Date: 04-23-2012

Case Style: Cheri Greeson-Crawley v. Seth Jamison

Case Number: CJ-2010-5224

Judge: Roger Stuart

Court: District Court, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma

Plaintiff's Attorney:

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Defendant's Attorney: Thomas G. Ferguson for Seth Jamison

Michael H. Githens for GEICO

Description: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma personal injury lawyer represented Plaintiff, who sued Defendant on an auto negligence theory claiming to have suffered more than $10,000 in injuries and/or damages as a direct result of Defendants failure to exercise due care in the operation of an automobile.

Cheri Greeson-Crawley sued Seth Jamison on an auto negligence theory claiming to have been injured in a car wreck caused by Jamison.

Plaintiffs Statement of Facts: Plaintiff was traveling westbound on 15th Street in Edmond, OK. At the same time, Defendant Jamison was traveling South on Fretz Avenue when he failed to stop for a stop sign and collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle.


Defendant claimed:

COMES NOW the Defendant, Seth Jamison, and for Answer to the Petition of Plaintiff herein, denies each and every material allegation therein contained save and except those specifically admitted herein. For thither answer this Defendant states and alleges as follows:
1. It is admitted that an accident occurred on or about October 26, 2009 on 15th Street in Edmond, Oklahoma. The balance of the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Petition are denied.
2. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Plaintiffs Petition are denied.
3. This Defendant has no knowledge of the mailers alleged in Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Petition and therefore denies the same.
4. Upon information and belief the Plaintiff suffered from pre-existing conditions which was neither caused nor aggravated by the accident in question.
5. The accident in question was unavoidable.
6. The accident in question occurred as a result of the negligence of third persons over whom this Defendant could exercise no control.
7. Injuries complained of by the Plaintiff occurred as a result of medical situations which existed prior to or subsequent to the date of the accident and arc not related to the accident in question.
8. Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against this Defendant.
9. Discovery is only recently commenced and this Defendant reserves the right to assert such additional defenses and affirmative defenses as may become apparent.
WHEREFORE having filly answered, Defendant, Seth Jamison, prays judgment in his favor and for such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Defendant moved in limine:

COMES NOW the Defendant, Seth Jamison, by and through counsel and respectfully moves for the Court’s Order in Limine directing that the Plaintiff, his counsel, andlor the witnesses withhold any and all comments, references, testimony, exhibits, arguments, opinions, or any suggestion, directly or indirectly, with regard to any of the following items:
1. Any reference to the Defendant being protected by a policy of liability insurance.
2. Any reference to the opinion of the investigating officer as to fault in this accident.
3. Any reference or attempt to introduce the traffic accident report prepared by the investigating officer.
4. Any mention that Stephen B. Conner, M.D. has testified in the past for defense counsel or his firm.
5. Any mention that Stephen B. Conner, M.D. has been compensated by defense counsel for his time involved in testifying.
6. Any reference to this Motion having been presented to or ruled upon by the Court. In support of this Motion, Defendant offers the following arguments and authorities:

