Date: 05-12-2016

Case Style: State of Missouri vs. Markus Michael A. Patterson

Case Number: WD78203

Judge: Thomas H. Newton

Court: MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT

Plaintiff's Attorney: Evan Buchheim

Defendant's Attorney: Emmett Queener

Description: Mr. Markus Michael A. Patterson appeals his conviction for the class D felony
of tampering with physical evidence, for which he was sentenced as a prior and
persistent offender to six years in the Department of Corrections. We affirm.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, Marshall,
Missouri, Police Officer Joey Valiquette1 stopped Mr. Patterson one night in May
2014 after observing that the passenger-side rear brake light of the vehicle Mr.
Patterson was driving did not work when he applied the brakes. Mr. Patterson, who
stated that the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend, could not produce a valid driver’s
license and tendered to Officer Valiquette an expired insurance card. The officer
asked Mr. Patterson to sit in the patrol car while the officer used the radio to run the
vehicle registration and establish whether any arrest warrants were pending against
Mr. Patterson. Officer Valiquette had the patrol car’s air conditioner cooling the
vehicle’s interior, but Mr. Patterson, who was dressed in a white muscle shirt and
jeans, was sweating profusely, breathing rapidly, and otherwise acting nervously. He
did not, however, appear to the officer to be intoxicated. Heavy police radio traffic
that night slowed responses to the officer’s request for service, so Officer Valiquette
had the opportunity to ask Mr. Patterson, based on his sweating, when he had last
used methamphetamine and whether he needed medical attention because it looked
like he had been in a fight. Mr. Patterson denied using methamphetamine, but
indicated that he had just come from a low-income neighborhood where he had been
involved in a scuffle; he refused medical treatment. Officer Valiquette noticed that
Mr. Patterson was concerned about “what was going on on the radio,” and started
looking over his right shoulder, as if to see whether another police officer were
approaching. Mr. Patterson asked the officer whether he had any active warrants for
his arrest. Officer Valiquette continued processing the tickets and completing other
tasks arising from the vehicle stop.
After the police dispatcher advised Officer Valiquette that Mr. Patterson did
not have any outstanding warrants, but that he lacked a valid driver’s license and had
a prior conviction for a narcotics-distribution violation, the officer asked if he could
search the vehicle Mr. Patterson had been driving. Mr. Patterson gave his consent. In
an open compartment under the stereo controls, Officer Valiquette found a glass pipe
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with a yellowish tar residue that he knew, based on his experience, would have been
used to smoke methamphetamine. Mr. Patterson continued to deny that he smoked
methamphetamine and offered to have his urine tested, while denying that the pipe
was his. Officer Valiquette arrested Mr. Patterson for possession of drug
paraphernalia and read him his Miranda rights. As they traveled to the police station,
Mr. Patterson insisted on using the restroom and was adamant about using the
restroom once they reached their destination. He also admitted that if his urine were
tested, he would test positive for marijuana and methamphetamine. He told the
officer that he had done a “line of meth,” but not that he had smoked the substance.
During booking, Officer Valiquette quickly arranged to have Mr. Patterson’s
urine tested because of his purported need to use the restroom, obtained the necessary
kit, and took Mr. Patterson to a holding cell so that he could provide the sample.
Based on his experience in other drug investigations and believing that Mr. Patterson
would attempt to get rid of any contraband in his possession that had not been found
during a pat-down when he was stopped, Officer Valiquette decided to conduct a
“further search of his person,” and had Mr. Patterson remove his shoes. Mr. Patterson
kicked his left shoe out of the officer’s line of sight, and the two began wrestling to
retrieve a baggie with a number of small, white pills that had been in the shoe. Mr.
