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Date: 10-17-2015

Case Style: AMOS v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Case Number: S15A1143

Judge: Keith R. Blackwell

Court: In the Supreme Court of Georgia on appeal from the Circuit Court, Glynn County

Plaintiff's Attorney: Douglas Wayne Alexander

Defendant's Attorney: Todd Carter, Jim Bishop

Description: Eddie Matthew Amos was tried by a Cobb County jury, which found him
guilty of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder, both in connection with the
killing of Robin Crankshaw. The trial court merged the voluntary manslaughter
into the felony murder, and it sentenced Amos for the murder. Amos appeals,
contending only that the trial court should have sentenced him instead for
voluntary manslaughter. We find no merit in this claim of error, and we affirm
the judgment below.1
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows
that Amos drove his van on the morning of August 7, 2007 to the auto repair
shop at which Crankshaw worked, where Amos fatally shot Crankshaw in the
chest. A responding officer found Crankshaw’s body lying face down on top of
a baseball bat, and two .32 caliber shell casings were found about 35 feet away.
Crankshaw’s employer saw Amos drive off in an older-model white van and
remembered the first three letters on the van’s license plate.
After a couple of years passed, investigators were able to locate and
interview Amos, with whom they had connected the van. Although Amos
initially denied any involvement in the killing of Crankshaw, he eventually
admitted that he shot Crankshaw, but Amos claimed that he did so in
self-defense. According to Amos, Crankshaw’s vehicle had bumped into his
van, but Crankshaw drove away while Amos was inspecting his van for damage.
Amos said that he pursued Crankshaw to obtain insurance information, and after
they arrived at Crankshaw’s workplace, Amos claimed, Crankshaw came at him
with a baseball bat and attacked him. Amos acknowledged that he then retrieved
a .32 caliber firearm from his van and fired two shots. Amos explained that he
fled because, as a convicted felon, he feared explaining the situation to police
officers. The evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to authorize a
rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Amos was guilty of
murder in the commission of a felony, the unlawful possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); see also Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 872 (1) (742
SE2d 707) (2013) (“jury is free to reject a defendant’s claim that he acted in
self-defense”) (citation omitted).
2. Because the jury found Amos guilty of both felony murder and
voluntary manslaughter, Amos contends, the trial court should have merged the
felony murder into the voluntary manslaughter and sentenced him only for
voluntary manslaughter. We disagree. In Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 866-867
(2) (414 SE2d 463) (1992), this Court adopted what has become known as the
“modified merger rule,” concluding that, when a defendant is found guilty of
both voluntary manslaughter and felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault, the trial court should sentence the defendant only for voluntary
manslaughter. Otherwise, we reasoned, almost every voluntary manslaughter
would amount to a felony murder (predicated on a felonious assault), and such
a rule “would eliminate voluntary manslaughter as a separate form of homicide.”
Id. at 866 (2). Since Edge, however, we have consistently held that this
“modified merger rule” is limited to cases in which the felony murder is
predicated on a felony that itself is integral to the homicide, such as aggravated
assault. See Kipp v. State, 296 Ga. 250, 252 (765 SE2d 924) (2014); Wallace v.
State, 294 Ga. 257, 258-259 (2) (754 SE2d 5) (2013) (Edge rule does not apply
where felony murder was predicated on unlawful possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon); Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 883 (3) (635 SE2d 134) (2006)
(same); Sims v. State, 265 Ga. 35, 36 (3) (453 SE2d 33) (1995) (same); see also
Grimes v. State, 293 Ga. 559, 561 (2) (748 SE2d 441) (2013); Smith v. State,
272 Ga. 874, 879-880 (5) (a) (536 SE2d 514) (2000).

Outcome: Because the felony murder in this case was predicated on unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon — a crime that is (on the facts of this case) independent of, and not integral to, the killing of Crankshaw2 — the Edge rule does not apply, and the trial court properly sentenced Amos for felony murder, not voluntary manslaughter.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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