Date: 11-30--0001

Case Style: State of Oklahoma v. Marco Darnell Ratliff a/k/a Burno and Samuel Fullbright a/k/a Sam Fullbright, a/k/a 54 Sam, a/k/a Big Sam

Case Number: CF-2013-6303

Judge: William Musseman

Court: District Court, Tulsa County, Oklahoma

Plaintiff's Attorney: Erik Grayless

Defendant's Attorney: Mark Cagle and Stephen Lee

Description: Tulsa County, OK - The State of Oklahoma Samuel Fullbright a/k/a Sam Fullbright, a/k/a 54 Sam, a/k/a Big Sam with first degree murder in violation of 701.7 and charged Marco Darnell Ratliff a/k/a Burno accessory after the fact in violation of 21 O.S. 173.

SAMIJEL FULLBRIGHT AND MARCO DARNELL RATLIFF, on or about 9/25/2009, in Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did commit the crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a Felony, by unlawfully, feloniously, and willfully while acting in concert each with the other, with malice aforethought, without authority of law, effect the death of Jacob Daniel Barnes by shooting him then and there and thereby inflicting certain mortal wounds in the body of said Jacob Daniel Barnes from which mortal wounds the same Jacob Daniel Barnes did languish and die on the 25th day of September, 2009.

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SPEEDY TRIAL AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

COMES NOW the Defendant,Marco Ratliff, by and through his attorney of record, Stephen Lee, and moves this Court to dismiss this case based on a denial of speedy trial. Defendant moves under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under Article II, § 6, 7 and 20, of the Oklahoma Constitution.

The United States and Oklahoma Constitutions guarantee an “accused” the right to a speedy trial, A person becomes “accused” either when charges are filed (whether by Information or Indictment) or when an arrest for the offense has occurred, whichever happens first. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463 (1971); State v. Powers, 952 P.2d 997, 999-1000 (Okl.Cr. 1997). As shown below, a period of four (4) years elapsed from the point when Mr.Ratliff became an “accused” by virtue of his arrest, until the State made any effort to actually prosecute Mr.Ratliff for this alleged offense.

The right to a speedy trial imposes on the prosecution the obligation to proceed with reasonable dispatch in order to avoid oppression and to prevent unnecessary delay in criminal prosecutions. Pickle v. Bliss, 418 P.2d 69 (Okl.Cr. 1966) (1 year delay between mistrial and retrial, where defendant free on bond but did nothing to contribute to delay, and where no good cause was shown for delay, violated right to speedy trial and compelled dismissal of murder charge). The State is responsible for undertaking reasonable efforts to secure the presence of a defendant for trial. The lack of diligence on the part of the State in failing to prosecute Mr. Ratliff for over four (4) years is a violation of his right to a speedy trial:

Dismissal is the only remedy when the right to a speedy trial is violated. “[Sluch severe remedies are not unique in the application of constitutional standards. In light of the policies which underlie the right to a speedy trial, dismissal must remain, as Barker noted, ‘the only possible remedy’. Ibid.” Stnmk v. United States 412 U.S. 434, 439-440, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 2263 (1973), invoking Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2181 (1972). Because the delay is so excessive in Mr. Ratliff’s case, and because the excessive delay had already occurred before he was brought before the Court, dismissal is the only remedy under Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (1992) and Strunk.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 25, 2009 Jacob Barnes was shot multiple times and ultimately succumbed to his injuries.

Police investigated, and arrested Marco Ratliff, but no charges were filed in this matter at the time of the incident. In December of 2011 a new witness came forward and provided information regarding Mr. Ratliff’s co-defendant in this case, Sammuel Fulibright, placing him as the shooter. The witness that came forward provided NO new evidence concerning Marco Ratliff. In December of 2013, 2 years after the “new” witness came forward, Marco Ratliff was charged with Murder 1 in Tulsa County case CF-13-6303. On August 14, 2014 the State amended Mr. Ratliff’s charge to Accessory After the Fact. In September of 2009 Marco Ratliff was sixteen (16) years old.

During these intervening four (4) years, Mr. Ratliff had the following involvement with the Tulsa County Criminal Justice system: Arrested in Tulsa Case CM-12-4906.

The State of Oklahoma failed to take even the most remedial measures in re-issuing and serving this warrant, and has only now, four (4) years later, chosen to re-file this warrant and to pursue the charges which were allegedly committed in
September of 2009 when Mr. Ratliff was sixteen (16) years old.

