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Date: 03-23-2013

Case Style: Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Charlotte Flooring, Inc.

Case Number: CJ-2012-4694

Judge: Jefferson D. Sellers

Court: District Court, Tulsa County, Oklahoma

Plaintiff's Attorney: James E. Weger Tadd J.P. Bogan

Defendant's Attorney: Steven K. Metcalf and William H. Spitler

Description: Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. sued Charlotte Flooring, Inc. on a breach of contract theory claiming:

1. Mastercraft is an Oklahoma corporation with its principal place of business in Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma.

2. Defendant is a foreign corporation, and upon information and belief, its principal place of business is in Charlotte, North Carolina.

3. The claims asserted herein arise out of a contract entered into between Mastercraft and
Defendant in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

4. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof, and is a
proper venue for this action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5. On or about May 25, 2010, Mastercraft submitted a proposal to Defendant to perform certain flooring work at the Harrah’s Cherokee Casino in North Carolina (the “Casino”).

6. On or about July 13, 2010. Mastercraft entered into a Scope of Work and Contractual Agreement with Defendant relating to installation of flooring at the Casino. (See Scope of Work dated June 25, 2010, attached hereto as Exhibit “1”)

7. On or about February 17, 2011, Defendant agreed to certain pricing and other terms submitted by Mastercraft to Defendant. (See Letter Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit

8. Mastercraft has fully performed the services contemplated by the agreements entered into by the parties.

9. Defendant has failed to fully pay Mastercraft for the labor, services and materials provided.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

BREACH OF CONTRACT

10. Mastercraft hereby incorporates and re-alleges the allegations contained in paragraph numbers one (1) through nine (9) above.

11. Defendant breached its contracts with Mastercraft by failing to pay for the labor, services, and materials provided,

12. As a result of Defendant’s foregoing breach, Mastercraft has suffered damages in the amount of One Hundred Forty
Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Six Dollars and TwentyThree Cents ($140,976.23), plus attorney fees and costs of this action.

13. Mastercraft is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney fee and costs of this action pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 936(A).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. prays the Court enter judgment in its favor and against Defendant Charlotte Flooring, Inc., and award it damages in an amount in excess of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00), plus attorney fees, costs and all other relief this Court deems just and equitable.

Defendant specially appeared and moved to dismiss as follows:

COMES NOW the Defendant, Charlotte Flooring, Inc. (“CFI”), and for its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction pursuant to OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12, § 2012 (B) (2), moves the Court for an order dismissing all claims asserted by Plaintiff in the Petition against CFI on grounds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over CFI in this matter. In support of this Motion, CFI relies upon the brief in support that follows, together with the affidavit and other materials appended thereto

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff has sued CFI in this Court without accounting in any way for how thi Court has personal jurisdiction over CFI. CFI is a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. CFI has never entered the State of Oklahoma for the purposes of conducting, soliciting or otherwise engaging in any sort of business activity. The claims of Plaintiff arise from a contract allegedly entered into between Plaintiff and CFI which was formed, if at all, in North Carolina. The business relationship between Plaintiff and CFI pertains to a construction project located exclusively in North Carolina. The work performed by the parties pursuant to this business relationship was performed exclusively on real property located in North Carolina. Save for Plaintiff’s involvement in the North Carolina project on behalf of CFI, there are insufficient contacts between CFI and the State of Oklahoma to establish either general or specific jurisdiction over CFI in this Court under prevailing state and federal authority. Accordingly, personal jurisdiction cannot be properly exercised by this Court over CFI in this action and the claims of Plaintiff against CFI must, therefore, be dismissed due to a lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12, § 2012 (B) (2).

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. This action arises from the alleged failure of CFI to pay Plaintiff for labor and services allegedly furnished in connection with construction of a hotel and casino in Cherokee, North Carolina. [Petition ¶ 5 - 9, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “A” and incorporated herein by reference.]

