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Date: 03-27-2019
Case Style:
Valentine V. Castillo, Jr. v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 01-18-00284-CR
Judge: Gordon Goodman
Court: Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas
Plaintiff's Attorney: Joseph Wilson Spence
Andrea T. Jacobs
Defendant's Attorney: Charles James Gibson
Description:
Aggravated sexual assault of a child
A grand jury indicted Castillo for one count of continuous sexual abuse of a
young child, two counts of aggravated sexual assault, and two counts of indecency
with a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 21.02(b), 21.11(a), 22.021(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B).
All counts concerned the same child complainant, the daughter of a woman whom
Castillo dated and with whom he intermittently resided. The indictment also alleged
that the complainant was younger than six years of age at the time of the offenses
and that Castillo was a habitual offender.
Castillo pleaded not guilty and the charges were tried to a jury.
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The complainant was thirteen years old at trial. She testified that Castillo
touched her vagina with his hand on many occasions. One night, when she was one
or two years old, she awoke in her mother’s bedroom while her mother was at work,
and a pornographic film was on the television. She was lying on the bed and her
pants had been pulled down to her knees. Castillo was touching her vagina with his
hand. He penetrated her with his finger and it hurt. Castillo warned the complainant
to keep his actions a secret or else he would hurt her mom.
She testified that he did the same thing to her on multiple other occasions in
her mother’s bedroom, in the car, and once at Castillo’s apartment. She recounted
said that these additional instances likewise took place when she was one or two
years old, except for the incident at his apartment, which happened when she was
three years old. She did not recall him ever sexually abusing her in any way other
than touching her.
The complainant did not tell anyone what had happened until she was eleven
years old because she did not think anyone would believe her. At age eleven, she
asked her mother why the complainant’s father, Louis Maldonado, was in prison.
Her mother told her that Maldonado had been convicted of sexually abusing the
complainant’s older stepsister, who is Castillo’s daughter. The complainant then
disclosed that Castillo had sexually abused her.
4
Defense counsel cross-examined the complainant about inconsistencies in her
allegations over time, including during her interview with a forensic interviewer,
Lindsey Dula, that took place after the complainant made the outcry to her mother.
For example, defense counsel questioned the complainant about inconsistent
representations as to her age when the alleged abuse occurred:
Q. [Y]ou told us here this morning that you believed you were one or two years old when most everything happened? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. And that you might have been around three years old when you were over at [Castillo’s] apartment; is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. So do you remember telling people different ages? A. No. Q. Do you remember telling your mom you were three or four? A. No. Q. Do you remember telling Lindsey Dula—Ms. Dula, she’s the lady that you talked to in the small room with the camera? A. No. Q. Do you remember telling her you were three or four? A. No. Q. Do you remember then telling Ms. Dula you might have been two? A. I don’t know.
Defense counsel also asked the complainant about inconsistencies in her allegations
over time concerning where the sexual abuse occurred as well as other details,
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including the first time Castillo abused her, whether he threatened to hurt her mother,
and the particular sex acts involved.
Over the defense’s objection that her testimony was not admissible under
article 38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complainant’s stepsister also
took the stand to testify about an incident when Castillo molested her, which
occurred when she was eleven years old. Early one morning, while the stepsister was
asleep on the couch at home, Castillo put his hands inside her pajama pants and
underwear and touched her vagina. When she realized what was happening, she
rolled over, turning away from him. Castillo then put his hand in the back of her
pajamas and touched her buttocks. He stopped shortly afterward because her mother
returned from work.
On cross-examination, defense counsel tried to question the complainant’s
stepsister about letters she had written to Castillo after the incident on the couch.
The State objected on hearsay and relevancy grounds. The defense argued that the
stepsister’s testimony on this issue would show her state of mind—specifically, that
she maintained a friendly relationship with Castillo after the incident, thereby calling
into question whether it had happened. The trial court sustained the State’s relevancy
objection.
When the complainant’s mother testified, she told the jury that she had dated
Castillo on and off for a decade and he had lived with her and her children during
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some of this time. She demanded that Castillo leave her home after she learned that
he had inappropriately touched her other daughter, the complainant’s stepsister.