Patterson was able to reach the baggie first and attempted to swallow it several times,
while telling the officer to “chill out,” “it was just pills.” It appeared to Officer
Valiquette that the baggie had broken open at one point and that Mr. Patterson had
possibly ingested some of the pills before he managed to toss the baggie into the
holding-cell toilet and flush the toilet. Office Valiquette arranged for emergency
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medical services to check Mr. Patterson, who later told the officer that the baggie had
contained 25 Vicodin pills that he had intended to sell and that he had taken some of
them. Mr. Patterson’s urine did not test positive for hydrocodone, one of Vicodin’s
two active ingredients. Mr. Patterson also told the officer that he did not know what
the pills were, and the officer was unable to retrieve the pills to conduct any test on
them to determine what they were. Had the officer been able to secure the bag of
pills, he testified that he would have done his own preliminary check to determine
what they were on the basis of their appearance and markings and that they would
have been lab-tested later. Officer Valiquette also testified that the pills were not
packaged in a manner that would indicate “that somebody had a prescription for
Vicodin.”
The State charged Mr. Patterson with the class D felony of tampering with
physical evidence under section 575.100,2 the class A misdemeanor of unlawful use
of drug paraphernalia under section 195.233, and driving while revoked or suspended
in violation of section 302.321. The State dismissed the latter charge. Mr. Patterson
waived a jury trial, and the State proved that he was a prior and persistent felony
offender with earlier convictions for a class B felony of sale of a controlled
substance, a felony conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, and a conviction
for involuntary manslaughter. During the ensuing bench trial, Mr. Patterson made no
request to suppress evidence based on a constitutional violation and did not object to
the admissibility of any evidence. His counsel stated his belief during closing that
2 Statutory references are to RSMo (2000) and cumulative supplements, unless otherwise indicated. Note that the 2014 amendments to the tampering statute do not take effect until 2017. § 575.100, RSMo Cumulative Supplement (2014).
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the officer detained Mr. Patterson “for what I would consider[] longer than it takes to
write out some traffic tickets, based on some general nervousness.” The trial court
found Mr. Patterson guilty of tampering with physical evidence while police were
investigating a felony, “either the possession of a controlled substance or possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,” and of possession of drug
paraphernalia with intent to use.3 According to the court, once the officer saw the
pills and attempted to get a hold of them, the investigation, for purposes of the
offense’s felony enhancement under section 575.100.2, had begun. The court
sentenced Mr. Patterson to six years in the Department of Corrections for felony
tampering and ninety days to be served concurrently for possession of drug
paraphernalia. Mr. Patterson filed this direct appeal from the felony judgment and
sentence.
Legal Analysis
Mr. Patterson argues that his constitutional rights were violated by a conviction
and sentence based on evidence obtained after a warrantless search of a vehicle
stopped beyond the time required to investigate a vehicle-equipment violation.
Because Mr. Patterson did not seek to suppress any evidence and made no objection
during the bench trial to its admission, we must analyze the first point, if at all, for
plain error. State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. banc 2015). Under this
standard, “[a]n unpreserved claim of error can be reviewed only for plain error, which
3 The State calls to this Court’s attention that “[t]he circuit court’s written judgment mistakenly asserts that Defendant’s tampering and possession charges were disposed of by a guilty plea. The written judgment should be corrected nunc pro tunc.” We agree and order that the record be so corrected.
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requires a finding of manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulting from the
trial court’s error.” Id. at 154.
Mr. Patterson contends that he was detained far longer than allowed under
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment traffic-stop case law for an equipment violation
and that nervousness alone is insufficient to show that the officer had a reasonable
suspicion to objectively justify a warrantless search. According to Mr. Patterson, the
officer’s stated reason for continuing to detain him, “his nervousness, his demeanor .