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. ANY REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT BEING PROTECTED BY A POLICY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
During the course of deposition, Plaintiff and counsel inquired concerning matters relating to liability insurance. In Oklahoma, liability insurance protection for motor vehicle operators is compelled as a matter of statute. However, evidence of such insurance is not admissible in civil cases as an effort to prove liability. IC. Penny Co. v. Barrientez, 411 P.2d 841, (Okia. 1965). Matchen v. McGahey, 455 P.2d 52 (Okia. 1969). Pratt v. Womack, 359 P.2d 223 (Okia. 1961)
2. ANY REFERENCE TO THE OPINION OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS TO FAULT IN THIS ACCIDENT
Defendant has listed as a possible witness the police officer who investigated this accident. The law is well settled that an investigating officer may not give his opinion as to the cause of an accident, but can only report facts which he identified during the course of his investigation. Gabus v. Harvey, 678 P.2d 253, (Okia. 1984).
3. ANY REFERENCE OR ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT PREPARED BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER
Oklahoma law is very clear that the accident report is not admissible under the Oklahoma Evidence Code. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2803.
4. ANY MENTION THAT STEPHEN B. CONNER, M.D. HAS OR MAY HAVE
CONDUCTED EXAMINATIONS AND/OR TESTIFIED IN THE PAST IN ANY
LITIGATION IN WHICH THE UNDERSIGNED DEFENSE COUNSEL OR HIS
FIRM WAS INVOLVED
The decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Jii v. Scott, 598 P.2d 279 (Okia. Ct. App. 1979), is instructive as to this issue. The holding, reasoning and logic of the Jii decision applies to the line of questioning it is anticipated Plaintiff’s counsel will pursue in his questioning of Dr. Conner.
In biiy defendant’s counsel cross-examined the plaintiff as to whether he had gone to see his lawyer before he ever went to a doctor. Such cross examination was conducted without objection. Subsequently plaintiff’s attorney appealed the jury verdict and argued that this line of questiohing was error. Defense counsel admitted that the purpose for this questioning was “to show that plaintiff’s medical problems were either manufactured or nurtured by his lawyer”. j4 at 283.
The Court of Appeals was distressed with this line of questioning. The Court pointed out that to imply that plaintiff was lying about his injuries was a permissible objective; however, to suggest that plaintiff was lying at the behest of his attorney was not permissible.
The appeals court stated:
To assault plaintiff’s credibility and to attempt to impeach his testimony regarding his injuries was appropriate. But to attack his lawyer and to him impute the serious crime of suborning perjury is to inject a collateral matter far more prejudicial than the mere matter of mentioning the sacrosanct word “insurance”. * * * And although it is common practice for plaintiff’s attorney to try and impugn the truthfulness of a defense physician’s testimony the act of imputing perjury of the witness to defense counsel during trial is neither customary nor one franchised by the courts.
For authority, the Court of Appeals noted that “improper questions having for their only purpose the casting of reflections upon the character of the witness is prejudicial conduct.” Id. at footnote 3, citing: Horany v. Paris, 369 P.2d 636 (Okia. 1962). The appellate court concluded that this rule should also protect lawyers - in this case Defendant’s counsel.
The essence of the issue presented by this Motion is quite simple: Why does Plaintiffs counsel need to point out that Dr. Conner has testified in cases involving this defense counsel or this
firm on past occasions? What possible relevance could this information have? The answer is simple. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks to imply that the relationship between Dr. Conner and counsel (or counsel’s firm) is such that a degreed, professional medical doctor would lie under oath. Moreover, this line of questioning seeks to imply that counsel and the doctor have entered into a conspiracy to misrepresent Plaintiff’s medical condition and to commit perjury. To quote the Court of Appeals decision in Ljjy: “But to attach his lawyer and to him impute the serious crime of suborning perjury is to inject a collateral matter far more prejudicial than the mere matter of mentioned in the sacrosanct word ‘insurance’“. Clearly Plaintiff, by this line of questioning, seeks to attack and discredit Dr. Conner and at the same time lead the jury to conclude that counsel has sought out and presented a witness who is not to be believed and presented him as a witness not only in this case but on other occasions.
5. ANY MENTION THAT STEPHEN B. CONNER, M.D. HAS BEEN COMPENSATED BY THIS DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR HIS TIME INVOLVED IN TESTIFYING
The reasoning of the above captioned argument also holds true as to the issue of compensating expert witnesses for their appearance in court. The law, in fact, requires paying expert witnesses for their time in testifying. 12 O.S. § 3226B.5.c.
The obvious argument is that payment to a witness demonstrates bias. It does not. It merely affords an expert payment for his time and effort in examining the Plaintiff and testifying as to his findings and rendering opinions concerning the Plaintiff’s physical condition as it relates to the accident in question.
Here it is anticipated that both Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s counsel will have paid health care experts for their professional time in testifying. Nothing sinister exists in compensating a medical professional for his or her time. Furthermore, any probative value the testimony has is far
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 12 O.S. § 2402. The only probative value in this testimony would be a rather lame attempt at showing bias. Still, the implication of the evidence would be to suggest that by compensating witnesses, both counsels have engaged in purchasing beneficial testimony. That simply is not true. The evidence of payment by either counsel in this regard should be excluded.
In further support of this Motion, defense counsel would respectfully point out that the logical conclusion of any bias argument would be in violation of RuLE 3.3: (3) “Candor toward the tribunal,” and RULE 3.4: (a) “Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel” and RuLE 8.3. 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 3A; et. seq. Both counsel know and realize that medical witnesses are not rendering favorable testimony for one side or the other merely because they are paid for their professional time. Any hint of bias suggested by the payment of such fees is not well grounded in fact or law and should be excluded.
6. ANY REFERENCE TO THIS MOTION HAVING BEEN PRESENTED TO OR RULED UPON BY THE COURT.
In this regard, Defendant moves that Plaintiffs counsel be instructed not to suggest to the jury by argument or otherwise that Defendant has sought to exclude from proof any matter bearing on the issues in this cause or the rights of the parties to this suit.
Motions in Limine, as with all objections to evidence, are questions of law for the Court. The Court has wide discretion under the auspices of 12 O.S. § 2403 to exclude relevant evidence that is unduly prejudicial. Defendant submits that mention of exclusion of evidence is wholly lacking in probative value and unduly prejudicial. In accordance with the dictates of 12 O.S. § 2403, Defendant asks the Court to exclude such mention of its prior rulings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Seth Jamison moves the Court for its Order granting Defendant’s Motions in Limine as set forth above.

Outcome: Settled and dismissed

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