The complainant’s mother testified that the complainant revealed that Castillo
had sexually abused her after they had a conversation about Maldonado’s abuse of
her stepsister. The complainant told her mother that Castillo had her with him in the
mother’s bedroom with pornography playing on the television when he touched her
in “her private area,” and that he made her touch his genitals.
The next morning, the mother contacted the police. The complainant
subsequently underwent a sexual assault examination and was interviewed by Dula.
The complainant’s mother testified that she and Castillo had not yet started their
dating relationship when the complainant was one or two years old.
The Fort Worth Police Department assigned Detective E. Buchanan to this
case. He scheduled the complainant to sit for a forensic interview with Dula, which
he observed by closed-circuit television. Next, he interviewed and took a statement
from the complainant’s mother. He referred the complainant for exam by a sexual
assault nurse. Afterward, he prepared the documentation necessary to secure a
warrant for Castillo’s arrest. In cross-examining Buchanan, defense counsel asked
whether the complainant’s allegations were consistent over time, including during
her forensic interview. Buchanan responded that there were no inconsistencies, but
he did acknowledge that the complainant’s mother had expressed some concerns
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about the consistency of the complainant’s allegations. He further acknowledged
that the complainant made her outcry after learning that her stepsister had accused
the complainant’s father, Maldonado, of molestation.
Amy Ornelas was the registered nurse who conducted the complainant’s
sexual assault exam. Based on notes that she took during the exam, Ornelas testified
that the complainant told her that Castillo touched her genitalia, inserted fingers
inside of her, put his mouth on her genitalia, and showed her pornography when she
was “three to four years old.” Ornelas’s exam did not reveal any physical injuries,
which she said was consistent with the complainant’s allegations that Castillo had
touched her with his hands and mouth. Ornelas conceded that the sole basis she had
for believing that the complainant had been sexually abused was what the
complainant had told her.
Dula, who conducted the complainant’s forensic interview, also testified. In
conjunction with her testimony, the State proffered a video recording of the
complainant’s forensic interview, arguing that it was admissible as a prior consistent
statement and that the defense had opened the door to this evidence by repeatedly
challenging the consistency of the complainant’s allegations, including the defense’s
repeated suggestion that the complainant had accused Castillo in retaliation for her
stepsister’s accusation against the complainant’s father, Maldonado. The defense
responded that the interview was inadmissible hearsay because it did not qualify as
8
a prior consistent statement. The court ruled that the interview was admissible, and
the video was played for the jury.
Dula stated that the complainant understood the difference between the truth
and a lie. She opined that the complainant’s account of the sexual abuse by Castillo
included sensory and peripheral details that made it credible and indicated that she
had not been coached. In the interview, Dula testified, the complainant described
chronic sexual abuse. On cross-examination, Dula agreed that the complainant did
not allege that Castillo put his mouth on her vagina or that he made her touch his
genitals. Dula further agreed that she was not opining as to whether the
complainant’s allegations were actually true.
The defense did not offer any of its own witnesses or other evidence.
Before the case went to the jury, the State waived the count of the indictment
charging Castillo with indecency with a child that alleged he forced her to touch his
genitals. The State also waived the remaining count of indecency with a child and
the two counts of aggravated sexual assault and requested that they instead be
submitted as lesser-included offenses of the count charging continuous sexual abuse
of a child. The court granted this request.
The charge instructed the jury to consider only alleged conduct occurring
before the presentment of the indictment and after September 1, 2007, when the
complainant was more than two and half years old. The jury found Castillo not guilty
9
of continuous sexual abuse of a child and aggravated sexual assault by putting his
mouth on the complainant’s vagina. It found him guilty of aggravated sexual assault
by digital penetration and indecency with a child by touching the complainant’s
vagina with his hand.
Because the count for indecency with a child by touching was a lesser
included offense of aggravated sexual assault by digital penetration, the trial court
vacated the indecency finding and entered a judgment of conviction for aggravated
sexual assault. Punishment was tried to the court, which assessed Castillo’s
punishment at 50 years’ confinement.
DISCUSSION
I. Ex Post Facto Claim
Having been convicted of committing aggravated sexual assault against a
child who was younger than six years of age, Castillo was subject to a minimum of
25 years of imprisonment and ineligible for parole by statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 22.021(f)(1); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.145(a). Castillo contends that the
application of these mandatory-minimum and parole-ineligibility statutes violates
his constitutional guarantees against conviction for ex post facto crimes. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 16. He reasons that that the jury heard
evidence of sexual assaults occurring both before and after September 1, 2007, the
10
effective date of these statutes, and that the trial court therefore may have applied
these statutes to conduct that he engaged in before they became law.
