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Date: 09-07-2020
Case Style:
John Chester Helton Taylor v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 01-18-00943-CR
Judge: Julie Countiss
Court: Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas
Plaintiff's Attorney: Holly Renee Magee
Jack Roady
Rebecca Klaren
Defendant's Attorney:
Call 888-853-4800 if you need a Criminal Defense Attorney in Texas.
Description:
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Former La Marque Police Department (“LMPD”) Officer R. Rice testified
that on the December 24, 2016, he responded to a report of a sexual assault at a home
in Galveston County, Texas. Rice testified that the residence consisted of a house
on a lot with a garage or carport and another, smaller, detached building “about 10
to 20 yards” behind the garage or carport that “looked like a very, very small
residence.” That building “had two bedrooms” and “two doors.” The door on the
left “was opened,” and he ell that . . . someone was living there.” The other
room “was just storage,” with “a bunch of chairs and whatnot in it.”
When Officer Rice arrived at the residence, he spoke with the complainant’s
mother. He remembered seeing two children but did not speak with them. After
speaking with the complainant’s mother for about five to ten minutes, Rice told her
that he needed to contact Child Protective Services about the sexual assault, and she
needed to take the complainant to the hospital and get “a rape kit . . . done” by the
Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (“SANE”).
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Angela Smith, an emergency-room and SANE nurse at University of Texas
Medical Branch at Galveston (“UTMB”), testified that she examined the
complainant. She explained the procedure she used for conducting the sexual assault
examination, including recording a history of the assault as told by the complainant.
According to Smith’s records, which she read to the jury, the complainant stated:
I went to [appellant’s] . . . room to show him my new phone my mom
got me yesterday; and we started talking. Then I sat down on the couch
he sleeps on, and he was talking that his hand was hurting because he
broke his hand; and that’s when it happened. Well, I just laid down on
the couch and then he got next to me and he started doing stuff. He was
rubbing on me with his hands, and then he pulled down my pants. Then
he pulled down his pants. Then he started doing all that. [(]Clarified,
penetrated [the complainant]’s vagina with [appellant]’s penis.[)] Then
that was it. Then my sister came in, and he started acting like
everything was cool. A month ago, I was in the house. It’s hard to
explain. I can’t remember all of it, but he did the same thing—
[(C]larified [appellant]’s penis penetrated [the complainant]’s
vagina[)]—but his hand wasn’t broken.
(Internal quotations omitted.)
Smith confirmed that the quotations were verbatim recordings of the
complainant’s statements to her. As to the complainant’s appearance and demeanor
when she told Smith about the sexual assault, Smith recorded:
She was well nourished. Her hair was disheveled. Alert and oriented
by answering questions and following commands appropriately. Spoke
in clear and concise speech with short responses. Quiet and crying at
times. Sat up on stretcher with feet dangling, holding stuffed animals.
According to the complainant’s medical records, which were admitted into
evidence, the sexual assault examination revealed that the complainant was actively
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bleeding from the vagina and had a hymenal tear, as well as redness, pain, and
abrasions on the left side of the vagina. Smith testified that these types of injuries
were consistent with blunt force trauma from a sexual assault. Materials collected
from the exam showed traces of semen in the crotch of the complainant’s pants.
The complainant’s fifteen-year-old sister testified that she lived at her
grandfather’s house in La Marque, Texas with her mother, her two younger sisters,
and her “step[-]dad.” At the time of trial, the complainant was twelve years old.
In late 2016, appellant—her uncle—also lived with them. The complainant’s
sister described the living arrangements at her grandfather’s home as consisting of a
“medium sized” main house and “another [small] house” that was detached from the
main house, where the family stored things. Appellant slept in the small, detached
house, which was “basically, his own house that was in [the] back[yard].” Appellant
just had a room out there with two couches in it. “[T]hroughout the day, he
would . . . come in [to the main house] and just chill out for the day; and come
nighttime, he would go out to his own part.”
On the morning of December 24, 2016, complainant’s sister recalled that her
stepfather took her mother to work. It was not a school day, and the girls’
grandfather and appellant were at the home with them. Their stepfather was outside
the house working on his car in the driveway. She and the complainant dressed
themselves that morning in casual clothes; the complainant put on a tee-shirt and
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sweatpants. The complainant’s sister saw the complainant leave the house, but
because they were “just hanging around,” she “didn’t think much of it.”
According to the complainant’s sister, at some point that morning, her
stepfather left in his car and returned with doughnuts. He gave them to her and told
her to pass them out to the family. The complainant’s sister was close to the building
with appellant’s room and went there first. She knocked on the door as she opened
it. From the open doorway, she saw appellant and the complainant lying together
on one of the couches, covered with a blanket. Appellant’s back was against the
back of the couch and the complainant had her back against him.