. . [c]ontinuing to sweat” falls short of “even a minimum level of justification to
believe criminal activity was afoot.” He fails to acknowledge, however, that Officer
Valiquette also attributed the duration of Mr. Patterson’s detention to heavy police
radio traffic that kept the officer from completing the checks incident to a routine
traffic stop, such as learning whether Mr. Patterson had a valid driver’s license, the
right to be driving the vehicle, and any outstanding warrants. See State v. Logan, 914
S.W.2d 806, 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (noting that, “[d]uring a routine traffic stop,
an officer may ‘request a driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a computer
check, and issue a citation.’” (citation omitted)). The information Officer Valiquette
obtained during this justifiable delay concerning Mr. Patterson’s lack of a valid
driver’s license and his prior conviction for narcotics distribution would have created
an objectively reasonable suspicion that the nervousness and sweating were due not
just to ambient weather conditions. Id. (“‘Stated another way, the lawful character of
a detention, and therefore a seizure, may be extended if a new factual predicate for
reasonable suspicion is found during the period of lawful seizure.’” (citation
omitted)).
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Mr. Patterson also fails to indicate how his consent to the search violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, Missouri courts have ruled that
“[c]onsent searches are a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.” State v. Hindman, 446 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Mo. App. W.D.
2014) (also noting that an officer may ask a citizen “at any time . . . whether he has
contraband in his car and may ask for permission to search”). Where “consent is
given without coercion, the subsequent search is not prohibited by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. Because he gave that consent and has not claimed that
his consent was coerced, Mr. Patterson cannot show manifest injustice or a
miscarriage of justice from the trial court’s admission of evidence seized during the
search or later found in his possession. This point is denied.
Regarding the second point, whether the evidence was sufficient to support Mr.
Patterson’s conviction for felony tampering with physical evidence under section
575.100, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by considering
whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find each of the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d
500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011). “[A]ll evidence favorable to the State is accepted as true,
including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence,” and “[a]ll evidence and
inferences to the contrary are disregarded.” Id.
The case law applying subsection 575.100.2 is sparse. The statute states, in
relevant part,
1. A person commits the crime of tampering with physical evidence if he:
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(1) Alters, destroys, suppresses or conceals any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity, legibility or availability in any official proceeding or investigation; . . .
2. Tampering with physical evidence is a class D felony if the actor impairs or obstructs the prosecution or defense of a felony; otherwise, tampering with physical evidence is a class A misdemeanor.
§ 575.100.
As we read the statute, the elements of the felony offense of tampering with
physical evidence in the context of this case are (1) the destruction of a thing (pills),
(2) with purpose, (3) to impair their availability in an investigation, and this
tampering (4) resulted in the impairment or obstruction of a felony prosecution.4 As
to the fourth element, which increases the crime’s penalty, Missouri courts have
recognized and embrace the principle enunciated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490 (2000), that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cullen, 39
S.W.3d 899, 905 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001) (distinguishing, in context of double jeopardy
4 Regarding these elements, we disagree with the trial court which stated that felony tampering is shown under the statute where the investigation is for a felony. This is a distinction with a difference, but does not change the outcome here. An “investigation” is defined as “[t]he activity of trying to find out the truth about something, such as a crime, accident, or historical issue…,” whereas a “prosecution” is defined as “[a] criminal proceeding in which an accused person is tried.” Investigation; Prosecution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The statute separates the investigation and prosecution elements, while the trial court conflated them by judicial shorthand in announcing the verdict. Because our courts have determined that no official proceeding or investigation must precede the tampering activity to sustain a conviction for this offense, State v. Hougardy, 396 S.W.3d 443, 449 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013), the distinction becomes particularly significant where felony enhancement is charged. If, as a result of the investigation during which the accused tampered with evidence, probable cause for a felony prosecution, regardless of the tampering, is lacking, we do not believe that a conviction for felony tampering with physical evidence can be sustained. Stated another way, the tampering must obstruct both the investigation (whether for a misdemeanor or felony) and the prosecution or defense of a felony to constitute felony tampering.
