in the warning.”). Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
requires that police record a defendant’s oral custodial statement, and that “prior to
the statement but during the recording the accused is given the warnings . . . and the
accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any rights set out in the
warning.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22 § 3(a) (1–2).
20
Coby argues that because the digital recorder used by officers separated the
magistrate judge’s warnings into a distinct audio file from the subsequent recording
of the custodial statement, the trial court should have deemed them inadmissible.
The State argues that the trial court’s ruling should be upheld because the evidence
shows substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 51.095(a)(5)(A)
given that the warnings and interview occurred on the same digital device and
timestamps show the warnings occurred consecutively.
We need not decide whether the audio recorder’s separation of the warning
and statement into two files violates section 51.095 because Coby has not shown
that he was harmed by the admission of his recorded custodial statement. Statutory
errors that result in erroneous admission of a statement are subject to a nonconstitutional harm analysis. Nonn v. State, 117 S.W.3d 874, 880–81 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003) (addressing analysis of an article 38.22 violation as non-constitutional
harm because such a violation did not render the statement unconstitutional). When
performing a rule 44.2(b) harm analysis, we uphold the verdict unless the erroneous
admission had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. Id.; see TEX.
R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
The record reflects that Coby admitted to his role in the murder during phone
conversations with his family. Coby had no right to privacy in the contents of these
conversations, and no police action caused him to make the inculpatory statements.
21
See Cortez v. State, 240 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d)
(“[Juvenile] appellant’s claim of privacy in a police station interview room is not
consistent with historical notions of privacy.”). Officer Burrow offered Coby his cell
phone, and Coby appeared to call several family members and friends. The
statements Coby made during the phone calls were not a result of a custodial
interrogation as they were not in response to questions initiated by law enforcement.
See Delacerda, 425 S.W.3d at 386. During the conversations, Coby admitted that he
was “fixing to go down for capital murder.” He admitted that he had made bad
decisions and been caught. He also stated: “We were out all night. We went to go
there, we tried to get this man, and he fought back, and I popped him in the chest
and like five minutes later he died.”
Physical evidence also tied Coby to the murder. Police tracked Ward’s cell
phone to the house that Coby left immediately before he was arrested. The victim’s
stolen car was found nearby with the phone inside. When police approached, Coby
ran under a house. He only surrendered after police threatened K-9 intervention.
We overrule Coby’s second issue and uphold the trial court’s denial of his
motion to suppress.

Outcome: We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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