2. CFI is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of North Carolina. [J 4, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

3. CFI has its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. [ 5, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

4. CFI has never owned, operated or conducted any business in the State of Oklahoma, either directly or indirectly, including in connection with the transaction contemplated in the Petition that initiated this action. [J 6, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

5. CFI is not registered or licensed to do business in the State of Oklahoma. [J 7, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

6. CFI has never owned, leased or controlled property or assets in the State of Oklahoma. [ 8, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

7. CFI does not maintain employees, agents, or bank accounts in the State of Oklahoma. [J 9, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

8. CFI does not recruit employees in the State of Oklahoma. [ 10, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

9. CFI does not have shareholders or members who reside in the State of Oklahoma. [ 11, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

10. CFI has never had any permanent or temporary office within the State of Oklahoma. [ 12, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

11. CFI has never maintained telephone or facsimile listings within the State of Oklahoma. [J 13, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

12. CFI has never advertised or solicited business in the State of Oklahoma. [f 14, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

13. CFI does not generate any of its revenue from activities in the State of Oklahoma. [f 15, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

14. CFI does not pay and has no obligation to pay taxes in the State of Oklahoma. [J
16, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

15. CFI has never employed any person that traveled to the State of Oklahoma on behalf of CFI for any purpose, including in connection with the transaction contemplated in the Petition that initiated this action. [J 17, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit
“B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

16. CFI maintains a passive informational website at www.charlotteflooring.com. The website is accessible to the general public and contains general information about CFI’ s services. Prospective customers may use the information on the website to evaluate different products handled by CFI, to choose and compare products for installation at different areas of their home, and to schedule an “in-home appointment” with employees of CFI. None of the services referenced or scheduled through the website involve any sales or services within the State of Oklahoma. [f 18, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

17. CFI was hired by Turner Construction in North Carolina to perform certain flooring work in connection with the Harrah’s Cherokee Hotel Tower III project in Cherokee, North Carolina (“Project”). [J 19, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B”
and incorporated herein by reference.]

18. The carpet and associated material installed by Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. were purchased by the Owner of the Project from the materials manufacturer located in Dalton, Georgia, and were furnished by CFI to the Project site in Cherokee, North Carolina for installation by Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. at the Project site. [J 20, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

19. The work performed by Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. in connection with the Project was performed at the Project site, exclusively in Cherokee, North Carolina. [J 21, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

20. No part of the “contract” referenced in the Petition was entered into in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Neither was any part of the “contract” performed in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. [J 22, Affidavit of David Swaney attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and incorporated herein by reference.]

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

CFI does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Oklahoma to support this Court’s jurisdiction over it. Therefore, CFI neither had nor has any reason to anticipate it would ever be hailed into court in the state of Oklahoma. Accordingly, well established binding precedent dictates that plaintiff’s petition must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

I. Applicable legal standard.

When a defendant raises the defense of the Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to establish personal jurisdiction. Roberts v. Jack Richards Aircraft Company, 536 P. 2d 353, 354 (Okla. 1975). Plaintiff cannot merely provide conclusory allegations in its Petition in support of personal jurisdiction over CFI, but must, instead, make aprimafacie showing, as supported by affidavit or other materials, of the minimum contacts necessary to demonstrate jurisdiction over CFI. National Occupational Health Services Inc. v. Advanced Industrial Care, 50 Fed. Supp. 2d 1111, 1116 (N.D. Okla. 1998); Ten Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plain Service Corp., 810 F. 2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1987).

Oklahoma’s long arm statute, OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12 § 2004 (F), states that “[a] court of this
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” The purpose of the Oklahoma long arm statute is to broaden “the jurisdiction of Oklahoma Courts over non-residents to the outer limits permitted by the Oklahoma Constitution and the due process clause of the United States Constitution.” Hough v. Leonard, 867 P.2d 438, 442 (Okla. 1993). Due process requires that in order to subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, if he is not present within the territory of the forum, he must have certain minimum contacts within it such that continuance of the suit does not offend conventional motions of fair play and substantial justice. Deeringwater v. Circus Enterprises, 21 P. 3d 646, 649-50 (Okla. App. 2001) (citing International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