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ruling, those cases where a crime’s status can be enhanced as a felony from those
where prior convictions enhance a sentence and thus are not an “essential element” of
the offense and do not require submission to a jury). Accordingly, the fourth
element, as the other three, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mr. Patterson does not and cannot dispute that the evidence shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that he destroyed the pills intentionally. As to the third element,
Missouri courts have determined that a conviction for this offense can be sustained
even where no official proceeding or investigation has begun when the suspect
attempts to destroy physical evidence. See State v. Hougardy, 396 S.W.3d 443, 449
(Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 896 (Mo. banc 1995),
court rules that statute does not require an investigation to begin before one can
impair it).5 Thus, it is also clear that Mr. Patterson sought to impair the availability
of the pills in an investigation by flushing them down a toilet. Indeed, Officer
Valiquette testified that he intended to identify the pills once he secured them and that
the pills would have been tested later; it is reasonable to infer therefore that he was
conducting an investigation during the holding-cell struggle. The only serious
dispute is over the fourth element: whether the evidence was sufficient to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that a felony prosecution was impaired, i.e., did Mr.
Patterson’s attempt to get rid of the pills obstruct the prosecution of a felony,
particularly given that these pills, which he asserted were Vicodin and that he
apparently ingested, may not have been Vicodin? No Missouri court has yet
considered what evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for felony tampering
with physical evidence. 5 This is the element on which the State focuses in its briefing of the second point on appeal.
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Mr. Patterson suggests that case law addressing the sufficiency of the evidence
to prove a felony offense of resisting or interfering with an arrest, and thus
distinguishing that offense from the misdemeanor degree, may assist the Court in
analyzing this issue. We agree. Section 575.150 makes the crime of resisting or
interfering with an arrest a misdemeanor, but the penalty may be increased for a
felony offense where the perpetrator “[r]esist[s], by means other than flight, or
interfer[es] with an arrest for a felony.” § 575.150.4. An arrest for a felony is the
underlying offense to felony resisting or interfering with an arrest, just as a felony
prosecution could be said to be the “underlying offense” for felony tampering with
physical evidence. As discussed further below, if the State does not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the underlying offense—an arrest—was for a felony, a felony
conviction for resisting or interfering with an arrest cannot be sustained.
In State v. Furne, 642 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Mo. banc 1982), our supreme court
determined that under section 575.150, “the degree of [the resisting or interfering]
offense is linked to the degree of the underlying offense for which the arrest is
made.” Because the State charged Mr. Furne with resisting arrest for disturbing the
peace, the court ruled that he was not charged with resisting arrest for a felony
offense and, therefore, could not have been found guilty of felony resisting arrest. Id.
This Court cited Furne in State v. Burton, 801 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Mo. App. W.D.
1990), observing that “resisting arrest is a felony only if the underlying offense is a
felony and the resistance is accomplished by a means other than flight.” In Burton,
the defendant “was being arrested for interfering with the arrest of Kenneth Jones. . .
. Jones was being arrested for driving while intoxicated which can be either a felony
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or a misdemeanor depending upon the circumstances.” Id. at 381-82 (emphasis
added). Because no evidence was presented to prove that Mr. Jones’s arrest was for a
felony, this Court determined that Mr. Burton’s felony conviction under section
575.150 could not stand. Id. at 382.
To illustrate the level of proof required for the State to show the underlying
felony arrest, we turn to the circumstances giving rise to the court’s reversal of a
conviction for felony interfering with an arrest in State v. Bell, 30 S.W.3d 206 (Mo.
App. S.D. 2000). After the bars closed in Cape Girardeau, Officer Roberts attempted
to arrest Gregg Campbell for violation of a municipal noise ordinance when Campbell
started cursing the officer. Id. Campbell refused to place his hands behind his back
to assist the officer’s attempt to handcuff him, and Officer Roberts then sprayed
Campbell with pepper mace. During the ensuing fight between the two,
Campbell ‘stomp-kicked’ Roberts in the chest, knocking him to the ground. Campbell’s brother, Kenneth Campbell, ran up and together the two began stomping Roberts in the face, chest and body. The officer later testified that he believed the brothers delivered fifteen kicks each and that he feared for his life.