We reject Castillo’s contention because he has not stated a cognizable ex post
facto claim. The federal and Texas constitutional guarantees against the application
of ex post facto laws are directed at the legislature, not the courts. Ortiz v. State, 93
S.W.3d 79, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Ex parte Heilman, 456 S.W.3d 159,
163–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (reaffirming Ortiz’s holding). To state a cognizable
ex post facto claim, Castillo must show that sections 22.021(f)(1) and 508.145(a)
themselves operate retroactively—not that the trial court retroactively applied them
to an offense he committed before their enactment. Ortiz, 93 S.W.3d at 91. Because
Castillo does not argue that these statutes operate retroactively, his ex post facto
claim fails. Id.; see also Pomier v. State, 326 S.W.3d 373, 387–88 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (erroneous application of statute by court to acts
committed by defendant before statute’s enactment wasn’t ex post facto violation).
Moreover, even if a trial court’s retroactive application of a statute to offenses
committed before the statute’s effective date could serve as basis for a valid ex post
facto claim (or some other appellate complaint), the trial court’s jury charge limited
the time period the jury was to consider to avoid the retroactive application of
sections 22.021(f)(1) and 508.145(a) to Castillo. The charge contained an instruction
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that the State had to prove that any offense committed by Castillo was committed
after September 1, 2007. It read:
You are further charged as the law in this case that the State is not required to prove the exact date alleged in the indictment, but may prove the offense, if any, to have been committed at any time prior to the presentment of the indictment, and after September 1, 2007.
Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume juries follow the trial court’s
instructions. Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Castillo
has not identified any contrary evidence and we discern none. Thus, the record
demonstrates that the jury found Castillo guilty of aggravated sexual assault based
on conduct that he engaged in after the enactment and effective dates of these
mandatory-minimum and parole-ineligibility statutes. Sections 22.021(f)(1) and
508.145(a) therefore were not erroneously applied to Castillo.
II. Evidentiary Complaints
Castillo contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the
recording of the complainant’s forensic interview and the testimony of the
complainant’s stepsister that Castillo had sexually abused her as well. Castillo also
contends that the trial court erred in excluding the letters that the complainant’s
stepsister wrote to him after the sexual abuse occurred.
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Under
12
this standard, we may reverse the trial court only if its decision lies outside the zone
of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 83; see also Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 318
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (explaining that appellate court would misapply abuse-of
discretion standard if it were to reverse merely because it disagrees with trial court’s
evidentiary decision).
B. Complainant’s forensic interview
Castillo contends that the recording of the complainant’s forensic interview
was inadmissible hearsay. The State responds that Castillo’s hearsay objection to the
entire interview was too general to preserve error for appellate review. The State
further argues that some or all of the interview was admissible under either the
hearsay exclusion for prior consistent statements offered to rebut a charge of recent
fabrication or the rule of optional completeness.
1. Applicable law
The proponent of evidence usually has the burden of establishing its
admissibility. White v. State, 549 S.W.3d 146, 151–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Thus, if the opposing side makes a proper objection to the admissibility of evidence,
the proponent must demonstrate that the evidence overcomes the stated objection.
Id. at 152. Generally speaking, a hearsay objection is sufficiently specific to require
the offering party to show that the evidence either is not hearsay or is admissible
13
under an exception to the hearsay rule. Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994).
Hearsay—a statement made outside of court that is offered for its truth—
generally is inadmissible. TEX. R. EVID. 801–02. The prior statement of a witness
that is consistent with her trial testimony, however, is not hearsay if it is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge that the witness recently fabricated it or acted
from a recent improper motive in so testifying. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B). To
qualify for admission as a prior consistent statement, however, the witness must have
made the statement before her ostensible motive to fabricate or other improper
motive arose. Hammons v. State, 239 S.W.3d 798, 808–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The rule of optional completeness is an exception to the hearsay rule. Pena v.