Mr.Ratliff only learned that this charge was active when he was arrested on the warrant. During the intervening years, Mr. Ratliff had at least one contact with the Tulsa County District Attorney’s office.

ARGUMENT

The State’s lack of diligence and good faith in pursuing the prosecution of Mr. Ratliff’s case for over four (4) years has violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial. In Wilson v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 471 P.2d 939, 942 (Okl.Cr. 1970), the Court of Criminal Appeals cited Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988 (1967) for the rule that the Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial.

Two years later, the four factors the Wilson Court found must be considered in a speedy trial analysis became the law of the land in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972). The four factors which must be considered are: 1) length of delay, 2) reason for delay, 3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and 4) prejudice to the defendant. Even at this time, both the Wilson and the Klopfer Courts noted the close relationship between factors #1 and #4; to wit: as the length of delay increases, so to does the presumption of prejudice to the defendant until at some point no showing of prejudice need be made.

In 1992, the Supreme Court settled the issue of the integral relationship between factors #1 and #4, holding that a 6 year delay attributable to the government’s sloth (characterized by the Court as “six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review”) constituted such an egregious length that the showing of prejudice was made entirely by the length of the delay itself. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. at 658.

Length of Delay

Doggett holds that the first Barker factor — length of delay — entails a double inquiry. First, “[s]imply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay...” I. at 65 1-652, 112 S.Ct. at 2690. The Doggett Court noted that post — accusation delay is generally found to be “presumptively prejudicial” at least as it approaches one year. I. at 652 fn. 1, 112 S.Ct. at 2691 fn. 1 (emphasis added). It also found the 6 year delay attributable to the government to be “six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review.” I. at 657-658, 112 S .Ct. at 2694. See also, United States v. Samson, 1993 WL 350182 (D. Guam
1993) (18 month delay “well exceed[edl” whatever period of delay is needed to trigger the speedy trial analysis under Barker); Barker v. WingQ, 407 U.S. 514, 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2193-2194 (5 year delay is “extraordinary”). Oklahoma codifies the 12 month benchmark in 22 O.S. 812.1.

The second part of this inquiry is “the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. at 2691. This part of the inquiry equates length of delay with prejudice to the defendant, because “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.” Id. The longer the delay beyond one year, the greater the presumption of prejudice to the defendant.

In the Doggett case, Mr. Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges in 1980 but left the United States before his arrest. The government found Doggett imprisoned in Panama, and requested the he be returned to the Untied States, but never followed up on this request. The government eventually gave up all effort to find him, and was unaware that he returned to the United States 2 years later in 1982. He lived openly under his true name. A credit check in 1988 revealed the warrant and he was arrested eight and one-half years after the indictment. Because he was out of the country for two years, the delay attributable to the government was only six years. 505 U.S. at 647, 657-658, 112 S.Ct. at 2688, 2694.

The Supreme Court found that the 81/2 year delay was uncommonly long, and that the government was more to blame in that it had numerous opportunities to fmd Doggett and to bring him to justice. The Court also found that Doggett did not assert his right to a speedy trial, as he was unaware that any charges had ever been filed against him, and the Court found, fmally, that Doggett had been prejudiced in that exculpatory evidence had been lost, and that memories had dimmed during the 81/2 year delay.

The delay in re-issuing the arrest warrant for Mr. Ratliff for over four (4) years is four times more than the delay which is presumptively prejudicial. The excessive length of delay also equates with a finding of prejudice to Mr.Ratliff.

Reason for Delay

In Doggett, the reason for the delay was found to be government negligence in not pursuing Doggett. 505 U.S. at 652-654, 112 S.Ct. at 2691. Although negligence is a more neutral reason for delay than deliberate bad faith, it is still required to be considered because “the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant”. Barkerv. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531,92 S.Ct. at 2192.
Doggett lived openly under his true name for over 6 of the 8 ‘/2 year delay between his charge and arrest. During this time, he was not incarcerated and made no demand for speedy trial because he had no idea that charges had been filed against him until he was arrested 8 ‘/2 years later. The only reason he was not prosecuted during this time is that the
prosecution simply made no effort to find him:

“For six years, the Government’s investigators made no serious effort to test their
progressively more questionable assumption that Doggett was living abroad, and, had they
done so, they could have found him within minutes. While the Government’s lethargy may have reflected no more than Doggett’s relative unimportance in the world of drug trafficking, it was still findable negligence, and the fmding stands.”

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. at 652-653, 112 S.Ct. at 2691.