Two other officers arrived and broke up the fight. Kenneth Campbell ran down the street, and Roberts chased him. Roberts attempted to arrest Kenneth Campbell, but he resisted. A large crowd had formed, and when two other officers arrived to assist Roberts, the crowd attempted to stop them from advancing on the scene. Some people in the crowd began throwing rocks at the officers.
Roberts noticed Dmitri Bell (Defendant) throwing rocks and told him to leave. Defendant responded, ‘You don’t know who you’re messing with.’ Defendant was later charged with assault of a law enforcement officer in the second degree, rioting, and interfering with an arrest.
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Id. at 206-07. Despite the lack of any direct evidence indicating for what charge
Kenneth Campbell was arrested, a jury convicted Bell of interfering with a felony
arrest. Id. at 207.
According to the court, “the question is whether it would be reasonable for a
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, when Defendant interfered, the
officer was attempting an arrest for a felony under § 565.081.” Id. Section 565.081
makes assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree a felony where the
person “attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical
injury to a law enforcement officer.” Considering all of the substantial evidence in
the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the court stated,
Assault was not the only basis shown in the evidence for which Kenneth Campbell could have been arrested. He might have been arrested for interfering with the arrest of his brother, Gregg. However, even if we assume that Kenneth Campbell was being arrested for assault, this still is not an easy question. Although 565.081, assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree, is one basis for which Kenneth Campbell could have been arrested, in certain situations, assault of a law enforcement officer can also be a misdemeanor. § 565.083 RSMo 1994. There are also assaults in general which may be misdemeanors, § 565.070, RSMo 1994, as well as possible municipal ordinance violations.
Id. at 208. The court also stated that “it may have been probable that Kenneth
Campbell was being arrested for felony assault on a law enforcement officer, as there
was evidence of a severe and prolonged attack upon the arresting officer by Kenneth
Campbell and his brother, Gregg Campbell.” Id. Still, the court concluded that “the
evidence falls short of establishing this basis for arrest beyond a reasonable doubt.
There was a variety of charges for which Kenneth Campbell could have been
arrested.” In the court’s view, “[i]t would have been simple for the State to show
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what the officer was arresting Campbell for. Failing to show this, when it could have
easily been established casts doubt on the State’s contentions.” Id.
In a number of similar cases, the courts have ruled that the defendant could not
be convicted of felony resisting arrest if evidence was either lacking altogether or
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the underlying arrest was for a
felony. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 830 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992) (noting
State’s acknowledgement that the information failed to plead and that no evidence
was presented to prove that the offense for which defendant was being arrested was a
felony, court reverses conviction for felony resisting arrest). The officers who
attempted to arrest Mr. Johnson had been told that he was in a certain hospital room
and there were “‘a couple of warrants’ for his arrest.” Id. at 37. He ran from them
into another patient’s room and held a knife up while holding onto the other patient’s
gown; one officer was able to take the knife from Mr. Johnson and sustained a minor
cut to his hand before Mr. Johnson was apprehended. Id. The court agreed with Mr.
Johnson and the State that no evidence had been presented at trial that the arrest was
for a felony.
In State v. Jordan, 181 S.W.3d 588, 593 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005), the court
overturned a felony conviction for resisting arrest because none of the officers
involved in stopping Mr. Jordan’s vehicle testified that his intent was to arrest Mr.
Jordan for a felony. According to the court, the State had relied on the “collective
testimony of the officers involved to show the reasonable inference from all of the
evidence was that Officer Livingston contemplated arresting Defendant for a felony.”
Id. at 592. The evidence showed that the officers were attempting to stop Mr.
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Jordan’s vehicle during a chase that ended with Mr. Jordan ramming Officer
O’Connor’s vehicle. Id. Officer O’Connor testified that Mr. Jordan “struck an
officer. We were planning on arresting him for the charges, evading my red lights,
and siren.” Id. at 593. The court found that “this evidence [even if it had been
relevant in that Officer O’Connor did not make the arrest] would only establish
resisting arrest by flight which does not constitute felony resisting arrest.” Id.