State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Under the rule, if a party
introduces into evidence part of a conversation or recorded statement, the party’s
opponent may introduce any other conversation or recorded statement that is
necessary to explain or allow the jury to fully understand the part previously
introduced. TEX. R. EVID. 107; Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 814. Thus, if a party questions
a witness about specific statements made by another during a recorded interview,
the opponent may introduce any remaining part of the interview that concerns the
same subject and is necessary to permit the jury to place those specific statements in
14
their proper context. Sauceda v. State, 129 S.W.3d 116, 122–23 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004).
2. Analysis
When the State proffered the video of the complainant’s forensic interview,
Castillo objected that it was hearsay. The State contends that this objection to the
recorded interview was insufficient to preserve error and that Castillo instead was
required to identify specific statements within the interview that were hearsay. We
disagree that Castillo’s objection was insufficient to preserve error for review. When
an exhibit encompasses multiple statements, only some of which are inadmissible
hearsay, an objecting party must identify the specific statements that are
objectionable to preserve any error for appellate review. See, e.g., Whitaker v. State,
286 S.W.3d 355, 368–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (global hearsay objection to
audiotapes insufficient to preserve error as to specific statements made within
recording); Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (global
hearsay objection to entire “pen packet” insufficient to preserve error as to specific
subset of documents within packet). Here, however, Castillo objected to the entirety
of the interview as hearsay and maintains this position on appeal. The State’s
position at trial—that the entire interview was a prior consistent statement and thus
outside the hearsay rule—was a tacit acknowledgement that the interview as a whole
otherwise would not have been admissible. On this record, Castillo’s hearsay
15
objection preserved this issue for our review. See Cofield, 891 S.W.2d at 954; see
also Tovar v. State, 221 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no
pet.) (defense counsel’s objection to admission of video as prior consistent statement
preserved that issue for appellate review).
As it did in the trial court, the State maintains that the complainant’s interview
is admissible because it falls within the hearsay exclusion for prior consistent
statements. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(B). Specifically, the State contends that it
was entitled to show that the complainant had made prior statements consistent with
her trial testimony to rebut the defense’s charge that the complainant had fabricated
her allegations of sexual abuse after learning that her father was imprisoned for
sexually abusing Castillo’s daughter. To qualify as a prior consistent statement under
Rule 801(e)(1)(B), however, the complainant would had to have sat for her forensic
interview before learning that her stepsister accused the complainant’s father of
molesting her, which, according to Castillo, gave her the motive to falsely accuse
Castillo of sexually assaulting her. See Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 809. The record is
clear that the complainant’s interview took place long after her mother told her why
her father had been imprisoned. Thus, the hearsay exclusion as to prior consistent
statements to rebut recent fabrication does not make the complainant’s interview
admissible. See id.; see e.g., Haughton v. State, 805 S.W.2d 405, 407–08 (Tex. Crim.
16
App. 1990) (videotaped statements not admissible under Rule 801(e)(1)(B) because
alleged motive to fabricate arose before the statements were recorded).
Nevertheless, the alternate ground that the State urged for admitting the video
of the complainant’s forensic interview—the rule of optional completeness—
supports the trial court’s ruling. Throughout trial, the defense called into question all
material aspects of the complainant’s allegations, including what happened, if
anything, when it happened, where it happened, and whether Castillo said or did
anything to ensure her silence. In his opening statement, defense counsel asserted
that the complainant repeatedly changed her allegations, including during her
forensic interview. Defense counsel called the complainant’s consistency into
question, including statements that she made during the interview, during cross
examination of the complainant. In response, the complainant generally was
indecisive or uncertain as to what she previously had said during the interview. In
addition, the defense called into question the complainant’s consistency while cross
examining Detective Buchanan, who maintained that she had been consistent. Given
the defense’s challenge of the complainant’s consistency during her interview, the
State was entitled to introduce the video into evidence so that the jury could decide
for itself the extent, if any, to which her story had changed. See TEX. R. EVID. 107;
Sauceda, 129 S.W.3d at 122–23; see also Tovar, 221 S.W.3d at 190–91 (video of
17
complainant’s interview was admissible under rule of optional completeness
because defense had questioned her consistency).
The Court of Criminal of Appeals has held that the rule of optional
completeness allows for the introduction of only those parts of a recorded statement
necessary to make the previously admitted evidence fully and fairly understood.