The State of Oklahoma has detailed a Process for Review which is set out in Title 22 0.S. sec. 812.2. Title 22 O.S. sec. 8 12.2(B) states that:

If, after hearing all the evidence and the legal arguments properly submitted, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the state is not proceeding with due diligence, that none of the exceptions set out in paragraph 2 of subsection A of this section justify additional delay and the right of the accused to a speedy trial has been violated, the court shall dismiss the case.

Mr. Ratliff never attempted to hide from authorities. The State certainly knew where he was
during the past four years. Mr. Ratliff had 1 separate cases filed by the Tulsa County District Attorney’s office during that time. Mr. Ratliff appeared and answered to that case brought against him.
The reason for the delay in prosecuting this case is, at best, simple negligence on the part of the State. It is, at worst, utter disregard for due process of law and the liberty interests of citizens. The delay between being charged and being arrested is to be attributed solely to the State.

Defendant’s Assertion of His Rights

As to Mr. Ratliff’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the answer is again found in Doggett. In Doggett, there was no evidence indicating the defendant knew of his indictment until the moment of his arrest. Due to the ignorance of the indictment, Doggett was “not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest.” 504,U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. at 2691.

Mr. Ratliff also had no knowledge that this charge was still active, nor was he aware that the warrant was reissued in December of 2013. Mr. Ratliff could not be expected to assert a right which he did not know he had. Further, the excessive delay had occurred before the warrant was even reissued.

Prejudice to the Defendant

The Supreme Court in Doggett recognized that general delay which approaches one year is presumptively prejudicial. 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1,658. This was further recognized by the l0t Circuit in United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1521 (loth Cir. 1995) (Although they have not established a “bright line beyond which pretrial delay will trigger a Barker Analysis” they are cognizant of the one year “presumptively prejudicial” delay recognized in Dogett.) The United States Supreme Court in presuming that the prejudice at 1 year further presumes that the prejudice has intensified overtime. 505 U.S. at 652.

The primary point of contention in Doggett was the government’s claim that no speedy trial violation had occurred because Doggett had not shown “precisely how he was prejudiced by the delay between his indictment and trial.” 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. at 2692. The Doggett Court answered by holding that impairment of the accused’s ability to effectively defend is the “most serious” form of prejudice because it “skews the fairness of the entire system”. Ith
However, the Dogett Court also held that “specifically demonstrable [and] affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim” because “excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove, or, for that matter, identify.” 505 U.S. at 655, 112 S.Ct. at 2692-2693. Doggett clarifies Barker by explaining that “Barker explicitly recognized that impairment of one’s defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be shown.” j Thus is was that Doggett was entitled to the dismissal of charges because the delay in his case was so great, in and of itself, as to constitute unalterable prejudice — to him, to the government, and to the fundamental administration of justice.

Like the delay in Doggett, the length and reason for delay in Mr. Ratliff’s case has not only triggered the necessity of a speedy trial analysis, but additionally support a finding against the State on the prejudice factor. Under the law of the land as expressed clearly in Doggett, Mr. Ratliff shouldn’t be held to proving particularized prejudice because his actions in no way contributed to the 4 year plus delay between the filing of the charges and the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, not to mention the delay between the issuance of the warrant itself and his arrest.
Although Mr. Ratliff is not required to show actual prejudice under the above cited case law, in this case Mr. Ratliff can demonstrate an actual prejudice. In 2009, Mr. Ratliff was sixteen (16), the alleged offense was committed. If the state had timely filed charges in this matter Mr. Ratliff would have been entitled to, at minimum, a certification hearing in juvenile court. Due to the State’s actions in failing to prosecute this case in a timely manner Mr. Ratliff has lost the opportunity to be tried as a juvenile and is instead forced into adult court, over his objection, for a crime that was allegedly committed as ajuvenile.

CONCLUSION

The State of Oklahoma has denied Mr. Ratliff his right to a speedy trial. This is a
constitutional right, afforded to the accused by both the United States and Oklahoma
Constitutions. In this case, the State has neglected its duty to diligently prosecute Mr. Ratliff. The delay is roughly four times longer than that necessary to trigger a speedy trial claim. Mr. Ratliff has been prejudiced by this delay and the manner in which this delay came about. This constitutes a clear violation of Mr. Ratliff’s right to a speedy trial. As such, the proper remedy is the dismissal of charges under Barker v. Wingo, supra, under Strunk v. United States, supra, and under Doggett v. United States, supra.

WHEREFORE, this Defendant prays this Court sustain this motion and dismiss the case.

Outcome: Dismissed

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