Officer Livingston had testified that his intention, when he approached Mr. Jordan
after the chase, was to “bring him under control . . . and stop the vehicle.” Id.
Because Officer Livingston did not indicate that he was “contemplating arresting
Defendant or that he intended to arrest Defendant for a felony,” and because “there
were a variety of charges for which Defendant could have been arrested,” including
assaulting a law enforcement officer and driving while intoxicated, the court
determined that the evidence did not establish “a basis for a felony arrest beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. While the court acknowledged that “[t]he relevant inquiry is
not whether the defendant is guilty of the charge for which he or she was arrested,” it
did require that the evidence show beyond a reasonable doubt that “the arresting
officer contemplated making a felony arrest.” Id. at 592 (citing State v. Merritt, 805
S.W.2d 337, 339 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991)). See also State v. Bell, 30 S.W.3d 206, 208
(Mo. App. S.D. 2000) (ruling that evidence fell short of establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt basis for arrest with which defendant allegedly interfered because
arrest could have been made for a “variety of charges”); DeClue v. State, 3 S.W.3d
395, 397-98 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) (finding that plea-hearing court erred in accepting
defendant’s plea of guilty to felony resisting arrest because “it was not established
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[during the plea colloquy or via testimony] that Movant was resisting an arrest for a
felony assault charge” (emphasis added)).
The principle we can derive from this line of authority as applied to subsection
575.100.2 can be stated as follows: to prove that a person has tampered with physical
evidence and thus obstructed the prosecution or defense of a felony, the evidence
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that a person intentionally “alters, destroys,
suppresses or conceals any record, document or thing” to impair its availability in an
official proceeding or investigation and, as to the fourth element, that this conduct
obstructed a felony prosecution. The trial court misstated the statutory elements in
finding Mr. Patterson guilty of tampering with physical evidence during an
investigation by stating that “the investigation was for the purposes of investigating a
felony.” This is not what the statute requires. Section 575.100.2 requires that the
tampering impair the item’s availability in an investigation and that the tampering
obstruct a felony prosecution, not that the purpose of the investigation was to
investigate a felony. Still, we do not find that this misstatement requires a reversal of
the conviction, because the evidence was sufficient to prove that Mr. Patterson, by
tampering with physical evidence, obstructed a felony prosecution.
Here, the charging document accused Mr. Patterson of destroying
“approximately 25 small white pills, with the purpose to impair its [sic] availability
for chemical testing . . . and thereby impaired and obstructed the prosecution of
defendant for the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a felony.” He was, accordingly, properly charged with felony tampering.
The trial court properly identified the “underlying” felony prosecution as “either the
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possession of a controlled substance or possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute.” The evidence showed that Mr. Patterson had hidden the pills in
a plastic baggie in one of his shoes, repeatedly asked to use a restroom on the way to
the police station, tried to prevent Officer Valiquette from seeing or seizing the pills,
and, when he could not swallow them, managed to destroy them in the holding-cell
toilet. Mr. Patterson’s actions were consistent with possession of a controlled
substance and resulted in preventing tests from being conducted on the pills
themselves. He also stated to the police that the pills were Vicodin and that he
intended to sell them. Because the evidence is unclear as to whether Mr. Patterson
actually ingested the pills, we can discount the test results and look to all the other
evidence favorable to his conviction.6
We find the evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
felony prosecution was impaired. Mr. Patterson had in his possession and was
charged with destroying “approximately 25 small white pills.” He treated them as a
controlled substance by going to extraordinary lengths to destroy them. He told the
police that they were Vicodin and that he had purchased them to sell to others. His
tampering with physical evidence impaired an investigation and obstructed his
prosecution for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. We
deny this point.

Outcome: We conclude that Mr. Patterson consented to the search and cannot show, as a
matter of plain error that the trial court erred in admitting, without objection, evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless vehicle search. We also conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Patterson tampered with physical evidence and impaired the prosecution of the felony crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. We affirm.

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