Sauceda, 129 S.W.3d at 123. Castillo, however, did not agree in the trial court that
only part of the interview was admissible, nor does he do so on appeal. Given that
his challenge to the complainant’s consistency embraced virtually every aspect of
her story, the uncertainty of her answers to specific questions posed in cross
examination, and the detective’s testimony that she had been consistent, the trial
court reasonably could have found that her entire recorded interview was necessary
to place any inconsistencies in context for the jury. See Tovar, 221 S.W.3d at 190–
91; see also Bezerra v. State, 485 S.W.3d 133, 142–43 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016,
pet. ref’d) (affirming admission of recorded interviews of complainants under rule
of optional completeness; entire interviews necessary to place testimony elicited
during cross-examination of law-enforcement officer as to non-verbal
communication of complainants in context); Mick v. State, 256 S.W.3d 828, 830–32
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (recorded interview of complainant
admissible under rule of optional completeness; entire interview was necessary
given challenge of complainant’s consistency made during cross-examination of
18
detective, who maintained that complainant had been consistent); Credille v. State,
925 S.W.2d 112, 116–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d)
(recorded interview of complainant admissible under rule of optional completeness;
entire interview necessary to place specific statements introduced by defense into
their proper context). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the complainant’s recorded interview.
C. Stepsister’s testimony about separate sex offense
Castillo contends that the trial court erred in allowing the complainant’s older
stepsister to testify that he also had sexually abused her. He maintains that article
38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not make her testimony admissible
because it allows for the admission of extraneous sexual offenses, whereas he merely
pleaded guilty to injuring the stepsister as part of a plea bargain in which the State
dismissed a charge of indecency with a child.
1. Applicable law
When a defendant is tried for certain sex offenses against children, including
continuous sexual abuse of a child, indecency with a child, and aggravated sexual
assault, the State may introduce evidence that the defendant has committed a
separate sex offense against another child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2(b);
see Caston v. State, 549 S.W.3d 601, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no
pet.). This evidence is admissible for any relevant purpose, including as proof of the
19
defendant’s character and propensity to act in conformity with his character. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2(b); Jacobs v. State, 560 S.W.3d 205, 207 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018). The evidence may consist solely of the other child’s testimony
about the other sex offense. See, e.g., Alvarez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 362, 366–67, 371
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (upholding admission of testimony
from defendant’s nieces that he had sexually assaulted them in defendant’s
prosecution for sex offense against another child); Gonzales v. State, 477 S.W.3d
475, 480–81 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref’d) (child’s testimony that
defendant had sexually abused her was sufficiently probative to support defendant’s
conviction for sex offenses against several other children).
2. Analysis
A grand jury previously indicted Castillo for indecency with a child and injury
to a child. The allegations in that case concerned his biological daughter, who is the
complainant’s older stepsister. As part of a plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to the
charge of injuring a child. Indecency with a child is a sex offense, whereas injury to
a child is not. Castillo contends that the State’s dismissal of that indecency charge is
the equivalent of an acquittal on the sex offense and precluded the introduction of
testimony by the stepsister that he had sexually abused her.
Whether considered as an acquittal or not, the trial court could properly
conclude that the evidence of a separate sex offense involving the complainant’s
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stepsister was admissible under article 38.37. Article 38.37 allows the introduction
of “evidence that the defendant has committed a separate offense” of a sexual nature
against a child, so long as the trial court first determines after a hearing outside the
jury’s presence that the evidence likely to be admitted will be adequate to support a
jury finding that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, §§ 2(b), 2-a. The defendant need not have
been charged with, tried for, or convicted of this separate offense for this evidence
to be admissible. See id. (allowing “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts”).
For example, in Bradshaw v. State, 466 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2015, pet. ref’d), the defendant was tried for the continuous sexual abuse of a child.
Id. at 877. At trial, the State put another child on the stand who testified that the
defendant had sexually abused her also. Id. On appeal, the defendant contended that
the trial court erred in admitting her testimony because a grand jury previously had
declined to indict him on charges of sexual abuse of the child witness. Id. at 877–78,
880. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the trial court acted within its
discretion in admitting the testimony and that the grand jury’s decision not to indict
the defendant for the alleged sexual abuse of the child witness did not preclude the
introduction of evidence that he had done so. Id. at 880. The court of appeals
reasoned that the grand jury’s refusal to indict merely constituted a finding that the
21
specific evidence that it heard was not convincing enough to merit a formal charge,
not an adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Id.