The sister could tell that the complainant did not have her sweatpants on; the
blanket did not completely cover her, and her bare thigh was exposed. The
complainant appeared pale and nervous; appellant “looked like—basically,
like . . . he got caught.” Appellant stood up, fully dressed, and opened the window
blinds. The complainant remained on the sofa under the blanket.
Feeling sick to her stomach, the complainant’s sister set the doughnuts on a
nearby table, said “here’s the doughnuts,” and left the room. She went into the main
house to her room. After a while, the complainant entered the room, followed by
appellant. Appellant asked the sister if she was okay; she responded, “Yeah, my
stomach just hurts.” Appellant then walked out of the room and left the house.
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After appellant left, the complainant’s sister borrowed her grandfather’s
cellular telephone, locked herself in a bathroom, and called her mother to tell her
what had happened.
The complainant testified that on the morning of December 24, 2016, she went
to appellant’s room to show him her new cellular telephone. Appellant was lying on
the larger couch watching television. She sat down on the smaller couch. As they
conversed, she went to the larger couch, sat down near his feet, then eventually laid
down. Appellant told her to take off her pants and penetrated her vagina with his
penis. A short time later, the complainant’s sister came into the room with
doughnuts.
The complainant’s mother testified that on December 24, 2016, she, her
husband, her daughters, her father, and appellant lived at her father’s home in
Galveston County, Texas. That morning, she left home to get to work at the CVS
Pharmacy in La Marque by 8:00 a.m. Her father, her daughters, and appellant were
at home when she left. Less than an hour later, she received a telephone call from
her oldest daughter. She “could tell” her oldest daughter was crying “because her
voice was shaking”; she “was breathing hard” and sounded “afraid.” The
complainant’s mother told her to stay on the phone with her until she got home. On
the way home, the complainant’s mother stopped at the LMPD station. She told
dispatch: “Hey, there’s an incident that may have taken place. I need an escort out.
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It’s involving my daughter and my brother with him sexually abusing her. I need an
escort.” Officer Rice came out and followed the complainant’s mother to her home.
By the time they arrived, appellant was no longer there. Officer Rice took a report,
and, at his advice, she took the complainant to UTMB for a sexual assault
examination.
Venue
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his conviction because the State did not “prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that th[e] offense occurred within the jurisdiction of Galveston County, Texas.”
Appellant asserts that “[t]he testimony adduced at trial never indicated that the
alleged acts against the complainant took place at a particular location within
Galveston County,” the testimony “pointed to where the family lived, not where the
alleged criminal [offense] took place,” and, as a result, the State did not establish
that jurisdiction lay in Galveston County.
Venue and jurisdiction are two distinct concepts. Etchieson v. State, 574
S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Yocham v. State, No. 01-18-00341-CR,
2019 WL 2426170, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 11, 2019, no pet.).
Jurisdiction concerns the authority of a court to try a case, whereas venue concerns
the place or county where a case may be tried. Etchieson, 574 S.W.2d at 759;
Donovan v. State, 232 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
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pet.). The Galveston County district court had jurisdiction to try this felony case,
without regard to where in Texas the offense was committed. See TEX. CONST. art.
V, § 8; Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).
We construe appellant’s issue not as a challenge to the power of the State to
prosecute crimes committed within its jurisdiction, but as a challenge to whether
venue for the criminal offense appellant committed lies in Galveston County.
Appellant asks us to review his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
under the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See id.
at 318–19; Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This
standard applies to challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
essential elements of the charged offense, but venue is not an essential element of
the charged offense. See Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014). The Jackson standard of review thus does not apply.
Appellant did not contest venue in the trial court. We therefore must presume
that the State proved venue at trial unless the record affirmatively demonstrates
contrary venue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1); Thompson v. State, No.
01-03-01287-CR, 2005 WL 375445, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 17,
2005, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Worley v. State, No.
01-03-00329-CR, 2004 WL 744584, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 8,
2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
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Appellant complains that the evidence at trial proved where the family lived,
but not where the alleged criminal offense took place. But the complainant’s
testimony, the records from the sexual assault examination, and the complainant’s
sister’s testimony show that the offense of aggravated sexual assault committed by
appellant occurred at the grandfather’s home in La Marque, which is in Galveston
County. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1); see also Watts v. State, 99 S.W.3d 604, 610
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding appellate court can take judicial notice that city is
within county for purposes of venue). As a result, appellant cannot overcome the
presumption that venue was proper in Galveston County.
We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s
conviction.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Outcome: We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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