II. Forms of Personal Jurisdiction.

There are two types of in personam jurisdiction: (1) general and (2) specific. Kiassen v. Lazik, 91 P.3d 90, 92 (Okia. App. 2004). Regarding general jurisdiction, a court may hear a lawsuit against a defendant who has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state, even if the injuries at issue in the lawsuit did not arise out of the defendant’s activities directed at the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales De Collembia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984). In contrast, specific jurisdiction is viable only if the injury giving rise to the claims asserted in the lawsuit occurred within or had some connection to the forum state. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
414. If general jurisdiction is not present, specific jurisdiction may be. Kiassen, 91 P. 3d at 92.

A. This Court Lacks General Personal Jurisdiction Over CFI. General jurisdiction refers to the power of a state or court within a state to adjudicate any cause of action and does not depend on the relationship between the cause of action and the contacts. Helicopteros 466 U.S. at 415, note 9. As mentioned above, general jurisdiction may be exercised over a non-resident only when that defendant conducts a “continuous and systematic” part of its business in the forum. Id at 414-16. “The facts required to establish general jurisdiction must be “extensive and persuasive.” Lively v. IJAM Inc., 114 P.3d 487, 494- 495 (Okia. App. 2005). “Random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts generally do not rise to the minimum level necessary for the exercise of general jurisdiction.” Gilbert v. Security Finance Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc., 152 P.3d 165, 173-175 (Okla. 2006). Because CFI has not conducted any business in Oklahoma, this Court cannot exercise general jurisdiction over it. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-4 16 (holding that even when the corporate defendant sent its chief executive officer to Texas to negotiate a contract, accepted into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank, purchased helicopters, equipment, and training services from a Texas corporation, and sent personnel for corporate training in Texas, Texas did not have jurisdiction to try a case against the defendant.)
In Soma Medical International v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit found the following factors to be significant in its determination of whether general personal jurisdiction existed as to a non-resident defendant:

[w]hether the corporate defendant is: (1) engaged in business in this state; (2) licensed to do business in this state; (3) owning, leasing, or controlling property (real or personal) or assets in this state; (4) maintaining employees, offices, agents, or bank accounts in this state; (5) present in that shareholders reside in this state; (6) maintaining phone or fax listings within this state; (7) advertising or soliciting business in this state; (8) traveling to this state by way of sales persons, etc.; (9) paying taxes in this state; (10) visiting potential customers in this state; (11) recruiting employees in the state; (12) generating a substantial percentage of its national sales through revenue generated from instate customers.

Soma Medical International v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 Fed. 3d 1292, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 1999).
CFI is not implicated in the personal jurisdiction analysis by any of these factors. While CFI does maintain a national website and the website is viewable by the general public, including in Oklahoma, the website is designed to provide information of a local nature to CFI’s business customers in Charlotte, North Carolina, not the in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 18.1 The court in Lively v. IJAM, Inc. addressed the impact of a website on minimum contacts, stating that “the key to analyzing the personal jurisdiction in internet-related cases is to look at the nature and quality of the defendant’s internet activity.” Lively v. IJAM Inc., 114 P.3d 487, 495-98 (Okia. App. 2005). The court subsequently held “that the amount of contacts or orders originating from persons within Oklahoma must be taken into consideration when determining whether personal jurisdiction exists.” Id. Therefore, “the fact that defendants had a website that anyone in Oklahoma could access, in and of itself is not enough to permit our courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants.” Id.

Furthermore, without proof of actual deliberate use of a website to conduct commercial transactions on a sustained basis with a substantial number of residents of the forum, an interactive website will not subject the defendant to the general personal jurisdiction of that forum. Smith v. Basin Park Hotel, Inc., 178 F.Supp. 2d 1225, 1235 (N. D. Okla. 2001). Since Plaintiff in this case did not use the website at any point in its dealings with CFI, there is no need to discuss the website in the context of an argument concerning specific jurisdiction because CFI’s website clearly had nothing to do with the injury alleged by Plaintiff.

Applying these legal standards to CFI in this case leads to the inevitable conclusion that general jurisdiction cannot be exercised by this forum over CFI. CFI does not conduct systematic and continuous activities in Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶J 5 - 18.]

CFI is not registered to do business in Oklahoma and has never owned or operated any business in Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶J 5 - 17.] CFI has never had any agents in Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶f 6 - 11 and 17.] CFI has not advertised its product and services directly in Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 14.]

CFI is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of North Carolina. [Exhibit
“B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 4.] CFI has its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 5.] Further, CFI has never owned, leased or controlled property or assets in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 8.] CFI does not maintain employees, agents, or bank accounts in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 9.] Neither does CFI recruit employees in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 10.]

CFI does not have shareholders or members who reside in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 11.1

CFI has never had any permanent or temporary office within the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 12.]

CFI has never maintained telephone or facsimile listings within the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 13.] CFI has never advertised or solicited business in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 14.]

CFI does not generate any of its revenue from activities in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 15.]

CFI does not pay and has no obligation to pay taxes in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 16.]

CFI has never employed any person that traveled to the State of Oklahoma on behalf of CFI for any purpose. [Exhibit
“B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 17.]

CFI does maintain a passive informational website at www.charlotteflooring.com. The website is accessible to the general public and contains general information about CFI’s services. Prospective customers may use the information on the website to evaluate different products handled by CFI, to choose and compare products for installation at different areas of their home, and to schedule an “in-home appointment” with employees of CFI. None of the services referenced or scheduled through the website involve any sales or services within the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 18.]

CFI was hired by Turner Construction in North Carolina to perform certain flooring work in connection with the Harrah’s Cherokee Hotel Tower III project in Cherokee, North Carolina (“Project”). [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 19.] The carpet and associated material installed by Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. were purchased by the Owner of the Project from the materials manufacturer located in Dalton, Georgia, and were furnished by the Owner to the Project site in Cherokee, North Carolina for installation by Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. at the Project site. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 20.]

The work performed by Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. in connection with the Project was performed at the Project site, exclusively in Cherokee, North Carolina. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 21.1 No part of the “contract” referenced in the Petition was entered into in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Neither was any part of the “contract” performed in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 22.]

CFI has simply not “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of conducting business within Oklahoma, has not directed its activities in any way towards residents of the State of Oklahoma, and exercise ofjurisdiction over CFI in this Court fails to comport with “traditional notions of fair play” and substantial justice.” See Glidewell Motors, Inc. v. Pate, 577 P.2d 1290, 1291 (Okla. 1978) (finding that general jurisdiction could not be asserted where the car dealership did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state, or in some manner that its activities were directed at the forum state.)

The receipt and payment by CFI of invoices and monthly statements from Plaintiff in Oklahoma for labor and services furnished by Plaintiff at a construction project located exclusively in Cherokee, North Carolina, is the only contact CFI has with the state of Oklahoma. Clearly, this is insufficient to establish either general or specific personal jurisdiction. VacuMaid, Inc. v. Covington, 530 P.2d 137 (OkIa. 1974). The court in Vacu-Maid determined that a
non-resident buyer’s passive activity even when repeated, was not sufficient to establish
minimum contacts. Id. at 143. The type of activity required to satisfy the due process clause of the United States Constitution is simply lacking in this case and, therefore, Plaintiff’s Petition
must be dismissed.

B. This Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction Over CFI.

There is a two-step process for assessing whether the court may exercise specific
jurisdiction over a non-resident. Kiassen, 91 P.3d at 92. “First, a court must determine whether the non-resident defendant had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum such that he
should have ‘reasonably anticipated being hailed into court.” Id. (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. V. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980)). This requirement of minimum
contacts “is satisfied when the cause of action relates to or arises out of the defendant’s forum related activities.” Klassen, 91 P. 3d, at 93 (citing Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 Fed. 2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987).
The second step requires the court to determine whether minimum contacts have been
established, and if so, the court must then decide whether the contention of personal jurisdiction would comply with the concepts of “fair play and substantial justice.” Klassen, 91 P. 3d at 93
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). The concepts of “fair play and substantial justice” are satisfied if it would be reasonable to require the defendant to defend the suit in the particular forum. Kiassen, 91 P. 3d at 93 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Courts consider several factors in evaluating whether it would reasonable to require a defendant to defend a suite in a particular forum. For instance, the burden on the defendant ... the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, ... at least when
that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiffs power to choose the forum, .the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several State’s in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292. With respect to the “first step”, the following is true:

1. CFI is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of North Carolina. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 4.]

2. CFI has its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 5.]

3. CFI has never owned, operated or conducted any business in the State of Oklahoma, either directly or indirectly, including in connection with the transaction contemplated in the Petition that initiated this action. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 6.]

4. CFI is not registered or licensed to do business in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 7.]

5. Further, CFI has never owned, leased or controlled property or assets in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 8.]

6. CFI does not maintain employees, agents, or bank accounts in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 9.]

7. Neither does CFI recruit employees in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 10.1

8. CFI does not have shareholders or members who reside in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 11.]

9. CFI has never had any permanent or temporary office within the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 12.]

10. CFI has never maintained telephone or facsimile listings within the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 13.]

11. CFI has never advertised or solicited business in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 14.]

12. CFI does not generate any of its revenue from activities in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 15.]

13. CFI does not pay and has no obligation to pay taxes in the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 16.]

14. CFI has never employed any person that traveled to the State of Oklahoma on behalf of CFI for any purpose, including in connection with the transaction contemplated in the Petition that initiated this action. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit atJ 17.]

15. CFI maintains a passive informational website. The website is accessible to the general public and contains general information about CFI’s services. Prospective customers may use the information on the website to evaluate different products handled by CFI, to choose and compare products for installation at different areas of their home, and to schedule an “in-home appointment” with employees of CFI. None of the services referenced or scheduled through the website involve any sales or services within the State of Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 18.]

16. CFI was hired by Turner Construction to perform certain flooring work in connection with the Project. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 19.]

17. The carpet and associated material installed by Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. were purchased by CFI from the materials manufacturer located in Charlotte, North Carolina, and were furnished by CFI to the Project site in Cherokee, North Carolina for installation by Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. at the Project site. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 20.1

18. The work performed by Mastercraft Floor Covering, Inc. in connection with the Project was performed at the Project
site, located exclusively in Cherokee, North Carolina. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 21.1

19. No part of the “contract” referenced in the Petition was entered into in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Neither was any part of the “contract” performed in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. [Exhibit “B”, Swaney Affidavit at ¶ 22.]
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that CFI does not have sufficient contacts with the State of Oklahoma to permit this Court to properly exercise either specific or general jurisdiction over CFI in this action. As indicated above, specific jurisdiction is viable only if the activity giving rise to the lawsuit occurred within or had some connection to the forum state. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. The State of Oklahoma has no connection to the injury alleged by Plaintiff in the Petition. When the transaction giving rise to a lawsuit does not occur in the forum state and the defendant does not have any contacts in the forum state, neither specific nor general jurisdiction can be exercised. See Glidewell, 577 P.2d at 1291. Because there are insufficient contacts with the State of Oklahoma to permit this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over CFI in this action, there is no need to proceed to the second step in the process of assessing whether specific personal jurisdiction can be exercised by this Court. Even if such additional analysis necessary, there is no basis among the Worldwide Volkswagen criteria that would support this Court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over CFI in this matter. Accordingly, CFI respectfully requests that this court dismiss Plaintiffs Petition for lack of personal jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for all the foregoing reasons, Defendant Charlotte Flooring, Inc., respectfully prays for an order of this Court dismissing Plaintiffs Petition against it for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12, § 2012(B)(2).


Outcome: The Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff filed a Petition In Error

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