Similarly, Texas appellate courts have affirmed the admission of or reliance
on evidence that the defendant committed a separate sexual offense against another
child under article 37.38 despite the dismissal of charges concerning those separate
offenses. See, e.g., McCombs v. State, 562 S.W.3d 748, 754, 765–68 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (upholding admission of eldest daughter’s
testimony about father’s sexual abuse of her at trial of father for sex offenses against
two younger daughters after charges involving eldest daughter had been dismissed);
Baez v. State, 486 S.W.3d 592, 597–99 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d)
(upholding charge’s instruction that jury could rely on child’s testimony about foster
father’s sex abuse in prosecution of foster father for sex offenses against other
children after state waived charges relating to testifying child on first day of trial).
Castillo’s plea bargain is like the situations addressed in Bradshaw,
McCombs, and Baez. Under the plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to injuring the
complainant’s stepsister in exchange for the State’s dismissal of an indecency
charge. The dismissal of the indecency charge was not an adjudication of Castillo’s
guilt or innocence as to that offense and therefore is not equivalent to an acquittal.
See Nassar v. State, 797 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet.
ref’d) (trial court’s approval of plea bargain did not require it to find that evidence
22
would not support a conviction for what it thought was greater offense and thus did
not amount to an acquittal for that offense).
Castillo does not assert that the trial court failed to comply with article 38.37’s
hearing requirement, nor does he contend that the testimony of the complainant’s
stepsister otherwise failed to satisfy article 38.37’s requirements. Thus, we hold that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of the
complainant’s stepsister.
D. Stepsister’s letters to Castillo
Castillo contends that the trial court erred in excluding the letters that the
complainant’s stepsister wrote to him after she accused him of sexually abusing her.
He asserts that these letters were admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the
hearsay rule, arguing that they showed that the stepsister had affection for him and
thus cast doubt on her testimony that he had abused her. The State responds that
Castillo did not present the letters to the trial court and that they were not relevant.
1. Applicable law
We construe the State’s contention that Castillo did not present the letters to
the trial court as an assertion that he failed to preserve error. To preserve error as to
the exclusion of evidence, a party must try to introduce the evidence and obtain an
adverse ruling from the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); TEX. R. EVID.
103(a)(2). The party also must make an offer of proof that informs the trial court of
23
the substance of the excluded evidence unless it is apparent from the context. TEX.
R. EVID. 103(a)(2). The offer must include “the meat of the actual evidence” rather
than a general, cursory summary, so that the appellate court can meaningfully assess
whether the exclusion of the evidence was erroneous and harmful. Mays v. State,
285 S.W.3d 884, 890–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). On appeal, the party’s complaint
must be the same complaint that it made in the trial court. See Lovill v. State, 319
S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 336
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
2. Analysis
Defense counsel tried to cross-examine the complainant’s stepsister about the
letters that she sent to Castillo, but the trial court sustained the State’s hearsay
objection to the defense’s question and excluded her testimony on the subject.
Castillo did not try to introduce the letters. He did not make an offer of proof that
included the actual letters, so they are not in the record. The record contains only
brief questioning of the complainant’s stepsister by defense counsel in a hearing
outside the presence of the jury. Her answers establish that in her letters she:
● said hello and expressed sadness that Castillo might not be able to attend her graduation;
● told him that she wanted to send him photographs of herself and her siblings; and
● wished him well and invited him to write back to her.
24
She agreed that she was polite and kind in these letters.
In the trial court, Castillo argued that the complainant’s stepsister’s testimony
about the letters was admissible. On appeal, Castillo complains about the exclusion
of the letters themselves, not the stepsister’s general, cursory testimony about them.
The record shows that the trial court did not exclude the letters. Because Castillo did
not offer them into evidence, obtain a timely ruling, and ensure that they were
included in the appellate record, he cannot complain about the letters on appeal. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2). His complaint on appeal differs
from the one made in the trial court and therefore is not preserved for review. See
Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691; Martinez, 91 S.W.3d at 336.
Outcome: We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: